



INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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The following article was contributed to *International Affairs* by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, whom we asked to comment on the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament and to spell out the position upheld by the USSR at it.

TOWARDS A SAFE WORLD

As I write this, preparations for the destruction of the first batch of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are drawing to a close at the Saryozek test site in Kazakhstan. The operation might take place even before these comments are published in which case readers will find nothing new in the report on the first-ever public elimination of a weapon.

The news is such, however, that its novelty will not soon wear off. The theory of information determines the extent of newness according to its impact on people's behaviour. What we have in this case is an event of such dimensions that it is bound to have the strongest impact on all humanity, on how it acts in the context of developing revolutionary concepts of the possibility of being without and outside arms.

I recall being struck by the heading of one of the numerous articles published in the wake of Mikhail Gorbachev's Statement of January 15, 1986. "A Farewell to Arms?" said the heading, the author having put a question mark after what is the title of the well-known novel.

"A Farewell to arms?" that journalist queried, commenting on the proposal of the CPSU CC General Secretary for the phased elimination of weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. His article, like numerous other publications on the same subject, offered no answer. But the question was answered less than 30 months later. Yes, farewell to nuclear arms. While they will remain a necessary attribute of the world setting for a long time to come and while Soviet and American intermediate- and shorter-range missiles make up a mere four per cent of the entire nuclear arsenal, the first agreement on their elimination implies an actual and not just a prospective step towards deliverance from the most devastating means of warfare.

It is only a beginning but a meaningful one, for by bearing out the logic of a centuries-long search for the road to a world without war and violence, it transfers the idea of disarmament from the realm of dreams to that of realities.

The chronology of nuclear disarmament that has begun, as Mikhail Gorbachev points out, calls for reflections on the rules of the new social intercourse that will sooner or later triumph on Earth. Thoughts about it are stimulated by events which coincide quite understandably with the beginning of a new, non-nuclear chronology.

One of these events was the Soviet-US summit in Moscow.

Then came the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament.

And there was the preparation of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

By bringing the problem into sharper focus, the logical link-up of these events showed the historical connection between the processes of renewal going on in our country and the present state of international affairs.

The mutual conditioning of these events, which fell on the spring and summer of 1988, is evident. We are in the presence of a law-governed trend and not a mere coincidence.

The Moscow summit formally put into effect the Soviet-US Treaty on the

Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and considerably advanced the drafting of important agreements on a whole set of disarmament problems in whose solution the world community has a vital stake.

It was not accidental, therefore, that its representatives at the Third Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, after speaking highly of the Moscow summit, concentrated on the new realities and disarmament tasks arising with the ratification of the INF Treaty.

In the same context the CPSU CC report presented by Mikhail Gorbachev to the 19th party conference confirmed the irreversibility of the **perestroika** process and contributed to the foreign policy strategy of the Soviet Union evolved by the 27th Party Congress.

To advance in this direction, the only one that is possible today, we need to know and take into account the motive forces of and the factors and prerequisites for progress as well as their sources.

NEW THINKING, PERESTROIKA AND THE WORLD

It is new political thinking that is paving the way for disarmament. The awakening of scientific thought to the discrepancy between traditional views and present-day realities led to a system of fundamental philosophical, moral and political principles as we embarked on our **perestroika**. It was **perestroika** that provided new political thinking with incentives and a proving ground and gave it ample access to the outside world. Born of the necessity for internal renewal, new thinking became a working instrument of **perestroika** in international affairs as well.

At present the coming of new thinking into its own in our foreign policy is an objective, law-governed process. It was long ago that an ancient wise-man, speaking of reason, said that "it is terrible unless it serves man". Yet not until the close of this century did a sound, worldwide organisation of social being, characterised by an absence of the congenital disease of self-destruction, come to be seen as an absolute necessity. Having looked at itself through the fence of nuclear missiles, humanity realised for the first time that, all distinctions notwithstanding, it is a single whole aspiring to preserve all its common and unifying elements. For the first time ever, a centuries-long trend—the operation of centrifugal forces leading to disunity—began to give way to a centripetal trend. This trend is still very far from prevailing in the life of humanity but it has already come out clearly enough.

This puts the new role of universal values, described by Mikhail Gorbachev as the centrepiece of new thinking, in a entirely different light.

"Their significance," Mikhail Gorbachev has said, "was pointed out by both Marx and Lenin. Nor were they merely general considerations derived from the humanist principle of their teachings. Stressing the importance of the internationalisation processes going on in the world, our great teachers revealed the objective basis of universal values, dialectically associating them with social class values. All this is now becoming a pivotal line of political practice. This demand on politics is due to both negative and positive developments of today: growing unprecedented dangers to the very existence of humankind and, on the other hand, the increasing role of the people and the general democratic factor in internal and world politics."

The above definition is a precise formula implying that by giving priority to universal values and subordinating social class guidelines to them, global internationalisation predetermines the main line of political practice.

It is by no means easy to accept this formula, to overcome the inertia of the old lingering in us. We are advancing to new thinking after our consciousness and our very souls have learnt the grim lessons of the past. We call our **perestroika** a revolutionary phenomenon, that is, one breaking with the old. In foreign policy, new thinking also involves renunciation of all that is obsolete

and a reappraisal of what was done for decades, which was considered right.

A further basic characteristic of new political thinking is courageous and straightforward self-criticism which relieves us of the deadening burden of outdated dogmas. This courage is not reckless, for we owe it primarily to the thought inspiring it. The most graphic example of this was furnished by Mikhail Gorbachev's report to the 19th party conference, by its foreign policy section, which points to the dogmatism and subjectivism that marked our foreign policy, to our lagging behind fundamental changes in the world, to the factors responsible for our involvement in the arms race. *

Naturally, this courage necessitates an adequate response wherever it is striving to vindicate a new view on the world.

New political thinking views humanity and the world as a multicoloured and multifaced yet single whole indivisible primarily as to security. And security itself has numerous facets: military, political, economic, humanitarian, cultural, ecological.

Any state which accepts the idea that the world is an integral whole will come to realise sooner or later that it cannot uphold and guarantee its interests outside the context of global, universal objectives.

For without attaining these objectives together with all other nations, no nation can safeguard its future against dangers threatening the whole world.

Indeed, a nation's security will be fictitious, whatever the level of armaments, as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Every state will be threatened with the degradation of its physical conditions until effective worldwide ecological cooperation is organised.

International security will be unstable and unreliable as long as countries are burdened with backbreaking debts undermining their economies and as long as there is no just economic order assuring every one of them a sufficiently high quality of life and an adequate level of prosperity corresponding to modern progress in science and technology.

Not one of the problems facing nations and the whole world community can be solved, which means that universal security cannot be dependably safeguarded, as long as nations reject common humanist values and common respect for human rights.

The logical connection between these links today is such that should one of them fall out, the whole chain could fall apart. This should be kept in mind at all times if age-long habits and traditions are not to result in a burden of narrowly conceived national interests dangerous to humanity.

The history of civilisation has nearly always been characterised by efforts to overcome fanaticism, intolerance and worship of one's own exclusiveness. There is no antagonism between the universal and the national, nor must there be any. As for unity of the world, it does not imply uniformity. The world can be durable only if every people and every country is recognised to be free to make its social and political choice.

New political thinking proves its worth in struggle against the old. Fundamentalism in today's world takes on many forms. Its most widespread form, which finds expression in quite a few attempts to impose one's own standards and concepts of organisation of national, political and social life on other countries, is probably especially dangerous.

This kind of fundamentalism is the chief opponent of new political thinking. Confrontation between them goes beyond national boundaries. And while inside the country concerned the dispute is settled by national means, elsewhere it is only international institutions that can settle it.

None but the international community can pass judgement on standards of international being. Any other approach results in sapping the pillars of social intercourse, generates arbitrary practices and tends to nullify human rights.

* The Soviet Foreign Ministry held a conference under the title "The 19th, All-Union Party Conference, Foreign Policy and Soviet Diplomacy".

Such is the starting point of our reflections on our country's place in the world today. Like any other country, ours would like to live in as favourable an international environment as possible. This certainly would be consonant with both our interests and everyone else's primarily the interests of our allies and friends, with whom we are bound by political, legal and moral obligations.

Our principal concern is to help safeguard peace, do away as far as possible with the risk of involvement in armed conflicts and keep our armed forces and military expenditures to an optimum low. No one should doubt that we will never forgo either our own security or that of our friends and allies.

Key in this respect is the problem of survival, which has been posed by nuclear arms and cannot be solved unless they are destroyed.

It is from the point of view of our national security that we cannot agree to the existence and preservation of weapons of total destruction, against which there is no defence.

In this case the coincidence of national and universal interests is particularly obvious. It is only together that every people and humanity as a whole can survive. Or they can perish together. This postulate is universal. No one in the nuclear world—neither the great powers nor countries lacking nuclear capability—has full or even limited guarantees of security.

We may presume with a fair degree of certainty that every sensible person on Earth is aware of the threat of death posed by nuclear weapons to humanity.

Inevitably, the question arises: Why is it that people whose high level of intelligence is beyond doubt have not yet come to the only reasonable decision leading to the elimination of this weapon of universal suicide?

The phenomenon has a record of its own. The nuclear weapon, which first appeared in only one country, supplied that country with the means to guarantee absolute security and enable it to win military superiority. And as this weapon could be used at the time, it was actually used against Japan.

We must be particularly precise on this point. That weapon was used both against Japan and against the Soviet Union, against ideas, trends and phenomena associated with it, against socialist countries generally. The explosion of the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an action in no way necessitated by the military strategic situation of the time, was a demonstration meant for us of US superiority in high military technology, an attempt to chart the postwar course of world development according to the concepts of the then US President and under his direction.

The demonstration almost succeeded but not quite. An act of atomic blackmail which sacrificed thousands of innocent lives to an utterly immoral idea, it had at least two global consequences that distorted the face and life of humanity for decades to come.

First, without either striking fear into our hearts or causing panic among us, it gave rise to an aspiration to create the means of atomic self-defence, an adequate nuclear arsenal. In other words, the first blasts of US atom bombs blew up strategic stability and gave the first impetus to the nuclear arms race.

Second, those blasts marked the beginning of the cold war and preceded the infamous Fulton speech.

The emergence of nuclear arms simulated a situation fit for any means of warfare. In 1945, the development of the atom bomb required the utmost concentration of scientific thought, the most advanced technology and immense material resources. At that time there was only one country that proved equal to coping with so formidable a project. However, it took only a few years for several countries to catch up with that nation. Not that other countries would have been unable to develop nuclear arsenals: they were simply wise enough to realise that nuclear weapons, if proliferated, would hasten the destruction of humanity.

The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere,

in Outer Space and Under Water and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expressed the collective recognition of the need to get rid of nuclear arms. Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty explicitly bound the signatories to work for that.

Nevertheless, two decades later the stockpile of these weapons has grown tenfold, with possibly more countries possessing them.

At the same time, however, there was a growing awareness of the unacceptability of nuclear weapons as an instrument of politics, let alone a means of warfare.

April 1985, which marked the emergence of *perestroika* predetermined the start of nuclear disarmament, the road to which had seemed to be hopelessly blocked, for a few months later the Soviet-US summit at Geneva recognised the impermissibility of nuclear war—a long-awaited move.

There followed Mikhail Gorbachev's Statement of January 15, 1986, which marked a new and clear-cut stage in the philosophical comprehension of the imperatives of the nuclear and space age and in efforts to bring about a transition to a nuclear-free world.

Reykjavik drew together philosophy and practice at an unexpectedly quick pace, and in Washington the two countries signed the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which came into force at the Moscow summit several months later.

Forty-odd years separate the first use of nuclear weapons and the first act of their physical elimination. Those years saw their stockpiling and sophistication as well as an accumulation and streamlining of ideas that have now taken shape as the doctrine of a nuclear-free and non-violent world. The doctrine is at work already, building stations, so to speak, on the road to nuclear disarmament.

Feasible is a still larger station on the road to a nuclear-free world. We may expect it to soon receive a trainload of half the strategic offensive weapons owned by the Soviet Union and United States and singled out for elimination.

Nevertheless, it would be premature to say that this process is durable, let alone irreversible. The doctrine of a nuclear-free world is regrettably still opposed by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which is at work for its part. In light of the treaty on the elimination of nuclear weapons now in force, there is something more than history to back the doctrine.

At present it is from the standpoint of current practice that we must answer the question why certain politicians regard a weapon undoubtedly suicidal for humanity as something sacred and hence inviolable.

THE DOCTRINE OF "NUCLEAR UNRESTRAINT"

All that the most vehement condemnation of nuclear weapons does is to surround them with an atmosphere of emotional tension. Yet emotions cannot end the existence of something for which there is a real need.

Nuclear weapons are neither a toy nor a hobby. Countries spend enormous sums to obtain them and preserve them, realising that these weapons also imperil their owners.

It follows that since nuclear weapons exist even though the absolute majority of people take a markedly negative view of them, they perform a necessary function or such a function is wrongly ascribed to them.

What can this function be?

Nobody has ever argued in earnest that nuclear weapons can be used for strictly defensive purposes. If an attacker knows that he is risking a nuclear retaliation and yet goes ahead, it must be because he is prepared to counter-strike. Consequently, the end result will be either the destruction of both or the surrender of the side which showed prudence.

What about war according to a "non-nuclear scenario"? Such a war is seen as not leading to mutual annihilation.

Could this be why nuclear weapons seem a deterrent?

Indeed, those who advocate the preservation of nuclear weapons claim that these have been instrumental in preventing a third world war for over forty years now.

We believe, however, that nuclear weapons served as a deterrent at one level only, by providing the nuclear powers with what Mikhail Gorbachev has called "safe-conduct" and allowing them to be unrestrained towards countries lacking such weapons. In other words, nuclear weapons objectively encourage the use of arbitrary and unlawful methods by members of the nuclear club, now as in the past. Thereby they encourage recourse to similar practices on the part of non-nuclear countries, which want to safeguard themselves against nuclear blackmail and are therefore set on securing nuclear arms.

Had nuclear weapons really been a deterrent they would logically have curbed the race in conventional armaments. Actually the reverse happened. Realising that nuclear war is out of the question, for it cannot be won, countries built up their conventional armed forces because they regarded "conventional war" as permissible even in the presence of the nuclear deterrent.

The arms race which has been going on throughout the past forty-odd years is material and not merely theoretical evidence that nuclear weapons have never performed a deterring function. Incidentally, "deterrence" itself has been built up without restraint and has already assumed such monstrous proportions that there is a nuclear weapon for nearly every modern tank or infantry platoon.

Truly, something must be wrong with this kind of deterrence.

There is not a single Soviet-US treaty or agreement reducing the danger of a war using conventional arms. Nor is there any agreement on limiting or reducing conventional armaments. But we have signed over a score of treaties, agreements and protocols safeguarding us in one way or another against the outbreak of a nuclear war. We have even opened centres for a reduction of the nuclear danger.

Moscow and Washington are plainly far from imagining that the two countries could suddenly start an exchange of tommygun fire. Yet they consider a nuclear strike perfectly possible.

So where does the danger lie? And what must deterrence be used against?

It is time to revise concepts born of the cold war years' atmosphere of fear, distrust and hostility.

Nuclear deterrence is a frozen legacy of that political "Ice Age".

The time has come to admit the only real function of nuclear weapons is to endanger the survival of humanity.

UN: URBI ET ORBI

Some countries look on nuclear weapons as the equivalent and a symbol of greatness. These weapons turn the heads of even sober-minded politicians. The result is an addiction to owning and keeping nuclear weapons that is anything but easy to overcome.

This is particularly difficult in the sphere of national security, which always leaves room for chauvinists and where common sense is under suspicion. Too many people yield to the temptation of reaping applause and making political capital by extolling strength. Too many go by the principle that might is right. Yet the nuclear and space age has made the need for responsible thinking greater than ever. Such thinking is necessary not only for the proper handling of computerised weapons but for managing with minimum quantities of arms and for realising the limitations of military strength and the effects of its use.

A mutually acceptable solution can be found provided the security of a country is never placed above that of other countries and negotiations are conducted with a view to seeking and establishing a balance of interests.

The integrity of the world connotes integrity of its security. This position is at the root of the idea of setting up a comprehensive system of international peace and security relying on the UN and respecting every provision of the UN Charter.

The Soviet leadership's concepts of how the system could function are set out in Mikhail Gorbachev's article "Reality and Guarantees of a Safe World".

I wish to stress that we are not formulating a rigid framework but merely stating our views on possible forms of organising international relations and on ways and means of safeguarding the security of nations in the context of disarmament and the transition to a nuclear-free world.

There is no need to invent any code of international conduct, for it exists already. It is the UN Charter.

There also exist basic institutions and mechanisms established in conformity with the Charter to maintain peace and international security.

The balance of fear brought about thanks to nuclear arms—or so we are told—must give way to a balance of confidence. More than four decades on, the following passage from the UN Charter, which says nations can "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours" and unite their strength "to maintain international peace and security", has not lost but gained in creative force; it has become classical.

Today's world is more and more like a gigantic megalopolis. It is increasingly difficult to run its economy, make the everyday life of its population easier and harmonise the interests of its diverse sections. However, we know by experience that even the biggest cities can cope with their problems.

Analogies are fraught with distortion but in this case comparison may not be out of place. Yes, every big city has to wrestle with crime and sharp contradictions but then nobody tries to solve the problem of personal security by turning his home into a fortress or his car into a tank.

Townsppeople rely on the municipal authorities in charge of law and order.

It is with good reason that the UN Charter expects nations to build their collective life on wise principles and to respect the rules and standards of social intercourse worked out in common and acceptable to all.

We must remember that numerous things in today's world are regulated at the international level. Take traffic, for instance. It may be right-side or left-side but the rules and signs ensuring safety are common and universal as far as the main points are concerned.

By the same token, progress towards a safe world can and must follow common international rules. We have a code of such rules, the UN Charter, as

have noted. The process of real disarmament which has begun provides real prerequisites for the statutory principles of peace and security to be respected by all and everywhere, especially since state-to-state activity tends more and more to be regulated according to international law.

We often fail to realise how very strong this trend is. A multitude of conventions, pacts, agreements, international standards channel a multitude of wills in a common direction.

In the case of the participating states of the European process, for instance, there already exist serious restrictions on military activity. The scale and frequency of troop exercises and manoeuvres are regulated, troop movements are effected according to definite rules, an increasing number of military facilities are put under control and inspected.

The Soviet Union and United States cannot, say, launch a ballistic missile for practice within their national territory any longer without notifying the other side beforehand.

Shaping up in point of fact is a system of international legal "deterrence" with regard to the military activity of countries, and a set of confidence-building measures covering both geographical areas and individual military activities is taking root and growing in scope.

Never before has there been anything like the present system of "fire prevention" in the sphere of security. It is no longer a political declaration but a new physical reality. The level attained by technology makes it possible to gain a sufficiently accurate and clear idea of the material means of war preparations and warfare. The composition of the armed forces of nations, the size of their arsenals and their fighting capacity are known in detail.

These data can be collected by using national means. True, not all countries command such means as yet. Nothing stands, however, in the way of establishing within the UN or under its aegis an international observation and control agency that could supply every government with the information it needed, doing so on a regular basis or upon request.

The concept of such an agency does not limit its function to supervising compliance with disarmament agreements. The agency would also concern itself with regional conflicts, watch developments in various regions and sound the alarm where the situation deteriorated and tension mounted.

The Soviet Union submitted the idea of such an agency to the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament and considered that by establishing the agency we could simplify control and make it more effective while at the same time reducing costs. As for the agency's mandate, it would reflect the world community's consensus on the objects, scale and depth of control.

We feel that the revolutionary changes coming about in our notions of openness in the military field still surpass our ability to fully appreciate them. It would have been hard to imagine such a thing even, say, five years ago; indeed, nowadays states exchange information on their armed forces, and the information is subject to verification. On-site inspection covers the most sensitive facilities; a new category being introduced is inspection on suspicion at short notice and without the right to refuse such inspection; permanent observation and control posts are being set up at arms production facilities. Control and verification measures under the INF Treaty, for one, will involve 1,200 people, and 400 mutual inspections are to be conducted. Throughout these thirteen years inspectors' teams will stay at Soviet and American missile plants.

The word "incredible" dies on one's lips at the sight of Soviet and American inspectors' teams arriving at facilities marked for inspection. The current process of taking "nuclear kitchens" off the security list might well be given the same title as the popular Soviet TV programme "Obvious If Incredible", except that it is soon to become an everyday occurrence and a largely routine matter.

New rules and standards are being introduced into humanity's work schedule. We must memorise and get used to them.

What is needed primarily is to revise in common military doctrines and strategies of nations.

We propose starting what may be called discussions on fundamental philosophical problems of security which should lead both to a better understanding of one another's intentions and to actual changes in the structures and distribution of armed forces.

We also propose putting at the centre of the discussions the new military strategic categories of sufficiency and non-offensive defence.

Entirely new realities have emerged behind the confrontational façade of East-West relations that came into being in the 1950s. We have come a long way by setting up a network of stabilisers that greatly reduce the likelihood of unexpected upheavals.

The Soviet-US Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is not merely a commitment to destroy a definite number of missiles. It is a new type of institution unprecedented in international relations. It establishes for thirteen years, or up to the end of this millennium, a definite regime in Soviet-US relations, thereby transforming their quality.

Our next goals are an agreement on a 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons, accords on nuclear weapons testing, beginning of the talks on reducing conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe, a convention on banning chemical weapons.

It is the afore-mentioned and not nuclear arms that we see as a real means of containment, a real guarantee of our own and universal security, a real barrier to war.

And this is what led the CPSU CC to draw the conclusion and tell the Soviet people that the threat of a war involving major powers has diminished, the world situation has gained in stability and the prospect of curbing the arms race is more real than before.

I can now answer the question of how security is to be safeguarded in a nuclear-free world. It will be safeguarded by agreements on arms cuts, by bringing the pattern and distribution of armed forces into line with the requirements of a defensive doctrine and a non-offensive doctrine and a non-offensive strategy, by strict and permanent control over compliance with obligations, by extending the range of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, by openness in military activity, by UN institutions and mechanisms.

IT IS NECESSARY AND, ABOVE ALL, POSSIBLE

The Soviet Union submitted to the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament a number of ideas supplementing the components of the new foreign policy concept which our country has evolved and is putting into practice. They are as follows:

- the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000;
- a comprehensive security system;
- a common European and universal home;
- defensive sufficiency and non-offensive strategy;
- national reconciliation and regional security;
- discontinuance on a reciprocal basis of the presence of foreign troops and bases on the territories of other countries.

The proposals submitted to the disarmament forum could, in our opinion, become the components of a new disarmament platform for the years after the beginning of the physical elimination of nuclear weapons.

This platform is being designed and built by the efforts of many countries. It was by no means as a tribute to rhetoric or a gesture intended to impress the audience that the UN Secretary General and representatives of a number of countries were invited to attend one of the early procedures of physical elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. We see this as, among other things, recognition by the world community of the need to end the nuclear arms race and as its collective contribution to this truly great achievement of political wisdom.

In setting out to implement Lenin's formula "disarmament is an ideal of socialism", the Soviet Union associates it with what it regards as universal values of overriding significance to it.

This is why we consider it so relevant to perfect the concept of disarmament so as to make it as integral and as common for all as the interdependent and interconnected world in the making.

Within the bounds of this global problem we will have to accomplish together and simultaneously two interconnected strategic tasks:

One, promoting the disarmament process in breadth and depth without slowing down the pace achieved.

Two, building security at a new qualitative level, making our own security and that of others, individual and universal security, without dividing it into mutually exclusive kinds: security for ourselves and security for all other countries.

This is necessary. Moreover, it is now possible. The Soviet leadership is firmly convinced of the possibility of safeguarding security by non-nuclear means.

This can be done on the principle of sufficiency.

The idea was conceived some time ago but only now can it be considered in practical terms, for world developments have already brought about a frame of mind and a psychological and political mood for steadily reducing arsenals, which should be sufficient for defence but not for attack.

What was unthinkable in the cold war climate is feasible in this period of global "thaw"—the result of a rise in temperature in the main, decisive layers of the international atmosphere.

Practically all speakers at the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly welcomed this long-awaited development even though they warned that the disarmament process is accompanied by an escalating arms race and a trend towards proliferation of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union shares this anxiety of its partners and is willing to cooperate with them in devising restrictive mechanisms. However, the very fact that the processes of disarmament and armament are following a parallel course is evidence of a turning point in an age-long trend, for never before was there any question of a competition between the two principles; countries simply armed themselves, leaving it to philosophers to reflect on disarmament.

However, philosophers were not so very far from the truth when they called for disarmament. What was far from it was psychological and political readiness for it. Now that it is emerging at long last, we cannot help being amazed at the prophetic power of many ideas about disarmament, in particular the one expressed by Immanuel Kant in his treatise **Towards Everlasting Peace** as an imperative of destiny imposing concord among people through discord, even against their will.

The INF Treaty is an instance of such concord.

Further expressions of it are numerous other accords that we feel certain will be signed before long.

These security bricks in the edifice of a nuclear-free world are no longer a figment of the imagination or wishful thinking. They exist, and many of them have already been laid at the foundation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The task is, as I have said, not only to eliminate nuclear weapons but parallel with it to build this new edifice for the future world and preferably even faster.

It is particularly important to open at long last talks on conventional armaments in Europe, for the disarmament chain stops short of them at the moment. Yet the chain must be unbroken, must lead us farther, to talks on limiting and reducing naval armaments.

A fundamental formula for the mandate of European talks covering the area between the Atlantic and the Urals has practically been found, and the remaining details could be settled before very long. However, it is also necessary to come to terms on the whole package of problems under discussion at the European conference in Vienna, where everything hinges on whether the participating states can bring themselves to show realism and lay down what can now be acceptable to all countries without exception. On the issue of mandate, the Soviet Union has shown readiness to cooperate and is entitled to expect other countries as well to proceed in the interest of promoting the European process.

Specifically, we propose beginning a reduction of conventional armaments by removing present imbalances and asymmetries on the basis of reciprocal exchange of data. One would think that there is a lot of such data going the round of the world. But it does not come from governments, and this robs

it of the necessary legal force and of validity as proof. We insist therefore on exchanging official data through official channels.

This could be done even before talks got off to a start, as Mikhail Gorbachev proposed at the Moscow summit. It is proposed that as soon as talks begin, on-site inspections be conducted to verify initial data so as to eliminate differences in assessment. At this stage we could decide on ways of ending imbalances and asymmetries by setting out to do this, and on the ways of reducing armed forces and armaments under the most rigorous control.

The second stage of the talks would be concerned with a reduction in armed forces by roughly 500,000 men on either side.

The third stage would see further cuts in armed forces and armaments: the armed forces of both sides would be lent a defensive character and their offensive core would be dismantled.

We would be agreeable at every stage of the talks to a reciprocal reduction in all offensive weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, strike aircraft and tanks.

Simultaneously the two sides could discuss steps to disengage the WTO and NATO armed forces and create corridors and zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons. Socialist countries have advanced most interesting ideas to this end, such as the proposals of the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, the Jaruzelski Plan or the Jakeš Plan.

Until recently traditional disarmament thinking was confined within the geographical boundaries of Europe, as if Europe had been the only area of deployment of nuclear missiles and conventional forces and the only address of international security.

Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking in Vladivostok in July 1986, pointed to a wider area of security interests—Asia and the Pacific—and put forward concrete ideas aimed at achieving greater stability in that vast region.

Our interest in what goes on in the region is not abstract. A sizable part of it belongs to the Soviet Union. We welcome the dynamic progress made by many Asian countries and their increasing role in the world but we are concerned about the rapid growth of military activity in the region. There is a danger now of a drastic escalation of the arms race due to the regional one. This is all the more dangerous because there are many trouble spots of local origin in the region, with its complicated and hence explosive heritage.

Three trends are coming to the fore from the point of view of regional and global security. Mikhail Gorbachev stressed them in his programme speeches in Vladivostok, Murmansk and Belgrade.

One, an increasing foreign naval presence in the coastal waters of Asian, North European and Mediterranean countries.

Two, the involvement of a wide spectrum of non-nuclear countries in nuclear strategy through the use of and visits to their ports by foreign warships carrying nuclear weapons.

Three, foreign military presence in general—whatever the form—and the existence of foreign military bases in particular.

As matters stand, many countries do not even know that there are nuclear weapons deployed on their soil, especially when ships of nuclear powers call at their ports on their way elsewhere so to speak or are anchored there.

There is a lot of discussion at diverse disarmament forums on openness in military affairs, on the need to know exactly where, say, a motorised infantry or airborne battalion is stationed or where it is being transferred to. Inspectors seem to be ready even to look into army kitchens to make sure they are cooking the right kind of food. But what kind of "food" is likely to be dished up to a country which considers itself non-nuclear yet is made to admit a ship carrying dozens of nuclear warheads?

The people of a non-nuclear country have a right to know that from such-and-such a day on they will for such-and-such a period of time be a potential target for a retaliatory nuclear strike.

The proposal for the nuclear powers to declare that their ships visiting foreign ports are carrying nuclear weapons—a proposal submitted by the Soviet Union to the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly—is not merely a call for openness and flexibility but a component of the control and verification system, of measures ensuring confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear countries.

It is from this angle that we are also advocating measures for confidence in the naval sphere and for safety on sea routes as well as the formation of a UN naval force.

In analysing world development trends and pointing out the substantial progress made in international relations and the appearance of encouraging prospects, we cannot but worry about a certain circumstance.

All that has been done to date to strengthen world peace and security could be nullified should plans for space weapons development be realised. The testing of the first space gun would push the world back to where it found itself following the Hiroshima blast. A new and completely uncontrollable arms race would start, and no one would be able this time to guarantee that the world would once again have forty years to realise the dangerous futility of that race.

Destiny has been kind to people for four decades but it may turn its back on them if they go on trying its patience.

This is something to be considered by all who see in Star Wars a rational instrument of politics or pin selfish hopes upon them.

We are very close now to the threshold of a safe world and are possibly crossing it already, and it would be tragic for us to have to turn back instead of pushing on.

What makes us confident that we are at the threshold of major changes for the better and that a nuclear-free, non-violent world is within reach?

A layer of fertile soil has formed on our war-ravaged planet. It is still thin and erodible. But those whose hearts were seared by the war have recovered and those who were blinded by it have regained their eyesight and can see the beauty of life and the fruitlessness of war.

"There can be no doubt," Russian poet Alexander Pushkin wrote, "that in time people will awaken to the ridiculous brutality of war..." What a man of genius foresaw in the past is now clear to millions.

The world community is growing; it is transforming its views, habits and concepts and becoming wiser, more tolerant and more merciful.

It is all like what happens to individuals.

Humanity has outgrown its complicated adolescence, its period of pugnacity, recklessness, instability and the complexes typical of the transitional age, and is aware now of the effects of its actions, aware of its great responsibility for the preservation of life on Earth.

Not all people attain maturity at one and the same time. This also holds true of new thinking. It will take time for it to prevail everywhere. But we have no doubt that it will prevail no matter what.

The road to a new humanism taken by mankind leads to a nuclear-free, non-violent world, a world of cooperation and concord.

REFLECTIONS AFTER THE 19TH ALL-UNION PARTY CONFERENCE

Alexander BESSMERTNYKH

History has witnessed many events whose importance and consequences were cognised only much later, while contemporaries remained oblivious to the fact that something was taking place during their lifetimes which would cause their descendants to rejoice or their hearts to shudder.

Convened on the mounting wave of sweeping changes in the country, the 19th All-Union Party Conference belongs not to the spontaneous results of unexpected combinations of political and social forces, but to phenomena of another order—purposeful actions with a programmed task to ensure the revolutionary development of the state, the party and society. The boldness of the task was palpable at the conference itself. The only thought that evoked concern was whether the high expectations of the people would be lived up to. The hope is that what is being wished for will come true, and fear is that it may not. Fear and hope coexist in the Cartesian idea. The chance of either one taking the upper hand is determined by the actual course of events. At the conference there was hope, but there were apprehensions as well, especially at the beginning.

And, of course, the addresses by Mikhail Gorbachev and the delegates evoked not only commentary—in the stalls and the balconies, where many regional delegations, including ours, from Tula, were seated—but also thoughts or reflections.

The four days of the conference did not shake the world, but they did shake up decades-old, obsolete concepts and views on how to live and how to run the country, and brought new ideas and solutions to light. But for starters, a few general impressions of the party conference itself.

The nature of the debates, the wave-like reaction of the audience, which reacted sensitively to the slightest manifestations of mendacity, formalism and clichés—all this conveyed a sense of the thirst for newness and innovation that had accumulated in the country. It was obvious that the party itself, which had longed for change—in strategy, tactics, solutions, people—was trying to mobilise itself, to take a leap forward.

Having tasted the freshness of the unfolding democracy and openness, the delegates shed, almost demonstratively, with perhaps exaggerated self-criticism and intellectual uninhibitedness, the wearisome vestiges of the double standard, when one thing was said in public and another in private. What was here was the whole truth, whose blinding nakedness made people, unaccustomed to it, numb. The style which just recently held complete sway in the political, economic and cultural spheres of Soviet society is called “administrative-command”. Rejection

Alexander Bessmertnykh—Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, a delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

if it implies repudiation of the product which it turned out—a grey, inert, stagnant regime which hampered the socialist ideal, the ideal for which the October Revolution was carried out.

I can recall in this connection the remarks of the director of one of the state farms on the Taman Peninsula, which I visited past February together with the secretary of the local district: "If our economy were given real freedom to develop, we would build the socialism Lenin was thinking of within five to seven years". He was talking about freedom from bureaucracy—the thick wall between the ruling elite and the producing lower strata, from financial and economic ignorance, from senseless wastefulness, from the fawning officials sitting pretty in party and economic bodies. Such is reality. Pythagoras said that real life is like spectacles—the bad people take the best seats.

The most interesting speeches at the party conference were delivered by workers and farmers. They thought in broad terms, with the interests of the state in mind, and they spoke lucidly, almost aphoristically. How right Lenin was when he underscored the necessity to break once and for all with the prejudice that state affairs and the management of banks and plants were beyond the capacities of workers!

The composition of the delegates at the Palace of Congresses evidently reflected objectively the range of the moods of party members and of the public at large. This was obvious not only from the speeches but also from such a minor detail as the applause. For example, it was astonishing that directly opposite views won equally vociferous applause. Evidently both stands had their supporters. What was striking was that on the issue of *glasnost*, especially on such an aspect of it as the critical work of the press, views differed greatly. The readiness of the press to criticise "anyone at all" was clearly not to the liking of the party leadership of a number of republics and regions. But in human terms this reaction to the new openness is understandable, as people had lived differently for a long time.

There was heated debate at the conference. There was no boring, drab monotony in views, no submissive silence, no readiness to rubber-stamp any viewpoint especially if it was expressed from the presidium. The wise men of the past used to say that if one does not have an opportunity to hear opposite views, how can the better one be chosen? This true thought was reaffirmed both throughout frank and sincere debate and by the content of the final resolutions of the conference.

There are three main impressions: that the party associates itself fully—from top to bottom—with the changes in the country and intends to ensure them in actions; that democratisation and openness are still not watchwords, but they are the foremost instruments for attaining these changes; that pluralism of views and multifacetedness of approaches united by a common aspiration to renewal of socialist society will evidently be the main accelerators of the sweeping reforms taking place in the Soviet Union.

Now a few words about the two or three reflections that arose at the conference; they might not have directly to do with the diplomatic art, but they were natural for a delegate of the conference at which the burning problems of our life were discussed.

First, it is a known fact that one of the causes of mistakes is ignorance of the best variant of actions. This applies to the development of the Soviet economy and to the elaboration of the most reliable conception of its guaranteed and stable growth. For decades we lived with a bureaucratised economy which was adapted—and which proved itself—to the extreme conditions of the post-revolutionary dislocation, restoration after the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, and preparations in case of imperialist aggression during the cold war. Everything engen-

dered by special circumstances had turned into a "normal state of affairs". The command method of management spawned passiveness on the part of executors and inertness with regard to innovations and scientific and technological progress. Stagnation ensued. In this way or approximately in this way we explain now the unparalleled paradox of an economy that ground to a halt by itself.

This is a large part of the truth, but only a part. The roots of the problem lie deeper.

Neither Marx nor Lenin ever stated that pure, admixture-free socioeconomic formations were possible. There was no pure slave-owning, feudal or capitalist systems. Each of them developed, suppressing in the struggle the bastions of the resistance of the past and simultaneously resisting the emergence of elements of the future system. In other words, all formations are multistructural. Herein lies the essence of the dialectical principle, the catalyst and constant mainspring of progress and social development. Isn't the main mistake of socialist economic development the fact that by destroying all the structures except the main one—socialised state property—we have doomed it to atrophy? Having no rivals, this one and only structure became complacent, developed into a bureaucracy, lost its vigilance and became dormant. Having violated the main law of the dialectics—the struggle between opposites—we stopped our movement without wanting to. Production relations mortified. In the 1970s the gap between the USSR and the leading capitalist countries in the major indices of social production ceased decreasing, and in the 1980s we began lagging farther and farther behind.

The restricting influence of obsolescent production relations notwithstanding, productive forces continued to develop, and the Soviet state has, by and large, a mighty economy. A rather high technological level has been reached.

The question as to what is to be done arises, and it was of primary importance during the party conference. How to ensure a powerful leap forward of the economy, to keep the country from turning into a third-class economic power? *We have developed a strategy of perestroika, but there is still no complete conceptual system for effecting maximum scientific and technological progress in the national economy, i. e., a level that will ensure the free development of socialism.*

The great dialectician Georg Hegel wrote: "Each person has fingers and can obtain a brush and paints, but this does not make him a painter. The same is true of thinking.... The only correct thinking is knowledge and cognition of a subject, and our cognition must therefore be scientific". Here is the key to the search for a genuinely correct formula which defines priorities and qualitative structural shifts of our economic development. Scientific cognition is imperative. However, at the party conference it was representatives of the scientific community, with perhaps the exception of Academician Abalkin, who did not conduct such a search, confining themselves to talk about organisational plans in the USSR Academy of Sciences or about things relatively far removed from the scientific sphere.

Evidently the problem is that scholars who came into their own during the period of stagnation and who spent their best creative years explaining and justifying "developed socialism" and the "building of the material and technical base of communism" and failed to address themselves to a normally functioning economic model are capable solely of selecting arguments for criticising the "damned past". But are they able to propose a constructive programme?

Hence the first idea that arose at the party conference was that it is imperative to involve in the elaboration of a model of developing

socialist society—with the aid of computers and the latest conclusions of modern science—young, bold scholars working in such fields as information science, political economy, philosophy, mathematics and history. Such scholars do exist, and they are working hard in laboratories on cardinal topics. They have to be assigned a clear-cut task and furnished assistance. Of course, “old” scholars should be involved in this work, as least as a point of reference.

Meanwhile, sweeping changes are apace almost unnoticeably in the capitalist socio-economic system. Imperceptible processes are taking place in the ruling elite of the USA, where a new oligarchy is laying its hands on the levers of government and where strange things are happening with forms of private property. Meanwhile, Soviet science continues in its study of the imperialist economy to inject fresh statistics chiefly into immobile formulas and pass this off as “scientific quest”. There is one task today—not to encounter the surprise of ignorance about the nature of what is going on “on the other side”, as we have to coexist and compete with it.

Second, some may ask why foreign policy did not figure prominently at the 19th party conference. Indeed, this topic was not developed, with the exception of a brief but clear-cut section in the report of Mikhail Gorbachev, the address of the Soviet Ambassador to the FRG and several passing remarks in one or two other speeches. Nevertheless, one cannot agree with the content of the question itself, as foreign policy and diplomacy were present at the conference, albeit invisibly.

This invisibility is a positive feature of it. A major achievement of foreign-policy activity is the fact that it is ceasing to be a subject of concern. Therefore, it has done its job, at least at the present stage, by ensuring a situation where *perestroika* in the economy, political structure and party is taking place peacefully. Had it not been for this, the tone at the conference would have been different. External tension and an impending threat of a conflict would have required a different approach to matters and priorities and also a different mode of discussion at the high party level in Moscow.

“In answer to the question which is uppermost in the minds of Soviet men and women and on which they want to hear an assessment of the work accomplished in three years—whether the war danger has been staved off—we can say yes, definitely.” Thus did Mikhail Gorbachev laconically, and specifically defined in his report the principled success scored by Soviet foreign policy.

It would be self-delusion, however, to view this assessment as a go-ahead to rest on our laurels. It is the high demand of the times to persistently continue to work for a secure peace in which the positive processes that have been initiated would become irreversible. Imperialistic militarism is firmly entrenched in the USA and other NATO countries. It has yet to repudiate power politics and, mindless of the imperatives of the age, entertains hopes of bringing back the cold war and severe confrontation between East and West. For this reason a great deal of work has to be done, and its main thrust is to continue exploring fresh possibilities for countering power politics on a broader political basis.

We believe that the most topical of all the many problems is the one regarding ways to scale down and halt the arms race. How can this be attained? How can further involvement in the arms race, which is senseless in terms of security and burdensome financially, be avoided? The first concrete steps in this direction have been taken—a treaty eliminating medium- and shorter-range missiles has been signed and is now beginning to be implemented. There is constant progress towards conventional arms reductions in Europe. The outlines of a Soviet-American

treaty on a 50-per cent reduction in strategic offensive weapons in the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty have come into focus.

However, continued progress will hinge largely on the West's readiness to initiate a realistic reassessment of its security strategy, the foundations of which were laid in the troubled years of the cold war. But is the current Western leadership capable of espousing the new thinking in these key areas and repudiating the stereotypes of the past and the canonical mode of thinking that were shaped under the long-standing impact of the advocates of power politics in dealing with the Soviet Union?

The course of political thought in the USA and a number of West European countries has shown that against the background of rather broad-based public support for renewal of military-strategic and foreign-policy orientations, policymakers continue to temporise and be cautious in the fear that "things might go awry". Appeals are appearing to test the "Gorbachev new thinking doctrine". With their thrust for doctrinairism (American foreign-policy philosophy has been dotted with the Truman, Nixon, Kissinger, Carter and Reagan "doctrines") it has yet to occur to the Americans that new thinking is not a doctrine or a finalised edifice but a dialectical method with whose aid we can and need to perfect and develop policies in accordance with the changeable course of world affairs. As Marx put it, "we do not confront the world in a doctrinaire way with a new principle: Here is the truth, kneel down before it!"

The underlying principle governing the method being proposed is to act in all situations above all from the standpoint of realism, of well-considered and sober consideration of one's own interests and those of others. In the nuclear age universal values have taken priority over class and national interests. This dialectical method is scientific and all-purpose in essence. Acting from the standpoint of the new thinking hardly means becoming a Marxist. Marxist thought was able to discover and formulate this method and generously share it with the rest of the world. There is more to it than whether the other side is capable of mastering it. What is important here is not formal recognition of new thinking. No one will take offence if the term itself is not used in the foreign-policy documents of official Washington, London or Paris. The main thing is that policies be based on fresh, original thinking, thinking born exclusively of the specifics of the late 20th century.

Being revamped on the underpinnings of new thinking and seeing positive shifts in the international situation, Soviet foreign policy is becoming an integral part of *perestroika* of Soviet society. There is a logical interconnection and interdependence here. The deeper the revolutionary transformation of the economic and political structure of socialism towards greater democracy and morality, the more effective diplomacy will be. The converse is true as well. Soviet foreign policy stands to derive direct gains—first, in success at talks on reducing and limiting weapons that are a drain on the economy, and second, in ensuring a peaceful atmosphere for carrying through *perestroika* in the country.

Third, having made a critical assessment of the 40-year history of our own involvement in the arms race, we have arrived at the conclusion that we took the liberty of surrendering to a predominantly military-strategic vision of world developments and real or spurious threats to the USSR and ways of countering them. The tension that arose in the world almost automatically meant for us at the time that we, like the West, set about forging additional weaponry. And this was repeated until stockpiles were packed high with the needed and not always needed weapons, and we became heavily bogged down in the arms race.

Does this mean that our involvement in the arms race at all the

postwar stages was equally unnecessary? Was it possible to avert it right from the start? I believe that there is a point in the postwar historical process prior to which we were forced to take part in the arms race for the sake of our security and the survival of socialism.

There was in effect no alternative. The USSR could not but set about the development of atomic weapons at a time when the US atomic monopoly was threatening us with far-reaching military and political consequences. Soviet policy felt the pressure of this monopoly for several years. The appearance, in 1949, of this mass-destruction weaponry in the hands of the USSR was the first rude awakening for the United States, which limited its possibility for blackmail. It made considerable positive changes in the alignment of forces. The events that followed justified this step and ultimately—forty years later—have led to a workable possibility to close the nuclear circle, to fully eliminate nuclear weapons by the 21st century.

The decision of the Soviet Union to create and deploy modern strategic delivery vehicles—heavy bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—was just as imperative for military and political strategy considerations as well. The TASS report of August 26, 1957 on the successful testing of a Soviet ICBM evidenced the appearance of a new quality in the Soviet defence potential. The same role was played by the development here in the 1960s of bombers capable of delivering a nuclear strike at US territory.

The emerging vulnerability of American territory for a retaliatory Soviet strike was our second sobering warning for the hotheads in Washington who, as is evidenced from recently disclosed archives of the late 1940s-early 1950s, were planning a preventive strike against the Soviet Union.

The appearance of new strategic systems in the Soviet armed forces still did not mean in and of itself that the task of ensuring our national security was accomplished, for the question was what level should they be limited to. What amount could be considered sufficient? An absolute understanding of the belief that this level should be adequate to the American one was particularly manifest in the analysis of the outcome of the Caribbean crisis of 1962, which took place at a time when the USA enjoyed a considerable advantage in strategic offensive weapons. Hence there emerged the USSR's goal of attaining strategic parity, which would guarantee it against chance and tragic misunderstandings.

Logically, our involvement in the arms race until strategic parity with the USA was attained was forced and, regrettably, inevitable. However, a question of signal importance arises here: How should we have behaved after the equilibrium was reached?

It can be assumed that the aftermath of the accomplishment of the historic task of creating a strategic balance with the USA in the early 1970s was not analysed deeply enough from the standpoint of the necessary displacement of the accent on the political possibilities of ensuring national security and lessening world tensions.

The existence of strategic parity has made it senseless to continue the nuclear arms race. And, according to the truly creative conclusions which the Soviet leadership has now arrived at, a further spiraling of nuclear arms can lead to a situation where the safety value of parity will be undermined and at some point in the escalation it will no longer be able to function as a guarantor of strategic stability. For this reason the current task of deep cuts in strategic arms on a mutual basis is becoming the key area of foreign-policy activity which, while ensuring the USSR's national security, simultaneously promises a considerable saving of resources for an economy undergoing structural reform.

It will be easier to avoid the mesmerising influence of the total indi-

ces of the current strategic arms levels if it is taken into consideration that underlying the sharp spiral in the strategic arms race initiated by the United States in the early 1960s was in essence improvisation and the absence of sufficiently grounded calculations. During the Caribbean crisis the strategic forces of the sides, particularly ICBMs and SLBMs, numbered in the dozens. Then the Kennedy Administration—precisely it imparted the strongest impetus to the strategic arms race—took a decision to deploy 1,000 Minutemen ICBMs and 41 submarines carrying Polaris missiles.

Why 1,000 ICBMs? This question has long bothered me because the documents, reminiscences or monographs that have been published do not contain a convincing explanation or the calculations that led to this figure. Three years ago, during a conversation with a close Kennedy adviser who was in Moscow, I asked about the reasons for the decision. Now, with so many years having passed, and no longer bound by security or professional considerations, he related that President Kennedy and Robert McNamara, who was the Defense Secretary at the time, took this as a ballpark figure, without preliminary extensive research at the Pentagon or in the scientific community. Considering that Kennedy had spoken a great deal about the USA's lagging behind the USSR, the figure of 1,000 ICBMs looked almost ideal politically, from the standpoint of influencing the public, the former adviser said.

We, too, have progressed towards this figure in developing our strategic forces. There is a great lesson to be derived here. As Confucius said, we cognise wisdom along three paths: reflection, which is the most noble path, imitation, which is the easiest, and experience, which is the most difficult. Has not the easiest road tempted us at times in creating weapons?

Paradoxical as it may seem, the Chernobyl tragedy struck a devastating blow at the magic attraction of big figures in which the "requisite levels of arming" are measured. It was discovered that the radiation leak alone (without the other destructive consequences which a real nuclear explosion would entail), which was equivalent to one-third of the smallest nuclear weapon, forced half of Europe to shudder. What then would happen if one side, even having taken advantage of the element of surprise, were to deliver a nuclear strike against the other side with 1,000 nuclear weapons? The answer is now crystal clear—the destruction of the victim of the aggression and the just as inevitable destruction of the aggressor himself together with the rest of the Earth's civilisation. For this reason nuclear weapons have to be eliminated, and the sooner the better. No one needs additional proof of the mortal danger with which they are fraught.

Consequently, this is the main idea. If our armed forces are to continue being a reliable guarantor of the security of the socialist state and simultaneously promote the country's economic stability and prosperity, we need to carry out a carefully verified analysis and, even better, a reassessment of the cycle "action—reaction—counteraction—action" in our relations with the USA in developing military hardware and determining the structure of armed forces. Strict economic substantiation of decisions in the sphere of arms R&D and production are absolutely imperative as well. One of Washington's strategic tasks is to wear out the USSR economically, including by imposing upon it—with the aid of bluffs, misinformation and at times even demonstrations of an expensive "example" of military programmes, which often lead to technical and strategic dead-ends. Evidently the time of gigantic figures and "ceilings" on military expenses is passing. Our *perestroika* is destined—and there is no other alternative—to lead the country into the road of powerful and rapid development.

In his report Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in this connection that the effectiveness of our defensive development "must henceforth be ensured chiefly by qualitative parameters—as regards both military hardware, military science and armed forces composition."

One last question: How can the duration of the time-limit history has allocated us for *perestroika* be predicted correctly? Do we have much or little time, if we also take into account the fact that the international scene is such that the forces hostile to socialism are still strong? The answer requires a detailed and careful weighing of all internal and external factors. For now, let us heed the parable from Francis Bacon's "New Atlantis". I knew a wise man, it said, who used to say when he saw excessive haste: "Wait a little in order to finish faster".

A VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

George SHULTZ

Secretary of State, the USA

Over the last four decades, the core issue of international politics has been the East-West competition. The U.S., with the support and active involvement of our allies, has tried to forge a policy that reduces tensions and prevents the competition from leading to war. Now, as demonstrated most recently during President Reagan's visit to Moscow, we are experiencing a singularly productive stretch in that policy. Yet, the U.S.-Soviet relationship remains both unique and difficult, and it plays out in a complex and changing international environment. Both sides can be proud of recent progress in relations, but not complacent. Sustaining progress will challenge the leadership and peoples of both countries.

The United States will continue to work toward expanding human freedoms, developing contacts between our two societies, enhancing strategic stability, and contributing to peace in war-torn areas of the world. Dealing concretely with these practical problems can ease the U.S.-Soviet competition, although we cannot expect that competition to disappear.

I will describe in detail the specific challenges on our agenda. But, before doing so, I want to touch on other currents that will affect how the United States and the Soviet Union proceed with each other and with other countries in the months and years ahead.

One current involves domestic political transitions. In this election year, Americans will freely choose a new President and Vice President, as well as many of their representatives in Congress. Our quadrennial national elections are a time of ferment and renewal in American politics—our process of political restructuring and new thinking, a process we have conducted without interruption for more than two centuries. The state of U.S.-Soviet relations surely will figure prominently in this year's national political debate. I believe President Reagan will hand on to his successor a policy toward the Soviet Union that enjoys a strong domestic consensus, and a working relationship between Washington and Moscow that will allow continued progress despite changes of administration or personalities.

We know firsthand from the President's trip to Moscow that the subject of political, economic and social change in the Soviet Union is

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very much on the minds of Soviet people—what it means for them individually, for their society, and for the Soviet Union's relations with the rest of the world. We recognize that the changes underway or being contemplated are designed for the Soviet Union's own purposes. Nevertheless, Americans are also keenly and legitimately interested in these developments and trends, for they seem to address important differences that have beset East-West relations for decades. They leave us confident that this is a time of hope for a more satisfactory U. S.-Soviet relationship.

A second current is the great change now underway in the international environment. Important new centers of economic wealth and political power are emerging in Europe and Asia. Instantaneous communications, faster transportation and better and more computers are making business, politics and culture truly global. These scientific, technological and economic developments pose opportunities and problems for all nations.

Among the keys to the global transformation are the new technologies for the creation, use and rapid transmission of information. For example, advanced information and communications financial market that every day handles flows equal to the annual budget of the U.S. Government, about one trillion dollars. The pace and complexity of the flow of information, and the capacity of individuals and organizations to act on that information, will only accelerate. Experts predict that computer technology for information processing will increase by a factor of 10 over the next ten years, and by a factor of 100 over the next 20 years. The heart of expanding international interaction is openness—the willingness to communicate information and ideas widely, and to put them to work rapidly. Intellectual openness, political openness and economic openness will be crucial to fostering and managing change.

In the face of this rapid and sweeping change, a crucial factor is the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to fashion and sustain a relationship that will contribute to greater international security and stability. The evidence, based on progress over the last three years, suggests that we can do so:

—The INF Treaty shows that the two sides can agree to reduce important elements of their nuclear arsenals with the detailed verification provisions necessary to give confidence in the parties' compliance with such agreements. The 1986 Stockholm agreement on confidence- and security-building measures also has contributed to security by enhancing the openness and predictability of peacetime military operations. We have established Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington and Moscow which will transmit data and notifications required under the INF verification regime. We also have upgraded the Washington-Moscow "Hotline" to improve communications between our governments in times of crisis.

—The Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan demonstrates that it is possible to achieve political solutions for longrunning regional conflicts.

—We have come a long way conceptually on the role of human rights issues in the U. S.-Soviet dialogue. Discussions between the two sides of these most sensitive issues are increasingly dynamic, candid and practical. Most important, there has been practical progress where it counts most, in the lives of individuals.

—Bilateral cooperation based on mutual benefit has expanded considerably, enriching both our societies. Much of this cooperation is oriented toward dealing with future challenges, such as conquering space, or dealing with changes in the global climate and other environmental issues. At the same time, such cooperation makes it possible

for the people of our two societies to get to know each other better, a goal which in itself is worth pursuing.

These are solid advances but they are only the first steps on the road to a more constructive U. S.-Soviet relationship. At the Moscow summit, as at Washington, Reykjavik and Geneva before, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev frankly recognized that serious differences remain between the two sides. Creative diplomacy, hard work, consistency of purpose, and persistence at dealing forthrightly with the fundamental sources of tension and mistrust in U. S.-Soviet relations, remain essential for progress.

To sustain the improvement in U. S.-Soviet relations, this process must genuinely address the interests of the two sides. It must do so across the full range of problems, and it must be realistic in its objectives. That is why the U. S. has sought concrete advances in what we call the four-part agenda of human rights, arms control, regional conflicts and bilateral affairs. The future priorities in these areas are clear.

ARMS CONTROL

From the moment he took office, President Reagan, in close consultation with our allies, has pursued the goal of deep and stabilizing cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals. General Secretary Gorbachev has described strategic nuclear weapons as the "root problem" in arms control. Through great effort, both sides have over time built up a substantial body of agreement on the principal elements of a Treaty that would dramatically cut strategic weapons *to 6,000 warheads on 1,600 delivery vehicles for each side*. But we're not there yet. At the Moscow summit, the President and the General Secretary affirmed their commitment to make every effort for early completion of a Treaty. The Geneva negotiators face the very difficult task of devising mutually acceptable provisions limiting the strategic nuclear systems of each side, as well as designing what surely will be the most complex arms control verification regime ever to deal with the many systems and facilities on both sides. Our goal—and the Soviet side says it agrees with us—is to reach a Treaty that will stand the test of time. As President Reagan has said, we want a good treaty, not a hasty one.

The U. S. will also continue to work towards a separate agreement that will enhance predictability and stability regarding strategic defenses. We see the investigation and development of effective strategic defenses as the way toward a safer future where deterrence is based on greater reliance on defense rather than on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Since the Soviet Union itself has long invested in its own strategic defense effort, progress should be possible.

As the U. S. and USSR pursue reductions in their strategic forces, efforts will continue in other arms control areas. The two sides have developed an innovative approach—a joint verification experiment intended to pave the way for verification improvements to existing treaty limitations on nuclear testing. At the Moscow summit, we concluded an agreement to expand the existing regime for notifying each other of strategic ballistic missile test launches, and we also agreed to have our experts explore a troubling new development on the international scene—the proliferation and use of ballistic missiles in unstable regions of the world. In conjunction with other states, the U.S. and the Soviet Union are making headway toward developing a mandate for new negotiations on conventional force stability in Europe, and towards a truly global and effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban.

Continued progress in arms reductions will also depend on resolving longstanding, serious questions about compliance with existing

agreements. Of special note is the Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk, which violates a central provision of the 1972 ABM Treaty. We have noted the halt in construction of that radar. But as long as it and other Soviet non-compliance remain uncorrected, confidence in the arms control process as a means of enhancing security is damaged and further steps are made more difficult. Confidence and trust are fundamental requirements for the future we would build. The greatest commitment and care is required if we are to overcome the legacy of distrust in our relations.

HUMAN RIGHTS

East-West differences are perhaps the most profound in this dimension of our relations, and these differences must be dealt with squarely. Fortunately, we are developing a human rights dialogue between our countries and citizens that is unprecedented in its scope and practicality. But problems remain in many areas, and they affect deeply how Americans perceive the Soviet Union. These problems include restrictions on the free exercise of religion, on the expression of different political views, and on the internationally recognized right to leave one's country. There are still too many individual humanitarian cases that should have been resolved by now but have not been. Many of these questions are being debated now in the Soviet Union, and we have been told that new legislation will seek to correct longstanding systemic problems. We hope that is so. Human rights is an issue that will not go away until old problems are resolved and new ones cease to arise—a tough standard, but in the long term the only realistic one. Trust among nations cannot rise above the standard by which a state treats its own citizens. It is the Helsinki Final Act which set this standard; it provides us with guidelines and commitments for the future. The Final Act reflects our belief that human rights are less likely to be abused when a nation's security is less in doubt, and that there is no true international security without respect for human rights.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

There are very real differences in interests and objectives between the United States and the Soviet Union on developments in and relations with other regions of the world. However, that should not prevent—and has not prevented—us from seeking common ground on ways to achieve peace in long-running regional conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Central America. These conflicts inflict enormous human suffering and have added substantially to East-West tensions in recent years. They are particularly troubling from the American perspective because they have involved the use of Soviet forces, as in Afghanistan, or wars waged by regimes supported by the Soviet Union against their own people.

At their meetings in Washington and Moscow, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev affirmed that the two sides would seek to foster solutions to regional conflicts that would advance “the independence, freedom and security” of the parties involved. The Geneva accords on Afghanistan give some hope that solutions can be encouraged in other regional conflicts. For instance, the two sides seem to be in general agreement that there may be better prospects now for progress in bringing to an end the war in Angola and Namibia, based on complete withdrawal of foreign forces from the conflict, and national reconciliation. In other areas, we agree on the urgent need for progress, and even on some of the details about how to achieve it, but serious

differences of objectives and interests remain. We have agreed, however, on the importance of candid and vigorous communication between the U.S. and the USSR on these issues, and believe that such exchanges can lay the basis for productive action on regional questions.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

The expansion of bilateral ties launched at the Geneva summit in November 1985 has been a genuine success story. Since then, the two sides have reached new agreements that have vastly improved opportunities for Soviet and American citizens to cooperate in dozens of ways—science, culture, education, tourism, sports and the environment.

This is, perhaps, the most future-oriented area of the four-part agenda. President Reagan has attached particular importance to exchanges among Soviet and American youth, recognizing that these young people will lead our two countries in the next century. And many of the cooperative activities we have developed or are considering are those that deal with such future opportunities as the exploration of space, greater understanding of the Arctic region and its peoples, the use of new technology in education, and the development of nuclear fusion as an unlimited source of energy. This cooperation is founded on a simple premise: both sides have much to gain and much to offer. Thus we will continue looking for mutually beneficial ways to cooperate on concrete problems, in ways that genuinely strengthen understanding between our two societies.

LOOKING AHEAD

When General Secretary Gorbachev visited Washington in December last year, I gave him some thoughts on managing the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I suggested six points that both sides should keep in mind:

- First, the recognition that the U.S.-Soviet relationship is as unique as it is important.

- Second, that this relationship will continue to be difficult to manage.

- Third, that both sides must be realistic, avoiding extremes either of hostility or euphoria.

- Fourth, that clarity and candor about our differences is crucial.

- Fifth, that we must look to the future without forgetting the lessons of the past.

- And sixth, that openness to ideas, information and contacts is the key to success.

It would be unrealistic and dangerous to expect that U.S.-Soviet competition will vanish; the differences in experience and philosophy between our two countries are too profound for that. Nonetheless, our leaders have a responsibility to recognize the opportunities which exist for our two countries to work together, and with other nations, to shape a more peaceful and cooperative world. This will be a task of years, not months, and inevitably there will be setbacks as well as advances. We have put in place a framework for relations that has proven to be resilient and effective, and can be a basis for sustained progress in the future. America is committed to such a future.

AN ARDUOUS BUT NECESSARY PATH

(The Destinies of New Thinking)

Vadim ZAGLADIN

The term "new thinking" has become part of the international political vocabulary. However, differing, and sometimes conflicting, opinions are expressed on its content and its relationship with Marxist-Leninist theory and with politics.

Some say, for example, that it is a new ideology. Some use expressions like the "new political theory" or the "new methodology of politics".

It is impossible to present all points of view. I shall therefore try to formulate my own.

First, let us look at the second part in the formula "new thinking". *Thinking*, or thought, the philosophical dictionaries tell us, is the "highest product of specially organised matter—the brain", an "active process of the reflection of the objective world in concepts, propositions, theories, etc". All this is no doubt true. But does it go far enough?

The above definitions consider the concept of "thinking" as a function of the human brain, as a process. But what is the *result* of these functions carried out by the brain? What is the result of the brain's activity?

Let us turn to other sources. Engels: "In every epoch... theoretical thought is a historical product, which at different times assumes very different forms, and therewith, very different contents".¹ Elsewhere he urges the need to study "an acquaintance with the historical course of development of human thought, with the views on the general interconnections in the external world expressed at various times".²

So, thought is a very special "product" of the brain, a product that develops historically and reflects the evolution of the views held by man and mankind concerning the "general interconnections in the external world", that is, it is a process of man's progressive cognition of himself and the surrounding world.

Philosophers since ancient times have been engaged in endless arguments about thought and its relationship to being. The two main moot points have been as follows: the first (the fundamental question of philosophy) is what is primary, thought or being? Materialism, proceeding from scientific knowledge, maintains that being is primary. It determines thought, its character and content. "Men, developing their mate-

rial production and their material intercourse alter, along with their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking",³ noted Marx and Engels.

Thought has developed, its frontiers have extended and its level has increased as man developed. The change in material conditions and the mode of social existence changed the individual thinking of every person, and the thinking of groups of people beginning from the family and tribe to social classes and national communities, and ending with the whole human race.

The other major moot point over the ages has been the identity or otherwise of thought and being, that is, to what degree does thought correspond to the evolving being. This question engaged Marx and Engels and, later, Lenin. Subsequently, however, interest in it slackened. This is understandable, for the study of this problem cannot be confined to solemn declarations about the need to develop thought. It requires that thought develop in accordance with the real changes in being. This approach, however, was at odds with the essence and the spirit of the essentially dogmatic attitudes that have prevailed in our society since the 1930s.

It is an established truth that consciousness usually lags behind being. Thought is part of consciousness (incidentally, much more consideration should be given to the relationship between consciousness and thought) and naturally can also lag behind being. This is particularly true when thought acquires a dogmatic character.

This was the case with thought in Soviet society in the period between 1930s and 1970s. With the exception of short periods which can better be described as breakthroughs (the 20th CPSU Congress) a dogmatic, often scholastic approach has prevailed. Hence the striking gulf between thought and the fast-evolving being at the national and world level. Hence the lethargic practice stemming from distorted notions of reality and the facts of life.

This gulf, the slumber of thought, or, to put it more precisely, the irrationality of practice, were important factors that distorted socialist values, principles and norms which led to distortions in the political sphere. The crisis phenomena or "marking time" in economics, politics and other spheres of life, including international affairs, that became apparent in the mid-seventies, were rooted not only in the distortions of politics, but also in the distortions of thinking.

To overcome crisis phenomena a drastic renewal of thinking was needed so as to put it on a consistently dialectical basis. As Engels said, dialectics is the highest form of reasoning.⁴

Needless to say, drastic renewal of thinking in domestic and foreign politics was necessary because the world had changed strikingly over the past decades. Our prevalent ideas of the world did not correspond to the real state of the world. This was a major hindrance to shaping effective policies, especially in world affairs. In other words, we had (going back to Engels' formula) to change both the form and the content of our thinking.

II

What was needed to this end?

First of all, reading afresh of the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin to profoundly grasp their genuine content and, on the other hand, a consistently historical approach to the conclusions drawn by the founding fathers, an approach taking into account the time and the conditions in which they were formulated. In short, what was needed was not just a repetition of quotations—which were correct, but removed from the

context of the epoch—but the study of the logic of the thinking of our teachers, their methodology.

We had to rehabilitate many of the neglected, dogmatically misjudged or even deliberately ignored ideas of the Marxist classics. This applied above all to the humanistic essence of socialism and its politics, the universal essence of communism. This applied of course to the true essence of the historic mission of the working class which, in fighting against exploitation and oppression, is fighting for the *emancipation of all mankind*.

I cannot help quoting from Engels again: "Communism stands, in principle, above the breach between bourgeoisie and proletariat, recognises only its historic significance for the present, but not its justification for the future... Hence it recognises as justified, so long as the struggle exists, the exasperation of the proletariat towards its oppressors as a necessity, as the most important lever for a labour movement just beginning; but it goes beyond this exasperation, because Communism is a question of humanity and not of the workers alone."⁵

I am sure the reader will admit that he has not often found these words quoted in our literature. The same is true of Engels' remark to the effect that the interests of the working class "and that of the human race" are "the same".⁶ The same is true of the now widely known statement of Lenin to the effect that the interests of social progress take precedence over the interests of a social class.

Forgotten and sometimes deliberately ignored was the remarkable, the pivotal idea of Marx and Lenin about the intimate connection between the interests of the proletariat and the interests of mankind, about the *universal humanitarian aspect* of the historic mission of the working class, the only class that does not pursue (or must not pursue) selfish goals, the class the meaning of whose existence lies in eliminating all classes (including itself) and bringing freedom to the human race. This was ignored because the narrow class approach leaves ample room for justifying any perversions of the humanistic ideals of the proletariat and the corresponding practice.

These ideas are particularly important and necessary in our age when humanity has been confronted with *common* dangers, when it has to struggle for its survival. In this day and age these ideas are particularly important for mankind and primarily for the working class.

All this had to be restored.

To renew our thinking it was necessary to take a realistic view of the new phenomena and imperatives within the country and in the world, a view that does not try to squeeze processes, events and facts into a preconceived scheme, but boldly faces life, penetrates into its essence and its diverse and complex, sometimes unpleasant, and sometimes tragic phenomena.

It is only by facing all the problems and contradictions of contemporary reality that this reality can be approached dialectically, and an effective policy to meet its requirements can be worked out.

Today, in this diverse and interdependent world, such a policy should not merely proceed from the domestic needs of our own country, but should take into account the national interests, and legitimate interests of all the countries and peoples, the common interests of mankind.

In other words, *modern thought of socialism and its modern politics*, must combine the class interest, the interest of socialism and the common interest of mankind. The basis of such thinking is Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology, but also, all the progressive and valuable achievements human thought has made over the decades. Our new thinking had to effect a *synthesis* of all the genuine achievements of human social thought.

Such a synthesis is natural in socialism, for socialism is a stage of social development that sees the beginning of the practical realisation of universal human values and interests. So, there are no fundamental difficulties there for us.

III

The April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC marked a turning point in the development of our country and its policies. But it has to be borne in mind that the Plenum was preceded by extensive and complex work. The early results of this work could be noticed back in 1984, for example, at the December conference on ideology, and in Mikhail Gorbachev's speeches in London.

This was *thought at work*. The task was to become aware of the real problems and requirements of socialism to ensure that it developed in the genuinely socialist spirit, that is, in accordance with genuinely democratic and humanistic values and principles.

On the domestic front, the answer to these questions was provided by the theory and policy of *perestroika*, which our party and our people arrived at through so much labour. In the international domain, the challenge of the time was met by new political thinking which underlies the new conception of foreign policy and the new blueprint for action in the world arena.

New political thinking is based entirely on Marxist-Leninist dialectics. One may recall Engels' remark on the significance of dialectics for the natural sciences. "Dialectics", he wrote, "constitutes the most important form of thinking for present-day natural science, for it alone offers the analogue for, and thereby the method of explaining the evolutionary processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in general, and transitions from one field of investigation to another."⁷

If you substitute "political science" and "international life" for "natural science" and "nature" respectively, you get an excellent formula which explains why a revival of the dialectical view of the world was necessary and what benefits such a revival will yield.

A consistent application of dialectics to the study of the world processes made it possible to form a truly scientific picture of the present stage of mankind's existence, a picture free of outdated stereotypes. It made it possible to see the world in three dimensions, as a world full of variety and contradictions, yet united in a complex entity by a thousand threads.

We have rid ourselves of the fallacy that the diversity of the world is nothing but a source of discord and differences and have come to see it as a rich source of experience whose study can be of great benefit to any civilisation, especially to the socialist civilisation, which is called upon to embody the supreme achievements of human thought and practice.

We have taken an unblinkered view of the contradictions of world development. We have seen that they are not only conducive to conflicts and alienation, but that they are, above all, a source of movement and development. These contradictions, even antagonistic ones, can be resolved dialectically and not necessarily by way of war. War, by the way, is the most undialectical method of resolving contradictions: it may destroy one, and in the present conditions, both of the sides engaged in the hostilities and even parties not engaged in hostilities. According to dialectics, (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) the way to resolve contradictions is very different.

We have noted that all contradictions change and evolve. New contradictions emerge. Unfortunately, the basic new contradiction of the second half of the 20th century that affects the very existence of civili-

sation, namely the conflict between the interests of mankind and the increasingly pressing global problems, was only noticed in this country when the whole world began to talk about it. Moreover, the world was engaged in stormy discussions about how to resolve it to ensure our civilisation's survival.

It was at this juncture that we remembered that contradictions must not be resolved through catastrophies and cataclysms, that alternative solutions should be sought that synthesise diverse experience, ensure step-by-step advance to remove, through concerted efforts, even the antagonistically opposite aspects of the more sinister consequences of the existing contradictions.

We have gained a new awareness of the interdependence of the world. In the past we virtually denied its existence (although we were confronted with its consequences at every step, especially in our foreign economic relations). In fact, even timid suggestions about interdependence and its consequences tended to be seen as disguised sorties of the class enemy. Granted, the imperialist forces have tried and will try to take advantage of the interdependence of countries and peoples to strengthen, for example, the neocolonialist web in order to subjugate the weaker states to the stronger. But this is only one side of the coin. The other is that interdependence opens up broad vistas for the development of cooperation among all countries and offers new and unheard-of opportunities for that.

So far we have been concerned with the new elements in the *picture* of the world and the *processes* of its development. But we have also reappraised the *conditions* of its development. These conditions have, indeed, acquired new properties.

Both East and West now recognise that civilisation is developing in such conditions which simultaneously reveal its vast, almost inexhaustible power and infinite possibilities and its inherent fragility and vulnerability in the face of unprecedented forces created by man's genius and harnessed to destructive purposes.

In the past as well, civilisation experienced complex periods and found itself at a crossroads. It has seen gigantic leaps, retreats and zigzags. But for the first time the progress of knowledge can destroy civilisation if used for evil purposes. Mankind has never found itself in such a situation before. It is now in such a situation.

In the past we looked at the surrounding reality through the prism of set formulas. These formulas were correct at certain periods and many of them remained so. However, they did not accommodate all the real complexities of the world. Sometimes it happened that we noticed some new phenomena but tried to pretend they did not exist because they did not fit into the old formulas. Now, after taking an unprejudiced look at the world we see that it is very different from what it seemed to us. As the documents of the 19th All-Union Party Conference put it, it is a world with "global threats to the very existence of the human race, and at the same time with an immense potential for coexistence, cooperation and political solution of outstanding problems".⁸

Do we know everything we need to know, have we learnt all the lessons? Do we have a grasp of everything? It is safe to say that we do not. The movement of our thinking has begun, but the process is far from completed, and hopefully will never be completed. For a halt in the process of thought, a standstill, are fraught with grave dangers. Inasmuch as we have become aware of it today, there are grounds for hoping that this process, once begun, will never end.

Not that this process is without its opponents.

Our literature and the press often raise new and unorthodox questions. Such questions are as well raised at the highest level, so to speak:

think of the exploratory character of Mikhail Gorbachev's speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution.

What is the reaction to the raising of new questions? In many cases the reaction is positive, as witnessed above all, by the search for solutions to the new problem that crop up. But there are also attempts to deny the legitimacy of such new questions on the grounds that they do not match the familiar formulas. It is sometimes claimed that some of the new ideas "contradict the Marxist-Leninist theory". On closer inspection we find that they contradict not the theory, but specific conclusions drawn from it. Theory is one thing, while the conclusions drawn at a certain period of time of the basis of current phenomena, events and facts are quite another.

Abandoning our dogmatic attitude to Marxist-Leninist theory in favour of a creative attitude is no easy matter. But such a transition is, if you like, an *imperative*.

IV

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a *practical* question. Man must prove the truth, i. e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of this thinking in practice."⁹

Thought in itself is just a product of the brain. But thought translated into practice may become a material force. This of course can only happen if thought is correct, and people act on this thought.

New thinking—the realistic philosophy of our activity today—if it is to be valid has, in its practical conclusions, to take into account not only the new state of the international community and its conditions of development (as mentioned above) but also the new domestic imperatives in our country—the processes of *perestroika*.

The new foreign policy conception based on new thinking was above all an answer to the requirements of *perestroika*. It adequately expressed its humanistic essence. Accordingly it is aimed at democratising the whole system of our international relations. It assigns a new place to our country in the international division of labour.

Our new conception has also taken into account the features of world development: the integrity of the world, on the one hand, and the priority of the task of human survival, on the other.

I am convinced that to understand the new Soviet foreign policy ideas one has to take into account the *entirety* of the basic, fundamental factors of the domestic and international situation. Otherwise our understanding will not be complete. If you take such an approach you cannot help noticing that our internal political imperatives do not contradict but are in harmony with the world imperatives.

The blend of the humanistic imperatives of *perestroika* and the pressing need to ensure the survival of the whole human race accounts for the characteristic feature of new thinking and the corresponding foreign policy principles, namely, the transition from the previously assumed primacy of class interests to the primacy of universal human interests. This does not mean that we renounce our class interests, that is the pursuit of the interests of socialism. Moreover, *only* such an approach can in reality ensure the interests of socialism, of its survival and robust development. Socialism is part of the international community, and it cannot separate its destiny from the destinies of the human race, especially in our time.

"... Lenin's idea about the priority of the interests of social development acquired a new meaning and a new importance"¹⁰ in our new foreign policy conception. This idea forms the core of new thinking.

This has prompted a good many questions and even reproaches: "How can you talk about universal human interests if the world is divided into opposing systems and its capitalist part into hostile social classes?"

But the human race has *objectively* always been a single whole. *Objectively* it has always had and will have common interests irrespective of class divisions. Yes, the interests of the classes—in our days the capitalists and the working class—are antagonistic. But are theirs only *antagonistic* interests? A dogmatic mind will shudder at the very question. But a dialectical mind will admit the legitimacy of the question.

Every person whoever he is, wants to survive. No one wants to be burned alive in a nuclear holocaust or to suffocate as a result of an ecological catastrophe. Thus, there are grounds for mutual understanding and even interaction.

This is not an easy question. Class egoism (which can afflict anyone) often obscures the common interests by concentrating on differences and contradictions. But today we must understand that the position of class egoism is dangerous for *anyone* who adopts it, whoever he may be. For such a position, in this contradiction-ridden world, precludes any agreement, any compromise, any progress.

Objectively, this should be obvious to the working class and its parties: its historical mission (as we have said) has a universally human, as well as a class dimension. (Herein lies the basic difference between the proletariat and all the preceding social classes.) The capitalist is in a more difficult position: that part of his interests which coincides with the common human interests contradicts those parts of his interest that are prompted by his class egoism, which is hostile to human progress.

One might say that this is no concern of ours. But this is not so. To ensure the peaceful resolution of the basic contradiction of our era (between socialism and capitalism) is undoubtedly our concern. There is no alternative to such a peaceful resolution. Nor is there an alternative for the working class of any country: it will not achieve its goals if civilisation perishes.

This often prompts the following objections: "What about the current objectives of the proletariat as a social class? Can we call on the worker to join the capitalist in the struggle for survival if the very capitalist oppresses and exploits him? Doesn't the thesis about the primacy of the universal human interests amount to renouncing the struggle for the class interests of the working people?"

No, it doesn't. If something is not yet fully understood, it doesn't mean that this "something" does not exist. In fact, *today* even for the working class the struggle for universal human interests is the struggle for its class interests. Peace and disarmament mean not only survival, but the solution of the current social problems and political rights for the working people today. One could extend the list but this is in general a special theme.

What we have said now must suffice.

Let us now turn to the foreign policy conception based on new thinking. The primacy of universal human interests, renunciation of the policy of force, and military ways of resolving the existing contradictions in the world provide the foundation of our foreign policy thinking, especially on the questions of ensuring peace and security.

V

This country was the first to speak out against the nuclear danger more than 40 years ago. Back in 1946 we called for the elimination of the threat, for a ban on atomic and then nuclear weapons. For

decades we have worked with perseverance towards these noble goals. However, we have not always been consistent. On the one hand, we have talked about the deadly menace of nuclear catastrophe. But on the other, we were late in recognising that nuclear war was not winnable. This was reflected in our documents, including party resolutions. This was reflected in some of our practical decisions.

"In response to the nuclear challenge to us and all the socialist world a strategic parity with the USA had to be attained. We did it. However, while concentrating huge expenses and attention on the military aspect of countering imperialism we did not always use the political opportunities opened due to fundamental changes in the world, to ensure security of states, bring down tensions and enhance understanding between peoples. In the end we found ourselves drawn into the arms race which could not but affect the country's social and economic development and international positions,"¹¹ stated Mikhail Gorbachev at the 19th Party Conference.

But if nuclear war is inadmissible, by its very nature, the inevitable conclusion follows that the road to security lies through disarmament. The realities of the present-day world and possible modifications of some factors that have caused wars suggest that the questions of the security of states will increasingly shift from the balance of military potentials to the sphere of politics, the primacy of law, universal human morality and compliance with international commitments.

The world is interconnected and interdependent. This means that *security can only by comprehensive*. There can be security for all (equal security) or for none. "It is vital that all should feel equally secure, for the fears and anxieties of the nuclear age generate unpredictability in politics and concrete actions."¹²

Of course, much depends on the relations between the USSR and the USA. Their economic and military strength places an exceptional responsibility on them for the future of all mankind. The Soviet Union and the USA have many points of contact, there is objectively a need to live in peace with each other, to cooperate on an equal and mutually beneficial basis, but on an equal and mutually beneficial basis only. Both countries are now aware of this. At least this is the conclusion that suggests itself after the four Soviet-American summits (Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow). That is good.

However, ensuring a reliable system of international security today requires active involvement of not only the USSR and the USA but of all countries. As Political Report of the CPSU CC to the 27th Party Congress stated, "the world is much larger than the USA and its occupation bases on foreign soil. And in world politics one cannot confine oneself to relations with only one, even a very important, country."¹³ Unique Europe with its rich political tradition, the turbulent great Asia, Latin America rising to its feet, Africa becoming an independent force—all these continents, all the peoples inhabiting them have the right to security and, of course, the right to contribute to ensuring security.

Another consideration. In the past peace was often equated to the absence of war. But today this definition is found wanting. In the nuclear age preventing war or even ruling out nuclear war is not enough. We are convinced that peace can be durable only if the nuclear and military threat in general is not simply removed but if solid guarantees are offered against its resurgence. Hence our conception of disarmament and arms reduction which provides for reducing the level of armaments to a threshold at which *every* country will be able to defend itself against any outside aggression but will be unable to perpetrate acts of aggression against any other country.

This is why we say that peaceful coexistence as a policy (there is no alternative to this policy for anyone) must evolve into a *new international order*.

An order that rules out the use of force. An order based on the recognition of the rights and interests of all peoples. An order when goodneighbourly relations and cooperation prevail, and there is a wide exchange in the field of science, technology and culture for the benefit of all nations. An order that guarantees every nation the right to free social and political choice. An order that offers favourable opportunities for the solution, through the common efforts of all states, of the global problems which have become so acute today. These provisions have been written into the Programme of the CPSU. Thereby we have proclaimed their realisation to be the key direction of our activity for the foreseeable historical period.

VI

The new Soviet foreign policy conception has not remained on paper, it has been translated into a concrete programme of action which is being unswervingly implemented. The basis for that programme was provided by the statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU CC of January 15, 1986. It is often referred to as the statement on a nuclear-free world. It is true that a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 is central to the document. But there is much more to it than that. In effect it sets forth our programme, moreover, a concrete and realistic plan for disarmament that includes elimination both of mass destruction weapons and a drastic cut in conventional weapons. This plan links the solution of disarmament problems to the solution of the economic and social problems, notably the development of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Another pillar of our practical programme of action based on the new foreign policy conception is the creation of a comprehensive system of peace and international security comprising all the main components: security in the military, political, economic, ecological spheres, and the solution of humanitarian problems.

Initially many people in the West declared that this was a "new utopia". But today, a little over two years later, everyone can see that this is not a utopia. Given a realistic approach and political goodwill everything our country proposes can be put into practice in the common interests of the whole of mankind. No one's interests will be impinged upon.

In the two-odd years since the statement on the nuclear-free world the world has advanced in many areas. History was made when the treaty to abolish two classes of nuclear weapons was signed and came into force. The Stockholm agreement on military confidence-building measures is in force. Soviet troops have started withdrawing from Afghanistan on the basis of the Geneva accords spelling the end to one of the most complicated and dangerous regional conflicts. Negotiations on every area of arms limitation and arms control are under way. International dialogue covering all the main international problems has assumed new forms and a new scale.

It is true that every step towards a nuclear-free, non-violent world is difficult. The problems of disarmament, the change from confrontation to peaceful, goodneighbourly cooperation are difficult problems that encounter vigorous resistance on the part of the forces which are clinging to outdated stereotypes in world affairs and in matters of security. Nevertheless things are moving and there are more and more adherents of progress.

The Soviet leadership's opinion on the results of the reshaping of our foreign policy which began in April 1985 has been expressed in the documents of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. "The direct threat involving major powers has diminished", state the documents. "The Soviet Union's international position has markedly improved, and not by the building up of strength, but through greater trust for our country. The situation in the world has become more stable and predictable. The prospect of curbing the arms race with all the consequences that would entail, including an alleviated burden of military expenditure, has become more real."¹⁴

In recent years new opportunities have arisen for opposing the threats to peace on a broader basis than before, for ensuring that the global problems of concern to all mankind be tackled on a concerted basis by the whole international community.

This brings us to another important point. From the outset we have said that new thinking is based on Marxist-Leninist dialectics. We have pointed out that new thinking is above all the result of our return to some, we shall say forgotten principles of our doctrine, reading anew of our classics. Why are the ideas of this doctrine acceptable even for those who do not share our views? Why does their application bring practical results?

Part of the answer lies in the fact that in working out our new concepts and initiatives we did not ignore the ideas and attitudes of other social forces in the West and in the East. We have drawn on all the best that human thought had to offer. In foreign policy, too, our party has renounced monopoly of the truth after the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU CC. In the diverse and complex world the truth can only be arrived at by taking into account all the rational ideas wherever they come from. As we see, this approach is yielding tangible and profound results.

But that is not all. The key to the success of new thinking and the policy it underlies is our reaffirmation of the primacy of universal human problems, the humanistic direction of our policy and humanisation of international relations.

New thinking broke down the barriers of misunderstanding and suspicion with regard to socialism and its policies. It made our policy more understandable and predictable, not only for ourselves, but for the rest of the world. New thinking has shattered the image of the "evil empire" and built bridges of mutual understanding and interaction with everyone, provided mutual interests are taken into account.

One could go even further and say that new thinking *for us* is increasingly becoming the new thinking *for the whole world*. Our ideas have helped the human community to become aware that its basic interests as a species are similar and in many ways identical. They have given an impetus to the slow—extremely slow, but steady—process of the emergence of a single consciousness of the whole reasoning part of humanity.

One can say, therefore, that new thinking is a logical stage in the development of human thought. The advent of this stage, marked by the awakening of world public opinion and an explosion of its activity, holds a great promise for the future. Yes, there will be debates, controversies and struggle. But if we continue to adhere to the new thinking and develop and deepen it, matching it by corresponding practical activities, the promise may be fulfilled.

¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 338.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 23, p. 339.

³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 25.

THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND DISARMAMENT

(On the Results of the Third Special Session
of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament)

Andrei K O L O S O V S K Y

The recent special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament was a major review of the approaches of the members of the world community to security in the nuclear age and of the positions of states on the entire spectrum of arms reduction and disarmament problems. The forum was attended by over 30 heads of state and government of different countries and top experts on disarmament from all over the world. The session provided them an opportunity to assess the state of the present-day international situation and its impact on progress in disarmament and the successes and failures of ensuring security in this area, and to set forth their views on how to advance in different aspects of disarmament.

The current, third, special session on disarmament was held in a setting that differed drastically from the last one, which took place in 1982. Normalisation of East-West relations had advanced considerably, bilateral and inter-bloc disarmament talks had been intensified, and such an important step towards settling regional crises as the start of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan had been made.

The beginning of the session coincided with the Soviet-American Summit in Moscow. There were apprehensions that this coincidence would overshadow the opening of the session and lower the level of the debates. However, the opposite was the case. It was the Moscow meeting, which reflected the changes in the relations between the two superpowers, that set the pace for the two weeks of general debate and showed that no matter how great the differences in approaches, productive dialogue on a wide range of problems is always possible in principle.

The speeches of virtually all the delegation heads in the general debate contained a positive appraisal of the INF Treaty, which came into force after the instruments of ratification were exchanged in Moscow. Although some representatives noted that the treaty involved a very small percentage of the two powers' nuclear arsenals, there was a general understanding that this step was a breakthrough in nuclear arms reductions. For the first time it was not the question of an agreement to somehow limit the arms race but a treaty to initiate its scaling down.

Broad-based support during the general debate was also expressed for the intention of the USSR and the USA to persistently continue talks on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive armaments. Pointing to the signal importance of this problem for promoting international peace, the delegates called upon the two nuclear powers to do everything possible to make a 50 per cent reduction in the most destructive weapons a reality.

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A positive reaction among the participants in the session was also evoked by the healthy developments on the international scene, above all by the reaching of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan and the start of the Soviet troop withdrawal from there. Another revealing point is that many delegates characterised the changes taking place in the Soviet Union, specifically, democratisation and the establishment of the new thinking in domestic and foreign policies, as a prime factor for promoting stability in the world and improving international relations.

After the Moscow summit, the addresses of the Soviet and American delegations in the general debate were awaited with understandably increased interest. Would the superpowers, while conducting constructive dialogue on a bilateral basis, use the multilateral forum as an arena of confrontation, as had been the case in the past? The Soviet address evoked an unconcealed sigh of relief. Delegates pointed to the clear-cut, principled exposition of the stands on the problems in question combined with a calm, constructive tone and a tendency towards a businesslike discussion, not mutual accusations. Alongside a high evaluation of the importance of the Soviet-American disarmament talks, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze focussed in his speech on the role of multilateral talks and set forth an entire range of specific proposals for multilateral discussions. The topics of these proposals, which largely coincided with the initiatives of a number of other countries, largely define today the agenda for the UN debate on disarmament. The feeling of relief was enhanced when this address was followed by the speech of US Secretary of State George Shultz which was made in a calm, businesslike fashion.

The most striking feature in comparison with the previous UN forums and perhaps the greatest achievement of the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament was the mood and atmosphere which prevailed during the general debate. Everyone felt that it was an exchange of views that was generally calm and imbued with an understanding of the need for joint elaboration of solutions acceptable to all, an exchange geared to the exposition of each side's vision of the problems and devoid of the mutual accusations typical of the past sessions. For the first time in many years it could be sensed at the UN that the chains of confrontation that used to push states towards propaganda rhetoric and forced them to be guided not by their own views and interests but by considerations of bloc discipline, had been loosened. For this reason the picture of the stands of different states on the foremost problems of war and peace ceased being painted mostly in two or three colours, as was the case in the past, but turned into a brilliant mosaic of opinions, approaches and proposals. At the same time almost everybody was talking about a "consensus", about the fact that it was imperative to embody this general mood for constructive cooperation in disarmament and in promoting security in a major document, in a joint programme for further actions endorsed by the special session.

The further course of the session and the proceedings in its committees and groups concerning the text of the document showed, however, that it is quite difficult to impart to the wishes for the need for joint efforts that were expressed at the political level the form of practical positions on specific problems. Moreover, when the grip of confrontation somewhat eased, it turned out that a whole number of states had their own, special approaches, which sometimes failed to mesh with the stands of other countries. It became obvious that some of those who had declared during the general debate a readiness to explore compromises began repudiating this path at the first opportunity and did not wish to bring their stand in line with the opinion of the majority. It transpired that the attainment of a real breakthrough in the activity of the UN and its

transformation into a venue of productive multilateral talks would require painstaking work with different states.

The group of socialist countries proved the most prepared for revamping the style and methods of discussion at the UN. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty partners came to the special session with a set of interesting proposals, receptiveness to the views of others, and the clear-cut aim of reaching accords that would help bridle the arms race in various areas and strengthen security. Of course, there were shades of opinion within the group, and the other groups of states were not prepared to concur immediately with all the proposals submitted by the socialist countries. However, they were the most consistent in favouring a consensus on the final document and for everyone being involved in a businesslike dialogue on disarmament. For this reason the socialist countries were on almost all issues at one with the majority, which declared for taking full advantage of the new atmosphere and elaborating a programmatic document on disarmament that would accord with it.

Another striking feature of the session was that this majority took shape not on the basis of affiliation to this or that bloc, but on the basis of common sense; a readiness to search for a balance of interests, and a sincere desire for arms reduction. Aside from the socialist countries, it consisted of a large part of the developing states, neutral countries, and virtually all the members of the Western group, with the exception of the USA, Britain and France on certain important issues. A generally positive attitude was displayed by the Chinese delegation, which showed guardedness only when the point at issue was provisions that could mean what it felt to be too immediate an inclusion of People's Republic of China in nuclear and conventional disarmament. Today, when Soviet-American confrontation no longer overshadows debates in the UN and when, above all, the USSR's new political course has resulted in the appearance of realistic prospects for a reduction in various types of weapons and the introduction of strict measures of control and confidence, the special stand on disarmament taken by a number of countries, especially major developing ones, has become more notable. This is evidently due to their ambitions for a leading role in their regions, their desire to deal with the great powers as equals, and their involvement in many conflict situations which, these states feel, need to be settled militarily. This stand was manifest in different ways, including maximalist demands known in advance to be unacceptable to others, and in essence boils down to a desire to reduce the disarmament process in the foreseeable future solely to the two blocs, thereby sidestepping considerable limitations in various types of weapons, nuclear included. This was particularly evident when work on the draft final document began. The intransigent stand on a number of issues taken by several developing countries at various stages of the work on the document created conditions for negativist statements by the United States, Britain and France which, to be frank, voiced doubts even long before the session over the possibility of reaching agreement on any comprehensive policy-making document. As work progressed on this document, the spirit of constructivism and tolerance towards the stances of others that was manifest in the general debate kept vanishing, and these countries more and more openly hampered harmonisation of a number of its foremost provisions, failing to reckon with the opinion of the majority. Britain and, in a somewhat milder form, France undertook vigorous attempts to prevent the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from being formalised in the document, and to postpone their participation in nuclear disarmament for as long as possible. The United States did not conceal its disregard for multilateral talks on disarmament and the UN role in

this sphere, and did not want to formalise consent to the prevention of the arms race in outer space and a limitation of naval forces.

The hallmark of the session was a combination of debates on the fundamental, philosophical questions of ensuring security and a practical, specific discussion of disarmament problems. A great deal was said about the need for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the search for security models that were more reliable and, most important, less dangerous for the future of the whole of humanity. The general debate brought out the fact that virtually no one, at least openly, links forever the future of our planet with nuclear weapons. At the same time it was obvious that the attitude of different states to the concept of nuclear deterrence is hardly unequivocal. On the one hand, this concept was severely criticised in many aspects. It was assailed most for the fact that it in effect removes from the competence of an absolute majority of states matters that directly pertain to their life and death. They are being tackled by five nuclear states and two military alliances. Nor are most states suited by the fact that while ensuring rather arguable security, any nuclear weapon creates the constant risk of an accidental disaster, which can destroy all life. Arguments were also heard to the effect that reliance on nuclear weapons provokes the conventional arms race and makes the task of arms reduction more complicated. However, the biggest members of the North Atlantic bloc argued that, like it or not, nuclear deterrence is a reality which has been ensuring the absence of war between the two main military groupings for several decades now. Simply discarding this reality and saying that from tomorrow on we can live without nuclear deterrence is, in their view, an impossible dream. They claim that if we seriously want to rid ourselves of nuclear weapons, we have to gradually tackle the broad spectrum of issues, which would make it possible to eliminate nuclear weapons without undermining in one way or another the existing stability in Europe, and increasing, not decreasing, the security of large and small countries, while not giving other states not involved in nuclear disarmament the occasion to take advantage of this and establish themselves as a leading military force. Among the tasks that have to be accomplished before elimination or even a very radical reduction of nuclear weapons can become a reality they name the following catalysts to greater stability: conventional weapons reductions, mandatory non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, scrapping of chemical weapons, and, most important, the creation of such a structure of security, such a structure of international relations in all spheres as would provide 100 per cent guarantees that the deterrent factors of nuclear weapons would be reliably replaced by other safeguards.

If one does not regard this solely as a pretext for evading nuclear reductions, one will evidently have to admit that there is a certain logic to such arguments. The noble task of ridding humanity of the horror of a nuclear nightmare requires not only a bold stating of the goal but also the elaboration of a realistic path to this goal and a set of gradual measures that would suit everyone on whom nuclear arms reductions depend. No matter how alluring the fine goal a nuclear-free world may be, you cannot get there on the magic carpet of good wishes.

The general debate on issues pertaining to nuclear deterrence and security also brought out shades in approaches to the order of priority of different spheres of disarmament and various measures to promote security. The speeches by representatives of a wide range of countries showed that a comprehensive view of the security problem and a realisation of the deep connection among what seem to be very different as-

pects of it are increasingly becoming part of the fabric of the present-day political thinking. The address by Hans Dietrich Genscher was revealing in this respect. He painted the picture of a security system that was very close to our ideas, albeit done in different terms.

Within the framework of these approaches virtually no one questioned the paramount importance of nuclear disarmament for improving the world situation. These approaches were augmented by consideration to the effect that a maximum of efforts should simultaneously be taken to resolve other security problems, such as reductions of conventional weapons, scrapping of chemical weapons, settlement of regional conflicts and many others. However, in both the collective stand of the non-aligned countries and the statement of some of the developing nations with biggest military capabilities one could sense that nuclear disarmament is advancing not simply as the leader among parallel paths of progress towards security, but as the first priority task. Aside from the understandable desire to put an end as quickly as possible to a situation where states are in a way divided into two castes—nuclear and non-nuclear, there was also a hint here of a desire to postpone as long as possible practical efforts on disarmament issues that affect not the nuclear powers but the developing countries themselves.

An impressive programme of actions to establish a nuclear-weapons-free and non-violent world order was presented by India. It was set forth in the address at the session by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and expounded upon in a detailed document circulated by the Indian delegation. It stresses that the nuclear arms reduction process under way has to be brought to its logical conclusion so as to rid the world of these armaments. It is high time, the statement reads, to seriously consider changing "doctrines, policies, positions and also institutions" called upon to pave the way to a nuclear-weapons-free and non-violent world. The programme is geared up to the year 2010 and is divided into three stages. At the first stage the Soviet Union and the United States would scrap their medium- and shorter-range missiles and reach agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic arsenals and a stage-by-stage elimination of battlefield weapons. At the second stage the other nuclear states would set about reducing their nuclear arsenals. Everything would conclude in the building of a reliable nuclear-free comprehensive system of global security. The programme also calls for a whole series of auxiliary measures linked with nuclear disarmament which, according to the authors, are supposed to create conditions for weapons reduction and non-revitalisation. Among other things, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, whose term of validity expires in the 1990s, would not be extended, but a multilateral treaty for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2010 should be elaborated by then. Limitation and regulation of the arms race on the basis of new technologies figure prominently in the programme. Aside from a gradual ban on the use of technologies for developing weapons, international control would also be imposed on all advanced technological research that could potentially be used for military purposes. The urgent need to put an end in the immediate future to all nuclear tests was pointed out.

India's action plan evoked keen interest as a considerable fresh contribution to the search for ways to advance to a nuclear-free world. It proved to be consonant not only with the Soviet programme for eliminating nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons by the year 2000 but also with the ideas and proposals of many other countries. Among other things, the session showed that the matter of using new technologies for creating weapons is becoming increasingly topical for many countries. However, the Indian plan came in for some criticism. During the discussion of the Indian proposals delegates voiced doubt as to whether

all measures for partial disarmament in all spheres, including the ones which are being carried out relatively easily even now, had been linked too closely with the demand being made on all nuclear states, including those that officially adhere to the nuclear deterrence doctrine at present, to agree to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Even though connection between new technology and the development of new weapons systems was perceived by many as being too restrictive for civilian research and development.

Many delegations, including Western ones, were put on their guard by the possibility provided for in the Indian plan for the non-renewal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons after 1995, which is not that far away. This guardedness was evidently enhanced by the reluctance exhibited at the session by India, which is not a party to the Treaty, to consent to include in the document any provisions implying its participation as well in efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and by its highly negative attitude to the idea of nuclear-free zones in general and to a nuclear-free zone in Southern Asia in particular. The session showed the ever increasing concern of a wide range of countries over the prospect for the appearance of even one new nuclear state which, as is their deep conviction, will not only trigger off a chain reaction and cancel out hopes for the elimination of or any serious reduction in, nuclear weapons, but would sharply whip up the arms race, undermine stability, and make our very existence even more fragile.

Diverging views were also voiced on such an important problem as prohibition of nuclear tests. It was acknowledged that this is an important measure in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. In the joint position of 12 West European countries the start of widescale stage-by-stage talks between the USSR and the USA aimed at the immediate ratification of the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, and also at the attainment of the ultimate goal of complete prohibition of nuclear weapons was characterised as an important event. However, the non-aligned countries, with the support of several neutral states, patently shifted the accent above all to the need for the immediate conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of tests, stressing that the absence of an accord on certain aspects of this process, such as verification could not be used as a pretext for the further development and perfection of this mass-destruction weapon. The working document of the Indian delegation unequivocally stated that any agreement allowing the possibility of a continuation of tests would be unacceptable.

In our opinion, the debate on this important and acute issue exhibited a number of tendencies. The desire of countries that do not conduct nuclear tests to have them banned immediately and completely is readily understandable. They believe that this has to be done without delay, and in different ways, including unilateral actions. The Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests was cited at the session as a positive example. Regret was expressed that it was suspended and that afterwards the two nuclear superpowers in a way rushed into a race to test nuclear devices. On the other hand, there was a certain reluctance on the part of states not directly involved in the actual talks on such important issues to delve into ways of settling them more realistically. After all, it is hard to deny that the Geneva talks are deciding truly important matters, including verification, without which it would hardly be possible to count on a serious, well-considered agreement being elaborated. All the more so since the course of the talks has shown that these issues are not as simple as they seem, and that they require very deep study.

It can be said without exaggeration this General Assembly session was the first UN meeting to witness such a full-blooded and broad discussion of the problem of conventional weapons and their impact on the possibility for progress in other disarmament areas and on security as a whole. The posing of conventional weapons issues took on a much more extensive, global scope and did not boil down to wishes for immediate reductions in Europe, as had been the case in the past on occasion. Many delegations stressed that regional conventional arms races were a serious threat to international peace and security. It is in so-called small wars that several million people have perished since the Second World War. American experts estimate that there are over 20 armed conflicts going on in the world at present, which take a daily toll of human lives. The conventional arms race, which is becoming increasingly destructive, is a heavy burden for the economies of the developing countries and undermines their social programmes. For this reason many delegations spoke out in favour of the UN's engaging in earnest in all aspects of this problem, stressing that it is this question that can and should be tackled on a multilateral basis, with all members of the world community doing their part. Western and several other states which were the most rigid in posing the issue of conventional weapons stressed that the responsibility for the regional arms race is borne both by the suppliers and receivers of weapons. The representatives of different groups of countries voiced the opinion that at the first stage the UN should monitor the transfer of weapons to different parts of the world. Mention was also made of the extremely dangerous and destabilising nature of secret deliveries of weapons and the on-going ballooning of the black market in arms. Also, many developing countries, above all Latin American ones, pointed to the urgent need to reduce weapons deliveries. One could not fail to note, however, that some of the militarily major developing states voiced the opinion that a reduction in conventional weapons in their regions could be undertaken only after the conventional weapons of the most heavily armed powers and their allies are reduced. For all the outward fairness of this demand, this stand could hardly be acknowledged as being in tune with the real requirements of disarmament, since it in effect opens the door to an unprecedented arms race in different regions with all the attendant unpredictable military, political and economic consequences.

Conventional armaments was one of the topics at the session where the theme of East-West relations stood out in bold relief. The NATO members unequivocally pointed out that today the question of establishment of a balance and stability as a result of conventional weapons reduction acceptable to them is the decisive one for shaping their joint policies both in disarmament and military development. This is indirectly confirmed by the election debates in the USA, during which Democratic candidate Dukakis made this problem a centre-piece of the military-political issues that he discusses in his speeches. He does not conceal the fact that if the correlation of forces in Europe in this sphere remains unchanged, his administration would favour the adoption by the allies of a programme that would considerably beef up and qualitatively modernise conventional weapons. It cannot be said that the Soviet proposals on exchanging information in this sphere and comparing military doctrines, and our recognition of the existence of imbalances are going unnoticed. It was with good reason that in one of its few articles on the session *The New York Times* focussed precisely on these Soviet proposals, although pretending that this was the first time it had heard about them. However, the Western delegates at the UN came right out and stated that as long as the current structure of Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe and the European part of the USSR remains intact,

as long as there is a lack of official information about actual programmes in this sphere against the background of rumours about modernisation of Soviet conventional armaments, and as long as the Soviet side takes no unilateral steps to buttress its proposals, the West—governments and to a great extent the public as well—will find it hard to believe that these are realistic proposals rather than sheer propaganda.

Issues pertaining to control over disarmament and of greater openness in the military sphere were raised in earnest during the session. It was widely acknowledged that control is an integral part of the disarmament process and of strengthening security. The formation of an international control mechanism within the United Nations framework was widely discussed. As the Soviet Union tabled proposals on this score, similar ideas were set forth by the heads of the so-called Six—Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden. Pointing to the importance of control in disarmament and confidence-building, the delegations of these countries declared in favour of the UN playing a vigorous role in the control sphere. They proposed approving the principle of an integral multilateral control system within the UN framework and of charging the Secretary General together with a team of experts with carefully studying practical ways in which this system could function. The document submitted by the six countries stresses that international control would not replace the established bilateral or specific control measures, but would supplement them. This idea was supported in the joint document of the Non-Aligned Movement member states as well.

The Western group was, by and large, not quite prepared for such a broad posing of the control issue, nor was it ready at all for a situation where the initiative on this topic, one traditional for it, was taken by the Soviet Union and neutral and several non-aligned states. While not rejecting this idea in principle, the USA and its allies set forth numerous stipulations and voiced doubts which showed that they clearly do not want to allow the UN to engage in control. Their main contention was that control measures should serve specific agreements on disarmament and be carried out in the volume in which they are agreed upon among the countries participatory to the agreement. Even if an international control system does have a right to exist its functions should be demarcated very precisely with control measures that are carried out under disarmament agreements. Of the Western group, the most constructive stand on this issue was taken by the Netherlands and Canada, which submitted a separate document on the issue. It acknowledges the fact that the UN can make an important contribution to monitoring compliance with agreements on control over armaments and disarmament, considering its responsibilities and the priority of promoting control over arms and disarmament. At the same time it points out that efforts to set up an integrated body that would carry out on-site control might encounter a host of legal, organisational and financial difficulties. For this reason it is proposed at the first stage to take partial measures that would be practicable in the immediate future. Specifically, the Netherlands and Canada proposed setting up in the UN a "data base" on control matters, finding individuals and organisations capable of rendering services in carrying out control, providing consultation to countries and organisations in the control sphere, and also conducting, at the request of participants in the talks, purposeful research on control measures for the agreements being signed.

Warranted objections were levelled by the representatives of a number of developing countries, including Brazil, at the contention that it is not up to the UN to monitor agreements with a limited number of parties. They argue that if such agreements are concluded with their participa-

tion, they would simply have neither the resources nor the skills for unilateral control measures.

A great deal of attention was also focussed on the issue of confidence and on the need to take specific measures to promote it further. Warsaw Treaty and NATO members characterised the results of the Stockholm conference and the confidence-building measures already being taken in Europe as a major positive step. They were also at one in their acknowledgement of the fact that trust is simultaneously a prime prerequisite and a result of disarmament and greater peace and security.

Developing countries displayed less of a readiness to agree to confidence-building measures. The stand of a number of them was that confidence-building measures are acceptable only in combination with specific agreements on arms reduction. Evidently, this approach logically follows from the developing countries' view of the priorities of disarmament both from the standpoint of which disarmament measures should be carried out first and foremost and who should be the first to carry them out. Another reason for this stand, of course, is the tense situation in different regions and the complicated and often hostile relations between neighbouring developing countries.

The tenet that greater openness in the military sphere and accessibility of information not only on the current state of armed forces and armaments but also projected military programme are important factors for promoting stability, normalising international relations, bolstering trust and carrying out sweeping disarmament measures, a tenet that figured prominently at the special session on disarmament, should be considered important. This topic was highlighted by the Western countries and the neutral European states, which substantiated in detail the belief that only after real openness and predictability are reached could the political foundations of the arms race be eliminated. In this context a high assessment was given to the Soviet course for political reform, *glasnost*, and freedom of information for the public. That the Soviet Union sent a letter on this issue to the UN Secretary General during the special session was pointed out as a positive fact.

However, a number of Western delegations expressed the belief that *glasnost* in the Soviet Union has yet to truly apply to the military sphere. The military budget remains unknown and it cannot be correctly compared with the budgets of other countries. Military development plans, the implementation of which can have a very serious effect on international stability and disarmament, are not submitted to legislative bodies and the public at large. The public does not have an opportunity to take part in the discussion of these plans. Pronouncements to the effect that too few members of the United Nations provide it with extensive information about their armed forces in accordance with an accountability system adopted at the UN resounded as a reproach to many countries.

Several other issues, such as prohibition of chemical weapons and prevention of an arms race in space, were discussed in detail at the session. The debate on them was largely traditional. The same could be said of the negative attitude of the USA, which does not wish to discuss the space problems outside the framework of Soviet-American bilateral talks. The problem of limiting naval weaponry proved important during the session. Aside from the Soviet Union, concern over this issue was voiced by Sweden and many non-aligned countries. They stressed that the race in naval armaments was no less dangerous than other aspects of this process. Naval forces can exert a destabilising influence both on the strategic alignment of forces and on the situation in individual regions. This posing of the issue evoked opposition from the USA, Great Britain and other major NATO members. Reluctantly admitting that naval forces evidently should be part of the arms control package, they evaded in

every possible way agreement on any specific provisions on this score. By the end of the work on the document the USA categorically objected to even mentioning naval armaments in it, contending that as an "insular power", it regarded the navy as an inalienable part of its armed forces and could not talk about its limitation apart from other aspects of the alignment of forces.

Deep-going contradictions between the developing and Western states again came to light in the problem of disarmament and development. The United States, which did not take part in last year's UN conference on this issue, reaffirmed its stand to the effect that it does not see a direct connection between these two processes. Other Western countries likewise departed from the position formalised at the Conference on Disarmament and Development. The developing countries, however, not only energetically insisted that a direct connection does exist; they demanded in effect that resources be immediately channelled to them as disarmament agreements are concluded. While acknowledging the correctness of establishing a link between disarmament and development, as well as the idea that part of the funds that are released as a result of disarmament should be spent on aiding the developing countries, especially the poorest of them, it should be noted that the demand immediately to receive funds from disarmament measures, which frequently involve additional expenditures at the first stage, looks more like a call to impose a sort of disarmament taxation than a corollary to the view that disarmament and development are intertwined.

Saturday, June 25, was the last working day of the special session. The sittings opened, as usual, at 10 a.m. Soon after midnight, when "the clocks were stopped", the chairman of the Committee of the Whole Ahmad (Pakistan), told the delegates who were trying to finalise the final document at the unofficial consultations that it was impossible to continue working after 2.30. Agreement was proceeding with difficulty, above all due to the unconditional refusal of the UN delegation even to discuss the inclusion in the document of matters pertaining to outer space, naval armaments and the connection between disarmament and development. Still ahead was a clash between the Arab states and the USA on an issue that was very painful for both sides, especially considering the election campaign in the USA, namely, condemnation of Israel's nuclear ambitions. Shortly before the deadline stated by the chairman, the American representative began to grasp literally at every word in paragraphs that were rather harmless for everyone. He delivered a lecture to the effect that he would not be forced to agree to unacceptable provisions under the pressure of consensus. Soon afterwards he stated that time had run out, that obviously the document would not be passed and that his delegation would no longer take part in the discussion of it. The proposal to extend the session for even a day, or even several hours did not garner unanimous support. The proposal that the session proceedings be postponed until the next US administration sounded as a bitter joke.

The final document of the session, on which so much effort was expended, failed to take shape. Even Western representatives did not conceal their dissatisfaction with their American colleagues' stand. Nor did those who had provoked the Americans as if on purpose with their maximalist demands and patently unacceptable wordings receive words of sympathy.

Tired and still wound up from debating, the delegates passed by the windows lit by the dawn to the hall of the General Assembly to summarise briefly and close the third special session on disarmament. Everybody felt somewhat disappointed. But when they got around to the poli-

tical assessments, they stressed that the results of the session were not confined to the fate of the document. It was a noteworthy session. There was a totally new atmosphere of general debate, issues were posed in a more businesslike and concrete manner, and there were a great number of interesting proposals which have a good chance of being implemented. This point was likewise made in the address by GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Peter Florin, the chairman of the session, who also singled out areas of likely general consent.

As far as formalised results are concerned, one cannot rule out the possibility that the very idea of reaching agreement on a sweeping, comprehensive document was to a certain extent doomed in present-day conditions. The times of verbose declarations which are too general or which no one takes seriously are past. Countries are striving to get more to the point. However, they are too different; they have too many of their own particular interests to harmonise all issues as a whole. This should be done in individual areas; limited but feasible steps should be planned. During the work on the document several such measures were agreed upon in effect. But neither the document nor provisions came into being.

PERESTROIKA IN HUNGARY

Oleg RUMYANTSEV

The Hungarian People's Republic is entering a new stage of development, a stage of major socio-political renewal. Only in this way will it be able to resolve the economic difficulties and contradictions that have accumulated in the country's political institutions and relations. The strategic direction for the new course is drawn up by the whole of society—the party, scientists, politicians and public figures. The concepts of this course make it very similar to the *perestroika*, process underway in the USSR and to the reforms being effected in a number of other socialist countries.

Hungary was one of the first among these countries to set out to break "Stalin's model" of socialism. As a result of its efforts, an original Hungarian model of socialism took shape in general terms by the 1980s. Its main distinctive feature, in the opinion of Hungarian theoreticians is the rejection of voluntarism in politics and of totally state-controlled socialism in the economy, and the transition to realism and pragmatism in building a socialist society.

The reformists came up against many difficulties. Until recently many of their experiments were not approved of in the fraternal countries, including the Soviet Union. The possible social and political costs and conflicts of the planned reforms were not investigated. Nonetheless, the country has managed to build a social model which can be described as a "moderate-state socialism". It is a relatively flexible combination of a planned commodity economy regulated by market mechanisms and real pluralistic forms of ownership and economic management, in which competition and enterprise are activated, the distributing relations largely decentralised, industrial enterprises and whole regions made more independent, etc. The concept of harmonising diverse interests is pivotal to the policy of economic reforms. It is this which made it possible to produce a fusion of state-run, cooperative and individual economic units in the agro-industrial sphere, and provide conditions for raising living standards, obtaining additional capital and building up confidence in the policy of reforms.

Economic restructuring was accompanied by some political changes which set the stage for a comprehensive political reform. During the "Kadar epoch" social life in the country became democratised, the economic and foreign policy became more open, greater attention has been paid to humanitarian problems and to human rights, the prestige of knowledge and professionalism has increased, and appropriate conditions have been created for free scientific and creative endeavour. The activity of the party itself has largely changed, too: for this reason the

political leadership has long been enjoying great authority among the people. There have appeared signs of the diversity of ideas and opinions and various forms of representing interests. Socialist pluralism has begun to take real shape.

And still the Hungarian reform had a number of congenial weaknesses and contradictions which were latently developing into a crisis. The reform lacked an integral, conceptual ideology of renewal. The idea of combining and coordinating cardinal changes in the economic, social, political and cultural spheres of life, of remodelling the mechanisms of administering the economic and political processes was sacrificed to suit technocracy. Thus a tendency inherent in pragmatism emerged: too much caution and avoidance of conflicts. But pragmatism has long been known to be effective only when based on a well-grounded conception, with real interests and motive forces behind it. However, the position, according to which a conscious risk of economic reforms should be compensated by the stability of internal political institutions, prevailed in Hungary.

In the 1980s, the connection between the difficult economic situation and the inability to meet the pressing need for resolute economic and political reforms was ever more clearly pronounced. Subjective mistakes became a factor of the crisis. The paradox of the situation was that the reforms were slowed down by those who were to carry them out—the cadres.

All this accounts for the indecisiveness and inconsistencies of the restructuring drive. Indeed, in 1983 the top leadership announced that there would be no second reform, and in 1984 an attempt was made to carry out a programme of economic revival which was impracticable, for it was not backed with required resources and was based on the unjustified idea of continuity between the new economic policy and the previous one. In 1985, the 13th Congress of the HSWP put forward a concept of acceleration and at the same time set the task of increasing capital investment in the economy, boosting consumption, lowering inflation and attaining equilibrium in the balance of payment. In other words, the 7th five-year plan was based, in fact, on different directions of development. That the development within the former model has been exhausted is confirmed by a number of factors—the re-emergence of problems that had once been “solved”, the relapses of theoretical and ideological administering from above, the bureaucratisation of the party and state apparatus, and the increasingly restraining role of the “relations of production” with regard to the free development of the productive forces. The prestige of the country’s leadership began to decline.

Thus it was becoming ever more obvious that the main hindrance to the socialist reforms was the preservation, without any change whatsoever, of the political system as it was. To preserve that system or just to patch it up would mean to end up at an historical impasse. The declaration of this fact has long ceased to be heresy or an “intellectual breakthrough” in Hungary.

In that situation the national Party Conference was held last May. The party openly admitted at the conference that the Central Committee and its apparatus, as well as the government bodies were responsible for the present state of affairs in the country, for the ungrounded assessment of the situation, and for the mistakes in carrying out the reform. The delegates voiced the opinion that the crisis had emerged not because of economic difficulties, but that the economic difficulties came as a result of a protracted socio-political and ideological crisis. It was admitted at the conference that “the economic reforms which were implemented failed to spread in due time to other spheres of society”. The HSWP saw a way out of the crisis in “a coordinated continuation and acceleration of the process of reform in the social and economic spher-

es". Political reform—this was the task the Hungarian Communists set themselves.

This reform is regarded in HSWP documents as a simultaneous process of renewal in the party, of the consistent pursuance of an alliance policy, filling it with new content, the strengthening of the people's power on principles of socialist pluralism, an increase in the activity of civic organisations and movements becoming more independent, and greater openness in the social and political process. As we see it, the tasks are quite similar to those set before the Soviet *perestroika* drive. It would be natural to ask then: what is there specific in the Hungarian process of reform?

The answer is quite definite: the distinctive feature of the renewal method which has prevailed in Hungary is that the architects of the reforms addressed themselves to the entire diversity of collective political thought in society and showed interest in the well thought-out prescriptions to cure the country's ailments. This approach has proved correct. Diverse and brilliant ideas, streamlined concepts and programmes that had matured in various sections of the society which, while pursuing one goal see different, sometimes alternative, ways to that goal, have emerged in Hungary.

The eternal problem of ends and means is being properly solved: society should be democratised solely by democratic means. The subject of a political reform should be the citizens themselves and their associations. This solves the problem of making the restructuring process irreversible—a guarantee of renewal is in the plurality of its subjects striving to attain a common goal on the basis of common values.

So what is a political reform Hungarian style? In the opinion of many social scientists in Hungary, it is a striving to achieve an effective combination and functional compatibility of the following elements: social democracy, effective administrative bureaucracy acting strictly within the limits of law and aimed at high efficiency of technocracy and logocracy, that is, science as a force capable of foreseeing and actively participating in preparing and taking political decisions. In our view, a mature socialist society should precisely be the harmonious combination of these four "-cracies", each regulating and restricting the others. The only "-cracy" inadmissible under socialism, though it has taken a strong root in it, is "ideocracy", the dogmatic pressure of ideological manipulations on every sphere in the life of society. It is precisely the uncontrolled domination of the "interpreters of the sacred scriptures", it is believed in Hungary, which calls into question the attractiveness of socialism as a historical alternative.

It is significant that various forces in society agree, on the whole, on the main directions of the reform: a. the strengthening and extension of effective market mechanisms of the socialist commodity economy; b. establishment of a democratic system of popular rule and representation of interests corresponding to the ideals and values of socialism; c. implementation within the country of an alliance policy based on a political union and social consensus of various forces and movements constructively cooperating with each other and striving to strengthen socialism and promote democracy in the country; d. respect for universal human standards and values and consistent application of the constitutional rights of the individual and society in practice; e. faithfulness to Hungary's allied commitments as a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the socialist community.

While the goals are more or less identical, the views on how to attain them vary a great deal.

The differences become understandable, when the conceptual documents which have largely contributed to the political reform in the country are analysed. Among such documents are the "Change and Reform" programme (1986), the "Social Contract or Conditions of Political Development" (1987), the materials of the Szeged Theoretical Conference of the IISWP (1987), the document "Reform and Democracy (Diagnosis and Programme)" (1987), and also the "Resolution of the All-Hungary Conference of the HSWP on the Tasks Facing the Party and the Development of the System of Political Institutions" (1988).

Now a few words about each of these concepts.

1. The "Change and Reform" programme was drawn up at the request of the Socio-Political Commission of the Patriotic People's Front, which is an alternative document on the directions of the economic reform and its links with political transformations. In October 1986, the concept was submitted for consideration by the HSWP Central Committee to help prepare the materials of the November 1986 Plenum of the Party's Central Committee. At that time its assessment was laconic: "It is for the party, not for the Patriotic People's Front, to draw up a programme".

But in 1987 good chances opened up before this concept. In the middle of that year its abridged version was published in the economic journal *Közgazdasági Szemle*. Published together with it was the report on the discussion of that document at a meeting of the working group of economists at the HSWP Central Committee. And, last but not least, in June that year the party, and in September also the government, produced their programme of stabilising the situation and overcoming the difficulties. In our opinion, some of its provisions clearly reveal the influence of the economic political concept of "Change and Reform".

2. Several sections worked at the all-Hungary theoretical conference in Szeged, including a separate section dealing with questions of the effectiveness of the political system. There, the thesis that the political system be substantially modernised by rationalising the mechanism of decision-taking and an active participation of this mechanism in resolving arising conflicts by means of timely revealing, harmonising and integrating in the best way various interests, was formalised for the first time in the party. The materials of the conference proved to be a valuable contribution to work on questions related to the functioning and role of the major institutions of the political system of socialism.

3. In 1987 there appeared a document entitled "Social Contract or Conditions of Political Development", which had been drawn up by a group representing the liberal-democratic movement in Hungary. The document contains interesting proposals on ways of building a state governed by the rule of law, solving social problems and guaranteeing human rights. At the same time there are a number of questionable, and sometimes naive, provisions. Nonetheless, the very fact of its existence is of definite interest.

4. The document "Reform and Democracy", prepared by Mihály Bihari, a leading Hungarian political scientist and the head of the political science department at Budapest University, at the request of the socio-political commission of the Patriotic People's Front, is a political continuation of the document "Change and Reform". It gives a detailed analysis of a broad range of problems concerning the political reform.

This programme evoked great interest and was published in a supplement to the *Medvetanc* journal. Its author put forward the programme at a number of large public meetings in Hungary. But soon an unexpected event occurred that is hard to understand: when the debate of the theses issued by the HSWP Central Committee for the Party Conference reached its peak, Mihály Bihari and three other persons were

expelled from the party by a decision of the Central Control Commission of the HSWP "for the propaganda at non-party forums of views running counter to the party's policy".

That event, which could be called "Nina Andreyeva in action", occurred during the weeks between publication of the article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and of the *Pravda* editorial, the weeks of political cowardice and attacks by bureaucrats on those who adhered to the positions of strength of arguments, but not of arguments of strength.

Meanwhile the document "Reform and Democracy" deserves attention. It sets forth in sufficient detail the main principles of a political reform, which can be used as a basis for a broad public movement for the country's renewal. This platform contains the following new elements: politisation of various sub-systems in society, eradication of political voluntarism, reorganisation of the overcentralised mechanism of distribution and re-distribution, switch over from total power monopoly to an alliance of diverse political forces and movements, democratic self-organisation of various political forces and their collective exercise of power on the basis of consensus and allied policy, resolute decentralisation of the decision-taking mechanism, creation of a democratic system of representing and defending interests, guarantee of openness in society and the freedom of the press, openness for criticism, joint participation in preparing and taking decisions, wide public control over the actions of the administrative apparatus, etc.

The measures suggested in the "Reform and Democracy" document successfully summarise the ideological search of the socio-political thought in Hungary. According to the document, a political reform should include: establishment and consolidation of inner-party democracy; a reform of the status and activities of the parliament; introduction of a post of the head of state to be elected directly by the people; a reform of the election system; establishment of an independent constitutional court; an increase of the independence and competence of judges; the strengthening of regional self-government; provision of legal guarantees of individual and collective civic initiatives, referendums and signature collecting campaigns; detailed establishment of the citizen's rights and freedoms in a separate law; adoption of a democratic law on setting up civic organisations and on their functioning; provision of guarantees for increasing the autonomy of universities and other institutions of higher education, free choice of a system of education and the subjects to be studied; legal guarantees of the freedom of the press; extension of democratic self-administration at enterprises and cooperatives; a remodelling of the activities of the bodies dealing with internal affairs (including state security) on principles of legality and democratic public control over their activities, etc. Many of the above-mentioned provisions are already being carried out, having a positive effect on the growth of public consciousness and consolidation of the democratic norms of public conduct.

5. The basic document determining the strategic direction for the development of the political system in Hungary is the "Resolution of the All-Hungary Conference of the HSWP on the Tasks Facing the Party and the Development of the System of Political Institutions". The documents for the Party Conference had been prepared by working commissions of the HSWP Central Committee all during the year 1987.

During the discussion of the prepared documents people expressed serious criticism making constructive proposals. But although about 200,000 people, or a quarter of the HSWP membership, took part in the discussion of the theses, it lasted just a few weeks. The final document adopted by the Conference contained a large number of amendments.

Renewal of the party and a new understanding of its role, functions and status is a central question of the political reform in Hungary. Since 1956 the HSWP has regarded its own democratisation as the main condition for extending socialist democracy and raising the effectiveness of the entire political system. Indeed, in the conditions of a one-party system it is the relationships within the party that determine the level of democracy in social relations. So it is precisely this question which concerns all members of society, and not only the HSWP.

At the theoretical conference on inner-party democracy, held in November 1985, it was correctly noted that "if party democracy is narrowed down, then issues are solved only by the leadership and a group of experts; it is becoming difficult to make a correct decision, there appear cracks in the political and functional unity of the party, and decision-making practices are faltering. But if the participation of party members in decision-making and the use of their collective experience are ensured, this will not only make the decisions more justified, but will increase the Communists' responsibility." In practice, however, these correct guidelines were being increasingly lost. Therefore the forum of Hungarian Communists demanded that they be strictly followed.

The enriched understanding of the status of the party as the guiding force in society should evidently be regarded as the most valuable element in the resolutions of the latest All-Hungary Party Conference. J. Berec, Political Bureau Member and Secretary of the HSWP Central Committee, noted that the party "should work as a truly political party, as a movement in the conditions of democratic internal relations which simultaneously ensure participation by party members in policy-making and an patient attitude to disputes and a difference of views and their integration. All this can serve as a sound basis for a new type of party unity."

This new understanding of unity is being spread ever more widely within the HSWP. Already in his New York interview General Secretary of the HSWP Karoly Grosz (at that time the Prime Minister) pointed out that this notion should be reappraised, because the falsely interpreted unity and fear to freely express one's opinion led to the mediocrity of leadership; one should regard calmly a difference of views as a mirror of healthy political ambitions. In an interview to the *Nepszabadsag* newspaper J. Berec confirmed also the presence of "groups of opinions" in the new Central Committee. Nonetheless, in a resolution of the Party Conference it is said that "party members may not express their opinions outside the competence of party forums in a spirit contradicting the adopted decisions; nor may they be organised in factions to protect their opinions."

Here arises one of the most serious problems of political development, which has not yet been solved definitely under socialism—the problem of socialist pluralism. The HSWP has stressed that the chief condition and means of exercising people's power is socialist pluralism relying on the leading role of the party. It provides possibilities for expressing different interests, harmonising them and embodying them in political will. But no specific mechanism of ensuring pluralism has been developed so far, and solutions here are not going to be simple.

It is pointed out in the resolutions of the HSWP Conference that a guarantee of the irreversibility of the process of reforms is, on the one hand, the participation of the Communists and all non-party champions of socialism in decision-making and, on the other, the renewal of the leading cadres and openness and publicity in politics. Under these conditions the party should become an openly politicising force ensuring a principled political leadership of society.

The Party Conference confirmed the need to conduct debates within the party on major issues and recognised the right of organisations to initiate such debates. During the preparation of political decisions the leading bodies should consider the opinions and proposals of civic organisations, the bodies representing various interests, as well as positions advanced at public meetings. In the future there should be a choice of as many variants and draft resolutions as possible. Stress was laid on the need to cover fully in the press all variants of decisions arising in the course of their preparations.

The allied policy pursued by the HSWP deserves close attention. The HSWP as a party of all the people considers it to be its major task to unite all who care for the good of the motherland. Meanwhile, the party is going to "take into account points of view that differ from its own one". A special role is to be played here by the Patriotic People's Front supported by the HSWP. Imre Poszgay, General Secretary of its All-Hungary Council and Political Bureau member of the HSWP Central Committee, has stressed that a historical task of the Patriotic People's Front movement is assistance in achieving new social concord in the country, consolidating new thinking in public consciousness and supporting citizens' participation in building socialist society "from below".

The movement of civic initiatives is gaining momentum in the country, and various clubs, unions and movements are growing ever more active. The country's leaders say there should be a dialogue with critical-minded persons whose views not always coincide with an official point of view. Such organisations are the Network of Civic Initiatives, the Democratic Youth Federation, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Significant in this context is the spirit of the appeal adopted by the Democratic Forum at the meeting of delegates of Hungarian intellectuals held on September 27, 1987, in Lakitelek. "After disputes and discussions we have agreed that social concord can be achieved only through the joint efforts of all progressive forces in society. Only through public participation is it possible to overcome the crisis, participation of the members of society and its political leaders. In the present system of political and social institutions the expression of independent view is not ensured. Therefore we propose the formation of a Hungarian Democratic Forum."

The development of a system of representing the interests of diverse social groups in Hungary evokes special interest.

A pluralistic structure of civic organisations and bodies representing various interests has already taken shape in the country. The system operates mainly on three levels—mass public organisations and movements (the People's Front, the Young Communist League and the trade unions); the bodies representing corporate interests, which are controlled by the state (the Academy of Sciences, the Federation of Research and Technical Societies, the Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Cooperatives, the Consumers' Society, etc.) and independent "non-formal" civic organisations and movements (environmentalist, pacifist, charity, and cultural-ethnic groups).

The stepping up of public initiatives makes it necessary to lift the restrictions in implementing the constitutional provision of the freedom of unions and associations. In March this year the principles of the Law on Civic Associations, which is being drawn up at present, were published. Its main provisions are based on a democratic position, according to which associations may be set up in the name of any activity so long as it does not contradict law. At the same time, there is an obvious striving among the law-makers to "divide" the law into legislative acts designed separately for civic organisations, amateur societies,

and clubs and other interest groups. The new draft law is expected to be considered in parliament at the end of this year.

Hungarian society has come to a new turn in its history. This turn is determined, above all, by the process of reforms based on the experience and results of three decades of a policy of change. Everything considered, the renewal process has also reached the mechanism of political decision-making. In these conditions it is extremely important that proper conclusions be drawn from the analysis of the political process in the country and necessary lessons are learned. The lessons and conclusions should evidently be the following.

It is inadmissible to carry out a reform while not having an integral ideology aimed at an all-round and interrelated renewal of all spheres in the life of society.

There must be no hesitation, delays and procrastinations in the course of the reform, political cowardice can cause grave crisis phenomena.

A key question of the reform is the building of an effective and flexible economy. But this cannot be done unless there operates a flexible system of resolving contradictions and conflicts arising in the process of transformations; this requires self-regulating mechanisms functioning in the political system. Their chief mission is to transform the insufficiently democratic system of power and eliminate its uncontrolled power monopoly bloc.

The subject of the reform should be the society itself, that is, it should take part in producing alternative versions of the reform, in taking decisions on them, in other words, display collective political will. All this is possible only in the framework of a democratic movement actively drawing citizens in the renewal process and in real policy-making.

To us the value of the Hungarian restructuring is in that it provides us with an example of realisation of socialist pluralism principles: it is characterised by marriage on equality basis of different forms of property, economy management and administration, and by variety of forms and means of representation, protection and coordination of diverse interests. A new phase of development of this concept is underway: the socialist pluralism is becoming an ever better defined plurality of political action vehicles when every citizen or group of citizens is capable of self-expression and self-organisation, of free expression of both their opinion and the political will. Without this, no development of democratic socialist society would be feasible.

A SECOND WIND?

Yevgeni SHMAGIN,

Igor BRATCHIKOV

There have been many ups and downs in the history of Soviet-West German relations. Ebbs and flows and sunrises and sunsets in them succeeded each other with almost fateful constancy. Rides down rocky roads would be succeeded by smooth, swift rides along straight highways, and, it seemed, this would never end. But something would prevent us from breezing along, and again we had to put on the brakes and turn off onto a country-track.

So, in which state are USSR-FRG relations now? Along what road are they running? Where will they be tomorrow? These are not idle questions. They are of concern to the public in both countries, to politicians, and to the man-in-the-street. We shall give you our opinion.

It doesn't take a genius to notice recent changes in the political and diplomatic contacts between the two countries. Moscow has become the centre of attraction for quite a few outstanding West German politicians and spokesmen of the parties in government and in opposition, for ministers and Bundestag deputies, businessmen and trade union leaders. The guests from Bonn were received in this country on a high level, and, evidently, the positive appraisal they gave of their Soviet visits and of their talks with Soviet leaders, so often expressed by the visitors back home, were not just a display of politeness.

Well in keeping with the principle of reciprocity, many return visits were made. In January, Eduard Shevardnadze visited West Germany. That visit exceeded all others in productivity and the content of political talks. The FRG was visited also by other Soviet politicians, ministers and public figures.

The law of dialectics says quantity is bound to turn into quality. Does this concern Moscow-Bonn relations as well? Such a prospect is becoming visible. The exchange of visits on the summit level has been announced. They are going to be a culmination of the unusually intensive growth of political activity. The announcement was made long before the visits, which has rarely been done in diplomatic practice. This is a noticeable, though maybe not very significant, sign of growing stability in relations between the two countries.

This autumn the Soviet Union will be visited by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and Mikhail Gorbachev is supposed to make an official visit to Bonn next spring. That will be the first West German visit by a Soviet top leader in eight years and the fourth one in the history of our relations. It is natural therefore that big hopes are pinned on the Moscow and Bonn visits which are expected to promote and stabilise the USSR-FRG relations for years to come.

Yevgeni Shmagin, Councillor of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet Ambassadors' Directorate.

Igor Bratchikov, Second Secretary of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Secretariat.

The role played in the history of Europe by relations between Russians and Germans, the two largest nations on the continent, is well known. The state of these relations has had a decisive effect on the alignment of forces in European politics. Indisposition in Russian-German relations had a painful effect on the health of the entire European organism. And such ailments were not infrequent.

The history of relations between Russia and Germany is a combination of contradictory tendencies, a peculiar fusion of love and hate, of confrontation and cooperation, of mutual attraction and mutual rejection. Since time immemorial Russians and Germans have felt keen curiosity towards each other and a strong drive towards contacts. As a result, the destinies of the two nations have been closely interwoven, which is also observed in present-day life. Respect for one another's objective interests has always been mutually beneficial. But whenever self-seeking calculations prevailed, the relations between the two peoples were marked by mutual bitterness and distress.

The wayward character of these relations carried over to the 20th century from the previous centuries grew worse. But during spells of improvement, as was the case in Rapallo, both sides would work vigorously to meet their urgent domestic requirements. However on the whole, the successors of Bismarck failed to translate into reality his political will in which he had said they should concern themselves with relations with Russia, seeking its disposition and friendship.

The Nazi aggression will never be forgotten. It has left deep scars in the historical thinking of both nations and largely determined their present perception of each other. The land flowed with the blood of our peoples from the Elba to the Volga, and who knows how many Goethes and Dostoyevskys, Beethovens and Tchaikovskys are lost to European culture. There is another factor which, in our opinion, should not be obscured. The war was fought not only by the states belonging to two opposite social systems, but also by the two peoples. It was not abstract Communists and Nazis, but Soviet people and Germans who shot at each other. Stalin's well-known utterance that Hitlers come and go but the German people stay, which was in essence correct, was a poor consolation for the millions of Soviet families which lost their nearest and dearest during the war.

The Soviet people have never been vindictive. But the pain remains there in our hearts, and it has been passed to the next generations who have never seen the war. It is for this reason that the word "German" is perceived in our country not like the words "Frenchman" or "Englishman". This is perhaps very bad. But you can't get away from it. Several generations will succeed one another before this will change. But we have to work to this end starting now.

By the logic of life the world wars not only placed our nations on the opposite sides of the frontline, but have developed in them similar genes of opposition to war, genes of love for peace and freedom. We cannot, and have no right to, clear our relations of painful memories of the past, but we can and must relieve them of the burden of confrontation in the name of the future. War memories should be not an obstacle to the promotion of relations, but a warning. Not only geopolitics but the lessons of history and vital interests dictate that our peoples should always maintain stable relations of good-neighbourliness and friendship.

Traditional contradictoriness was overcome with one of the legal successors of the former Reich—the German Democratic Republic, a socialist state on German soil. These relations are consistent and harmonious, and the priority task at present, and in the future, is to strengthen in every way the fraternal alliance and close interaction in every area of political and public activities and in the economy, and to bring the

people of our countries really close together. This does not mean, of course, that relations between the USSR and the GDR have not come up against problems. Absence of problems in present-day relations between states would perhaps be unnatural. But solutions have always been found in the interests of both peoples and the socialist community as a whole.

As for the FRG, relations with it were developing along a different path and had to carry the whole burden of the unfavourable "hereditary" factors. The first postwar decade saw too many instances of hostility and attempts to solve problems by threats, and sometimes even by power methods. It required political courage to make a step towards each other.

That step was made in June 1955, when the Soviet government proposed to the government of the FRG to establish diplomatic relations. In September that year Chancellor Konrad Adenauer arrived in Moscow. Sincere and at times stormy discussions went on for five days. Official talks sometimes developed into confidential conversations. The sides spoke passionately about the past and the future. It was not easy to overcome the heritage of the war, but precisely this psychological factor influenced the participants in the talks, for whom the past battles were still resounding in their memory, and who had lost their relatives in that war. Sometimes it seemed that no positive solution would ever be found.

One should do justice to the then leaders of the two countries, to Chancellor Adenauer and to Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin who at that time conducted the talks on behalf of the Soviet government. The wisdom of statemanship and the wish to find compromise solutions displayed by both sides prevailed and, as a result, it was agreed on establishing diplomatic relations.

Back in Bonn, Adenauer declared he was confident the Soviet Union sincerely wanted a reliable security system. He called upon others to regard this fact as a reality and spoke in favour of cooperation with the USSR in the interest of European peace. But at that time the opportunities for establishing such cooperation were not used, largely through the fault of the Chancellor himself. Adenauer became aware of the peaceful aspirations of the Russian people once more shortly before his death.

So the first attempt proved ineffective. The period of improvement in Soviet-West German relations in the late 1950s was succeeded by a period of stagnation in the 1960s. It became obvious that progress in these matters was unthinkable unless fundamental political questions were solved, and unless these relations were placed on a reliable legal contractual basis.

The coming to power of the social-liberal coalition in the FRG in 1969 and the "new Eastern Policy" (*Ostpolitik*) it proclaimed, as well as the start of intensive Soviet-West German negotiations to formulate the long-term principles of our relations, signalled the coming of a new stage. At that time both sides displayed realism, foresight, a high sense of responsibility and ability to take a new approach to difficult problems that seemed almost insoluble. Their efforts culminated in the signing in the Kremlin of the historic and in many ways unique Moscow Treaty on August 12, 1970, which played the role of a railway switch directing the relations between the two countries along a new track. But the significance of the Moscow Treaty by far exceeds the limits of bilateral relations.

Having formulated the basic principles of the inviolability of the borders of all states in Europe and of refraining from the use of force, the treaty, signed by Alexei Kosygin and Willy Brandt, became a major document of the postwar time. The subsequent normalisation of the FRG's

relations with other socialist countries, the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin and, last but not least, the Helsinki Final Act provided abundant proof that the Moscow Treaty had become a pivot of detente, determining the international climate in the first half of the 1970s.

The treaty, being a balance of compromises and a maximum of what could be achieved at the moment, did not, of course, solve all problems in our relations and many of them remained unsolved mainly because the West German side was unprepared for that. This was seen from the difficult process of the treaty's ratification. But the Moscow Treaty has lost none of its significance in our days, too. Meeting the long-term interests of each side, it serves the cause of consolidating European security. The work done to produce the treaty shows that we can cooperate in the interests of the peoples of our countries, for the benefit of European and world peace, and in the name of restoring mutual trust and productive cooperation.

After the signing of the Moscow Treaty relations between the USSR and the FRG notably improved. In any case, they no longer were as strained as they had been. Moreover, at some point precisely the FRG became our main political and economic partner among Western countries. As the treaty was being implemented, our economic, scientific and technological ties expanded and grew stronger. The sides signed an agreement on economic cooperation for a term of twenty-five years. Multimillion dollar deals were made. Tourism and exchanges in culture and sports rapidly grew. In a word, a large field was ploughed in the 1970s, and the young crops which sprang up were promising, indeed.

However, for various reasons the positive development was gradually slowing down and our relations were obviously worsening. The home and foreign policy pursued by the SPD-FDP government headed by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was becoming ever more two-faced. The declared resolve to consolidate a democratic order turned into an onslaught on human rights and the toughening of the *Berufsverbote* practices. The slogans of rapprochement with the East gave way to calls for building up NATO's military might.

Good relations were also prevented by the excessive display of German nationalism on the Rhine and the high-handed view on the role to be played by the FRG in the world today. The West Berlin problem was becoming a mounting impediment. Paying formal tribute to the Quadripartite Agreement, the authorities in Bonn invariably behaved as if West Berlin were part of the FRG and were governed by it.

The general worsening of the international situation in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the accelerated arms race, which resulted, among other things, in the deployment of hundreds of Soviet SS-20 missiles, plus the Afghan problem, set off a new tide of anti-Sovietism in the West, which culminated in 1979 in NATO's infamous "double track" decision concerning armament.

The deployment of US medium-range missiles in the FRG caused great damage not only to detente. It also hit hard at relations with the USSR. The appearance of Pershing 2s and cruise missiles in Mutlangen and Neue Ulm meant that for the first time in the postwar years a direct threat of war to the Soviet Union again came from German soil. The Soviet people began to wonder what Bonn's intentions really were. They wanted to know what the Germans wanted to achieve by that and what their plans with regard to the USSR were. Concern was mounting, especially after the FRG leadership emphasised with pride that their Chancellor was the father of the "double track" decision.

The greater part of the West German population (up to three-quarters by some estimates) realised the threat to the world. "No missiles

in the West and in the East"—under this slogan a tide of protest demonstrations rolled across the country. Hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in the capital or at military bases. Following the movement of the 1950s against remilitarisation, and the mass action in the 1960s against attempts to provide the Bundeswehr with nuclear arms, the anti-missile movement in the country reached unprecedented proportions, demonstrating the Germans' unwillingness to be involved in a new dangerous venture.

At the dramatic Bundestag session in November 1982 the deputies of the Green Party and the Social Democrats tried to make use of the entire arsenal of parliamentary procedures to delay the adoption of the unpopular decision on missile deployment. "The war threat should never come from German soil"—this demand, repeated by millions, was then included in official communiques.

Reason triumphed in the end, and the INF Treaty was signed. But that did not occur automatically. It required a new approach to the theory and practice of international relations and new thinking generated by the Soviet leadership.

The FRG government, too, had to reckon with the will of its own people. It played a positive role, no doubt, at the concluding stage of Soviet-American talks on the issue. The solution to the Pershing 1A problem and also the preparedness of the West German side to allow inspection on its territory do credit to the Kohl government. The elimination of the missiles helps to improve Soviet-West German relations, since thus one of the main obstacles in the way of their development is being removed.

It is already noticeable now that the time of hostility and alienation is receding ever farther into the past. The ties between our peoples and their cultures, which have a record of centuries, are being gradually restored." These words said by Mikhail Gorbachev during the meeting with Lothar Späth, Prime Minister of the Baden-Württemberg in February 1988 in Moscow very accurately reflected the new trend.

Similar pronouncements have been made by the FRG leaders. Chancellor Helmut Kohl, President Richard von Weizsäcker, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher spoke about the "central significance" of cooperation with the USSR for Bonn.

So what is needed to make this process go on faster, without a downturn, which has so often been the case in the past? What is to be done to make the new positive changes irreversible?

For objective reasons security matters have always been among the main ones in our relations. Due consideration for one another's vital interests in this sphere has always been, and remains, the cornerstone without which a sound foundation of confidence and cooperation cannot be built. Regrettably, in the past security matters were more often a heavy drag on progress in Soviet-West German relations as a whole.

Owing to the bold and far-reaching moves of the Soviet Union, there is a real prospect of making these questions a matter of business-like partnership. We need dialogue more than ever before, not just monologues when each sets forth his own position, or polemics in which the sides accuse or reproach each other. We need a dialogue in which joint thinking produces useful ideas that help lower the level of military confrontation on the continent. Such a dialogue should concentrate on the entire range of nuclear issues, on ways of achieving the speediest elimination of chemical weapons and conventional arms which now have a notably greater role to play in the European balance of forces.

We would not sin against the truth to say that the stances of the

USSR and the FRG on these matters have more in common now than any time before. This offers Europe the chance to throw off at least part of the excessive burden of armaments under which it has been languishing during the last decades. Ideas consonant with the Soviet moves are fermenting not only in the social democratic quarters, where the concept of "partnership in security matters" is being advocated, but also in the government parties. It is here that we may expect good results and achieve greater unity. Regrettably, the experience of the past years makes us cautious about Bonn statements. Is there a guarantee that the old stance will not prevail?

It is often said that cooperation in security matters suggests an appropriate level of trust among people. It is hard to argue against that. And why argue? Wouldn't that resemble an argument over what came first—the chicken or the egg? Wouldn't it be better to proceed both ways—to build up confidence and strengthen security? But there is a trap set up for us in both cases—the notorious "image of the enemy" which took shape in the cold war years.

Over the lifetime of two generations fear of an "invasion from the East" was being ingrained in the minds of West Germans. The "Soviet threat", spiced with anti-Russian clichés that had been current at the start of this century, remained part of political thinking in West Germany for decades. In all fairness it must be admitted that the presence of a powerful grouping of Soviet armed forces close to the West German border gave grounds, say, for a question like this: "Will it take the Russians two or three days to drive their tanks to the Rhine?" "It is not subjective intentions but real possibilities that count"—one could hear such reasoning from people who are far from being our bitter enemies.

Today, the Europeans—and our peoples are no exception, of course—feel the acute need to remove the accumulated suspicion and bias. We are learning to understand each other, while fundamental differences in our views remain. It is most important that we learn well to achieve good progress in such a momentous undertaking as the building of a common European home. The "image of the enemy" is gradually giving way to the image of the partner, of a neighbour with a world outlook he is not intending to impose on anybody.

It is necessary to unfetter our social consciousness, freeing it from the stereotypes that hamper the progress of goodneighbourly relations between us. For a long time, for instance, the image of the FRG as a state which has always been hostile to us, preparing for another attack on the East, was widespread in the Soviet Union. There were grounds for that, no doubt. But didn't that image turn by inertia into self-intimidation? Don't we sometimes ignore the obvious fact that the FRG today is no more aggressive than, say, France and Britain, its NATO allies?

We think that our mass media, too, had contributed to shaping the inadequate image of West Germany by portraying it at times as a state of revenge-seekers, and at times as a country of peace champions. Incidentally, an outburst of emotions over revanchism in our press usually coincided with a cold spell in relations between our countries. And, conversely, revenge-seeking was forgotten at periods of thaw. All this was inevitably misleading, and people could not form an objective opinion.

The problem of revanchism has a special place in our relations. There are many *Landmannschaften* (countrymen's associations) in the FRG uniting over 2.5 million people. One may agree, perhaps, that many migrants and their descendants have given up the illusion that they will return to the land of their ancestors. They have been deeply integrated into the economic, social and political structures of the FRG. One can

understand their wish to preserve their cultural traditions and national customs. But if it were only this!

Annual congresses of Sudeten and Silesian Germans, at which their leaders invariably discourse upon the 1937 German borders and state that the "Eastern treaties" are not obligatory for a "future united Germany", and that lasting peace in Europe is impossible unless the unity of "all Germans" is achieved, provide ever more proof that revanchism is not merely cold ashes, as it is alleged by some West German politicians. It would be more precise to compare it with smouldering coals being fanned from time to time by those who like to play with fire, forgetting that the flame can get out of control.

This is usually done for various time-serving considerations: either for obstructing the normalisation of relations with the East, or during election campaigns, when someone wants to win the votes of the ultra-Right. However, nationalism and chauvinism are known to have led Germans to catastrophe on several occasions. Mindful of those lessons of history, one should pull up the weeds before they grow tall.

And one more thing. Today, when Soviet foreign policy has become many times more dynamic and flexible, some West German politicians, and not only those in the government quarters, shout from rooftops that the "German question remains open". Their goal is to effect a turn in the Soviet policy with regard to German affairs, which would make the reunification of Germany possible. Some articles in the Soviet press, reflecting the pluralism of opinions in Soviet society today, and some utterances taken out of the general context are interpreted in the West as an erosion of the USSR's principled line on this question.

The official stand on this matter is known. Restoration of the unity of Germany as a state was provided for in the postwar Soviet proposals on German settlement. They were rejected by the West. Since then the situation in the world has changed cardinally. To expect Soviet foreign policy to return to what it was in the early 1950s is just as hopeless as to try to build a time machine. To insist on again opening up the "German question" is to deliberately doom Soviet-West German relations to failure. The only fair judge here is history.

Let history pass its verdict. But now there are more urgent problems to solve, the main of them being to exclude a situation in which the very existence of Germans, and all other European nations for that matter, would be at stake. Here, as we see it, the national interests of our two countries fully coincide, opening up truly unlimited opportunities for interaction.

The Soviet and West German leaders have announced on several occasions in recent time their preparedness to reappraise our relations and write a new chapter in them. What will that chapter be like? Will it be written by a bold and sure hand as was the case in 1955 and 1970s?

Fuller use should be made of the Moscow Treaty in the political sphere. The protocol on consultations signed by Eduard Shevardnadze and Hans-Dietrich Genscher in January 1988 in Bonn is a substantially new element in our contractual-legal basis. *Perestroika*, now under way in the USSR, offers still more opportunities for promoting trade and economic ties and giving effect to the existing agreements and understandings looking into the next century.

Time demands that a breakthrough be made in yet another area—in the humanitarian one. This cannot be done by means of one or two symbolic gestures. It can be the result only of painstaking efforts and persistent advance towards each other. Now it is an appropriate moment for this.

Hardly anyone would dare to deny that numerous contacts among people are an earnest of stable relations among states. The integrational practice in the eastern and western parts of Europe confirms this only too well. For instance, it is recalled with pride in the FRG that the age-old enmity between the Germans and the French was eliminated in this way. To a large extent, though not in everything, this was really so. Every section of West German society, all geographic regions of the country, are linked with the partners in France—from kindergartens to old people's homes, from large cities and Lands to tiny villages. The extent of contacts is, indeed, amazing.

The result is obvious: the policy of coming ever closer together, turning the Franco-West German relations into a key element of West European community, a policy advocated by the leaders of both states, is viewed by the population of these countries as a natural continuation of, and an addition to, the contacts among people.

All this is more difficult, no doubt, in the case of Soviet-West German relations. The FRG and France have identical social systems, a common border, and many other things conducive to integration. And still it is obvious that none of these excuses cannot obscure the main thing: contacts among people is the most reliable way of promoting cooperation among countries.

In recent years there has been an enormous upswing in interest to the Soviet Union among West Germans, mainly due to their sympathy with our *perestroika*. People want to see it with their own eyes and take part in shaping new relations between the two countries. One can feel a thirst for truthful information about the USSR. The fear of contacts is disappearing. Today they are a usual thing involving the entire party spectrum of the FRG—from the Communists to the CSU. Since his Moscow visit Franz Josef Strauss has been speaking positively about the Soviet Union! Mikhail Gorbachev's book *Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World* has been a bestseller for many months in West Germany! Only recently this could not be even imagined.

Contacts between members of parliament, trade unions, and women's, youth, sports and many other organisations have been rejuvenated. Relations between the Soviet Peace Committee and its numerous West German partners are developing in the spirit of "people's diplomacy". The growing cultural exchanges are taking ever more diverse forms. The Russian Orthodox Church cooperates effectively with the Evangelical Church of the FRG.

It must be admitted that all these contacts are limited mainly to the upper echelons, involving the mass of people to a smaller extent. Trade union relations, for instance, were established over 20 years ago. The leaders of a number of West German trade unions were among the pioneers of cooperation between the two countries. But today, as before, these contacts are mainly limited to the exchange of tiny delegations of trade union functionaries. Ordinary trade union members, the workers, receive little from such cooperation. True, in recent years there has been some progress there, too. But, on the whole, progress is extremely slow. And the situation is much the same in other spheres.

One of the most promising areas of cooperation, as world practice has shown, is partner relations between cities. This form of contacts is effective also in the Soviet-West German exchanges, which is evidenced by partnership between Saarbrücken and Tbilisi, Rostov-on-Don and Dortmund and about two dozen more couples of Soviet and West German cities. But it is a far cry from the 1,500 agreements on partnership between the cities of the FRG and France.

However, one should not shut his eyes to numerous attacks against our country in the press, in radio broadcasts of the Deutsche Welle, and

in the FRG's daily life. The TV bridges have shown that it is not easy at all to get rid of the influence of the past obstructions. Conceived as an instrument of rapprochement between the two nations, the TV bridges have failed to live up to the mark so far: the stress has often been not on the search for what is common between them but on differences.

The sprouts of the new find it hard to take root and are growing only where both sides displayed sincere, not just ostensible, care for them. Not everything has been done as expected, and not all projects have been effected. Perhaps precisely the lack of genuine will for practical deeds, which are replaced by eloquent declarations, prevented a spring of ties to grow into a wide flow. In order that this would not repeat, our relations require complete openness and publicity on both sides, or *Transparenz*, as they put it in the FRG.

The Soviet people show great interest in the Federal Republic. Krupp, Mercedes, Burda, Böll, Modern Talking, Fassbinder, the Green Party, *Berufsverbote*, the peace movement, unemployment—the range of knowledge about the FRG is wide and diverse in the Soviet Union. The FRG has become closer in many ways. And still it is fairly remote. Aware of this, the Soviet side is doing much to make up for what was lost. But we wouldn't go far without reciprocity.

Week festivals of West German films are very popular in the Soviet Union, largely because the Soviet organisers of the festivals do everything to make them a success. Bonn, however, shows a different approach to the week festivals of Soviet films in the FRG. How many millions of Soviet schoolchildren and students study German, and how many of their West German counterparts study Russian? Most people in the USSR know what *guten Tag* means, but very few persons in the FRG know the meaning of the Russian greeting *zdravstvuite*. And it is hard to imagine contacts without knowing the language of each other.

We are told in some tourist firms of the FRG that it is unprofitable to receive Soviet citizens. But is it right to display a purely commercial approach here? They did find money after all for the postwar reconciliation with Frenchmen and Britishers, in which no mean role was played by human contacts. Lavish allocations are made in the FRG—from the budget and private funds—to finance diverse exchanges with Western countries today as well.

Perhaps we could expect a more open and honest approach to the growth of economic ties. One obstacle to this growth, for instance, is the notorious black lists of COCOM, this cold war relic consolidating the economic split of Europe.

Admittedly, the Soviet side is not sinless either. Bureaucracy displayed in excess in some Soviet establishments, sluggishness, and the dogmatic and authoritarian way of thinking and of acting among some officials are all in the way of progress on this path. There also exist quite a few barriers to the growth of economic cooperation. West German businessmen know from their own experience about the command style of management, the atmosphere of indifference and incompetence which long prevailed in some Moscow offices. The reform of the mechanism of foreign economic activities under way in the Soviet Union is expected to eliminate these negative phenomena.

The concept of joint ventures is very promising. It is time to make a decisive step from the primitive (by modern standards) commodity exchange to industrial and scientific cooperation, to which the future belongs.

We are yet to gain experience in contacts with foreigners and to overcome the residual elements of fear caused by Stalinism. It is essen-

tial, though not easy, to remove the psychological and organisational barriers.

Admittedly, among a part of the Soviet population the word "Germany" is associated with the German Democratic Republic. This is a logical and natural phenomenon, a result of extensive ties with that country on all levels. Many Soviet citizens are yet to discover the other German state.

Many people have got used to read that the FRG is located at the dividing line between East and West. This is correct, no doubt. But the geopolitical location of that country tells us something else, too: it can play the role of a connecting seam, a bridge between the two parts of the continent. The 1970s demonstrated to the peoples of our countries the correctness of the simple idea that peace is the greatest value which both West Germans and the Soviet people should preserve. The Moscow Treaty was one of the first instances when the new political thinking, so insistently demanded in our days, was used. Both states have gained the experience of finding non-standard solutions in various historical situations, the experience which must be increased and enriched.

Today, when a bit more than a decade is left to the start of the new millennium, the question is what will the Russians and Germans take along with them into the 21st century, with what thoughts and feelings towards each other will they go there?

At a reception in the Kremlin on September 12, 1955, Konrad Adenauer proposed a toast "for good, friendly, and not just diplomatic", relations between the FRG and the USSR. Regrettably, during the time of his rule it remained just a good wish. The same fate befell other good intentions expressed now and again from high rostrums in Bonn. Now there is a real chance to go over from words to deeds, so that the relations between the two countries could get the "second wind".

Many signs indicate that the restructuring of relations between the USSR and the FRG has started, and these relations are reaching a new level. The Soviet Union has made its choice. And if the FRG government adheres to the same stand, then the forthcoming summit talks can really become a turning point in the history of our nations.

TIME TO GATHER STONES TOGETHER

Boris A SOYAN

South Africa has had bad luck: its development is lagging behind. While racial antagonisms are a thing of the past for most nations, South Africa is just entering a painful period when its system of racial discrimination is dying out.

To complicate matters for the regime, this process is developing under conditions of a wide spread of the mass media. What did the world know in the past about the policy of apartheid (its name was different, but not its essence) pursued, say, by the authorities of the United States and Australia with regard to the indigenous population? As a matter of fact, they employed far more brutal methods than the South African authorities do, with the effect of their actions being a great deal more harmful for the Indians and aboriginals. But who could protest then, and who wanted to? At that time the entire "civilised" world was busy seizing new lands and enslaving other peoples.

No wonder, then, that South Africa today resembles a fragment of the past mysteriously present in our time, a "forsaken land" where a system, long denounced and forgotten, has survived unchanged. South Africa fell behind and tries to make up for the lost time. Here, in my view, is the main source of its present misfortunes.

The government under Pieter Botha has been pursuing a policy of reforms for a decade now. But is there less of apartheid now? On the other hand, have we enough reason to say that these reforms have totally failed to change the monolithic system established by the National Party 40 years ago? Can we say that South Africa is moving from crisis to catastrophe? And, lastly, is it correct to say that we follow the rapid changes taking place in its political situation? Aren't we content with the old myths and old stereotypes associated with the country?

The situation in South Africa today cannot be assessed in simple terms. It is contradictory and multi-dimensional. One can see in it the sprouts of the future, which are growing, though not at all easily, through the strong and deep roots of the outgoing past. There is still a good deal of cruelty, intolerance, stupidity and bloodshed in it. But one should not fail to see the abundant reserve of goodwill, mercy, and talent. It is all pervaded with racism and ethnic chauvinism, but at the same time powerful trends towards what is common to the whole nation and non-racial are reviving.

So far, South Africa is solving the question of who runs the country or who will run it, but not the question of *how* it is run. There is an immense distance between these two questions which at first seemed so close, and perhaps years will pass before the former grows into the latter.

For the white minority this question is solved simply enough: the whites should remain in power, even if the blacks are granted political rights. The difference between the right and the ultra-right is purely

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semantic. Both wish to preserve discrimination (apartheid) on the level of major decision-making in the key areas of life.

This question is absolutely clear to the black majority as well: the "one man—one vote" principle, on which it uncompromisingly insists, will automatically turn the hourglass over. And there, too, the differences between political organisations over "who should run the country" are practically insignificant.

Possibly South Africa is not yet ready for an intelligent move to a reasonable compromise which would open the way to justice. Such decisions grow ripe at appropriate time.

But I will take the liberty of asserting that most South African Whites there admit, if not openly then to themselves, that a government with black-majority rule is inevitable. This inevitability is registered even in the statistics. In 1988 the whites made up 13 per cent of the population, while the Afrikaners,* among whom the ideas of retaining the white rule are especially strong, constituted roughly 9 per cent. In the year 2000 the difference will grow, and the share of the whites will drop to 12 per cent.

The situation at present, which is close to a stalemate, can hardly remain indefinitely. Drastic actions are necessary. All the participants in the South African drama realise that. The question is who starts first, and in what way the situation will change.

What is the situation in the two camps of South Africa today? One of the main causes of the stalemate in it is the lack of strong unity on both sides of the dividing line.

THE "WHITE TRIBE"

The first settlers from Europe—the Dutch and French—sought not only to provide security for themselves, but also to preserve their originality to ensure their survival in a hostile environment. Distrust of all people of a different nationality, especially of close neighbours, belief in being superior and unique, plus the Calvinist confidence in a divine predestination of races made up the basis on which the Afrikaner society was built.

The wars with the local tribes and with the British who came later tempered the Boers ("boer" is the Dutch for "peasant"). The Afrikaner nation was forged in the flames of almost incessant battles. Sometimes it is called "the white tribe of Africa". It is a nation which has produced Professor Christian Barnard, who was the first to transplant a human heart, and black reservations; a unique technology of producing liquid fuel from coal and laws of medieval cruelty; scientists designing the first space vehicle in African history and officials determining the race of a newborn baby by its hair and nails.

Far from everything is simple and easy in this tribe. Those who still think that it consists entirely of convinced racists who are opposed to cardinal changes and talks with the Black majority, are wrong. The Afrikaner society has been set in motion under the impact of many factors, including Botha's reforms. Deep-going changes are under way, eroding the elements of the racial discrimination system.

While people like Sampie Terre Blanche, a professor at Stellenbosch University, are in search for liberty of conscience, the people of Eugene Terre Blanche, head of the fascist-like group AWB, driven by Calvinist intolerance, preach slavery. Convinced opponents of apartheid reject

* Afrikaners (Boers) are descendants of the Dutch and French who arrived in South Africa in the mid-17th century. Early in 1988, they accounted for 60 per cent of the 4.8 million whites in the country. The second largest group of white South Africans comes from Great Britain (over one million). The white community also includes Portuguese, Germans and other Europeans.

prestigious posts in parliament and join the South Africans, whatever the colour of their skin, who fight against the barbaric system. Children of the Afrikaner elite flee abroad, refusing to serve in the army which performs police functions in Black suburbs and is conducting a war of aggression against the neighbouring African states. Some White young people join "Umkonto We Sizwe", the combat detachments of the African National Congress. The dictates of conscience appear to be stronger than the call of white skin, so making the complex situation in the self-isolated minority still more complicated.

The white tribe, being split apart by contradictions which have grown most acute since the mid-1970s, is rapidly losing the desire and readiness to fight for the ideals of yesterday. In this tribe the gods of the past are now looked upon as false idols not worthy of worship. It looks for new ideals, but does not find them. Neither the ruling National Party, which has a long political record, nor the young oppositional Conservative party, which has set out to revive the decrepit foundations of apartheid, can offer it such ideals. Nor can the Whites rely on the Liberals, who have been acting with indecision over all these years of apartheid and have failed to provide a real counterbalance to the official ideology. Moreover, they lost their former positions in 1987, when, it seemed, they could have attained good results under the conditions of reforms, and while the anti-apartheid movement was on the upswing. Such ideals could come neither from ultra-Right groups like the AWB, nor from the "new liberals" in the intellectual quarters.

New ideals that can be readily accepted by all South Africans, whatever their skin colour, can appear only within a relatively long period, as the existing bastions and barricades are dismantled. This process would be much easier, if the authorities would be bold enough to abrogate the remaining apartheid laws which no longer play the role for which they were adopted and only destroy the future of South Africa.

Apartheid is so shameful and unseemly a phenomenon that only its most zealous backers can advocate it publicly. It is only from the ultras that we can hear today words in its defence—an echo of the time and morals long gone. They alone still see apartheid as a viable version of South African society based on minority rule, the minority being ready to carry the desired "burden of the white man". The life they envision for the Afrikaners smells of death and devastation. The temple of freedom for the Afrikaners, they declare, can be restored only after all liberals have been done away with. In other words, the positions of the ultras can be secured only at the cost of millions of lives.

The savage movement led by Eugene Terre Blanche is sure to melt away, but how much suffering is it going to cause the Afrikaners before that? The ultra-Right are rocking the boat of Afrikaner nationalism, which is shaky to begin with. I do not believe that they will ever be able to seize power, but I admit quite definitely that they will become increasingly negative factor for stability as the country proceeds along the path of change.

The followers of Eugene Terre Blanche are proud of their rigid views and predict that the liberals will sooner or later see the light. Well, the way the so-called reformers behave today, is a sign that they are in doubt, contemplating the possibility of returning to the "laager" when they would throw off the chains of reforms, pick up again the whip and the rifle, and go on war path.

The government, utmostly infuriated by the proportions the crisis has reached and the pressure being exerted by most diverse forces, is suppressing with shocking ruthlessness any brain work, denying any chance of free and peaceful development to almost 100 million people living in the south of Africa. South Africa is entering the last decade of

this century under the threadbare banner of military despotism completely stained with the blood of Angolans, Mozambicans, and their own peoples—a fierce civilisation, its gilt peeling off. Its political leaders seem to be at a loss, unprepared for long-term political decisions. South Africa is all alone now, more than any time before, and this loneliness is becoming ever more hopeless.

How long will the Afrikaner, with whom the whole civilised world sympathised in his sufferings at the start of this century, remain silent? How long will he shut his eyes to the barbarity of his leaders and the police? "There is a permanent revolutionary tribunal in every man," wrote Alexander Herzen, "and there is merciless Fouquier-Tinville and, most important, there is a guillotine. Sometimes the judge would fall asleep, and the guillotine would go rusty..., and all of a sudden a wild blow would awaken the erroneous jury, the dozing executioner, and savage reprisals would follow... There is no option: they would execute people and advance further, or else, pardoning them, they would have to stop half-way." ¹ This is the dilemma the Afrikaner is faced with.

THE BLACK COMMUNITY

We see apartheid mainly as a problem of the colour of one's skin. Whites oppress Blacks, and Blacks have to fight for their freedom.

But in reality it is not at all that simple. For instance, many wealthy Blacks today are better off than many poor Whites. But being black still limits their opportunities, preventing them from making full use of their finances. On the other hand, the Black businessman feels strong enough to bar White business from Black regions. And the struggle for the Black consumer, who accounts today for 50 per cent of the purchasing capacity of the entire population, is growing increasingly severe.

Pieter Botha's reforms facilitate to some extent a gradual transformation of purely racial barriers into social ones. Stratification is going on rapidly within the Black community and among Afrikaners, where the social distance between the wealthy and less wealthy has been traditionally short. This tradition has a long history. The White millionaire is just as inaccessible as in any other Western society. But the Black millionaire, too, gradually distances himself from his less lucky tribesmen.

In recent years the South African working class has lost many typical features associated with apartheid. This was largely due to the abrogation of the laws limiting workforce migration, the legalisation of Black trade unions, the lifting of bans on some trades and professions for Blacks, and the gradual evening out of the wage level of Black and White workers. The relationships between the worker and the employer are changing fast: in many companies shares are sold to Black and White workers alike, and Blacks are given not only access to high posts, but also an opportunity to live in "White" districts.

Due to all these measures a part of Black working people are beginning to respond positively to the idea of "social peace" and to arguments against strikes and anti-government action. They express ever more often the view that strikes, as well as international sanctions against South Africa, ultimately cause a worsening of the working people's conditions. It should be also borne in mind that in the past decade the living standards of Black South Africans (earnings and access to education, medical care, the mass media, etc.) have grown far higher than in the rest of Africa and than in many countries of the Third World.

Meanwhile, the Black trade unions, their total membership running into millions, have become a powerful political factor in the struggle against apartheid, and now they play an ever bigger role in the anti-racist movement.

Under these conditions the unwillingness of the white trade unions and white workers to agree to a lifting of racist barriers is more pronounced than ever. Many white workers are active in right-wing and pro-fascist groups. They are worried, among other things, by the fact that Blacks are competing ever more successfully with Whites on the labour market. Unemployment among Whites, though still low arouses greater racist sentiments among the White working people.

The White racism of the ultra-Right groups is "balanced" by the Black racism of the ultra-Left forces which deny the White man his historical right to live in South Africa and demand his banishment. The struggle against the "others" racism has turned in these groups into a struggle for their "own" chauvinism. This makes them objectively similar to the ultra-Right: none of them accepts compromises and the slogan "Everything for Us or Nothing for Anyone" is advanced by all of them. The danger of these tendencies must not be underestimated.

Today the entire picture of social and political life in South Africa is growing rapidly more complex. Not everything has come to the surface yet, but there is no doubt that someday it will.

The Black urban population, for instance, which makes up almost half of the Black South Africans, is an immense force. Before 1976 we did not even know about Soweto, a city with a population of 1.5 to 2 million, which is absent on maps. In this immense human hive, where hunger, poverty and crime intermingle with the dubious wealth of a few lucky ones, ideas of overthrowing the world of injustice are fermenting. Soweto, like other unrecognised giants, is a social force which is yet to demonstrate its whole strength. No possible version of South Africa's future can be imagined without it.

In political terms South Africa is an equation with many unknown quantities. Besides Soweto, the Bantustans too, are joining the struggle. Despite all the limitations imposed on them and their truncated independence, they have parliaments and political parties of their own. The political self-awareness of the population living without apartheid laws is growing there with every passing year. They are, in a sense, a school of political struggle for millions of Black Africans. What way will their development go?

At the same time it would be a mistake to ignore the considerable ethnic contradictions within the black majority, contradictions which add fuel to the flames of grave differences among various black political groupings. The common goal of smashing apartheid has helped so far to hold these contradictions and personal ambitions in check, but there have already been instances when they erupted into severe clashes, often causing heavy casualties. African nationalism will also have a long way to go before it becomes truly African nationalism or, which is still more preferable, South African nationalism, a fusion of the nationalism of the Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa and other peoples.

Some of these clashes, as in Pietermaritzburg, lasted long, giving new grounds for assertions that a civil war had already broken out between Black South Africans, and that it would inevitably grow to nationwide proportions if the Black majority comes to power. Many opinion polls conducted among Whites and Blacks have shown that such an outcome is a real, and almost the main, threat looming large in South Africa.

Evidence given by witnesses reflects a gloomy picture of violence in the Pietermaritzburg suburbs (in the White districts of the city the situation is rather calm). At night people do not go to bed, listening to the sounds in the streets. On hearing the patter of feet nearby, accompanied by war cries and the sound of drums, they know that this may be their last night. The zone of the undeclared war between the combat groups of the Zulu political organisation "Inkhata" and of the United Democra-

tic Front * covers the entire territory of the black population. Even children take part in this bloody war. All entertainment is forgotten in those areas. Weddings and parties gave way to incessant funerals. The belligerent groupings recruit people for their armies by force. Those who refuse are beaten to death. An escape of a potential recruit may cost death to his parents.

Fanaticism and uncompromisingness reign in the African districts, and any deviation from the adopted political line of today is regarded as betrayal to be immediately punished with shocking cruelty. Meanwhile those who collaborate with the authorities or just avoid being active in the struggle are labelled "sellouts" and may face a mob trial.

Those mob trials which end in burning the victim alive are abominable. The execution cynically called "necklace" is carried out like this: the condemned person is tied hand and foot, often after being severely beaten, and lashed to a post or a tree with a car tyre drenched in petrol around his neck. The tyre is set alight and the frenzied mob often goes dancing round the human torch. Sometimes such punishments have been meted out on behalf of ANC. The "necklace" has lately been replaced by another monstrosity called "mannequin" and smacking of the cultural revolution of Chairman Mao's times. Stripped naked, the accused is led along the streets and made to confess his "crimes" to every person he meets on the way.

Somebody could say that revolutions have always made short work of their traitors. However, there have been also instances of rampant violence throwing revolutions off the revolutionary path.

The danger of such developments had been foreseen by Nelson Mandela a quarter of a century back. "Without due leadership and control," he said, "outbreaks of terrorism will give rise to hostility and bitterness among races to an extent which cannot be caused even by war".

If only the Afrikaner leaders had heeded his words then...

TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

One can often hear today that a majority government has already been formed and functions in South Africa: no matter what the government in Pretoria does, it will fail to achieve success without the consent of the Black population. To some extent this assertion is correct. Indeed, the strength of the oppressed people has reached a point where it can "veto" any plans of the government. This is a basically new and most important characteristic of the anti-racist movement of South Africa in the 1980s. The call issued by the African National Congress to "render South Africa ungovernable" has not only reached the people, but was implemented and has been accepted by all, to become a rule, despite the repressions used by the authorities and their punitive laws. All this confirms once again the immense influence the ANC exerts in the country, the effectiveness of its slogans, and its prestige among the Black population both in the cities and in the Bantustans.

On the other hand, the assertions about a "majority rule" being a reality contain a great deal of cynicism. One can usually hear them being said with various shades of meaning by both the ultra-Right and by liberals. These assertions are designed to show that all is well now, that the government allegedly heeds the suggestions of the majority and there-

* "Inkhata" has a membership of about 1 million and exercises immense influence among the Zulu, the largest ethnic group in South Africa (6.4 million). It advocates an evolutionary non-violent way of eliminating apartheid. Its leader is Gatsha Buthelezi.

The United Democratic Front comprises over 700 various organisations and groups (also on a non-racial basis) coming out against apartheid from legal positions. In February 1988 the political activities of the Front were banned.

for the best thing is to stop at that. And set to restoring apartheid, add the ultra-Right. Much the same is heard in speeches by the ruling elite, which today speaks more about the economic reform than about political changes.

It would be a great mistake to believe, as some people do in South Africa that the time has come to make a halt, at least in order to pause for breath after the fast changes. The changes were rapid, indeed, there is no doubt about that. For the Whites, and especially for the Afrikaners, the changes, possibly, were revolutionary. But to stop now, when South Africa has been stirred to action, when it is at the crossroads, and when there is the alternative of peaceful change, would mean to give the die-hards an opportunity to take over the initiative, to try to discredit the policy of change and commit provocations enkindling racial enmity and pushing the country onto a suicidal path of civil war.

There is no doubt that they are capable of doing this. However, some much respected journalists and scholars assert that the fascist-like tendencies are too insignificant in the White community to be taken into consideration and groups like the AWB can be easily quashed by the police. To get an idea of the amount of damage they can cause, one should refer to history which knows many examples when a handful of seemingly harmless bandits, with time developed into a worldwide threat. Under certain circumstances the AWB is quite capable of creating an atmosphere of terror which would reduce to naught all the positive movements to changes. This dangerous prospect should be reckoned with.

Trust among people is an agonising problem in South Africa today. Though the stereotypes associated with race, with skin colour are being gradually eroded this process is extremely slow. When one listens to White leaders, one feels no trust on their part but hostility and the unwillingness to understand, with the single aim to suppress and to impose their own will, their own solutions. But when they speak of the need for change, what they actually mean to say is how these changes can be bypassed. As they talk of justice, they mean privileges for a chosen few. Distrust is felt throughout the discourse by Afrikaners about the need for change. Whites fear that Blacks will treat them as the Whites treat Africans. Alan Paton, great South African writer, had brilliantly predicted the present political situation in his book *Cry, the Beloved Country*, which was published in 1948, the year when the National Party came to power. His words are often recalled today in South Africa. In that novel Black priest Msimanhangu muses about the time when Whites would at long last see the injustice of racial discrimination: "I have one great fear in my heart, that one day when they turn to loving they will find we are turned to hating."

This danger has always existed, and it is still there today. Most of the opponents of apartheid want justice for all and a fair share of the common pie. But before that, the pie should become really common. So far, only the Whites eat it, leaving the crumbs to the Blacks, although the latter still have an immense reserve of goodwill.

The African National Congress, one of the oldest political organisations in South Africa, remains the only force having a programme for the country's future development. The Charter of Freedom adopted in 1955 by delegates of numerous anti-racist organisations, who at that time adhered only to positions of non-violence, sets the chief goal of the struggle directly in its preamble: South Africa must belong to all who live in it, Blacks and Whites alike.

Calling for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa, the programme is no less topical today than it was 33 years ago. It may well serve as the basis for bringing together all, even the extreme, points of view. If one reads it carefully, not as was done, for instance, by the Heri-

tage Foundation officials who analysed in one of their bulletins the Charter of Freedom from cold-war positions (most of the arguments and quotations referred to the cold-war period), but the way this document should be read, one will not fail to see that in its essence it meets the interests of the overwhelming majority of the South African population, regardless of skin colour.

I am convinced that those who fiercely attack the ANC and its slogans will some day re-read the Charter of Freedom and be amazed by their short-sightedness. I think it would be appropriate to quote from Alan Paton again. In the book under the symbolic title **Save the Beloved Country**, published forty years later, after the author's death, he wrote: "The great problem which confronts white South Africans and their country today is whether they will be able to undo the damage of the Verwoerdian doctrines * and gain, to some extent at least, the trust and confidence of Black South Africa in the goodness of their intentions."

REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION

The question of whether there is a revolutionary situation in South Africa is debated nowadays not only in universities of the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union. It is discussed on a fairly broad scale in South Africa itself. There are diametrically opposed points of view, which is only natural, and they do not necessarily reflect the political nature of one or another camp. For example, Andrian Vlok, South Africa's Minister of Law and Order, stated on several occasions that there was a revolutionary situation in South Africa and so harsh police reprisals were justified. President Pieter Botha also speaks of a revolutionary situation, though, of course, with a sarcastic tinge, hinting that it is a propaganda cliché of the enemy and should not therefore be regarded seriously.

It is a paradox, but the ultra-Right declare with conviction that the National Party is to blame that a revolutionary situation has taken shape in the country, a situation which can end only in a revolution if the Nationalists go on pursuing their policy of "betrayal". Conservative Party leader Andries Treurnicht has listed the sins of the National Party: reforms which reflect the semi-permanent state of emergency, the constant threat of sanctions, the depreciated rand, the economy taking on Third World features, whole cities of squatters, almost imperial presidential rule, bureaucracy which has swollen to unbelievable proportions, White unemployment the terror and impotence of the police in the Black suburbs, limitations on freedom of the press, the blurring out of "White" residential districts, growing emigration which exceeds immigration, the tremendous rise of the Black trade unions, the increase of taxes, the mounting government spending, the monopolisation of the economy, the spread of corruption, the outbreak of crime, the restrictions on democracy, and so on.

However, the solution the conservatives offer is to step up repression, whatever the consequences for the domestic political and economic situation. It must be admitted, though, that the description of the results achieved due to the political line of President Botha is fair enough in some points.

The revolutionary situation is discussed, of course, in the Black community, too. And opposite points of view exist there as well. Several Black leaders, like, for instance Buthelezi, refuse to recognise the signs of a revolutionary situation and assert that South Africa is not ripe for a revo-

* Hendrik Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 to 1966, one of the architects of apartheid.

lution, that a revolution might reduce to naught all efforts aimed at a peaceful and evolutionary advance to a society without apartheid.

Pronouncements by ANC spokesmen prompt the conclusion that at present the situation in the country has reached a stage very close to one at which conditions required for a revolutionary situation may arise, and it is believed that such conditions are sure to appear.

Perhaps it would be useful to turn to a classical definition of a revolutionary situation and examine it in the context of modern South Africa.

In his work "The Collapse of the Second International" written in 1915 Lenin defined the political situation preceding the revolution: "(1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the "upper classes", a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for "the lower classes not to want" to live in the old way; it is also necessary that "the upper classes should be unable" to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual, (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in "peace time", but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the "upper classes" themselves into independent historical action.

Without these objective changes, which are independent of the will, not only of individual groups and parties but even of individual classes, a revolution, as a general rule, is impossible. The totality of all these objective changes is called a revolutionary situation."²

Lenin stressed then that "...it is not every revolutionary situation that gives rise to a revolution; revolution arises only out of a situation in which the above mentioned objective changes are accompanied by a subjective change, namely, the ability of the revolutionary mass action **strong** enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, "falls", if it is not toppled over."³

If revolution is viewed as a brief and unanimous onslaught of the revolutionary forces sweeping away rotten power, then, in my opinion, such a revolution is hardly possible under the conditions existing in South Africa, at least because power is in the hands of not just the upper crust of a class, but of an ethnic group, which is to a certain extent united and is not opposed by a monolithic working class rallied round one programme. Revolution in the South African context can be regarded only as a relatively long period of revolutionary battles, international pressure, intricate political and diplomatic manoeuvring, and, to use Lenin's expression, "intervals of counterrevolutionary convulsions"⁴ of the ruling system.

Revolutions have never erupted spontaneously, without being prepared. This is an indisputable historical fact. A revolution is always a lengthy process. And, according to Lenin, even a revolutionary situation does not necessarily end in a revolution.

Even if conditions are ripe for an upheaval due to certain conditions of social and economic development, "it would be a mistake to think that the revolutionary classes are invariably strong enough to effect a revolution". Human society is not something reasonably and "suitably" arranged. "A revolution may be ripe, and yet the forces of its revolutionary creators may prove insufficient to carry it out, in which case society decays, and this process of decay sometimes drags on for decades."⁵ These words are quite applicable to the present situation in South Africa. Revolution is long overdue there. The apartheid regime evokes revulsion all over the world. International pressure on it is mounting, the movement against apartheid is on the rise within South Africa, the lower strata do

not want, and the upper ones do not seem able to live in the old way, that is, all the necessary conditions are there, but the oppressed class has not enough strength to accomplish a revolution. But the decay has begun and is noticeable not only in the political and ideological spheres but in the economy as well. In this state of the "impotent balance" of forces the authorities are obviously at a loss, lacking clear guidelines, incapable of making decisions that would meet the long-term interests of the country. Hence the instances of lurching from reprisals to concessions and back to reprisals.

But apartheid definitely cannot hold back social development. Its narrow limits come into ever greater conflict with the interests of the bourgeoisie, and the interests of the intellectuals, and it is becoming the main obstacle to progress.

Historical parallels—just like long-term forecasts—are quite a risky affair. One can, however, understand those in South Africa who see in the present situation some features resembling the situation during the first Russian revolution.

I shall cite here without comment an extract from Lenin's work "The Denouement is at Hand" written in 1905: "The sole purpose of the government's retreat is, as we have already said, to enable it choose what it considers a new and a more favourable situation for a battle. The proclamation of the 'liberties' that adorn the scrap of paper known as the Manifesto of October 17 is merely an attempt to prepare the moral conditions for a struggle against the revolution, while Trepov, at the head of the all-Russian Black Hundreds, prepares the material conditions for that struggle.... In words, the government has begun to fall back, but in deed it has immediately begun to prepare for an offensive. Promises of a constitution have been followed by the most brutal and ugly acts of violence, which have seemed purposely designed to give the people a still more striking object lesson of the real significance of the autocracy's real power. The contrast between promises, words and scraps of paper, on the one hand, and the facts of reality, on the other, has become infinitely more manifest. Events have begun to provide a telling confirmation of a truth we long ago proclaimed to our readers, and shall repeat over and over again, namely, that until tsarism's actual power is overthrown, all its concessions, and even a constituent assembly, are a phantom, a mirage, a piece of deception."⁶

But, again, drawing parallels is a risky affair. Any of the many unexplored aspects can change the whole picture, giving rise to an absolutely new and unpredictable turn of events. There have been quite a few instances of this in history.

It is safe to state that the revolution in South Africa is already going on. One cannot entirely rule out, of course, that the government will try to wriggle out the fix by making concessions. But this is unlikely, since support for the regime is rapidly shrinking not only in South Africa, but also outside it. A relative outcast, say, in the 1960s, South Africa has become a total outcast today.

This is precisely why the second version—victory of the anti-apartheid movement—is most probable. The disgraceful war being waged by Pretoria against weak and poor African countries lays bare the aggressiveness of the ruling regime. The long undivided dominance of racist ideology has built up among the people an immense reserve of revolutionary energy, which is not easy to neutralise. Ever larger segments break away from the "white tribe", segments which, even if not going over to the opposed camp, become enemies of the ideology and policy of the ruling minority. The allies of the liberation forces, voluntary or not, from among intellectuals, businessmen, religious leaders, and the youth are growing in number every day. This factor, no doubt, is making victory ever more probable.

South Africa has clearly gone astray from the path on which Botha was trying to set it and, as the Russian writer Herzen put it, "is hurtling along through crimes and absurdities towards calamities which, perhaps, will be rectified, but will certainly leave a trace."

One of the main problems facing South Africa today is that there is no leader among the Whites who honestly admits what is now obvious to the overwhelming majority of the population: that sooner or later South Africa will be ruled by a government in which there will be more Blacks than Whites. There are no leaders who understand that only such a solution can guarantee security for Whites, for Afrikaners, for their culture, language and religion. Because any other version will most likely cause bloodshed and a very protracted, perhaps endless, war, not only between races but between the various political factions, which it would be much harder to stop then, than to make a step towards concord today.

South Africa is still at the stage of growth. While other nations are becoming "elderly" or have long been so, it is growing at a rapid pace, with still a long way to go to reach its full potential which is, indeed, immense. All that is going on today may well turn out to be merely preparatory work for the future which this wonderful country, abounding in human talent, well deserves. It stirs all people not only because the wheel of history has bogged down there in some incredible way at this barbaric period of rule. The world feels that there is a large reserve of strength in South Africa, a powerful energy potential capable of leading it on the path of great progress.

One can sometimes hear that it is unwise to curse the past, that the heritage of the past should be used one way or another for future development, and that for historical development it is not very important how that heritage was built—through bloodshed or peacefully. But future generations of South Africans will not be indifferent to how this preparatory work will proceed and how much blood will be shed on the foundations of a new South Africa.

This should be the concern of not only Africans, but of all who are involved one way or another in the tragic drama in the south of Africa.

¹ А И Герцен, *Сочинения* в 9 тт., Vol 3, Moscow, 1958

² V I Lenin *Collected Works*, Vol 21, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, pp 213-214

³ *Ibid* p 214

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 215

⁵ *Ibid*, Vol 9, p 368

⁶ *Ibid*, pp 447-448.

AFGHANISTAN: CONTINUING THE BEGINNING

By August 15 half of the Soviet troops is to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. The process of the Afghan settlement whose foundations were laid by the Geneva accords continues.

The accords on a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan deal with the external aspects of the Afghan problem. They were signed in the Geneva Palais des Nations on April 14, 1988. The road to it was long and hard. It required seven rounds of strenuous talks between the Afghan and Pakistani delegations and much effort by the UN Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and his personal representative and the UN mediator on Afghanistan, Diego Cordovez, who made repeated trips to the region. Mutually acceptable agreements were attained thanks to patience, readiness to compromise and, last but not least, what we now call new political thinking.

The Afghan-Pakistani bilateral talks (Iran declined to join) were first called "indirect" and then "close-distance". They began in Geneva in June 1982 and ended in the signing of four documents in April 1988: the Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular, on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention; the Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; the Declaration on International Guarantees, signed for the government of the USSR by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze, and for the government of the USA by Secretary of State George Shultz; the Agreement on the Interrelationship for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan. Attached to this last document as a component part is a memorandum of understanding, which specifies the forms, methods and questions of providing technical facilities for the work of the representatives of the UN Secretary General and the personnel at his disposal for control over the implementation of the agreements listed above.

The Geneva accords came into force last May 15. Thereupon Afghanistan and the Soviet Union proceeded to scrupulously fulfil their obligations flowing from the accords. The withdrawal of Soviet troops began when, on May 15, their first column left Jalalabad. The event was witnessed by more than a hundred foreign journalists who arrived expressly in Afghanistan, and by UN observers headed by General Rauli Helminen, head of UNGOMAP.

The Afghan authorities and Soviet military command in Afghanistan provided all facilities for the normal functioning of UNGOMAP on Afghan soil. This was done in strict conformity with the relevant Geneva documents and, in the case of the limited contingent of Soviet armed forces, to the extent that the task concerned it. The Afghan authorities put

premises, living quarters and automobile transport² at the disposal of the mission's staff group in Kabul, and see to the safety of UN observers on their tours of the country, which is not easy in view of continuing hostilities. They have assisted the mission in setting up observation posts at two points on the Afghan-Soviet border—Hairaton and Turgundi—to supervise the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

General Helminen told a news conference in Kabul that the UN observers group received constant aid and support from the Afghan authorities. All problems were promptly settled with due regard to the mission's wishes. The General spoke highly of the assistance being rendered by Soviet military command in Afghanistan to the UN observers. He confirmed the fact that the observers were getting the necessary information from the Soviet military and registering the passage of troop columns and their crossing of the Afghan-Soviet frontier. General Helminen stressed that the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces was proceeding smoothly and on schedule.

All this prompted UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar to voice satisfaction during his meeting with President Najibullah in New York at the Afghan side's compliance with the Geneva accords.

Paragraph 6 of the Agreement on the Interrelationship for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan stipulates that from May 15, 1988, onwards there shall be no interference or intervention in any form in the affairs of the sides, the international guarantees shall be in force; the voluntary repatriation of refugees shall begin and be completed within the timeframe set in the agreement on the voluntary return of refugees, and the phased withdrawal of foreign troops shall begin and be completed according to the schedule envisaged in Paragraph 5.

As far as the withdrawal is concerned, everything is clear, and there is no room for doubt even to the most exacting controllers. In particular, Diego Cordovez who once again made a shuttle visit to the region noted with satisfaction that Soviet troops were withdrawn strictly in keeping with the schedule. Under paragraph 5 of the agreement on the interrelationship, half the Soviet armed forces is to be withdrawn by August 15, 1988, and the pullout of all troops is to be completed within nine months, that is, by February 15, 1989.

What about other provisions of paragraph 6?

Afghanistan has adopted measures necessitated by the repatriation of refugees. It has enacted laws guaranteeing their political, social and economic rights and established a ministry in charge of refugees, and is setting up receiving centres for repatriates in areas bordering on Pakistan and Iran. Lastly, the Afghan government has allocated substantial funds and material resources to meet the needs of tribes, poor sections of the population and repatriates, specifically in the form of gratuitous Soviet aid worth over 300 million dollars. A considerable part of the cantonments and property being left by the Soviet troops that are pulling out will be used for repatriates' needs; it is worth about 600 million rubles. As many as 130,000 Afghans returned to their country between early 1987 and June 1988, in the course of the national reconciliation being promoted by Kabul. Speaking to the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, President Najibullah gave the assurance that Afghanistan would continue sincerely and conscientiously meet its commitments under the Geneva accords.

The Soviet position on the accords is equally explicit. We will do everything possible to honour the accords. It is necessary to make an appropriate comment on the speculations about the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan. Yes, Soviet troops are leaving the country. However, the co-operation of the two neighbouring states, the two friendly nations in the political, economic, scientific, cultural, and technological fields will conti-

nue and expand. Russia has maintained contacts with Afghanistan for a long time. Now, is it possible to disrupt them? We are in favour of a neutral, non-aligned and friendly Afghanistan.

We regret to put it on record that Islamabad has openly and in fact formally taken a stand for fully ignoring this commitments. The Pakistani President pretends that there is nothing worthy of attention in the Geneva accords but the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from Afghanistan. Foreign interference in Afghan affairs did not stop after May 15 but intensified.

The creation of the so-called transitional government of Afghanistan by the Afghan opposition on the territory of Pakistan is a gross violation of the Geneva accords. This clearly contradicts the obligations assumed by Pakistan under the agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the principles concerning mutual relations. As Yuli Vorontsov, First Deputy of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated to the chargé d'affaires of Pakistan in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "in these conditions the balance of the obligations of the parties which is the foundation of the Geneva accords is becoming increasingly fragile, which puts into question the implementation of the entire package of measures linked with the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. The Pakistan leadership will bear the responsibility for all consequences entailed by the incessant violations of the Geneva agreements by the Pakistani side."

Nor can we understand the attitude of the United States, one of the signatories to the Declaration on International Guarantees and the Agreement on Interrelationship. Commenting on his talks with Mikhail Gorbachev, President Reagan said that the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan created a positive precedent for settling other regional conflicts. Meanwhile, the USA pursues, through Pakistan, its arms deliveries for the opposition to the tune of millions of dollars.

Pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental principle of international law which also applies to the Geneva accords on Afghanistan. There is no tolerating a situation where one side—Afghanistan and the Soviet Union—is meeting its commitments under the accords while the other side—Pakistan and the United States—grossly ignores them.

THE FUTURE OF THE OLD WEAPON

Sergei VYBORN OV,
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With the start of real disarmament marked by the Soviet-American Treaty on the elimination of medium and shorter-range missiles the problem of conventional weapons has moved to the forefront. Plans for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals up to their complete elimination, on the one hand, and rapid modernisation of old, "traditional" types of weapons which open up totally new possibilities for their use, on the other, lead to the redistribution of military functions between nuclear and conventional armaments in favour of the latter.

This redistribution and the "compensation" of reductions in nuclear arsenals by the buildup of conventional arms is extremely dangerous because the measure of control by central political organs of the state over conventional weapons and their military use is substantially lower than over nuclear, and especially, strategic weapons.

Throughout the postwar period conventional armed forces and armaments have practically been overshadowed by the strategic and tactical nuclear systems. The presence of such a heavy "counterweight" as nuclear weapons minimised the importance of conventional arms balance, diminished the significance of qualitative and quantitative imbalances and asymmetries in personnel, number of divisions, tanks, artillery, tactical aviation, etc. According to military strategists, the nuclear weapons were supposed to perform all operational tasks both in the offensive and the defence, to reverse the most unfavourable course of combat in favour of the side using such kind of weapons.

Nuclear weapons have become a permanent, organic element of the armed forces of nuclear powers. Both the tactics of conventional armed forces and specifications of "classical" weaponry were adjusted to nuclear weapons. In this context, the historically established balance of conventional forces seemed to suit both sides (though this was not stated publicly) which did not seek any substantial changes in this field. Implicitly this is confirmed by, *inter alia*, the inefficiency of the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe conducted during fifteen years and the results of which were hardly any better than those of the disarmament effort of the League of Nations.

The Soviet programme of general and complete elimination of nuclear weapons up to the year 2000 has delivered a tangible blow on the dogmas of military strategy which emerged in the era of nuclear confrontation, on the habitually soothing confidence in the possession of a reliable and

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effective "superweapon". Publications in both the Soviet and Western press testify to the fact that changes in ideas, the comprehension of the realities of modern world are not an easy process. However, such changes are essential because they serve as an important guarantee of the irreversibility of disarmament and exclusion of "compensatory" approach to the solution of relevant problems.

The detailed analysis of problems concerning the promotion of security in the process of disarmament and, in the first instance, of the question of conventional forces and weapons' place and role in strengthening international peace and maintaining strategic stability is acquiring particular importance. It is the conventional armaments which in the context of deep reduction and, more so, of elimination of nuclear weapons are to guarantee national security and the defence of sovereign rights of interested parties. They consume the greater part of today's world military expenditures. We are on the verge of a new spiral of the most ruinous qualitative arms race, primarily in non-nuclear sphere; in certain fields we seem already to have begun to enter it.

However, some Western analysts assert that the cost of a weapon's system has the same growth rate as the gross domestic product (GDP), in any case, in those countries where there is a close link between the military and civil industries, therefore the arms race can be continued without raising the proportion of military expenditures in the GDP. Incidentally it is worth mentioning that, in our opinion, Western potential for raising military expenditures is quite considerable notwithstanding previous stereotypes. First, the NATO countries are far from utilising the full potential of their military-industrial specialisation and cooperation in the production of conventional armaments making only first steps in this highly lucrative field for military monopolies. Second, most NATO states have systematically fallen behind the agreed targets for the growth of military budgets, a situation which may change. Third, the absolute figures of aggregate Western GDP are substantially higher than for the socialist community which is equally important. Finally, the possibilities for "belt-tightening" in socialist countries are far from boundless which is not exclusively due to economic factors.

The problem of conventional armaments has the most acute character in Europe where runs the line of contact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty members, and hence the imminent threat of a direct clash between the two largest military alliances. Europe is also the seat of the negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments which were held at the beginning on a subregional basis (Central Europe) and which are now being raised to a regional basis covering the whole continent, from the Atlantic to the Urals. However, neither diplomats nor scientists have for the time being been able to work out a mutually acceptable plan for reducing the level of conventional confrontation in Europe.

The main obstacle here seems to lie not only and not so much in the lack of the official figures though their publication would, undoubtedly, be of utmost significance for any serious discussion on quantitative criteria for the balance and on the ways to lower it. It seems that the problem rather lies in the fact that the process of a radical reduction of conventional armaments should be not so much of the regional as of the global nature. It can be realised in full only on the global basis which in practice would be tantamount to general and complete disarmament.

What could, however, be the model of a militarily stable situation in Europe based on conventional armaments? The problem is by no means an easy one even in respect of nuclear weapons bearing in mind that in

Europe at present there are four centres and about ten systems consisting of three main elements: ground, air and naval, with approximately similar characteristics. It is relatively easier to build such a model in respect of the Soviet-American balance. But any attempt to introduce into such model the nuclear forces of third parties and qualitatively new nuclear systems poses insurmountable difficulties to experts on modelling the strategic stability.

In the case of conventional armaments, however, the number of inputs grows tremendously—instead of maximum four centres and ten systems of weapons one has to account for tens of countries and hundreds of systems with an indefinite degree of equivalency. All this makes the problem an extremely difficult one.

Many states participating in the Warsaw Treaty-NATO balance in Europe have to take into account in their military policy and in the development of armed forces the factor of third parties. This places rigid limits on their capacity to conduct mutual or unilateral reforms of armed forces. Quite naturally, a situation when some states would go back to the military capabilities of 1914-1918 and the others would at the same time acquire the potential of the year 2000 is excluded. That is a good subject for science-fiction writers but not for politicians. Outside threats are not limited to 16 member states of NATO nor to seven Warsaw Treaty members. One should not forget about it, otherwise we would only waste time and effort on the construction of far-fetched, unrealistic models.

If the threat posed by the strategic nuclear weapons is of universal nature, tactical nuclear weapons and, particularly, conventional armaments pose a threat primarily to European countries. Let us take NATO conceptions on the use of conventional armaments to deliver strikes at deep operational formations of Warsaw Treaty countries and superimpose them on the political and economic map of Europe. Let us purely theoretically plot mirror reflection of these points on the map of Western Europe. Taking into account that NATO in the case of war plans to use conventional armaments for strikes at military targets up to 800 kilometres away and using the GDR-FRG border as a reference point we get a zone stretching approximately from Brest on the Bug to the eastern suburbs of Paris. In addition, NATO capability to deliver conventional strikes against the USSR territory is limited whereas the US territory remains practically invulnerable.

Hundreds of high-risk economic installations are situated in the designated zone with Western Europe leading in nuclear reactors and Eastern Europe—in chemical plants. Thus, any war, including a conventional one, is totally unacceptable to Europeans. However, from the West European standpoint this cannot be said about its major potential adversary, nor about its major ally whose territory can be effectively hit only by strategic nuclear weapons.

Thus, the unresolved problem of conventional forces posing a specific threat to European states can lead to an ironic, at a first glance, situation when they can be more interested in the maintainance of strategic nuclear weapons than the major nuclear powers—the USA and the USSR. The underestimation of this fact could complicate the realisation of deep reductions in the USSR and US strategic arsenals and even cast doubt on them. (By the way, the elements of such reaction were evident in connection with the US consent to "double zero" option.)

Europe's geographic situation is characterised not only by the lack of operational depth in its western part. Europe is asymmetrical in its concrete potential for the reduction of the level of armed forces and armaments concentration. Indeed, there is practically no place in its western parts to withdraw troops by, let's say, disposing defence in depth, as proposed by some western experts. Under present conditions it is politi-

In other words, the dialectics of the modern arms race lies in the constant qualitative modernisation of means of combat with the quantitative aspect playing an auxiliary role.

The real possibility for the reduction of conventional armaments would appear probably when there is an agreement on limiting or putting an end to qualitative arms race, and industry is no more capable for rapid conversion to military production.

Obviously, a proposal to cease immediately all military-oriented R&D or to renounce the industrial production of the existing armaments would seem utopian. However, an agreed termination of work on new programmes beginning with, for example, 1990 or 1991 could become a reality. The production of technology-intensive types of armaments can be raised substantially in a short period of time only if its mass production has started prior to that necessity. No matter what superweapon is created in a lab, its industrial production would take years.

Due to the fact that the current research would give first industrial results not earlier than in 1998-2000 (R&D and industrial implementation of high technology programmes last in average 10-15 years), it would be possible starting from the year 2000 or somewhat earlier to mutually renounce mass production of newly designed armaments. It would be realistic even now to make a first step and to renounce the modernisation of the systems in service. The process of gradual termination of qualitative arms race should be accompanied by the establishment of the system of multiple confidence-building measures in the military and technical field.

The package of measures aimed at the limitation of qualitative capabilities can be extended to all types of weapons or to those which are most destructive and mobile. A third option presupposes a freeze on all the developments except those of new stationary air and army defence systems having no mobile and offensive potential whatsoever. In the course of time this would create such conditions under which the "sword" would gradually lose its efficiency against the "shield" and be scrapped due to uselessness.

Moreover, unlike the direct deep cuts in or elimination of the whole classes of conventional armaments which are feasible, in our opinion, only on the global basis, the termination of qualitative arms race would require the participation of only several states outside Europe and North America which are independently capable to conduct the complete cycle of development and production of the most modern weapons of various classes. They are Brazil, Israel, South Africa, India, China, Japan and, in the future, the "new industrial states".

The reduction of conventional armaments in Europe could hold quite unexpected implications, namely, dealing with the economic aspects of their production. Unlike the strategic nuclear missile systems which are totally dependent on state budgets of corresponding countries, a certain part of conventional armaments can be bought and sold (even if there are some political limitations). The production of armaments occupies a substantial place in the activities of companies which determine the industrial image of the country.

Western Europe has been and remains one of the primary international markets of armaments. However, no country of the region is capable of producing independently the whole range of necessary armaments, therefore they have to import them more and more often. The exporters are firms from the USA and other West European countries. On basis of reciprocal trade in armaments the states of Western Europe are able to sustain the development of science-intensive branches of industry which

are strategically important for them. Proceeds from the export of armaments are largely used to finance the R&D of these firms in the key spheres of technological progress, including the civilian ones. The curtailment of the European market would make it necessary for many West European countries either to convert their military industries to civilian production or to eliminate some of them completely.

It should be recalled that the practical solution of the problem of military industry conversion in the West is complicated by an extensive participation of private and mixed enterprises in the military production whose normal functioning is now guaranteed by military contracts. Therefore, a substantial reduction in the level of conventional armaments in Europe most certainly would meet with fierce resistance on the part of the members of the military-industrial complex who will obviously strive to compensate the quantitative curtailment of their sales by the growth of quality and, consequently, of prices.

Thus, the problem of conversion of military industry to civilian production that is not inferior to military hardware from the point of view of its technical level and profitability is closely tied to the problem of arms reduction and strengthening of stability in Europe. That is why these two problems should be dealt with simultaneously. The fewer people are disadvantaged by disarmament the more lasting it would be. However, this does not mean that Warsaw Treaty and NATO members cannot reach essential agreements on the reduction of the present level of military confrontation on the continent.

Moreover, in the regional framework it is more or less possible to solve the problem of reducing the threat of a surprise attack as well as preventing it altogether. It is proposed to this end to establish special zones and corridors, to extend measures of confidence and to take some other steps. Perhaps, it is possible to go even further. In view of the fact that reasonable political and military leaders in the West acknowledge the approximate parity of forces in Europe the situation could be stabilised by limiting, for example, the means of both sides to mobilise reservists.

It would be opportune, probably, to consider such steps as the reduction of stockpiles of military hardware and ammunition. They should, in the first instance, cover the reserves of equipment which form the material potential of both sides to increase sharply troop strength in a crisis situation. The solution of the problem of equipment reserves (naturally, not only in Warsaw Treaty countries but also in Western states, including the "forward-based materiel" of the US Army in Europe) would allow to eliminate such factor as the military significance of the human potential which is difficult to equalise.

The maintainance of peace is based not only on goodwill, moral considerations and strict economic estimates but also on the key notion of strategic stability which forms the military mechanism of the system of the maintainance of peace coexisting with political, economic and moral-psychological mechanism.

The military mechanism is the most tangible among them. It is always under the control and guidance of governments of the interested parties, it is the most manageable and has the least inertia. It undergoes the fastest changes but these changes are not spontaneous; they are the result of the policy-making decisions which can be confirmed, changed or substituted by others according to the situation. However, the construction of this mechanism requires not only decisions but also investments on the part of states. Judging by direct public investments the military mechanism of the maintainance of stability is the most expen-

sive. Its construction and functioning directly affect all the citizens contributing to the state budget, and they have every reason to be interested, at least in general terms, in where the funds go and how efficiently they are used.

However, the tangible nature of military mechanism is a two-edged weapon. Being flexible and obedient under a rigid and public political control it can break loose under the slightest indulgence. This would in turn lead to political decisions based not on a thorough analysis of the situation but on the illusions of the race for superiority, momentary emotions, obsolete stereotypes, certain technological innovations. Many such examples are given by the activities of the military-industrial complex in the leading Western countries which has transformed from the instrument of state policy into an autonomous political force.

Another essential feature of the strategic stability mechanism is its multilateral nature. "It takes two for a wedding", says a French proverb. Intentionally or not, stability is formed by the whole range of mutually dependent and interrelated actions of both sides. In other words, by the combination of consistent measures to achieve military superiority and counter-measures to neutralise them which are independently taken by each of the sides. That confrontation structure of development has given rise to the present mechanism of strategic stability which is cumbersome, quite unsteady and hard to control, any minute capable of self-destruction.

However, there is another way. It presupposes concrete agreed and multilateral action. That is the way of cooperation dictated by new thinking. On this way it is possible to improve and rationalise the present mechanism of military stability. In other words, to eliminate the elements of sharp conflicts, to lower the level of military confrontation up till its complete elimination and exclusion of a military factor from the sphere of interstate relations (at least, from the relations of the great powers).

Cooperation in strengthening the strategic stability requires a common approach, uniform understanding of tasks, purposes and means of the conducted policy. Otherwise, there is a real danger that separate breakthroughs in the direction of lowering the level of military confrontation would still be isolated actions immediately compensated by a buildup and modernisation of armaments in other fields. A similar situation was depicted in the old Greek myth about the fight of Hercules with Hydra. As is known, Hydra's heads which had been cut off grew again which made the situation "stable" for Hydra but not for Hercules. The latter had found his own way to stabilise it by searing the wounds thereby preventing the heads from regenerating.

The present situation in the field of disarmament looks more like a fight between Hydras in which both sides are equal in their potential to restore the lost heads and warheads. The lack of common understanding of stability (or else, its common understanding as a confrontation of outdated military power criteria) immediately raises the question of compensation of any disarmament measures.

Disarmament is simultaneously an end and a means, or rather more a means than an end. It is the means for achieving a world based on security and non-violence, i. e. a militarily stable world. Therefore, the issue of maintaining stability in the course of disarmament, at all its stages is acquiring a priority status. Its analysis and coordination should precede all disarmament measures. The *post-factum* consideration of the problem of stability would inevitably open up possibilities for unilateral conflicting interpretations and decisions.

A polycentric, multi-polar nature of today's world makes it imperative to analyse thoroughly the issues of maintaining and strengthening stability in the process of disarmament. Certain steps taken by one or two

states can change the situation for the third one, provoke response on their part leading, in turn, to the transformation of the original situation and casting doubt on initial decisions.

Noteworthy in this respect is the mixed reaction of the European nuclear powers *vis-à-vis* the Soviet-American INF Treaty, the desire to compensate the withdrawal of Pershings and cruise missiles by equivalent systems (the French mobile MRM S-4, a project for a Franco-British cruise missile), by the increase in strike capability of their SLBMs, etc. As the result medium-range missiles would remain in Europe even after the implementation of the Soviet-American agreement; the only changes would be in their deployment areas and identification marks. Would this provoke a response from the other side, and if so, what kind of response?

Thus, the problems of disarmament and stability are closely linked together as are the problems of the elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments. It is impossible to solve them separately, they can be solved only in totality. That is why it becomes more and more necessary to work out a combined programme of disarmament and strengthening of stability. Foundations for that are not lacking. In the field of nuclear disarmament provisions contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's Statement of January 15, 1986 are being successfully implemented. A necessary complement to them has been provided by the declaration on negotiations to reduce armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe adopted at the recent Conference of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw.

THE ARMS RACE: A SENSELESS PROPOSITION

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In foreign policy, as in any other sphere of human activity there are certain nerve-centres, key problems attracting particular attention. It seems that in present-day Soviet foreign policy it is difficult to find a more vital nerve-centre than a complex of military-strategic problems affecting both the national security and the economic destiny of the country.

In its current interpretation the arms race is a relatively new phenomenon. Some historians believe that in its present form it began in the second half of the 19th century after the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. Then for the first time Germany, France, Britain and Russia began the race in the attempt to outstrip their potential enemies in peacetime not only in the stockpiles of accumulated weapons but also in their technical characteristics.

It was at that time that the major economic consequences of the arms race became apparent. There was a sharp increase in the costs of military preparations, and, consequently, military might became more dependent on the level of economic development. It became necessary to replace one generation of weapons by another as frequently and as soon as possible by drawing into this process the entire scientific, technological and economic potential of states. Simultaneously, the gap in military potentials of various states noticeably widened. A small group of the most powerful countries began to dominate in international relations precisely because they kept pace with the development of military technology.

For a long period there was a balance between quantitative and qualitative parameters in the arms race and only after the Second World War quality began to move to the forefront. Actually, the creation of nuclear weapons by the United States was the first attempt to gain a decisive superiority by a qualitative breakthrough. Another classic example is development and deployment by the USA of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles. Then cruise missiles followed, and today we see a peculiar attempt to gain an edge on the Soviet Union through the Star Wars project. In three cases an attempt was made to replace the traditional concept of increasing the number of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles by a new concept of increased quality to offset quantitative indicators. Thus, although quite expensive, qualitative improvement became the cornerstone in the arms race.

It is fairly stated that enormous military expenditures are a heavy burden for the Soviet economy, particularly because it faces the chal-

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lenge posed by the aggregate economic might of the USA, Western Europe and Japan. It is necessary, however, to pay here particular attention to a new and quite indicative trend in the arms race. This is a global trend and it is associated with the appearance of certain types of constraint on military spending. Definite limits, beyond which military expenditures become politically, socially and economically unacceptable, make themselves felt, though occasionally and in different ways for different countries. Instead of strengthening the state they weaken it and cut in on the badly-needed money which otherwise would have been spent on social needs, education, science, etc. For instance, some estimates made in the West show that in Western Europe the minimum level of expenditures on social security and social aid is 35 to 40 per cent of the state budget. The corresponding figure for the United States is around 25 per cent, and as the record of the present administration shows it is politically difficult, if not entirely impossible, to lower that level. That is why already today there are grounds to say that even the most developed countries have reached the stage when they have no more resources to proceed with the arms race in a straightforward way.

Until a certain moment there remained opportunities for the application of results both in the military and civil industries; however these opportunities are shrinking of late. As for fundamental research this level is rather high, but the production of military motor-vehicles, helicopters and aircraft has become very specialised. Meanwhile, the cost of new technologies, particularly military, is rapidly climbing and this necessitates more investments in a rather limited sphere of the application of results. Despite the fact that two-thirds of all Pentagon allocations were spent on electronics-related R&D, since 1984 it is in electronic articles that the United States has been running a foreign trade deficit.

Here we clearly see the second factor in the interaction of the economy and the arms race, that is the negative influence exerted by the high level of military expenditures on the state of the national economy. Although the reverse correlation between them is subject to fluctuations it is still quite visible. The special report prepared by the Democratic faction of the Congress in 1982 contains indicative figures: had the USA rechannelled military expenditures to civil purposes the volume of investments would have grown by 30 per cent, in Britain—by 26, in France—by 18, in West Germany—by 15, and in Japan—by 3 per cent. These figures vividly demonstrate the scale of the diversion of funds from the economic development and it is easy to see that they most adequately reflect the trend in the economic growth correlation in various states.

Military production also draws on the brain potential, and this factor quite sufficiently explains the above-mentioned negative impact of the arms race. At present, we see a rather peculiar situation: while earlier the USA brain-drained other countries, within the USA itself there was a brain outflow to the military sphere. At present, it employs up to 30 per cent of US engineers and about 30 per cent of college and university graduates. In the aerospace industry this figure has reached almost 50 per cent. This has led to an acute shortage of specialists in the civilian industries.

It is natural that politicians in the developed countries are confronted by the dilemma of either investing in civilian research and increasing the competitiveness of national industries thereby promoting economic growth, or creating new arms entailing the risk of lagging behind others in the scientific and technological race and, consequently, undermining one's own economic and, in the final count, defence potential of the country. As a result, we see a peculiar situation when the arms race engendered, among other things, by scientific and technological progress, now impedes this progress.

Thus, the contradiction between the goals of economic development and the arms race is most visible in the problem of financing military efforts. R&D of the new means of annihilation are paid for from the state budget. At the same time, capitalist countries increasingly tend to redistribute the national income through the budget, in particular, by raising the level of various state expenditures. However, the opportunities for financing state requirements are not unlimited. Huge budget deficits impeding the normal functioning of the economy have become a regular feature in many countries.

In these conditions efforts to increase budgetary allocations for military purposes have become a rather difficult venture. It takes a lot of effort to brainwash law-makers and public opinion in order to push any defence programme through the legislature. The discussion in the Congress of SDI allocations for 1989 may serve as a good example. According to press reports the US Congress decided to allocate \$4.083 billion for that programme, compared to \$4.5 billion requested by the present Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and \$6.3 billion requested by his predecessor Caspar Weinberger. Thus, in real terms next year SDI allocations will be even lower than in the current year. Some foreign experts predict a reduction of military budgets of some Western countries in the immediate future. The United States is already taking these steps. Last year Washington declared a reduction of military expenditures by 11 to 12 per cent.

In recent years, a tendency towards saving on military spendings using "internal reserves" has become more pronounced in the NATO countries. It assumes various forms. First of all, it is the renunciation of creating new armaments in favour of modernising the existing ones. This approach, particularly as regards sophisticated weapons, allows substantial cuts. Another approach to reducing military expenditures is to pool the efforts of several countries. This trend is particularly evident in Western Europe. Suffice it to recall the British-West German-Italian attack aircraft Tornado, the Anglo-French Jaguar and the newly born West German-British-Italian project to create a Eurofighter.

The reduction of the armed forces is an efficient means of reducing military expenditures. There is a growing trend in some NATO countries to reduce their armies despite the opposition to these plans on the part of their military establishments and propagandistic statements alleging that the Warsaw Treaty forces have a substantial superiority.

In December 1987 William Taft, US Under-Secretary of Defense, said that by the mid-1990s the American army would be reduced by 100,000 servicemen. In February this year an announcement was made to the effect that 350 colonels and lieutenant-colonels would be retired from the US army ahead of schedule. It is planned to retire another 1,540 officers and a large number of soldiers in 1989. In this connection the USA has already elaborated a new military-political doctrine of competitive strategies in which the emphasis is laid on the latest military technologies capable of ensuring advantage despite the numerical superiority of the other side.

The demographic factor also contributes to the reduction of armies. Thus, specialists predict that as a result of the sharp drop in the population growth rates in West Germany in 1994 there will be 49 per cent fewer young people available for the draft than in 1986. To offset this loss the FRG government decided to extend the service term from 15 to 18 months. However, this measure does not solve the problem, and Western commentators predict that quite soon there will be women's battalions in the West German army.

Incidentally, this trend towards the reduction of the overall strength of the army exists not only in capitalist countries. According to Western

sources, the strength of the army of the People's Republic of China dwindled from 4.5 million servicemen in 1974 to 4.1 million in 1984. In 1985 Beijing announced another major reduction by one million. This step was explained by the need to switch over from the quantitative to the qualitative indicators. Military expenditures of the country amounted to 20 per cent of the state budget in 1979 and 8 per cent in 1987. Early this year the Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia decreed to reduce the strength of the Yugoslav People's Army in peacetime by 12 per cent. Simultaneously it was decided to reduce in five years the expenditures on the army by 10 per cent.

Naturally, economic realities do not rule out the arms race. However, the present drift towards establishing a close correlation between the economy and the military policy is an important prerequisite for progress in the field of disarmament.

Another important feature in the development of international situation which influences the course of the arms race and, consequently, needs to be taken into account in evaluating possible trends in the Soviet foreign policy is a gradual reduction of the significance of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. This trend is quite stable. Nuclear arms may serve as an obvious example. It is not only unthinkable to use them, but actually it became impossible even to threaten with their use. The efficiency of using conventional arms to attain foreign policy objectives is declining.

In the past the use of military force, particularly in conditions of a substantial difference in the potentials of the sides, ensured tangible advantages not only on the battlefield but also in the access to vital resources and territory and ensured a political gain, that is, ensured dividends on the investment in military might. In the modern world, even with the incomparable military and industrial potentials, it is economically ruinous to wage military operations to seize and hold territories or ensure their total subjugation. Simultaneously, there emerged more flexible and diverse forms of exerting influence, including direct coercion, only as one of the elements in the wide range of various means. The leading role is now played by financial, economic and social instruments: the strengthening of the political system, support rendered to certain social strata, credit and investment manipulations, etc. In these conditions military might is used only as a supplement buttressing other, first of all economic, instruments.

This trend became particularly clear approximately in the 1970s with the growing interdependence and reciprocal influence of various states and even socio-economic systems. Non-military instruments of power and even non-violent methods are becoming more efficient tools of foreign policy and ensure more stable ties between various states, while the decisive role is played not by the military, but economic, primarily scientific and technological, potential.

Does this mean, as it was claimed by many Western political analysts in the 1970s, that military might is losing its significance in the modern world? Probably not. However, it is the developing countries which continue to rely first of all on military force, more so than the developed nations. Account should also be taken of the purposes for which military force is used by developed states and on what scale. The basic line of US approach to this aspect of foreign policy, for instance, is gradually becoming more transparent. Increasingly more often it involves "the show of one's colours" and short-term "pinpoint" strikes. Probably, these limited efforts are enough to take care of broad external political and economic interests when the main regions of the world are declared to be the zones of "vital interests". West European countries are more wary

of using military force. They probably attach greater significance to the non-military aspects of their foreign policy.

Thus, we see two major processes unfolding in the policy of Western countries: structural changes in armed forces and military production on the one hand, and the changing correlation between military and non-military instruments of exerting external influence, on the other. It seems that only by taking into account these trends can one search for answers to the questions which are of great importance for our own policy and the future of *perestroika*.

It is always necessary to take into account the "changing world" in appraising the results of the Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s and its prospects. The problem of choosing a foreign policy course always implies an appraisal of the foreign policy "environment". It is not enough to pose adequate tasks, it is necessary to find the optimal ways of solving them.

In many cases the entire range of military-strategic and foreign policy problems can and, actually, should not be an item of state expenditures but a factor in strengthening the economic might of the state.

BACON'S „IDOLS“ IN THE MODERN WORLD

Yekaterina YEGOROVA,
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Just how reality may be distorted in human perceptions was shown in a remarkably clear form in 1620 by Francis Bacon, the great English philosopher, in his *Novum Organum*, his principal work.

Lord Bacon said these distorted perceptions were fallacies of the mind which had to be shed if one was to get at the truth. He called them the “*idola*” (idols), and classified them under four heads. First there are the *idola tribus*, the “idols of the tribe”, which are fallacies incident to human faith in the truth of what they regard as preferable or more pleasant; the second are the *idola specus*, the “idols of the cave”, signifying the errors incident to the peculiar mental or bodily constitution of each individual, errors to which virtually all human beings are prone; the third are the *idola fori*, the “idols of the market place”, or errors arising from the tendency to incorrect use of words and cliches; and fourth, the *idola theatri*, the “idols of the theatre”, which arise from blind faith in authority and dogmatic adherence to conceptions.

Lord Bacon's work was certainly written a very long time ago, but a look at the history of foreign policy over the past three and a half centuries will reveal the silhouettes of his “idols” behind the backs of many political leaders.

When international tensions were slightly relaxed in the 1980s, one began to hear talk in many countries of some “image of the enemy”, meaning not just a reflection of the objective contradictions between states, but a deliberate vision of the adversary against a black-and-white view of the world, an attempt to identify the adversary with the Absolute Evil (as in: “The Soviet Union is the evil empire”). But the “enemy image” is only a particular case of the partner in international relations being seen in the wrong light.

There are, indeed, two diametrically opposite standpoints: from one of these, states conduct their foreign policy only with an eye to their own interests, so that all their acts in the world arena spring from purely objective causes. From the second standpoint, states are not so much engaged in fighting each other as imaginary enemies, while the external threat tends to push internal problems into the background. An intermediate postulate here would appear to be the appropriate one: a very large number of foreign policy acts are, indeed, based on misconceptions, but these have quite real economic, social and ideological roots.

Frederick Engels once said that the “driving causes” of history “in the minds of acting masses and their leaders—so-called great men—are reflected as conscious motives, clearly or unclearly, directly or in ideological, even *glorified* [our italics—*Auth.*] form”.¹

While the study of foreign policy concepts involves all the forms in which they are reflected, we intend to deal here with the “glorified”,

distorted forms in which the reality is perceived, and with the subjective and objective factors connected with these perceptions.

The flow of information, which is obviously erratic, has an effect on the distorted perception of political realities: now and again there is an excess of unnecessary information, sometimes a lack of the most vital information, and sometimes the information is deliberately false. There is also the effect of individual mentality and of socio-psychological mechanisms which influence the perception of international developments by individual states or blocs of states.

One distorted perception of international relations is the tendency to regard the behaviour of adversaries in the international arena as being more organised, more planned and more concerted than it really is. That is due to the ingrained urge on the part of any observer to tie in the intricate and frequently disparate details into one consistent image, a conceptualisation of events which does not, as a rule, help to gain a true understanding of the situation and is fairly misleading. Instead of an analysis of the motivations behind the adversary's acts, there is a search for devious plans masterminded by the adversary's think tanks, so that all his subsequent steps are viewed through the prism of these plans. When the adversary is another state, government or group of political leaders, their behaviour is seen as absolutely centralised and consolidated, instead of as relatively independent behaviour of individuals each of whom wants to attain his own objectives, which are partially in tune with the "national interest". There we have the tendency to regard the cohesion of one's adversaries as being more solid than it in fact is.

Another typical fallacy is to tie in international developments in a coherent perception in terms of time and space: whenever two acts or events that are not a matter of indifference for the perceiver occur simultaneously or close to each other in space, these are not regarded in isolation, each on its own merits, not as a coincidence, but as elements of one and the same chain of political events.

Inadequate approach to Soviet-US relations—the relations which largely determine the future of the planet—is, of course, nowadays the most critical.

Let us not go to extremes and claim, as some now, incidentally, often tend to do, that everything will be all right, and that just sort of an idyllic alliance will be established between the two powers once the false images and stereotypes in Soviet-US relations are corrected. There are objective contradictions of various types between the USSR and the United States, and these will always produce sharp clashes, but the critical tensions can truly be removed and the danger of an armed conflict radically reduced once the USSR's image in the USA and the USA's in the USSR are rectified, and not only—and perhaps not so much—on the level of the mass consciousness as on the level of the leadership and the intellectual elite.

There is certainly an erroneous perception of the military confrontation, the issue which, regrettably, continues to be the crucial one in Soviet-US relations. There is an erroneous assessment both of the adversary's intentions and strength, the two key factors in this area. Our press has written much on the stereotypes which exist in the United States concerning the USSR's intentions and strength in the military field, quite correctly exposing the myth about some Soviet threat which many US politicians have been using to intimidate their own people and those of other countries.

We feel, however, that less than enough attention has been given to another point: in most cases the Soviet threat myth has been spread and refurbished on every level—from the mass consciousness to the intellec-

tual elite and leadership of the United States—not only out of the evil design of the military-industrial complex to dupe the country so as to wax rich on arms contracts or to annihilate communism by means of armed force at some future time. There is also a huge distortion of the true motivations and intentions of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union has been invested with the features of an “evil empire” because of the false perception of our country by the United States as a whole, both the military-industrial complex and the “average American”. There are, of course, objective roots to such false perceptions: the rejection in the United States of socialism in principle (let us recall that even Social Democracy has failed to find a foothold in the United States), the historical record of the confrontation between the two worlds, the present Soviet-US contradictions, the arms race, which has a logic of its own, the painful US reverses in the international arena, and unfortunate Soviet foreign policy acts.

Most of us have also formed either an erroneous or incomplete image of the United States because of the assumption of the often non-existent element of malice in the anti-Sovietism of the United States. Instead of the objectively evolved misperception of our country among the people of the United States, we often see a conspiracy and a deliberate effort to disinform public opinion.

Propaganda stereotypes have a complicated role to play. In many cases, the US mass media certainly dupe public opinion deliberately with their canards, but the basic propaganda stereotypes (the aggressiveness and trickiness of the Russians, the pitch-dark totalitarianism in the USSR) are accepted even by those who use them to launch their canards on order. This a good point to recall the Forrestal phenomenon”. That anti-Soviet minded US Defense Secretary jumped to his death from a mental hospital window with the cry: “The Russians are coming!”. That was a classical instance of the tail wagging the dog: the stereotype escapes control and begins to rule the mind.

We shall obviously have to review our perceptions of the principles of US foreign policy and to stop traditionally regarding it as an embodiment of ill will. Why not assume that the United States is sincere in its belief that it is on the defensive?

Regional policy is an important issue. The United States regards the conception of proletarian internationalism as being no more than a screen invented by the crafty Bolsheviks to realise the old dream of the tsars to dominate Eurasia. For our part, we regard the USA's close attention to the Third World's social development as a desire to enslave the less developed countries in the spirit of neocolonialism, and to assure itself of global domination behind cynical talk of democracy.

Consequently, both sides tend to underestimate what one could call the partner's idealism, the urge to spread his concepts of democracy and of the economic and social system. Say, messianism is a part of US political culture which originated after the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the country in the late 18th century. That is why some of the wars fought by the United States over the past decades were, while, of course, being cynical military-political gambles, also a sort of sanguinary idealism in the spirit of Rudyard Kipling's “white man's burden”.

Fortunately, even the heavy load of erroneous and inadequate perceptions of each other has not yet carried Soviet-US contradictions to the brink, but even the worst has, after all, happened in history.

The impact of these “idols” is tragically exemplified by the events on the eve of World War II. All the great powers were then variously captive to false or inadequate perceptions.

The United States, Britain and France regarded the Soviet Union as the arch-enemy, instead of German nazism and its Italian and Japanese allies; the Western democracies preferred to appease the aggressor so as to send him off to the East, instead of cooperating with the USSR against the fascists. The Soviet Union, for its part, had an inadequate perception of the intentions and strength of Hitler's Reich on the eve of the war, while Germany had calculated the balance of forces in Europe at that time correctly and had, on the whole, adequate perceptions of its today's partners and tomorrow's enemies, while having an altogether fantastic image of what the future had in store for all the European countries. The plans for world domination, bound to fail in any epoch, were even more absurd in the 1930s.

These false and inadequate perceptions did, of course, spring from objective causes, but they operated as conscious motivations, and there is no reason to minimise their role. In a sense (and one should bear in mind that there are always several dimensions to history at one and the same time), World War II was generally the product of a distorted foreign policy perception.

False or inadequate perceptions have repeatedly led to armed conflicts in recent years as well. Thus, the United States got itself involved in the dead-end war in Indochina, having misperceptions of the economic and social situation in the area, of the role of the USSR and the People's Republic of China in the region and, moreover, of the "civilising" mission of the United States on a world scale. Before the armed conflict broke out in the South Atlantic, Argentina clearly had an inadequate perception of Britain's strength and intentions.

How is then one to characterise the underlying uniformities of spontaneous distorted perceptions? They take shape spontaneously, under the impact of objective historical, economic and ideological factors, and are not the exclusive attribute of any one epoch, state or economic and social system. They have such a great role in international relations that they can totally obscure the reality, in which case the prism of the human perception of the world operates with a huge coefficient of refraction. Distorted perceptions may lead not only to tensions and tragic misunderstandings between the partners, but also to armed conflicts and even to actual wars. World War II was bound to break out in a world situation in which two economic and social systems were locked in confrontation with each other, but it would not have assumed such proportions had the objective causes not been reinforced by the vastly distorted perceptions. Wars on a lesser scale may flare up chiefly because of distorted or inadequate perceptions.

It is our view that perceptions of the evilness of every act by the adversary are the most dangerous among the characteristic misperceptions. While not being justified in essence, these acts may be the objective effect of the adversary's foreign policy concepts which he believes to be an expression of the national interest. But even in this series one could identify the "supermisperception": the case in which ill intent is ascribed to those of the adversary's acts which are a reflection of his misperceptions of our misperceptions. This kind of double misperception tends to block cooperation and even to produce conflict.

We find elements of the double misperception in Soviet-US relations as well. In the simplest terms, this is expressed in the situation in which the statement that "we are prepared to deliver the first nuclear strike" because they are prepared to deliver a nuclear strike is essentially an expression of the formula: "We are prepared to deliver the first nuclear

strike because we think that they will deliver the first nuclear strike because they think that we will deliver the first nuclear strike."

Once a misperception has originated, it is so viable that it usually takes some historical cataclysm on a macro- or micro-scale to obliterate or even to correct it.

One should add that it is not worthwhile identifying the "enemy image" with misperceptions generally, which can also develop in a positive direction: Stalin's attitude to Germany from 1939 to 1941, and the attitude of Chamberlain and Daladier to Germany from 1937 to 1939.

An exaggerated and partially fantastic sense of alliance, which does not reflect the essence of the relations, tends to clash with reality and to produce a shock like that caused in the Soviet Union in the early 1960s following the disarray in the "fraternal relations" with China.

Misperceptions of the adversary in international relations do not necessarily make him also have misperceptions about you. While mutual misperceptions are frequent, they are not the rule, and usually become inevitable following years of confrontation.

Apart from the purely spontaneous causes of misperceptions of international realities, there are many mechanisms, well-gearred over the years and even the centuries, for specifically producing false images by means of propaganda addressed to broad social strata, or manipulations aimed to alter someone's concrete personal perception or that of a limited group of persons.

Deliberate distortion becomes possible, say, in the process of consent: an individual accepts the influence being exerted on him in the hope of a favourable response on the part of another individual or group who are far from immaterial to him. Indeed, that individual may not at first entirely believe the communicated information, but the urge for goodwill tends to tip the balance and he changes his views of events and already begins to perceive the reality in different terms.

We ourselves have more than enough of that kind of experience. To back up our own internal and external acts, we have on many occasions quoted some statement by a US senator or a British lord, who may not even have had any intention at all to back up our stand in real earnest, but that is something which is not required in this case. A few apt quotations can help to leave the impression that "sober-minded politicians abroad approve of the historic Soviet initiative".

Identification of oneself with some individual or group of individuals is another personality mechanism facilitating purposeful distortion of perceptions. One characteristic example is the buildup of the desired images and perception stereotypes among various strata of the population by means of US presidential programmes. If a president is popular, like Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy or Ronald Reagan, many of their admirers do not find it hard at all to be influenced by the mass media into accepting whatever the president is saying as their own view, and to keep modifying it from time to time as the president does. There was something similar in China under Mao Zedong, when the country's foreign policy orientation was radically changed on two occasions.

Internalisation² occurs under the influence of the propaganda media, when a person begins to take a totally different view of the reality because the new image is much more consonant with his inner system of value judgements than was the old one. This kind of "fitting" of the new image into one's inner world is a source of psychological comfort for a person because it ends the conflict that had arisen from the discrepancy between the internal system of values and the vision of reality.

This makes the new images highly solid and stable with respect to other purposeful influences.

It has often happened in history when a political leader's immediate entourage deliberately influenced his perception of the foreign policy reality for the sake of their own interests. For this kind of operation to succeed, the political leader does not have to be either flabby or exceptionally yielding: all the necessary conditions for insinuating the "required" image are created by the leader's trust of the members of his entourage who are trying to impose their distorted image, the plausibility of their arguments, and the frequency and intensity of the information spots.

All the phenomena in social life are run into a head-on clash with reality by any crisis, and this also applies to foreign policy concepts. The prism through which the society looks at the external world is subjected to pressure from external forces in the period of crisis: it can either crack up and disappear or start focussing the external world with greater intensity.

The end of the "strange war", the German blitz across Belgium, the break through the Maginot line, the occupation of Northern France, and the rout of the British expeditionary corps at Dunkerque signified the collapse of the Western democracies' perceptions of Nazi Germany and simultaneously a growth of misperceptions among the Nazis, who were increasingly confirmed in their ideal future for Europe. But sooner or later every misconception is caught up in the throes of the crisis that kills it, like in the Opium War of 1840-42 when British guns destroyed the Chinese perception of the British as the vehicles of higher forms of civilisation who need not reckon with the other powers. False perceptions of partners, allies and one's own role in the world were also in a sense eroded in the process of the Caribbean crisis, which, however, also showed that it is extremely hard to break up a misperception entirely: its prism, as a rule, merely rotates, so correcting the extent of the distortion.

There is good reason why the term "crisis behaviour" has become widely current in psychology. At the moment of virtually any crisis and especially an international one, when too much is at stake, a political leaders' behaviour is so distorted by stress, insomnia, fear, etc., that the concept of psychological norm can be applied to him only by stretching a point. That is why those who are involved in situations of heavy stress very often describe them subsequently in totally different ways and as a far cry from the reality.

One can well imagine the erroneous foreign policy decisions a leader may take under pressure from such misperceptions. Under the influence of stress, the age, sex and personality of the political leader have an essential role to play but, while being subject to the "laws of crisis behaviour", the political leader bends all these common laws to his own perception of the international realities.

In a situation of crisis, political leaders tend, under the influence of stress, to start by building up the conceptual image that is dominant in the mind and to assimilate within it everything that goes on. This dominant image is often, though not always, something that the political leader is already well aware of, and then any fact or piece of information is assimilated within the image. Whenever these are at odds with the image, they are simply brushed off as being false or are ignored. Let us recall, say, Jimmy Carter's idea of helicoptering in an assault party to rescue the US diplomats who were being held hostage in Iran: the

image of such a blitz operation turned out to be the dominant one, and all the counter-arguments had no effect.

Thinking in historical categories with an erroneous perception of the identity of causes in a historical and a current situation and, accordingly, of the consequences as well, is a more complicated version of the same mechanism.

Whenever a political leader comes to feel that the situation in which he has to take a foreign policy decision is a vague one, two types of protective information processes originate under the influence of stress: "hyper-vigilance" and "protective avoidance". "Hyper-vigilance" is akin to panic but has the additional important property of inducing a paranoid suspicion of everything going forward in the camp of the enemy, whose every act is perceived from that angle. With "protective avoidance", the political leader simply puts his head in the sand, refuses to perceive the negative effects of his chosen alternative and fails to see the potential losses. Fear and uncertainty in an international crisis frequently involve wishful thinking.

After everything that has been said about the harmful effects of misperception on international relations, it could seem odd to assert that misperceptions may now and again be useful, in the sense that "we cherish more the deception that adds to our stature than a host of down-to-earth truths", as the poet put it.

There is no doubt that strategic misperceptions can produce nothing but tragic errors and even national disasters, but the short-term misperception is not as easily sorted out.

Let us say, for instance, that a misperception may be useful not only to a given class, but also to the state as a whole, if the state is regarded as a coherent organism, which it, in fact, always is, with the exception of periods of acute class struggle. Misperceptions relating to images of a hostile external world tend to unite the society and help to concentrate the physical and mental forces of the population. For the USA as a monolithic state without any acute forms of class struggle since the 1930s, the perception by its society of the Soviet Union as the enemy standing "at the door" has undoubtedly acted as a catalyst of unity.

It is quite another matter that misperceptions can never benefit the national interest, the free development of a nation over the long term.

Inadequate perceptions (which, as is known, differ from fallacies) may produce a positive effect in the national interest over the short term. When the youthful maximalism of an awakened less developed nation regards the imperialist powers as an outside enemy, that is not simply inevitable, but even useful at the initial stages, because it helps to unite the people and to justify the privations of the early post-revolutionary years. In many cases, the participants in the revolutionary movement in Latin America fail to realise that far from all the "gringos" are enemies. The US leadership is itself captive to misperceptions as, on the one hand, it maps out an incredible picture of the future in store for the Latin American countries, in the light of US messianism, and on the other, takes a distorted view of the social and ideological processes under way south of the Rio Grande. It is not so easy, say, to reduce the Sandinista revolution to a manifestation of Marxism in Central America, but that is precisely the US posture.

Let us say this once again: false and inadequate perceptions are equally dangerous for the long term. One set of social strata abuses the trust of the others. The state tends to develop an imperial complex. National interests are transformed in a truly fantastic way, as it has happened, for instance, with Iran and Iraq.

It would be a bad mistake to regard the ultra-hostile attitude to the external world on the part of Khomeini and the entire Iranian leadership as a desire to dupe the masses so as to stay in power: the expansionism and aggressiveness, which are now a feature of Islamic fundamentalism are characteristic both of the thinking of the teenagers who die in the "human waves" on the Iran-Iraq front, and of the Shi'ite ideologists. There is hardly any need to explain what this holds in store for the Iranian people's national interests.

Encounter with reality now and again proves to be as brutal for political leaders and governments as it is for the population as a whole, so frequently causing a veritable psychic upheaval. The people of the United States had believed in the power and authority of the United States in the world so unreservedly and for so long that the failure in Vietnam produced a grave inferiority complex known as the "Vietnam syndrome", which afflicted the United States for more than ten years. The negative role of misperceptions in international life, among individuals and entire nations stands out in bolder relief when their global significance is considered.

Is there any kind of "insight" mechanism? What have we gained from historical experience? How are we to avoid one misperception developing into another, and how is the prism to be turned into an ordinary piece of glass with a minimum—even if inevitable—degree of distortion?

As of now, the answer is, regrettably, not too encouraging. All the vastly distorted images of the past tended to collapse in moments of crisis. The outbreak of World War II destroyed the Western powers' misperceptions of the role of the USSR and of Germany in the world. The Caribbean crisis, which marked the start of the efforts to change the system of misperceptions about the nuclear world and the duties of its protagonists, just about led to a nuclear war.

Putting behind us both the inadequate and the false perceptions of Afghanistan is nowadays no easy thing for us.

There is, therefore, only one conclusion: in this world of ours, it is more than risky to hope that history will itself correct the misperceptions, as it has done in the past.

Consequently, the spontaneous and brutal awakening should be countered with scientifically informed conscious action, a foundation which is now fortunately taking shape.

New events may now and again so strongly affect the emotions of the population that its misperceptions are dimmed and lose their clarity, so that those who had entertained these misperceptions are in doubt about their adequacy and strive to obtain new information which more truly reflects the situation. That is best exemplified today by the Soviet *perestroika*: it has already shattered so many stereotypes and dispelled so many misconceptions abroad. But if *perestroika* slows down and begins to mark time, and if the democratisation and *glasnost* in the Soviet society do not gain in depth, there could be a relapse into the old stereotypes.

New thinking, as an instrument of *perestroika* in foreign policy in this one and interdependent world, requires a cut-off of misperceptions, for otherwise there can be no hope not just of a nuclear-free world, but even of the mere maintenance of normal interstate relations.

Prevailing over the fallacies and inadequate perceptions is, therefore a practical task, and it should be treated as such. There is a need for a broad discussion—both by specialists and by all those who feel themselves involved in foreign policy, in the spirit of people's diplomacy—of the actual methods by means of which false and inadequate perceptions

could first be identified and then gradually surmounted in the most explosive places. Had this been done, there would have been no Afghanistan, no SS-20s. Nor would there have been any of the other miscalculations which now have to be corrected with such great effort and at such material and moral cost.

It would never have occurred to Lord Bacon, even in a nightmare, that a world tragedy like nuclear war could be the handiwork of his "idols". The world no longer has the right to pay the price of wars, whether big or small, for dispelling the countries' misperceptions of each other. International relations and foreign policy must be consciously conducted so as to put into practice that fine but yet unrealised formula: to execute the leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.

¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. Three, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973, p 367

² A process in which new external impressions, norms and values are transferred into one's inner world, "fitted" into one's system and then used as one's own.

DIALOGUE BETWEEN A RUSSIAN AND A SWEDE

Rolf Edberg. In our previous dialogue we said quite a lot about the nuclear threat. But we apparently forgot to make a very important reservation. The point is that the problem of humanity's survival would by no means be solved even if all nuclear weapons were destroyed. Not all people realise this or they don't realise it always—far from it.

Yet we would arrive at a global catastrophe very soon should we go on handling our planet in the same scandalous way as now. I, for one, see at least three different but closely interlinked ecological threats. First, an excessive growth of population. Second, wasteful use of the extracted minerals which play a passing role in our everyday lives. And third, the destruction and poisoning of all that makes life on Earth possible.

Speaking of pollution and poisoning, we should always look on man as part of the environment. Indeed, when drinking a glass of water in the morning, I wash my tissues with moisture that has come from the prehistorical ocean and undergone numerous transformations. It was rivers, clouds and downpours, spread as a morning mist over Lake Baikal, went up with the exhalation of billions of beings and took part in the cooling of, say, a reactor. The air ventilating my tissues was among taiga pine-needles and in the thick foliage of a rain-soaked forest. It stayed with Buddha and Ghenghis Khan, and afterwards it mixed with smoke rising from factory stacks and rushed through an automobile engine. Since water and air also pass through our bodies as they circulate continuously in nature, we poison our own tissues by poisoning and polluting the air. Our tendons and internal organs are made from humus, which combines past with future life.

I think the inference is that we are part of global biochemical processes. In appraising our actions, we certainly can and should use technological and political categories, but the moral point of view should come first.

Alexei Yablokov. Well said. It's all true, we are merely part of the immense cycle of substances on the Earth. The idea is correct and relevant. It is noteworthy, however, that the ancient Greeks, Avicenna and Omar Khayyam spoke about that in almost the same terms. But while their views were amazingly prophetic, they fell short of scientific knowledge. This knowledge is at our disposal now. The trouble is, however, that it has yet to transform itself into the logic of our everyday behaviour. We forget that since humanity is but a particle of the universal cycle, we are endangering ourselves by interfering with this cycle.

I believe humanity isn't prepared as yet to realise all the negative consequences of the so-called scientific and technological progress of society. We aren't quite prepared to grasp the negative effects of this process in—I wish to stress—its contemporary form. Really, the enormous inertia of our thinking is a serious factor. What is to be done for generally known ecological laws, i. e., elementary realities, to become moral imperatives? That is the question. Let me repeat the four laws of ecology: "Everything is connected with everything else", "Everything

The interlocutors are Rolf Edberg, diplomat and author, a noted Swedish public figure, and Alexei Yablokov, biologist, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Continued from INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 8, 1988, "Dialogue Between a Russian and a Swede".

must go somewhere", "Nature knows better", and "Nothing comes as a gift". But how is this ecological ABC to be driven home to everybody?

Edberg. You want to know how to put it across to people caught in today's economic and political routine that they are part of an indivisible global ecological context. This is a highly important problem, and it's anything but simple.

I think we would do well to turn to so powerful a universal sentiment as elementary biological attachment to those who bring us into the world and those whom we bring into the world. After all, what makes environmental pollution so terrible is that it's harmful to both the expectant mother and the unborn child. As the two have a common blood circulation, exhalations from factories and machines don't linger in the system of an only generation but affect posterity, poisoning it in advance. A newborn baby sucks "poisoned" milk from its mother's breast, thereby taking in an even larger amount of industrial poison than it absorbs while in the womb. Does everybody know that?

This information should be part of the elementary knowledge we gain at school. Perhaps we'll recall at long last the need for a healthy planet as we start to think of the health of our own children?

Yablokov. You know, there's a sinister contradiction here. Let me explain. A baby has to be fed, of course. Baby bottle-feeding used to be very popular in developed countries. But a few years ago it emerged that on growing up, children fed artificially are less healthy than breast-fed children. They are more susceptible to diseases, their intestines function worse, and most of them have an unstable nervous system. The obvious conclusion would seem to be that baby bottle-feeding must be given up in favour of breast-feeding. That's what we all thought. But due to global environment pollution, as you have noted, every nursing mother gives her baby both milk and various chemical "additives", including the notorious DDT. And so we have a very sad paradox: artificial food proves more useful after all because its pollutant content is lower than in the case of mother's milk. This is a reality of today's world.

Edberg. This immediately poses the question: Can I, a free and sovereign man responsible for the life of the Earth and the lives of my children, put up with a factory or company poisoning the air I breathe, the water that will enter my blood and the minute oceans of my cells, the soil whose salts and juices must feed me? The very question should sound as a call for a revolt across all political and ideological boundaries against those who are poisoning the environment.

Yablokov. But what can one person do in the face of humanity's enormous if ill-organised household? Opposing him are powerful industries and intricate economic and political systems connected with them in one way or another. I think what is needed in the circumstances is an elementary ecological school, a harmonious system of ecological education. All that is anti-ecological should be considered immoral. Only in that case will politicians and decision-makers have to follow the only possible logic, that of environment protection.

Edberg. It's not an easy task. One of the reasons lies in the question: just what should be considered a poison?

The fact is that we produce numerous substances which never before existed in natural conditions. According to estimates by American scientists, we use about 70,000 chemicals, or man-made, synthetic substances in everyday life, and 400 of them have already been detected in the human body. Some are poisonous from the outset but most of them haven't been tested in any way, so that we know nothing about their effect on our systems. Nor do we know how far nature can assimilate and dissolve substance foreign to her. Nobody seems to really know

what we now produce and offer for sale after all. We simply don't know what we are doing.

Yablokov It follows that a pollutant is any substance appearing in the wrong place, at the wrong time and in the wrong quantity. There's the revealing example of manure. It was a blessing for thousands of years because it guaranteed a new harvest. Afterwards man set up huge farms with thousands of animals, and the huge quantities of manure became a big problem. It's one of the most natural substances but there is too much of it. As a result, nature cannot cope with the task of assimilating it.

Hence the new expression, "agricultural pollution". Ever since 1980, the UN has classified the threat to living nature coming from agriculture as one of the four greatest. It's an unusual threat, a paradox. Farming produces food for us but the food often turns out to be contaminated. Why? Because two big problems have arisen. One of them is the growing use of chemical pesticides for the protection of crops and the other, the use of mineral fertilisers.

Speaking of these fertilisers, I wish to mention nitrates. In recent years we've owed it to them that crop yields in our country are up, water-melons are larger and vegetables look more appetising than before. But people now buy these products reluctantly and with misgivings because excessive quantities of nitrates cause food poisoning. What is worse, however, is that nitrates may cause cancer by going through a series of transformations in our systems. It's just like that: we have delicious, attractive-looking products on the one hand and a sharp increase in the incidence of a fatal disease, on the other. Isn't this indicative of an anti-ecological approach to life itself?

Edberg. I would like to say a word for my part about excessive fertilising. We in Sweden have some bitter experience of it. We've established that fields oversaturated with chemicals release nitrogen into subsoil and flowing waters, which carry it into the sea. There nitrogen is fed on by a seaweed called peridinium which absorbs as it multiplies so much oxygen that lobsters and other benthic animals perish, and as for fish, it either perishes too or moves to other waters. This is the situation all along the coast of Western Europe, and I'm sure the Soviet Union is faced with similar problems in its own coastal waters. Our government and parliament have adopted decisions providing for a 50 per cent reduction in the amount of nitrogenous fertilisers now in use but even that isn't enough any longer.

Sweden and four more European countries proposed signing an international agreement on reducing by 30 per cent emissions of nitrous oxides but the others voted against, I regret to say. After that the five countries tried to reach agreement on at least freezing those emissions at the 1987 level but that, too, was rejected by the delegates of Eastern Europe, the United States, Britain and Italy.

That's the brief comment I wanted to make. And now I wonder what you have to say about pesticides whose use has become an acute problem.

Yablokov. You realise, don't you, that I cannot simply drop the topic of fertiliser. You've brought up a truly sore subject. Many scientists estimate that plants only use one quarter of the fertilisers applied while the rest, or three-fourths, is washed away and ends up in reservoirs. In the end fertilisers prove harmful to the very vegetables grown with their aid, for they keep worse.

And now for pesticides. I'll give some figures to stress the dimensions of the problem. Every year sees from 20 to 25 billion dollars' worth of pesticides sold in the world. This means 400 to 500 grams per inhabitant of the Earth. In the United States and the Soviet Union the amount of pesticides per person is close to two kilograms while in some regions

it can be up to 50 kilograms. These figures are impressive, of course, except that there's a little "but" to them. Careful tests have shown that when pesticides are sprayed no more than three per cent of them reaches their destination, and usually it's even less than that. The rest is blown by winds out of the soil and into the atmosphere or into water. And so it's clear that pesticides are a powerful chemical weapon used by man against himself and other forms of life.

While recent years have seen a switch from very dangerous and durable organic chlorides, such as DDT, to fast-decaying phosphoro-organic carbamates and pyrethroids, all pesticides are most harmful to the environment just the same. And it's interesting to note that their effectiveness is not growing as expected but declining. In the United States, for instance, pests destroyed seven per cent of the crops in the forties but in the eighties they destroyed 14 per cent. In the same period, the use of pesticides increased tenfold. I believe this calls for some serious thinking.

Edberg. You said "pests" but is it right at all to call any insects "pests"? To be sure, where an insect population reaches excessive proportions it is likely to cause harm to plants and animals. But don't we ourselves foster the growth of certain populations by lending agriculture a one-sided character?

Yablokov. That's exactly what most scientists in the world think. The appearance of a "pest" in a field is an unmistakable sign of ill-advised farming, such as the single-crop system. There are no pests in nature except for man, who breeds them through mismanagement. However, today's world is such that chemical warfare against pests may last long. This is why we must warn even more emphatically against the threat posed to us all by pesticides.

Many people know nothing about them. It isn't because research produces no results but simply because, more often than not, they are deliberately withheld from the population at large. Yet the harm done by this "chemical delight" is enormous. In our country it's estimated that 80 per cent of all deaths among elk, boar and hare plus 40 per cent of the deaths that occur among fish every year is a direct consequence of agricultural pollution.

Needless to say, man hasn't escaped this fate, either. Pesticides contain quite a few mutagenic substances deforming human heredity. Roughly two per cent of the world's newborn come into the world carrying new hereditary diseases. You might say two per cent isn't so very much but the magnitude of the problem dawns upon us when we think that it's a question of millions, that those hereditary mutations persist among the population and multiply, that they form diverse combinations and what we call the burden of heredity. Nor is that all. Pesticides affect pregnancy, leading to a growing number of still-born children and spontaneous miscarriages. Children born in regions of intensive use of pesticides betray lower intelligence and physical retardation. Some consider that industrial agriculture has become one of the most hazardous occupations.

Elberg. We Swedes realise this more and more. Our government has resolved to cut the use of pesticides by half in a short time. Its initiative is unique at the international level. Besides, it has banned the use of growth inhibitors and will probably ban the import of intensive crops produced by international companies and requiring the use of pesticides. Generally speaking, the aim should be to stop using any pesticides.

So far we've been talking about careless treatment of the Earth's surface. But humanity also manipulates the atmosphere. And this poses as serious a threat as that of ruining living, fertile soil.

We've said that poison is a substance applied in the wrong place

and at the wrong time. Furthermore, it's used in the wrong combinations. Strange as it may seem, this also holds true of ozone. One molecule of this gas contains three atoms of oxygen. Even a small concentration of ozone plays a tremendous role for us. Were the ozone shield to disappear from the planetary atmosphere, ultraviolet rays would kill all higher organisms on the Earth.

The discovery of the fact that the ozone layer around the Earth was thinning came therefore as an unpleasant surprise. Why is this happening? Very many researchers are convinced that the villain's role is being played by the chlorine and bromine we emit into the atmosphere in the form of halogenous hydrocarbons, or what we call freons. They are like beasts of prey prowling in the stratosphere and tearing ozone molecules to pieces.

Years ago an environmental committee of the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences urged the government to ban the use of freons in aerosol cans. The quantities were trifling but combined they pose a real danger. Such a ban was actually decreed in our country, and afterwards the United States and some other countries followed suit.

But what good is it? After all, since then it has transpired that there is much more freon in refrigerators, foam plastics, insulating materials and so on. The latest data provided by Earth satellites have shown that the ozone layer is being destroyed even faster than was believed earlier. A sinister warning, that. The effect we can now observe is caused by freons emitted 30 or 40 years ago. Should we go on pumping them into the atmosphere, we will endanger even our children and grandchildren, which means that in the end they will have to protect themselves by wearing masks and gloves. The climate will change, as will farming conditions, photosynthesis and many, many other things.

Yablokov. The Americans, who are so fond of calculating everything, have discovered that even now the incidence of skin cancer in the United States rises by an annual two per cent under the impact of stratospheric processes. The future is now here, it seems.

Edberg. I am familiar with that data. That's one aspect of the problem of ozone: a shortage of ozone in the stratosphere is dangerous to life. But the reverse is just as true: too much ozone near the Earth's surface is harmful as well. The ozone which forms under the impact of sunrays from the nitrous oxides and hydrocarbons contained in automobile exhausts kills huge numbers of trees in our forests as well as in yours.

The conclusion to be drawn is that we should not manipulate natural substances in a way leading to an excessive increase or decrease in them somewhere. The West is now making more or less impressive efforts to reduce emissions of freons but the business interests concerned are resisting this.

I don't think it's easy to cope with the problem of freons in the Soviet Union, either, but that is for you to say.

Yablokov. All that you've said is correct. In our country as elsewhere, the remote effects of human activity are not yet realised by everybody, and the low ecological standard of our thinking, our bid to get "twice as much" and "twice as fast" as before doesn't make the task any easier.

Edberg. Freons aren't our only headache. There is also our long-time enemy, carbon dioxide, and we talk and write a lot about the dangerous growth of its quantity in the atmosphere. We had imagined that climatic changes due to carbon dioxide would come about gradually and very slowly. But now there is a new and alarming forecast that at some future juncture which can't be specified the climate might undergo a drastic change, that is, a fatal leap might occur. And then it would be too late, for beyond that boundary there would be no way back for the generations

ahead, since it might take the oceans hundreds of years to absorb the excess of carbon dioxide.

We are playing dangerous games. They may lead to a bad end.

Yablokov. I believe the problem of so-called hothouse gases is somewhat more complicated than you've shown. It's true that the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is rising year after year. But whereas earlier we attributed that to the use of fossil fuels, the latest research has established that the excess of carbon dioxide is due primarily to the vital activity of certain microorganisms which become more active in the soil after it has been stripped of forests. See how all things are interconnected: the removal of forests produces a hothouse effect, chemicals used for killing the tsetse fly decrease Africa's genetic fund, and so on. All problems are shortcircuited as it were.

Edberg. Precisely. Forests are an excellent indicator, for they are hit in many respects. Take, for example, the problem of acid rain. When it came down on lakes, choking life in them, people's reaction was strangely lukewarm. But when coniferous trees began to shed their needles, turning into skeletons, we roused to action. Well, that's understandable, come to think of it. After all, trees symbolise life, and when they began to die we were terrified.

Yablokov. Since what we have is a global phenomenon crossing borders, international cooperation is not merely desirable but urgent and inevitable, isn't it?

Edberg. Yes, there's an international agreement on a 30 per cent reduction in emissions of sulphur dioxide by 1993 against the 1980 level. The so-called Club of 30 comprises a score of countries now, including Sweden and the Soviet Union. The situation is particularly grave in countries that haven't yet joined the club.

Let us take an Eastern and a Western country as an example. Britain today is the chief source of emissions of sulphur dioxide in Western Europe. While pollution in other countries is diminishing, the British Isles show an increase. The country is hit by this, for pollution has a disastrous effect on Scotland's beautiful lakes, on relics of the past and cultural monuments. In other words, Britain is incurring losses even in terms of money.

Similar processes are under way in Poland, another country outside the Club of 30. The war took a heavy toll of it but the Poles saved and rehabilitated their country by dint of heroic efforts. However, they must save it again. During the war Cracow, an ancient cultural centre of Europe, was threatened with destruction, with the loss of its valuable historical and architectural patrimony. What's happening today is almost the same, for sulphur, carbon and nitrous oxides are steadily gnawing away the city's statues and other monuments, millimetre after millimetre.

I've seen figures made available, incidentally, by Poland itself. They indicate that three-fourths of the country's lands is poisoned to one degree or another. Four of the worst-affected regions have been declared areas of ecological disaster. The mortality rate among the newborn is going up, life expectancy is declining, the incidence of cancer, blood and respiratory diseases is on the rise, and so forth.

This ecological crisis involves all countries, of course, for Europe is too small for any country to be unaware of trouble in a neighbour's atmosphere. The ecological situation in any one country concerns all. While we are still very far from putting things in order in our own national house, we're also uneasy about the situation in yours. We feel that Eastern Europe is polluted even more than Western Europe bar Britain. This is why the Swedish Minister of Environment has called on Poland, the Soviet Union and the GDR to revise their thinking so as to reduce the damage which their economic activity causes to the continent's

environment. However, I realise that in your country that's a gigantic problem.

Yablokov. We are aware of our shortcomings and are doing much to remove them. But as a biologist I have the impression that our country isn't doing enough to solve even those problems whose seriousness we fully realise. For instance, we try to curb emissions by using filters. But that's a half-measure. It's non-waste production that would really solve the problem. I'm no expert on this but I understand that France has set a good example by renouncing all import of sulphur, which it now gets from its smokestacks, having equipped them with special collectors. It follows that both ecologically and in terms of everyday life, the right approach is to keep a place clean rather than remove refuse from it.

Edberg. But why doesn't every country go about it in the same way? I don't think the solution lies in "clean technologies" alone. It all hinges on how many rubles, kronor, marks or pounds would have to be spent on them. The narrow-mindedness of this approach is betrayed if only by the fact that even a tentative estimate of the value of the environment leaves no room for doubt that its destruction loses us more even in money terms than the most expensive pollutant abatement facilities would. We may say, therefore, that a normal ecological situation means a normal economy.

I think there's a need to bring about a complete change in the thinking of individuals, the public and governments, to adopt a fundamentally different approach to the problem. What we must calculate is not how many zlotys, rubles or kronor one or another environment protection measure costs, but how much our inaction will cost and, indeed, costs even now.

I wish to say, possibly at the risk of repeating myself, that what we're doing is too serious because our very future, our children, the very survival of the human race are at stake. I mean this literally. We've said that our posterity is imperilled even in the womb. But it looks as if crisis sets in even earlier. According to research done in Norway, the number of viable spermatozoa in the case of Scandinavian men dropped from 70 to 30 per cent in twenty years. Some researchers go as far as to predict that should this trend persist, the proportion of men capable of reproduction would be down noticeably by the end of this century. Now isn't that a revolt of nature against a whole genus which flouts her fundamental laws?

Yablokov. Another aspect of the problem is that the state of our environment is changing at an extremely rapid pace but we hardly notice it, being absorbed in our daily routine. This reminds me of a parallel. One day researchers carried out a cruel but instructive experiment. They placed a frog in a pail of water and put the pail on a gas-ring. The frog boiled slowly without suspecting it, so to speak, never making an attempt to get out of its "bath". But if you heat water to a high temperature and then throw a frog into it, the creature will try hard to jump out. I fear that we may find ourselves in the same plight as the first frog.

Edberg. I think it's clear that all concepts of contemporary technology need to be thoroughly revised. The only criterion is that whatever is une-
cological is criminal.

This is why today's industrial society with its predatory attitude to nature and man has no chance of surviving. Industrialisation as it has existed in the East and West for two hundred years has fulfilled its historical mission and must go. It's doomed.

We've plainly come to a pass where we need entirely new industries if we want to survive—industries based on man's requirement for a clean environment and on something else, such as would lend deep

meaning and a rich content to the existence of the individual. This calls for a society inspired by an ecological worldview. The road to it leads through new morals.

Yablokov. I fully agree with your opinion of the concept of today's industrial society and its morals, or amorality to be exact. Technocrats should realise that environment protection, nature conservation are indispensable to the existence of humanity. As for bragging about one's technological potentialities, one's ability to go even further and faster and accomplish still more than before, that's a dangerous habit. There is any number of cases in point.

As a consequence of our reckless activity, the protective properties of the atmosphere are declining, the hothouse effect is increasing, and the pollution level in the world is so high now that it's already altering the model of man's behaviour and deforming his genetic fund very seriously; indeed, the proportion of deformed individuals showing the most graphic pathological deviations is steadily growing. We are nearing a dangerous limit in saturating the biosphere with electromagnetic, radioactive, noise and light pollutants, and have proved unable to preserve the natural fertility of soil. As a consequence of this and other developments, the pattern of mortality has undergone a marked change. Isn't that in itself a major indicator? The evidence is that whereas 100 years ago the main causes of death were communicable diseases and parasitoses, today it's cancer and diseases affecting blood circulation that are in the lead. The environment created by industrial society is killing its creator.

We come to a similar conclusion as we compare risk factors. The risk of being killed by, say, lightning is negligible: one case a year per two million people. The risk of dying from a snake bite in India is 1:500,000. But the likelihood of dying in an air crash is much greater: one case per 100,000 people travelling by air. In industry death by accident befalls one in every 30,000, and in traffic accidents it's every 7,000th driver that loses his life. The risk of being killed by acid rain in an industrial country is 1:5,000, while the proportion of fatal cases of poisoning by pesticides in areas of intensive farming is greater than 1:1,000.

Mortality due to anthropogenous changes in the environment has long since passed permissible limits. I think if we had complete statistics on disease and mortality in the world and in individual regions, we would be struck even more by the critical state of the "man-society-nature" relationship.

Hence the main provision of humanity's new moral code should be:

We can conquer nature only by submitting to her laws." These aren't my words. They were first spoken in 1620 by Francis Bacon, the great English philosopher. There you have old morals that are still new.

I foresee all sorts of objections to this proposition as well, since the idea of "defeating" nature seems to have stopped tempting anybody long ago. But I'm not speaking of hopelessly outdated philosophies of combating and subduing nature. All that belongs in the Stone Age. What I mean now is the need to adopt the moral principle of protecting and conserving nature, of subordinating technologies to the natural processes going on in the biosphere, to the restoration of the green world around us. This would constitute the content of precisely a new morality, or what you call *ecosophy*.

Edberg. To help it prevail, the world has some prerequisites already, including the one that may be defined as the awakening of ecoconscience. Many of our contemporaries feel something of a guilt complex towards nature, for we are collectively betraying our common, prehistorical mother. This is why I hope in spite of everything that humanity will soon realise the great yet simple truth that it's we who belong to the Earth and not the other way round.

We are now running what may be called a race with time. The question is whether we can outrun it. The myth of the creation of the world says that Jehovah created in six days water, land, plants, animals and the crown of his labours, man. When, on the seventh day, he had everything, he saw that it was "excellent indeed".

We've worked hard and long, building, inventing and transforming. We did all this in the hope of saying something comparable about our achievements. Regrettably, we now know that we will never say it is "excellent indeed" as we look back at what we've done. Its sight arouses an entirely different sentiment.

We began the process of creation in the reverse order, by turning a blooming garden into a barren desert. We began to count the days and must stop short of the seventh day.

On Sunday it will be too late.

RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC CUSTOM

Leonid YUZEFOVICH

EMISSARIES FROM HALF THE WORLD

A Muscovite born, say, in the early 16th century, i. e., during the last years of the reign of Ivan III, might have observed in the course of his life dozens of foreign diplomats of all ranks—from simple couriers surrounded by several companions, to “grand” ambassadors, accompanied by a brilliant suite of hundreds of noblemen and servants—walking down the capital’s streets. They came to Moscow from all over the world. From the South, via Dikoye Pole, Vorotynsk, Putivl and Borovsk, along the same road that “strong ambassadors” of the Golden Horde—collectors of tribute—had come to Russ just previously, there now galloped embassies of Crimean and Nogai khans, stirring up clouds of dust and moving with them for sale herds of horses numbering in the hundreds, and even thousands. This was the route used by the envoys of the overlords of the Brilliant Porte—the Turkish sultans.

From the North, from the “haven” of the Monastery of St. Nicholas of Korel on the White Sea (later from the “new city of Arkhangelsk”), through Kholmogory and Yaroslavl there raced to Moscow emissaries of the English “virgin queen” Elizabeth I, who was interested in trade no less than politics, and London merchants, who frequently fulfilled simultaneously the duties of diplomatic agents; in winter, they travelled over frozen rivers and lakes to save time.

From the East, along the Volga and Oka, came the ambassadors of the Kazan and Astrakhan khans whose possessions were later annexed to Russia. After Astrakhan surrendered in 1556 without resistance, and the Caucasus and Persia entered the orbit of Russian foreign policy, this route was followed by the “Kizilbash” (Persian), “Iverian” (Georgian) and “Circassian” (Kabardian) embassies.

The greatest number of ambassadors came from the West, however. Through Novgorod and Pskov travelled Scandinavians—Swedes and Danes, and also representatives of the Prussian and Livonian commanders. Envoys of the Habsburgs’ Empire and huge Polish-Lithuanian embassies, which were more similar to military detachments than peaceful missions, moved slowly and noisily through Smolensk, along the ancient trade highway going to Dorogobuzh, Mozhaisk and farther on to Moscow.

In the late 15th century Russian ambassadors began travelling abroad, too. They rode on horseback and in coaches on the roads of Western Europe, fled from robbers in the steppes by the Black Sea, fought pirates

on the Caspian, suffered from seasickness on Turkish ships and English galleys, and died from malaria in the Caucasus.

Until the mid-16th century the now customary type of resident ambassador who permanently lives in the country of station was virtually unknown both in Russia and in Western Europe. Admittedly, the Republic of Venice had long had its representatives at a number of royal courts, and in 1513 Pope Leo X, following its example, established nunciatures in France, England and Germany (unlike legates, who fulfilled single diplomatic assignments of the Vatican, nuncios permanently represented its interests at the courts of Catholic monarchs). During the latter half of the 16th century the new method of diplomatic representation was gradually instituted in the major European powers.

The benefits of permanent representation were obvious. And in the 16th century Russia tried to keep its ambassadors in the Crimea for long periods, which made it possible to exert a more successful influence on the Perekop rulers and provide Moscow with more reliable information on their intentions. However, in relations with the West during this period there predominated a diplomacy which the British historian C. Carter called "occasional"—embassies were dispatched "on occasion". The first Russian diplomat of the new type was V. Tyapkin, who was sent to Warsaw only in 1669.

THE TSAR'S "PLOUGHMEN"

Beginning in the times of Ivan III, when vigorous relations were established between the young Russian state and most European and many Asian powers after the yoke of the Golden Horde had been overthrown, Muscovian diplomacy came to face tasks that were so complicated that the founding of a special diplomatic department was ultimately required to accomplish them. Initially, foreign policy matters fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Grand Duke himself and the Boyar Duma, diplomatic correspondence was handled by the Keeper of the State Seal, while the arrangement of audiences, dispatch of Russian missions and the reception of foreign missions and the provision of them with everything they needed were the province of individual clerks and scribes and the agents of the sovereign who fulfilled one-time assignments; in ties with the East, the main figure was the Treasurer.

At first foreigners in the service of Muscovy—Italians and Greeks—were primarily used as ambassadors, but under the reign of Vassili III they were elbowed out by Russians. Specialisation of the state apparatus was in progress at that time. Whereas earlier the clerks in charge of the reception and dispatch of embassies were also engaged in other matters totally disconnected with foreign policy, in the second quarter of the 16th century they began increasingly concentrating solely on the discharge of diplomatic duties and acquired assistants in the person of scribes, experienced ushers (noblemen who accompanied arriving foreign missions), interpreters and translators. In 1549 Ivan the Terrible placed all "ambassadorial matters" under the jurisdiction of scribe Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovaty, subsequently Clerk of the Duma. This is believed to have inaugurated the Ambassadorial Department as a special institution although, as some scholars believe, that agency existed prior to 1549 as well.

In any event, Russia had professional diplomats—Ambassadorial Clerks—from as early as the end of the 15th century. They compiled important documents (Viskovaty personally compiled the texts of messages that were sent abroad on behalf of the highest officials, up to and including Archbishop Makariy and the tsar himself), conducted talks with foreign ambassadors, and travelled abroad with Russian missions where

they directed their actions covertly or openly. A titled grand ambassador was frequently just a figurehead.

One of the most educated Russians of his time, a scholar and an expert on iconography, Viskovaty headed the foreign policy department for some two decades, until 1570. He was accused of high treason by the tsar, of maintaining secret relations simultaneously with the Turkish sultan, the Crimean khan, the emigre Prince Kurbsky, and the Polish king, to whom he supposedly intended to turn over Novgorod and Pskov, and was subjected to an agonising public execution by dismembering (the tsar "ordered that the clerk Viskovaty be executed by being dismembered at the joints").

Andrei Yakovlevich Shchelkalov, who replaced him, was also an important figure. According to I. Massa, a Dutch merchant who lived in Moscow in the early 17th century, Boris Godunov believed that the whole world was too small for a man of Shchelkalov's abilities, and serving Alexander of Macedonia alone would have befitted him.

The following Ambassadorial Clerks are known as well: Fyodor Kuritsyn and Boldyr Payusov—under Ivan III; Fyodor Karpov, Tretyak Dolmatov, Fyodor Mishurin and Yelizar Tsyplyatev—under Vassili III; Andrei Vassilyev and Andrei Scherefetdinov—under Ivan the Terrible, and many others, who were less influential—who travelled abroad or never left Russia, experts on ceremonies or the running of offices. Several of them knew foreign languages, including Latin and Greek, while others spoke and wrote only Russian. Some were people "skilled in book-learning", such as Fyodor Kuritsyn, who was inclined to free thinking and a non-Orthodox interpretation of Orthodox dogmas, or Fyodor Karpov, a pupil and friend of the Byzantine theologian and educator Maximos the Greek, who lived in Moscow. Others, while not possessing book wisdom, stood out for their sober practical intellect, broad political horizons, fine memory and enormous capacity for work. This applied above all to Andrei Shchelkalov and his younger brother Vassili.

However, while being people of different cultural levels, the Ambassadorial Clerks were similar in one thing—their consciousness of the extreme importance of the mission conferred upon them. In 1594, while receiving N. Varkotsch, an emissary from the Holy Roman Empire at the Ambassadorial Department, Andrei Shchelkalov told him: "Both your and my sovereigns have begun the ploughing for the glory of Christianity, and Boris Fyodorovich [Godunov, who had yet to ascend the throne.—L. Y.], you and I are the ploughmen."¹ In oral folk poetry and early Russian literature "ploughing" was a metaphor for combat and military affairs. Used by Shchelkalov, this figure of speech shows how diplomatic activity was perceived at the time and how much importance was attached to it.

It was in the environment of the Ambassadorial Clerks and scribes (not without the participation of the Duma Clerks and the sovereigns themselves, of course) that notions of norms of international law, including the rights of an embassy, diplomatic etiquette and the rules of ambassadorial service were gradually elaborated during the first decades of the 16th century. As early as the start of the 16th century there existed in Russia a clearly defined gradation of diplomatic representatives, which included three main ranks: ambassadors ("grand ambassadors"), emissaries ("light ambassadors") and couriers. The first and second were deputies of the sovereign who held talks and concluded agreements in his name, and the third merely carried written reports, often not even knowing their contents (the documents of the Ambassadorial Department say that ambassadors and emissaries carry certificates "with open seals", while couriers—"with closed seals"). Oral reports were not conveyed with couriers, as the latter were not deputies of the sovereign but execu-

lors of his will. At that time the tsar's "speeches" conveyed to a foreign monarch with ambassadors and emissaries had to be delivered by them orally and in the first person. A deputy of the sovereign at all times, an ambassador in a way became the sovereign himself at the moment he delivered "speeches".

In the relations among the princes during the period of feudal fragmentation, diplomatic assignments in Russ were frequently conferred upon authoritative clergymen. For example, Sergiy of Radonezh travelled to Oleg of Ryazan on an ambassadorial mission from Dmitri Donskoi. In the 16th-17th centuries, however, church figures were assigned to Russian diplomatic missions only as priests accompanying these missions, which reflected general European trends. Diplomacy had become a purely secular endeavour.

As early as the reign of Ivan III a procedure was established under which a prince or boyar was appointed the head of an embassy, and an *okolnuchy* [member of social group with status second to that of boyars.—*Ed.*] or a Duma nobleman was designated head of an emissary mission; noblemen, "boyar children", scribes or lower court officials, such as attorneys, "residents", etc., travelled as couriers. In keeping with the established canons, in miniatures of Russian chronicles ambassadors and emissaries were portrayed in a long-hemmed dress and with beards, couriers—in a short-hemmed dress and without beards, like other "junior people", i. e., standing low on the social ladder (although chronologically a courier could be older than an ambassador). A person of relatively low station could not embody the sovereign, and a "boyar's son" could not be an ambassador as, for that matter, a boyar could not be a courier, but for a different reason—this would dishonour not the tsar but the boyar himself. The social standing and official court status of the head and members of an embassy had to correspond strictly to their diplomatic rank.

A diplomat's social status and rank had to be endorsed by the appropriate number of the coterie. Only emissaries were sent to England, for example, inasmuch as passage to the British Isles with a large number of accompanying persons was impossible. For the same reasons the average rank of Russian diplomatic representatives was also designated in relations with Turkey, Persia and the Papal See in Rome. The hardships of a long journey prevented grand ambassadors from coming before a foreign monarch with all the pomp befitting their rank.

In Russo-Lithuanian diplomatic practice a suite of couriers comprised between 20 and 30 persons on average, that of emissaries—150-200, and that of ambassadors—300-400, while the most important missions consisted at times of a thousand persons and more: noblemen, servants, chefs, barbers, priests, scribes, stablemen, and so on. The upkeep of such an army of guests naturally made for a host of inconveniences and troubles and entailed enormous expenses for food for the people and feed for the horses. However, neither Muscovy, Vilno nor Cracow attempted to limit the size of suites, which attested to the high standing of a diplomat and therefore served the honour of the sovereign receiving the embassy.

At the same time, Russian diplomats in the Crimea periodically reminded the khan "not to send too many people to accompany his ambassador". This alarm was readily understandable—for one thing, the Tatar princes demanded gifts; for another, Crimean horsemen "conducted themselves riotously" en route, and they had to be protected. Here pragmatic considerations took the upper hand over prestige, inasmuch as etiquette in Russo-Crimean relations by and large did not have the significance attached to it in relations with Western Europe, where the Russian sovereigns invariably made it a paramount point of honour, and tried to underscore their might and sovereign power.

"THERE ARE NO CULPABLE AMBASSADORS ANYWHERE"

The right of diplomatic immunity, on whose observance, as was believed in Russia and Poland, the very well-being of the state is based, was law in the Middle Ages, and an unshakeable one, in that it was based on custom rather than letter. However, Russian diplomatic custom also had written guarantees of the immunity of foreign diplomats, called "certificates against danger". They were duly delivered to a monarch intending to dispatch an embassy and were formalised according to the following stereotype: "...whomever you send to us as your ambassadors, your ambassadors should come to us and leave us unimpeded; the road is clear both ways."

In the Crimea Russian diplomats used to be subjected to all manner of mockery. They were locked up, beaten, threatened with torture, kept without food or water, their horses were stolen, gifts were extorted from them, and their property was pilfered. In order to guarantee them at least a modicum of safety, an "exchange" of ambassadors was adopted in Russo-Crimean practice. It took place on the southern borders, mostly in Putivl. From here the Russian ambassador would leave for the Crimea and the khan's ambassador for Moscow, and each was a sort of guarantor of the safety of the other. However, this precautionary measure did not save Russian diplomats from affronts and insults.

The Crimean khan Sahib-Girei, who complained of a violation of diplomatic immunity in Moscow in 1546, "disgraced" a member of the Russian mission, a scrivener named Lyapun. His nose and ears were sewn up with thread, after which he was stripped naked and dragged around the city bazaar. Russian diplomats were subjected to coercion, at times fiendish, both in the Nogai Horde and in Kazan, but most of all in the Crimea, where the khans were stubbornly, trying to revitalise the spectre of the Horde's domination over Russ.

Minor incidents linked with improper behaviour on the part of an embassy suite were rather common phenomena throughout the 16th century. Back in 1491, in Kaffa (Feodosia), the servants of A. Pleshcheyev, the ambassador of Ivan III to Turkey, beat up a Kaffa door-keeper. The latter, perhaps executing his duty too zealously, had begun chasing the embassy horses out of the moat where they were picking at grass, for which he was beaten. Suites of European diplomats in Russia did not comport themselves any better. In 1519 a child of the Imperial ambassador I. Kristof "cut off the finger of a warden's child" with a sword, and also took a cow away from a certain "old man". Nogai and Crimean Tatars were not the only ones who behaved riotously on the road to Moscow. Polish noblemen would amuse themselves by cutting off the tails of others' horses in the Moscow streets. In Moscow the suite of Lithuanian ambassadors repeatedly got into fights with Russian police-officers, with whips, rods and even sabres being used.

These and other occurrences evoked reprimands from the sides; complaints were made which were sometimes not acted upon and others entailed punishment for the guilty if they could not show just cause. Thus, in 1604 a clerk by the name of I. Leontyev, who had just travelled to Georgia with an embassy, where he comported himself "impolitely", was, following the accusation by the Georgian ambassador who had arrived in Moscow, whipped right before the latter's eyes.

As a rule, the Russian authorities themselves did not punish members of an embassy suite who committed crimes in Russia, but demanded that they be punished by the government of the country they were from. Thus, the Russian side subordinated itself to the well-known norm of international law that was formulated by the 17th-century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius as the extraterritoriality of an ambassador and his suite.

Individual occurrences of this type did not lead to serious diplomatic complications. However, the right of diplomatic immunity was sometimes violated for political reasons. In 1568 there began a saga, unparalleled before or after, when for over a number of years Russian diplomats in Sweden and Swedish diplomats in Russia were subjected to insults, arrested, exiled to distant regions, and so on. This unique "diplomatic war" was started by the Swedes.

During the stay of the embassy of I. Vorontsov in Stockholm, King Erik XIV, a supporter of a Russo-Swedish alliance, was overthrown by the detachments of his brother, Johan, Duke of Finland, the future King Johan III, which had burst into the capital. The Duke's armed people seized the town house where the Russian ambassadors were living, looted their property and even removed the ambassadors' clothing, leaving them "only in their shirts". Then Vorontsov "with his comrades" were locked up and given neither food nor water for four days. At the same time the duke's hirelings pillaged the embassy boats in the port. Admittedly, part of the property was subsequently returned; however, the embassy, which was divided into two groups, was forcibly detained in Sweden another six months—they were sent from Stockholm to the environs of the city of Åbo (now Turku, in Finland).

Afterwards the Swedes carefully explained away what had happened as a simple misunderstanding, citing the confusion that reigned during the assault on the capital. However, this action was obviously intentional, its cause being the earlier promise of Erik XIV to steal away from Johan of Finland, who was in prison at the time, his wife, Katerina Jagello, the sister of King Sigismund II Augustus of Poland, whom Ivan the Terrible himself had sought in marriage, and to give her in marriage to the tsar. This most likely became known to the indignant duke, whose policy as a whole had a Polish and, therefore, anti-Russian orientation.

And when a Swedish embassy headed by Bishop Paul Justen arrived in Russia later that year, the furious tsar undertook retaliatory repressions: "the sovereign ordered that the Swedish ambassadors be robbed because the Swedish king had robbed the ambassadors of the sovereign". But Ivan the Terrible paid the Swedes back a hundredfold. At the court of the governor of Novgorod their hands were tied, the ends of the ropes were given to a horseman, and the ambassadors were made to run after him to their lodgings down the street amidst a jeering crowd. Then all the ambassadors' property was taken away from them and they were exiled to Murom, where they had a daily roll-call before the local police-officers. In Murom the Swedes languished several months, counting the logs in the paling around their lodgings (in his report Justen writes that there were 745 logs) before they were eventually sent home.

Over the years that followed Ivan the Terrible and Johan III exchanged several "abusive" letters (in his correspondence the tsar was not particular about the way he expressed himself). Nothing is known of the fate of the couriers who delivered these letters to Moscow and Stockholm, but one can surmise that it was a sad one. Finally, in 1573, a Russian courier named V. Chikhachev arrived in Sweden. Apprehensive that the new missive from the tsar had been written in the same spirit as those in the past, the Swedes demanded that the courier hand it over prior to the audience. Naturally, Chikhachev refused on the plea that according to etiquette a missive of the tsar could be handed over only directly to the King himself, i. e., Johan III.

Several days later, with the aim of wheedling Ivan the Terrible's letter and preventing the King from receiving it directly, the Swedes staged a spectacle that was fantastic even for those times. Chikhachev was granted an audience, at which he handed Johan III the missive of the tsar. The audience was held according to all the rules; the next day, however,

Christofer Fleming, a royal adviser, appeared at the residence of the Russian courier and stated that Chikhachev had been received not by the king but by him—Fleming, who had been garbed in the king's clothing and had been sitting on the throne instead of Johan III.

Chikhachev could not acknowledge the mistake. Such a mistake, which threatened him with severe punishment upon his arrival in Moscow, led to the "belittling of the honour" of the tsar. Chikhachev's fortunes shaped up tragically. The king exiled him to some place in the North, to Finland, where he soon died, far from his homeland, thus escaping punishment for having been deceived by a Swedish grandee attired in royal dress.

Referring to the incident with the embassy of Vorontsov, Ivan the Terrible wrote to Johan III: "There are no culpable ambassadors anywhere: they arrive with what they are sent."² But he endorsed the direct opposite: "It has been established from time immemorial that those who come to sever relations, declare war, etc. are not allowed to live."³ And in 1579, when a Polish courier brought the tsar a "letter of severance of relations" from King Stefan Batory, who advocated a new campaign against the Russian lands, Ivan the Terrible declared: "Whosoever travels with such letters will be executed everywhere. We, as the sovereign of a Christian land, do not want your wretched blood!"⁴ Ivan the Terrible with his contradictory character and his intrinsic mental imbalance (foreigners, for example, noted that when he became excited he would repeat everything twice) not only voiced totally contradicting ideas but also easily reconciled them within himself.

All the same, there is not even the slightest trustworthy mention of foreign diplomats ever being executed in Russia. Rare incidents like the ones described above were conditioned by a worsening of already strained relations with Sweden, the Rzecz Pospolita and the Crimea—the nearest neighbours and most dangerous enemies. Nor can one but fail to take into account the traits of Ivan the Terrible as a person and a ruler: no Russian sovereign before or after him ever took the liberty of violating the right of diplomatic immunity.

"An ambassador is like a wineskin—he carries what he is filled with"—this stereotyped formula was constantly used by both Russian and Polish-Lithuanian diplomats. "Don't beat, curse or whip an ambassador; reward him" reads a Russian saying found in a handwritten 17th century collection of manuscripts. It clearly mirrors popular notions about norms of treating ambassadors. Individual violations failed to shake tradition. What is more, it appears even more forceful against their background.

BEHIND THE HIGH FENCES

Accommodation in a town house was part of the system of complete state provision of ambassadors and their suite with everything they needed. This system took shape gradually in Moscow. In the Novgorod and Pskov of the times of their independence, German and Scandinavian ambassadors lived in the homes of their merchant countrymen and did not receive maintenance from the city treasury. In Moscow, however, lodgings were supplied by the authorities, and foreign diplomats had no opportunity to choose.

Couriers who arrived with a small suite were normally accommodated at the courts of rich Muscovites—at one or several, if the suite exceeded 15-20 people, but definitely neighbouring. Larger embassies were accommodated at spacious monastery hostels, sometimes in Dorogomilovo, where the residence of the archbishop of Rostov was located. Beginning in 1526 there was mention of the Lithuanian embassy court near the Uspensky Ravine, in the area of present-day Belinsky and Ogarev streets. This court

existed until the late 16th century. Accommodated at it were the Polish-Lithuanian and Swedish embassies, and, less frequently, Imperial embassies, and only the biggest at that. In the early 17th century there began to function a stone embassy court in Ilyinka St. which replaced the old one. It was a three-storey structure with a gallery-promenade and a vast territory behind the walls which was used both for economic needs and for entertainment.

The stay of foreign diplomats in Moscow was sometimes delayed for several months, and throughout this time, with the exception of days of audiences and talks, they were supposed to remain at their residence. For Lithuanian diplomats, most of whom professed Orthodoxy, a church was built at the residence, while their attending services at the Kremlin cathedrals was strictly regimented and, as a rule, timed to coincide with the highest audience or the latest round of talks. In 1517 Lithuanian diplomats complained to Imperial ambassador S. Gerberstein that "they are being watched over like beasts in the wilderness".⁵ And almost a hundred years later Polish ambassadors told the boyars: "All the liberty we have is to see as much of the sky as is above us and as much land as is below us at the residence".⁶ But Gerberstein himself had much greater freedom. He went hunting with Vassili III; at the invitation of the Grand Duke he enjoyed bear hunting. It was the Polish-Lithuanian and Swedish diplomats that were guarded with particular care in Moscow.

Contacts of ambassadors with the local population, foreign merchants and their own government were totally ruled out. The latter was particularly important. Say, a courier from Vilno or Stockholm did not have the right to hand additional instructions without the knowledge of the Russian authorities to the Polish-Lithuanian or Swedish ambassadors in Moscow. Such a courier was accommodated separately from the ambassadors, and they could meet only under the observation of Russian police-officers. This was done so that the ambassadors would not be able to learn about any changes in the international situation that could influence their position or change it during talks.

The stringent security was also dictated by a fear of espionage. Foreign diplomats could send news home from Moscow only if the Russians acquainted themselves with it in advance. There was nothing out of the ordinary here, as in all European states the gathering of information about the host country was one of the ambassador's obligation. This was a paramount source of political news in times when neither newspapers nor foreign correspondents existed.

In Moscow, naturally, care was taken to keep any information undesirable for the Russian government from leaking abroad through diplomatic channels. A curious incident occurred in 1528, when the Turkish ambassador suddenly took ill and died at his Moscow residence. When a distraint was made of his belongings which were to be sent back to Turkey, police-officers discovered a letter addressed to the sultan in which the deceased reported that when Vassili III learned of the defeat of Turkish troops in Hungary, he had church bells rung for joy. Of course, this letter, which was capable of harming Russo-Turkish relations, was secretly removed and did not reach Istanbul.

The Russian system of "guarding" functioned in full measure only during war with the country whence an embassy arrived. A representative of a hostile power was a semi-prisoner, and that of a friendly country—a guest, but in the 16th century relations with Sweden and the Rzecz Pospolita were never entirely amicable. However, the ambassadors of other states enjoyed relative freedom. English, Imperial, Danish and Persian diplomats were able unimpededly to go about the city and to the market (admittedly, with a Russian escort), and receive merchant countrymen at their residence. With regard to representatives of friendly

powers the strictness was maintained only until the first audience at court. In 1587 police-officers told the Imperial emissary, G. Heugel, that "he has not seen the sovereign yet, and it was not proper to allow his people outside to walk around, but as soon as he sees the sovereign, both he and his people will be granted that liberty".⁷

Moscow, of course, was worried about ambassadors revealing the goals of their mission before the government learned about it. But another point was no less important. The tight security for ambassadors prior to the first audience was of ceremonial importance—etiquette required that an ambassador who came to the sovereign appear before him before anyone else. In Western Europe, too, the rules of diplomatic courtesy envisaged a procedure according to which a newly arrived ambassador did not have to pay a visit to anyone until the first presentation to the monarch, but in Moscow this rule was implemented with the rigidity that had developed in Russo-Lithuanian relations. The austere regime of maintenance of ambassadors that was traditional for these relations and which applied in part to the representatives of other powers was relaxed gradually. Only in the 17th century did provision of freedom to all ambassadors after an audience with the tsar fully become a norm.

The moment a foreign embassy was met at the border, both the ambassadors and their suite were fully supplied with foodstuffs. A diplomat of any rank arriving in Russia was considered a guest of the sovereign, and he received food directly on his behalf. Purchasing additional provisions was considered "improper", since that would call the tsar's generosity into question. The tsar's "honour" was likewise affronted if ambassadors rejected a "food ration", as was the case, for example, in 1607, when the chef of the Polish embassy, annoyed that the tsar's sheep were too skinny, stabbed one of them and hung its carcass on the gate of the embassy residence.

Stores of food were supplied in ample quantity. The Imperial ambassador I. Kobenzel (1575) wrote that the provisions sent to him and his suite would have been sufficient not only for the thirty people of his embassy but for three hundred. Misunderstandings arose only rarely due to the quality and variety of food or beverages.

European, Turkish and Persian ambassadors were always supplied better than the Crimean and Nogai ones. From the latter the Russians took back, during the rule of Ivan III, the skins of the sheep they had eaten (at that time Russian ambassadors, too, were supposed to return the skins of the sheep they had consumed on their way to the border), but subsequently such petty economising was considered unbecoming to a sovereign.

"Food rations" were issued to foreign diplomats depending on their rank—an emissary was equalled to a junior member of a "grand" embassy of that power, a courier—to the ambassadorial "secretarius", and the suite of the emissary received per capita half of what the ambassador's was issued. In the 17th century these rather complicated computations were simplified, and money was issued to the ambassadors instead of foodstuffs, and they purchased supplies themselves at the market.

Aside from the "ordinary issue" which comprised the usual daily ration, an "arrival ration" was sometimes issued on the occasion of an embassy's arrival in the capital. After a diplomatic agreement was concluded or simply after an audience with the tsar, an "honour ration" could be issued as a supplement to the daily ration.

During the reigns of Ivan III and his son and grandson, foreign ambassadors were definitely invited at least once to dinner at the court in the presence of the sovereign himself. However, by the end of the 16th century such invitations had become a rarity, with dishes from the royal kitchen being sent to the ambassadors' residence on the so-

vereign's behalf more frequently. In 1602, 200 courtiers and royal cup-bearers were sent by Boris Godunov to the residences of the Imperial ambassadors S. Kakasch and K. Tektander. They walked in the streets of Moscow, festively carrying exclusively fish dishes, as it was a *lenten day*. This occurred during the unprecedentedly bad harvests of the first years of the 17th century, and one can imagine the feelings with which hungry Muscovites gazed at this procession.

An integral part of diplomatic custom was the sending and receiving of diplomatic gifts ("tokens"). Usually, furs, especially sable, were sent to West European countries. The most valuable sables were sent individually, and less valuable—in bundles of forty. Sometimes hunting falcons and gerfalcons, and less frequently—weapons and saddles and harnesses of Oriental make. The gifts to Persian shahs and Georgian kings were more varied—not only furs but also live animals, sables, bears and hunting dogs, and silver tableware. The Crimean khans received from Moscow furs and coats, cloth, coats of mail and other armour, firearms, seal bone, brass pots, brass and silver kitchenware, etc.

To reciprocate, the Crimean ambassadors brought the Russian sovereigns almost exclusively horses, Persian and Georgian ones, expensive clothing, carpets, fabrics, rings with semi-precious stones and simply precious stones and gold-embroidered saddles and bridles. Boris Godunov received a throne decorated with turquoise as a gift from the Persian shah. An English merchant named J. Gorsey saw in the treasure-store of Ivan the Terrible a necklace of magnetised needles which the tsar extraordinarily valued; perhaps it had been brought from Derbent, where chunks of magnetic iron were found. Once a live elephant was sent to Ivan the Terrible from Persia. En route the driver fell ill and died, and the elephant, refusing food, lay on his grave until it was killed; the tusks were removed and sent to the tsar.

The Imperial ambassador N. Poppel brought the wife of Ivan III, Grand Dutchess Sofya Paleolog, a parrot in a cage. Elizabeth I presented Ivan the Terrible with English wolfhounds and live lions; but gold and silver tableware comprised most of the gifts brought to Moscow by West European diplomats. A frequent gift was valuable cups, which might have been a consequence of archaic notions on the indissolubility of a treaty and the ritual drinking. Clocks and even weapons were brought (it was not considered insulting if the blades were in their scabbards).

During the reigns of Ivan III and Vassili III "ship coins"—coins of the Holy Roman Empire on whose reverse was chasing with the image of ship—were considered the most usual gift in Moscow-Vilno relations. In 1543 King Sygismund I sent Ivan the Terrible, a 13-year-old youth at the time, 30 Hungarian gold coins. But this is the last report of this type. Afterwards coins were never sent as diplomatic gifts, as notions to the effect that money could only be a "reward" from an older person to a younger one, from the sovereign to a subject, or from a suzerain to a vassal had finally become ingrained in Russians' consciousness.

There were two types of diplomatic gifts—official, which were sent from one monarch to another—and private—from the ambassadors themselves. Foreign diplomats in Russia and Russians abroad constantly gave gifts not only from their sovereigns but also from themselves personally. More often than not, these gifts were issued from the treasury to Russian ambassadors before their departure abroad, and they were supposed to return to the treasury the reciprocal "donation" of the monarch. The tsar kept the most valuable things, leaving the rest for the ambassadors as a reward for their service.

Gifts sent from the sovereign could be presented only to a foreign sovereign personally and to no one else, and in a festive setting.

In Moscow gifts were given not only to the tsar but also to the heirs to the throne and even to the embassy police-officers. Treasurers sent gifts to arriving foreign diplomats and immediately received gifts in return. Ivan the Terrible invited to his table ("to eat bread") only those persons of an embassy suite who had presented him with their own gifts, etc. This complicated system of giving and receiving gifts and "donations" was a definite element of Russian diplomatic custom, which should not be regarded as proof of the corruption of the Muscovian court. Beliefs to the effect that the giver and the receiver enter into a special, magical union probably told here. This union was perceived, albeit unconsciously, as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of diplomatic contacts. One medieval Persian chronicler called diplomatic gifts the "foundation of coalescence" and "support of favour". This pithy aphoristic formula could have belonged to any 16th century Russian or West European diplomat.

IN THE STREETS OF MOSCOW

The festive entry of foreign embassies into Moscow and their procession to the palace for an audience was a colourful and exciting spectacle. Its scenario was worked out in advance and category clerks and clerks of the Embassy Department were its directors.

At the last field camp before Moscow ambassadors would be sent horses from the tsar's stables, on which they were supposed to enter the capital. The horses were pedigree and richly adorned, with embroidered saddles, and collars and reins made in the shape of silver or gilded chains. These chains especially astounded foreigners. The links were wide and long, but flat, and, as a European diplomat put it, "no thicker than the edge of a dull knife". The same chains, only shorter, were sometimes attached to the horses' legs.

The embassy train, headed by a grand ambassador, and the procession of "greeters", i. e., the persons appointed by the tsar to meet arriving diplomats, converged in the designated place, where everyone was to dismount. The Russians required that the first to dismount be the diplomats, who in their turn sought the reverse order. As a result of long "debates" both agreed to dismount simultaneously, but they got out of their saddles extremely slowly in an effort to touch the ground with their boots even a fraction of a second later than their opponents. Various tricks were possible here, and the West European diplomats were just as well versed in them as the Muscovites. Such contrivances were due to a fear of belittling the "honour" of one's sovereign, a fear that was equally intrinsic to both sides.

The ambassadors, their hats off, would listen to the ceremonial greeting from the tsar, conveyed through the senior "greeter". By the early 17th century its text, which used to be brief, had ballooned considerably due to the overall complication of etiquette and often was not delivered but read out. Then they would remount, and the procession would continue decorously along the streets. According to tradition, the Russian police-officers and "greeters" were supposed to ride in single file to the left of the ambassadors. The right side was considered more honourable (the left, for Moslems), and if the ambassadors did not like that procedure, as was often the case, the Russians would line up on both sides of them, the senior "greeter" riding on the right, and the rest—on the left (with Moslem embassies it was the other way round).

Ambassadors were informed in advance of the time of a forthcoming audience with the sovereign; then they were notified on the eve and once again on the morning of the appointed day. In the latter half of the 16th century ambassadors received in advance detailed instructions on the

rules of court etiquette, about, for example, the fact that they would have to come before the sovereign without swords (in Western Europe ambassadors presented themselves to monarchs with swords).

Ambassadors were obliged to proceed to the audience, as well as enter the capital, on horseback. Carriages were not allowed, for next to the ambassadorial carriage the Russian participants in the procession, who were riding on horseback, looked like subordinates rather than equals.

Embassy audiences were always arranged for the morning. Admittedly, Ivan the Terrible sometimes received Crimean ambassadors "after vespers", i. e., following the evening service in the Cathedral of the Annunciation. For example, T. Randolph, the agent of Queen Elizabeth I, was once invited to the palace for secret talks even late at night, but in such situations receptions with the tsar were patently informal. In Moscow the time between matins and liturgy was considered the most convenient and natural for an audience with a high official. When in 1595 M. Velyaminov in Prague was asked to be at a reception at the court of Rudolf II late in the evening, he decisively resisted, stating that it was "improper" to travel to the palace at such an hour. There was more to it than a punctilious following of the rules customary in Russia. An audience was an honour for an ambassador and simultaneously a sign of respect for his ruler, which had to be manifested publicly, for all to see.

In Moscow an embassy procession to the Kremlin was organised with still more pomp than an entry to the capital. Crowds of Muscovites filled the streets, and trade stopped in Red Square. S. Gerberstein wrote: "Upon orders from the prince, the people, serfs and soldiers are summoned from the environs and neighbouring areas every time dignified ambassadors from foreign sovereigns have to be taken to the palace; around this time all stores and workshops in the city close and salesmen and customers are chased from the square...."⁸ There is no evidence that special decrees by the tsar were released to the effect that no one should work on such days. However, it is a fact that the first audiences of the most important embassies were frequently arranged in Moscow on Sundays and holidays. Gerberstein was able to correctly assess the meaning of those multitudes—"to show foreigners the prince's might through the crowds of subjects, and to manifest to all his grandeur through such embassies from foreign sovereigns".⁹ However, foreigners in part exaggerated here the elements of state regulations. On the one hand, spectators were in fact gathered upon orders of the authorities, but, on the other, hundreds and thousands of Muscovites converged to enjoy the spectacle of the embassy procession themselves, without any coercion.

Problems of domestic policy as well were sometimes solved through the festive atmosphere reigning in the city, an atmosphere which in itself made for notions of the grandeur of the tsar's power. In 1598, when Boris Godunov had just ascended the throne, M. Schile, a courier from the Holy Roman Empire who had arrived in Moscow at that time, was offered to call himself an ambassador rather than a courier. Schile himself wrote afterwards that so unusual a suggestion was made "for the sake of greater numbers of people in honour of the grand duke".¹⁰ He was the first diplomat to come to Godunov the tsar, and all possible advantages were to be drawn from that visit, for the new sovereign, who had not used completely legitimate means to attain supreme power, had not yet firmly entrenched himself on the throne of the line of Rurik.

Beginning in the 1670s armed *streltsy* (soldiers) began lining up along the route of the embassy train. The length of the *streltsy* line varied. For couriers, they stood only along the palace staircase; for emissaries—in Red Square and inside the Kremlin walls; during a procession of "grand ambassadors" the lines of *streltsy* stretched at times from the residence to the steps of the tsar's porch.

Special mounted couriers, who scurried back and forth between the Kremlin and the embassy train, defined the speed of traffic, ordering now to hurry if everything at the palace was already prepared for the start of the audience, now to go slowly if some unforeseen complications had arisen there. Generally speaking, however, the embassy procession was extremely decorous and moved more slowly if the diplomat's rank was higher—"diplomats walk, while couriers ride" read 16th-century Russian documents. This procession was a prologue for subsequent, still more important scenes of the ceremonial spectacle which were acted out in the sovereign's reception chambers, where the strictly diplomatic ceremonial merged with court etiquette, and ideology with everyday life, and each word, each gesture by the participants in the audience was imbued with a special meaning and was a sign of political ideas.

TENTS ON THE FRONTIER

Both Russia and contiguous countries attached enormous importance to the procedure for the exchange of diplomatic visits and the order in which one's own missions were dispatched and foreign missions were received. If relations between two countries were severed for some period and there emerged a mutual need to resume them, it was more honorable to receive foreign ambassadors first and then send a reciprocal mission. Ranking Russian diplomats could not be sent to the same sovereign two times in a row without harm being done to the tsar's "honour"; only couriers, who would explore the possibility of an exchange of "grand" embassies, were frequently sent, one right after the other. The only case in which ambassadors could be sent first was if a new monarch had ascended the throne. According to tradition this was announced to all countries with which diplomatic relations were maintained, and order of priority was not taken into account here.

The side which was the first to send ambassadors to an enemy during hostilities thus in a way acknowledged itself vanquished. During the serious defeats of the later period of the Livonian War, when the tsar's military commanders were losing one fortress after another, Ivan the Terrible was forced to send his authorised representatives to King Stefan Batory, without waiting for reciprocal Polish missions. While fitting out an embassy, the tsar wrote Batory with bitterness: "Humbling ourselves before God and you, we have ordered our ambassadors to go to you."¹¹ Much is implied by these words. The situation of the state was truly desperate if the "earthly god", who always disdained the Polish upstart-king and berated Batory for his low origins and the limitedness of his power as an elective monarch and not a hereditary one, was nevertheless forced, "humbling himself", to be the first to send ambassadors to him.

However, if no one was agreeing to concessions and the sides were totally unable to come to an agreement on the procedure for an exchange of embassies, "ambassadors' meetings" were arranged on the border of the two states so that the honour of neither monarch would suffer. Such gatherings were practised in relations with countries having a common border with Russia, namely, Sweden, the Rzecz Pospolita, and, very rarely, with the Crimean Khanate. In 1561 Russian diplomacy raised the issue of a border meeting not of ambassadors but of sovereigns themselves—Ivan the Terrible and King Sygismund II Augustus of Poland. Talks were already being held concerning the ceremonial of the summit, the composition and accommodation of the suite of the two monarchs, and the mutual treats, but this meeting, which could have become a unique event in European diplomatic history, failed to materialise because of the hostilities that had been initiated.

As it was, the numerous delegations leaving for ambassadors' meetings were accompanied by heavy security—*streltsy*, Tatar cavalry or detachments of the irregular noble guard. The most revered and oldest icons encased in settings of precious stones were sent with delegations as much as with troops going to war as an aid. These holy relics were not supposed to leave Russia, and such expensive and famous icons were not sent with missions going abroad rather than to border gatherings, as the ambassadors could not guarantee their safe-keeping there.

When arriving at a meeting, whose approximate location was determined in advance, the delegations would negotiate the concrete conditions of the conference through their representatives—the suite noblemen. But these preliminary talks would drag out for many days, and even weeks, because at the gatherings, too, the problem of a venue for the talks, in other words, the same order of priority was a very acute issue, although on a lesser scale. Usually, the delegations were accommodated in tents on both sides of the border, and each proposed for the talks its own tent on its own territory. Ultimate agreement would be reached on setting up a single "gathering" tent comprised of two tents, their entrances facing in opposite directions.

Still greater difficulties arose in instances when the border was a river, as was the case at the Russo-Swedish gathering in 1575 which put an end to the famous "diplomatic war" between Ivan the Terrible and Johan III. The Russian delegation set up its tent on one bank of the Sestra River, and the Swedish, on the other, while the preliminary talks were held in the middle of a bridge. Johan's representatives proposed meeting on their bank, but the Russians replied: "We won't take a single step on your side of the bridge." Then the Swedes put a cloth covering on poles over the bridge, erecting something of a tent, but the envoys of Ivan the Terrible categorically refused to hold talks under those conditions either: "Great affairs of state are not administered on bridges!"¹² Finally, after requesting permission from the Russians and obtaining their consent, the Swedes moved their "roofing" across the bridge to the Russian bank, to the embassy tent set up right by the water, at the entrance to the bridge, and thus set up a joint "gathering" tent. In the report of the Russian ambassadors the moving of the "cloth" was explained by the heavy rain that was falling at the time, but evidently this had symbolic meaning for the Swedes as well—they had not merely come to the Russian tent but had in a way moved their own territory to the other bank.

Inside the "gathering" tent, which was a sort of model of a frontier setting, there was a long table for sessions, which was separated in the middle by a curtain. Usually, each of the sides demanded that the larger half of this table be on its side. Both sides entered the tent simultaneously, from opposite ends, each through its own entrance, but they tried to delay awhile at the entrance so that the other would enter first. It was considered "more honourable" if the other waited even for a few seconds inside the tent. Without even seeing each other, the partners took their places at the table—the Russian ambassadors on their half and the Swedes or Poles on their half, and only later was the curtain separating the delegations opened and the talks begun.

The 17th century French writer and philosopher Jean de La Bruyere characterised the diplomat of his times as follows: "All his activities are guided by the court, his every step is directed in advance, even his most insignificant proposal is prescribed to him from above; nevertheless, in each difficult instance, in each controversial issue he acts as if he has

just taken a decision himself and was guided solely by peaceful intentions...." ¹³

This characterisation can be applied just as readily to both the French diplomats of the era of Louis XIV and the Russian diplomats of the times of Ivan the Terrible, Boris Godunov or the first Romanovs. What was similar was not only the techniques of the art of diplomacy that were employed in Russia and West European countries, but also diplomatic custom itself, although, of course, there were also differences, which were conditioned by Byzantine and Eastern influences, national specifics and the peculiarities of the development of the Russian state.

Unlike the diplomatic protocol of recent times, Russian diplomatic custom of the 15th-17th centuries was precisely custom. Its norms were not recorded and even less so endorsed by some official acts; they were preserved in the memory, in oral tradition that was passed down from generation to generation. These norms did not lose their ties with Russian society; they changed and developed together with it, taking shape in the destinies of hundreds and thousands of people every time the ancient call "Arise, courier, saddle your horse!" was heard.

¹ Ф. Аделунг. *Критико-литературное обозрение путешественников по России до 1700 г. и их сочинений*, Part 1, Moscow, 1864, p. 268.

² *Сборник Русского Исторического общества*, Vol. 129, Saint Petersburg, 1910, p. 218.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 71, 1892, p. 569.

⁴ *Книга посольская Метрики Великого Княжества Литовского*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1845, p. 53.

⁵ *Памятники дипломатических сношений Древней России с державами иностранными*, Vol. 1, Saint Petersburg, 1851, p. 253.

⁶ *Сборник Русского Исторического общества*, Vol. 137, 1915, p. 641.

⁷ *Памятники дипломатических сношений Древней России с державами иностранными*, Vol. 1, p. 967.

⁸ С. Герберштейн, *Записки о Московии*, Saint Petersburg, 1866, p. 188.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Чтения в Обществе истории и древностей российских при Московском университете*, Book 2, Moscow, 1875, pp. 4-5.

¹¹ *Книга посольская Метрики Великого княжества Литовского*, Part 2, p. 97.

¹² *Сборник Русского Исторического общества*, Vol. 129, p. 329.

¹³ Ж. де Лабрюйер, *Характеры или нравы нынешнего века*. Moscow-Leningrad, 1964, p. 215.

THE RIGA PEACE TREATY

Vladlen SIROTKIN

Of late the history of Soviet diplomacy and especially such periods of it as the signing of the Brest Peace Treaty in March 1918 has been increasingly drawing the attention of the Soviet public at large. This has been promoted to a considerable extent by the appearance in periodicals and in the theatre of such works as Mikhail Shatrov's play *The Brest Peace*.

However, the main thing does not lie in the sharpness of conflict. The main thing is that it was during the period when the Brest Peace Treaty was concluded that the opposition between two strategic lines in the leadership of the party—the course for the building of socialism in one country and peaceful coexistence, and the orientation for world proletarian revolution even if it meant the destruction of the socialist state in the fight for this lofty aim—revealed themselves. This dramatic conflict did not end with the signing of the Brest Peace Treaty. The Brest peace was shortlived—the November Revolution of 1918 in Germany toppled the Kaiser Wilhelm regime, and the “obscene” peace treaty, as Lenin called it, was denounced by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. However, three years later, again in March, history repeated itself under no less dramatic circumstances.

On March 18, 1921 Soviet Russia and the Polish Republic signed in Riga a peace treaty under which approximately half of Byelorussia with a population of some four million and all of Western Ukraine with a population of over ten million was ceded to Poland. The western border of the USSR was established along a line extending almost 30 kilometres from Minsk.¹ Unlike the Brest Peace Treaty, the Riga Treaty defined the western border of the USSR for a whole 18 years, until September 1939, and in this capacity was, in our opinion, a component of the Versailles system of accords.

The basic principles of the Riga Treaty were discussed in detail at the Ninth Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) held in September 1920. A heated debate on the reasons for the failure of the Red Army in the hostilities against Poland unfolded and there again arose the matter of the prospects for the development of revolution in Europe and, correspondingly, of the political strategy and tactics of the Soviet state.

In her “Reminiscences of Lenin” Klara Zetkin adduces the following statement of Lenin's concerning the circumstances of this debate: “Do you know that at first the conclusion of peace with Poland met great opposition, just as was the case during the conclusion of the Brest-Li-

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to the Riga Peace Treaty? I had to endure a fierce fight, since I was in favour of the adoption of peace terms that were definitely favourable for Poland and very difficult for us.”²

In many of his pronouncements of that period Lenin stressed that “owing to ... the offensive now continuing on the Western and Wrangel fronts, our position is again highly critical”.³ “That haste stemmed from a desire to avoid a winter campaign,”⁴ and, lastly, “To us frontiers do not matter so much; we do not mind losing some territory in the frontier regions. To us it is more important to preserve the lives of tens of thousands of workers and peasants and retain the possibility of peaceful construction, than to keep a small piece of territory.”⁵

The diplomatic aspect of the bilateral Soviet-Polish talks in October 1920-March 1921 concerning the conclusion of the preliminary and final Riga Peace Treaty has been researched rather thoroughly in Soviet and Polish literature. The major documents of these talks have been issued as well, although some important elements are overlooked even in the well-founded monography by P. N. Olshansky.⁶ However, to the question of how the “fierce fight” Lenin spoke about proceeded, modern Soviet studies have yet to give an answer, that is, if we do not consider the confused analogies with the debate over the Brest Peace Treaty or, for that matter, the mention among Lenin’s foes of the group of “leftists” and one person—Nikolai Bukharin.

Meanwhile, as far as Bukharin is concerned, unlike 1918, he was not at all Lenin’s main opponent (this role was assumed by Lev Kamenev and Lev Trotsky), and the chief debate at the Ninth Party Conference revolved not so much around the need to conclude an immediate peace treaty with a large territorial concession as around a far more important, principled issue—the paths of the further development of the world revolution and the preservation of the socialist gains in Soviet Russia.

To understand the full importance of the turnabout effected by the party in 1921 at Lenin’s insistence in foreign policy (the Riga Peace Treaty) and domestic policy (NEP), one should call to mind that the Bolsheviks and other parties of the Comintern regarded the October Revolution as the “start of the international revolution of the proletariat”.⁷

Political developments in Europe and elsewhere in the world right after the end of the First World War seemed to be flowing in the mainstream that was programmed by the first and second congresses of the Comintern (March 1919 and July-August 1920): the November Revolution in Germany, Soviet power in Hungary, the revolutionary collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the revolutionary upsurge in the Entente countries, and the beginning of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire’s possessions.

That is why the Second Comintern Congress adopted the appeal “Soviet-Polish War” at the height of the Red Army’s offensive on Warsaw: “Working men and women! If the capitalist swine the world over screams a threat to the independence of Poland in order to prepare a new campaign against Russia, know one thing: your slavowners are trembling in the fear ... that if, under the blows of the Red Army, White Guard Poland falls apart and Polish workers seize power, the German, Austrian, Italian and French workers will find it easier to rid themselves of their exploiters, and that they will be followed by the workers of Britain and America as well.”⁸

Revealing in this regard is the speech delivered at the Ninth Conference of the RCP(B) by Bela Kun (People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, and Member of the

Military Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front in 1920). "There are some comrades in the West," Bela Kun said, "who consider themselves Communists and who call this policy of Soviet Russia imperialist. Such comrades should be ashamed of themselves, because it is entirely incorrect to allege that the masses of Germany, Poland and Southeast Europe are speaking of Bolshevik imperialism. Not only our comrades in Hungary, who have been under White terror, but also the proletariat of Czechoslovakia, Austria and Southeast Europe are awaiting the Red Army not as an imperialist army but as the army of Communist Russia, as a liberator-army... I assure you that the international revolution has come of age, that the Red Army, if it advances ... will be supported by an armed uprising of the proletariat of these countries."⁹

It comes as no surprise, then, that Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who commanded one of the armies that marched on Warsaw, signed in July 1920 an order that contained the words: "On our bayonets we will bring happiness and peace to the workers of the world. Forward, to the West!"¹⁰

The programme to speed up world revolution in Europe with the aid of the Red Army and to establish political power of the European proletariat in the form of Soviets with the subsequent reunification of these "daughter" Soviet European and Asian republics with Soviet Russia was expressed in clear-cut terms in the "Manifesto of the Second Comintern Congress" adopted in Moscow in August 1920. "The Communist International is the party of the revolutionary uprising of the international proletariat," it read. "...United with Soviet Russia, Soviet Germany would immediately be stronger than all the capitalist states taken together! The Communist International has declared the cause of Soviet Russia its cause. The international proletariat will not put its sword into its scabbard until Soviet Russia becomes a link in the federation of Soviet republics all over the world."¹¹

It is highly important to stress that in 1919-1920 the concept of world revolution in its extreme interpretation (Trotsky) recognised neither the bourgeois principle of sovereignty nor bourgeois treaties (the tsarist secret treaties were made public back in 1917-1918) nor even diplomacy as such. Appointed People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Trotsky declared at his very first meeting with the Commissariat staff members that world revolution needs no diplomacy, either bourgeois or proletarian, for the working people of the entire world will find a common language as it is, without resorting to any "caste of intermediaries".

Trotsky's attitude to diplomatic relations with bourgeois states was rather clearly manifested in Brest-Litovsk—"neither peace nor war". He took a similar attitude to the Riga Peace Treaty: "our slogan can remain unchanged: diplomacy will go to Riga, but the Red Army will go to Warsaw".¹²

Even after the transition to NEP in 1921-1922 and before the start of the lengthy peaceful coexistence between Soviet Russia and the West, Trotsky said at the Fourth Comintern Congress in 1922: "We are forced to retreat temporarily (sic) from our strategic aim of 1919 direct world European revolution."¹³

Trotsky was far from alone in his orientation towards "direct" world revolution with the participation of the Red Army. At the Fourth Comintern Congress even Bukharin, a zealous supporter of NEP, proposed including the following point in the Comintern programme: "Each proletarian state has the right to *red intervention*" inasmuch as "the spread of the Red Army is the spread of socialism, proletarian power and revolution"¹⁴ (Bukharin's proposition was declined by Lenin and Radek). Prior to the catastrophe at Warsaw this orientation was as if implemented in part: in 1920 Mikhail Frunze helped establish Soviet power

in Bukhara, and in 1920-1921 Soviet power was established in the Transcaucasus by the 11th Army (headed by Sergei Kirov) of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

The establishment of Soviet power in Poland and, in the event of victory, in Germany, Hungary and elsewhere was viewed by most Comintern leaders at the time along the same model. In the same fashion as the Provisional Revolutionary Committee headed by Nariman Narimanov summoned the 11th Army for assistance in Azerbaijan in April 1920, a revolutionary committee headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky and Julian Marchlewski was set up in Poland in summer 1920. However, unlike Azerbaijan, a nationwide uprising against the landowners, capitalists and the Entente did not follow in Poland despite all the appeals by the revolutionary committee. Quite the contrary—most of the population came out against the Red Army, which largely served to paralyse its communications on the road to Warsaw.

Subsequently historians of Soviet-Polish relation of this period tried not to write about this clash between Polish peasant patriotism (it was defined by the Soviet side as nationalism at the time) and the course for proletarian internationalism, which was supposed to ensure the Red Army's victory. However, in those years, including at the Ninth Conference of the RCP(b) and the extraordinary session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee held in October 1920, at which the preliminary peace signed in Riga on October 12, 1920 was endorsed, this was spoken about openly. Member of the Military Revolutionary Council of the 15th Army of the Western Front D. V. Poluyan stated: "... Nowhere did we meet effective and vigorous support from the Polish proletariat, nor did we see the Polish industrial proletariat... I am stating that the overwhelming majority of the Polish army was comprised of Polish workers. For this reason everything bespeaks the fact ... that the Polish worker is imbued with nationalism, and chauvinism plays an enormous role in this [Polish—V. S.] army." ¹⁵

Other participants in the Polish campaign, including Stalin, who was a member of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Southwestern Front at the time, admitted that support had not been found among the local population—the local militia formed by the revolutionary committee had turned its arms against the Red Army by setting up partisan detachments (Poluyan), Polish artillerymen had fought to the last shell (Minin), and Polish partisans had been blowing up roads and bridges (Stalin).

Lenin took a very attentive attitude towards these assessments. In the Political Report of the RCP(B) Central Committee to the Ninth Party Conference Lenin assailed the trite approach of the Red Army command to the war against Poland like the civil war against Kolchak and Denikin. He said: "We defeated Kolchak and Denikin only after the social composition of their armies had changed, when their basic cadres were watered down in the mass of mobilised peasants." ¹⁶

In his address Poluyan stressed: "When we fought against Kolchak and Denikin we did not have a national chauvinistic element... Nothing welded the men in Denikin's army with Denikin's officers. In the Polish army the national idea is welding the bourgeois, the peasant and the worker, and this has been observed everywhere. The fear that we would come as conquerors, that we would be implanting Soviet power—this fear was intrinsic to all." ¹⁷

Poluyan in fact touched upon the main issue—an open clash between nationalism and internationalism. "We posed one of two points—either a social revolution in Europe had become imminent, in which case the social revolution would destroy the Polish bourgeoisie as well, or, if the opposite was true, our seizure of Warsaw would lead to a reverse si-

tuation, for the European capitalists could not reconcile themselves to the fact that we were violating the Versailles Peace."¹⁸

Even though the Ninth Party Conference highlighted the purely military aspects of the defeat at Warsaw (the sharp criticism of delegate K. K. Yurenev against Trotsky's adventuristic military orientation to the effect that at Warsaw the Red Army had a "rear ahead", i. e., in Germany, the quibbling between Trotsky and Stalin over who was more to blame, etc.), military issues became derivatives of the main question, namely, whether Europe was ready for a world socialist revolution in August 1920.

Most delegates at the conference, including Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky, Bukharin and Kamenev, responded to this question in the affirmative, regarding the Red Army's failure solely as a military defeat. The corresponding tactics were proposed for the future, too. Trotsky considered it necessary to "fully release the Red Army as a force of international action" after the rout of Wrangel, and Kamenev suggested making "the next sally". "If a failure the first time," he claimed, "unification with our proletarian armies will succeed the next time."¹⁹

A minority of delegates, including Radek, Poluyan, Yurenev and Khodorovsky, were far less optimistic. I. I. Khodorovsky spoke with great doubt about the possibility of a "new sally". He adduced facts of "enormous difficulties" plaguing the Russian rear, such as dislocation, mass draft evasion and the negative reaction in party organisations to the war with Poland plus the fact that "the non-party masses were ... in a state of full prostration, exhaustion and fatigue". There was a general "desire to take a rest". In the countryside there was a drought that lasted the entire summer of 1920, threatening famine, and in cities "there were strikes at numerous plants". He called for immediate peace efforts.²⁰

A sober analysis of the international situation after the defeat at Warsaw was made at the conference by Karl Radek.

The main reason for the fall of the entire Polish campaign, he said, was the erroneous assessment of the revolutionary situation in Europe: "The bayonet will be useful if a certain revolution has to be helped, but we have another weapon for ascertaining the situation in a particular country—Marxism, and we don't have to send Red Army men for this."²¹ Polemicising with Trotsky, Kamenev and others, Radek came right out and said that "the solution is incorrect politically", that it is clear as it is that "in Central Europe relations have not become ripe for a revolution".²²

It obtained from Radek's address that there was considerable vacillation in the Central Committee over the issue of marching on Warsaw and that only Trotsky's solemn assurances to the effect that by August 16 he would take not only Warsaw but also Danzig (Gdansk), to cut off Entente military supplies to Pilsudski's army, turned the scales in favour of a forced campaign against Poland. The same was said by Stalin, who in effect defended Trotsky on this point: "The Central Committee has decided the issue not in favour of giving a respite to the international bourgeoisie and its dog on a chain—Poland."²³

Touching upon the international developments of the period, Radek stressed: "Our German Communist comrades have told us that if we come to the German border this will revitalise the German movement, but that we shouldn't expect an explosion. As to the situation in Britain, Comrade Bukharin says that he did not expect an uprising there, and even less so in France. So what prompted us to go regardless of the difficulties?"²⁴

Some delegates to the Party Conference, such as V. D. Vilensky, a delegate from the Far Eastern Republic, had already started talking about shifting the emphasis of the world revolution to the East, to Asia,

"and here, together with our disappointment over the West, calls are being made for a Chinese revolution, which seems to be spreading there" ²⁵

The struggle around the Riga Peace Treaty also had directly to do with the elaboration of a strategy for a transition from "war communism" to a new economic policy.

The "cavalry attack" was a failure—world capitalism repulsed it and held firm. A temporary balance between capitalism and socialism had arrived amidst a notable decline of the revolutionary movement in Europe and a growth of it in the East. This would be, Lenin figured in 1921-1922, a lengthy period during which the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR would most likely have to spend some time building socialism alone in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, but given vigorous international assistance from the world proletariat, as was the case from 1919 to 1920, it could hamper future capitalist military intervention against the Soviet state.

The thesis that NEP was a "purely Russian" phenomenon and emerged as a reaction to domestic Russian difficulties *per se* firmly established itself in Soviet historical literature beginning at the time of *A Short History of the CPSU (B)* written in Stalin's time. Of external factors, mention is made solely of the promise of military aid to the participants in the Kronstadt rebellion on the part of the Entente and White Guard emigres. However, external difficulties, including the Red Army's defeat in Poland, played an important role.

Although Lenin had proved even before the October Revolution that a socialist revolution could emerge victorious not in a group of industrialised or even one, albeit industrialised, country (as Marx and Engels surmised), but in a backward semi-colonial country with a middle level of capitalist development, the Bolsheviks, even after the victory in October 1917, nevertheless thought, as Lenin pointed out in his address to the Third Comintern Congress, that "either the international revolution comes to our assistance, and in that case our victory will be fully assured, or we shall do our modest revolutionary work in the conviction that even in the event of defeat we shall have served the cause of the revolution and that our experience will benefit other revolutions. It was clear to us that *without the support of the international world revolution the victory of the proletarian revolution [in Russia—V. S.] is impossible [my italics—V. S.]*" ²⁶ In his speech before the highest forum of the world's Communists Lenin said: "Before the revolution, and even after it, we thought: either revolution breaks out in the other countries, in the capitalistically more developed countries, immediately, or at least very quickly, or we must perish."

However, the desperate attempt to "push" this world revolution to the industrialised countries of Europe, to Germany first and foremost, was not successful. "Actually," Lenin summarised, "events did not proceed along as straight a line as we had expected." ²⁷

What was to be done? It was here that the most critical moment arrived. Generations of Russian and foreign Marxist revolutionaries were becoming convinced, first in revolutionary circles and later in practice, in the Civil War of 1918-1920, that their ultimate goal was direct world revolution. Now they had to explore another path.

Of exceptional importance for understanding the principled turnabout in *methods* of further revolutionary struggle both in Soviet Russia and on a world scope are Lenin's Comintern documents which, regrettably, are still being used extremely selectively in Soviet literature. Meanwhi-

le, it is our deep conviction that precisely at the first four (1919-1922) Comintern congresses Lenin revealed the essence of the first (1919-1920) and the second (beginning in 1921) stages of the world strategy of communism, of which the domestic and foreign policies of the RCP(B) were a component part.

Strictly speaking, the elements of the new strategy of the international working class movement, a strategy based on a search for reasonable compromises (the compromise concept was what underlay NEP) were mapped out by Lenin in his *"Left-Wing" Communism—An Infantile Disorder*, which was published in June 1920 (prior to the offensive on Warsaw), for the Second Comintern Congress, at which the organisational formalities of this international proletarian organisation were concluded. However, judging from the above-cited "Manifesto" that was adopted at that congress, the idea of a search for compromises had yet to become a Comintern line.

Meanwhile, the situation had changed by the time the Third Comintern Congress convened in summer 1921 in Moscow. As Lenin pointed out, "The war against Poland, or, to be more precise, the July-August [1920—V. S.] campaign, has radically changed the international political situation."²⁸

The "Theses for a Report on the Tactics of the RCP" to the Third Comintern Congress prepared by Lenin with Radek's participation read: "The result is a state of equilibrium which, although highly unstable and precarious, enables the Socialist Republic [in Russia—V. S.] to exist—not for long, of course—within the capitalist encirclement."²⁹

The fact that the theses refer to a short time is quite explainable. The Bolsheviks were proceeding from experience that had already been accumulated. In 1919 the Hungarian Socialist Federative Republic existed only 133 days, Soviet power lasted three weeks in Slovakia and two weeks in Bavaria. Earlier, proletarian revolutions carried out in the image of the October Revolution had been stifled in Finland, Estonia and Poland. In almost all instances, alongside internal counter-revolution, an active part in the armed suppression of the working class was taken by international counter-revolution.

It was on the basis of this experience that Lenin wrote in the "Theses for a Report on the Tactics of the RCP" that the international bourgeoisie "is waiting and watching for the moment when circumstances will permit it to resume the war".³⁰

What should the new tactics of the Comintern consist in according to Lenin? In his speech at its Third Congress he stated: "...We must take advantage of this brief respite in order to adapt our tactics to this zig-zag line of history."³¹

The strategic line of the Comintern—to overthrow the yoke of world capital through a world revolution—remained unchanged at both the Third Congress and at all the ones that followed. "The ultimate goal of the Communist International is to replace the world capitalist economy with the world communist system," said the second programme adopted by the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928.³²

However, the *methods* (tactics) of achieving this ultimate goal were changing drastically. One of the main reasons—aside from the change in the overall international situation and the ebb of the revolutionary wave in the West—was what later came to be called the "price" of the revolution. In Lenin's articles and speeches from late 1920 and in 1921-1922 the "price" of world revolution became one of the overriding issues. Lenin had posed this issue in his speech at the Third Comintern Congress, stressing in particular the fact that the successes of the period of "war communism", the defence of the revolution in Russia and the support of the international proletariat had become possible only thanks to the

"miracle" that "the Russian people and the working class", which "were able to endure such suffering", had worked.³³

Lenin did not share the theories of class peace and "capitalism growing into socialism" which, after the First World War, in the 1920s and 1930s, were implanted into the consciousness of the European working class by rightist and centrist leaders and figures of the Second (Amsterdam) and Second and a Half (Vienna) reformist Internationals. He fully shared the Marxist teaching on coercion as the "midwife" of history and voiced the assumption that "the case will, in all probability, be the same in every other country [i. e., as well as in Russia, after 1917—V. S.]".³⁴

However, in 1921 he advanced the slogan of making a revolution "not on enthusiasm", but "with the aid of enthusiasm". At the Third Comintern Congress Lenin decisively came out against the "leftists" (Bela Kun and others) with their "theory of offence" and in 1920-1921 during the debate in the RCP(B) on the role of the trade unions in building the foundations of socialism in Russia—against Trotsky and his programme of toughening the political line. Bukharin was very precise in calling this change in tactics a transition from the policy of "civil war" to the policy of "civil peace".

In his speech at the Third Congress and especially in his report "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution" on November 13, 1922 at the Fourth Comintern Congress Lenin characterised NEP as a general path for laying the foundations of socialism both in the USSR and in other countries, capitalist included. He committed the delegates to the Fourth Comintern Congress to learn NEP: "I do not know," he said, "for how long the capitalist powers will give us the opportunity to study in peace. But we must take advantage of every moment of respite from fighting, from war, to study, and to study from scratch."³⁵

Somewhat later, in one of his last articles, "On Cooperation", he revealed these main objects of a "study of the Comintern": "...We have to admit that there has been a radical modification in our whole outlook on socialism. The radical modification is this: formerly we placed, and had to place, the main emphasis on the political struggle, on revolution, on winning political power, etc. Now the emphasis is changing and shifting to peaceful, organisational, 'cultural' work. I should say that emphasis is shifting to education work, were it not for our international relations, were it not for the fact that we have to fight for our position on a world scale."³⁶

Clearly evident here is Lenin's departure from an appraisal of NEP as a *tactical* turnabout (on which Trotsky and his leftist supporters in the RCP(B) and the Comintern concurred) to his assessment of it as a *strategic* turnabout (which was fully supported by Bukharin and his supporters in the party)—"in earnest and for a long time". Regrettably, in 1922-1923 Lenin was unable to provide a more detailed substantiation of this strategic turnabout in either the policies of the RCP(B) or the Comintern, a turnabout which was also largely promoted by the conclusion of the Riga Peace Treaty.

Bukharin, who spoke with Lenin more frequently than did the other then RCP(B) and Comintern leaders during the last two years of Lenin's life about the development of capitalism, socialism and world revolution, expounded in generalised form Lenin's last articles and his oral instructions in "Lenin's Political Behest", a report devoted to the fifth anniversary of Lenin's death.

Let us note Lenin's main idea as set forth by Bukharin: in 1921 "centre of gravity" of world revolution shifted in the USSR as a "model" of world socialism and communism ("the homeland of the world prole-

tariat"); this "model" has to be built on NEP principles in conditions of much greater stabilisation of capitalism and "balance" than Lenin presupposed in 1921; the world revolution will most likely come from Asia in connection "with the start of giant revolutionary ferment among hundreds of millions of Eastern peoples", the alliance of which (the USSR, India, China, etc.) will ultimately decide the outcome of the colossal struggle between capitalism and communism.³⁷

Developing Lenin's thought, Bukharin advanced, at the Fourth Comintern Congress, the idea of "national types of socialism" for which the transitional period in the form of NEP would be mandatory: "I say that the problems of the New Economic Policy are of an international nature... If we take even the most industrialised countries, such as Germany or even America, do you really think that they would not find themselves faced with such a problem? Yes, they would come up against it right after a revolution. Is it possible, for example, to put American farmers' production activities under a certain organised plan at the very outset? Certainly not. Such layers need a certain economic freedom. The same applies to Germany..."³⁸

Six years later, at the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, Bukharin talked in his final speech concerning the results of the debate on the Comintern's programme about the "all-purpose importance of NEP".³⁹

Bukharin noted, however, that in 1922 Lenin no longer posed the issue of time limits for a world revolution—"he answered with extreme caution" "linking the next revolutionary explosion directly with the *coming war*".⁴⁰ But this "explosion with war" now depended not so much on the Comintern or the USSR as on the exacerbation of inter-imperialist contradictions in the capitalist camp.

One of the main reasons why world revolution failed in Europe in 1918-1920 was, according to the Comintern and Lenin, the subjective factor—the betrayal of the interests of the proletariat by the leaders of international Social Democracy. However, the experience of the class battles of 1918-1921 in the West European countries showed that Social Democracy was still capable of leading considerable contingents of the proletariat. For this reason Lenin advanced at the Third Comintern Congress the task of everyday struggle in mass working class organisations to divorce them from Social Democracy and to form "*large, revolutionary communist mass parties*".⁴¹

However, in the context of an ebb of the revolutionary movement in Europe and partial stabilisation of capitalism Lenin recommended to Communists not to shut the door to talks with Social Democrats. It was this goal that was served by the resolution of the Third Comintern Congress on the formation of a "united front" of workers of two currents—Communists and Social Democrats, a resolution which permitted talks with leaders of the Second International within certain limits. In fact this was a "Social Democratic Genoa" and it was not accidental that during the Genoa Conference another was being held—in Berlin. In April 1922 a delegation from the Third International consisting of Bukharin, Radek and Klara Zetkin conducted talks with the leaders of the Second and Second and a Half Internationals. If successful, this "conference of three Internationals" could have inaugurated the formation of a truly "united front", and, who knows, if it had remained intact until the start of the 1930s perhaps Hitler would not have come to power in Germany.

At the conference the representatives of the three Internationals reached agreement on convening in The Hague a world working class con-

gress as the first step towards the formation of a "united front" internationally and nationally.⁴² Regrettably, through the fault of both sides further talks were broken off, and The Hague world working class congress was held without the participation of Comintern representatives.

Nevertheless, the Fourth Comintern Congress in November 1922 reaffirmed the veracity of the "united front" strategy. However, Grigori Zinoviev continued to stigmatise the "social-traitors": "Capitalism is now maintained exclusively by the person of the social-traitors from the Second International. The working class is now so large that a mere shrug of its shoulder could shake off international capital if only the Social Democrats would not constantly keep entangling themselves at its feet and would not hold onto its hands..."⁴³

At the Fifth Comintern Congress, held in summer 1924, half a year after Lenin's death, Zinoviev had already openly led the attack against the "united front", which evoked a sharp rebuke from Radek, who castigated the Comintern chairman for his obvious departure from Lenin's behests.⁴⁴

In 1920-1922 the Bolsheviks also witnessed a new policy of bourgeois reformism—the policy of "conceding the unimportant and keeping the important" — "Lloyd Georgism", as Lenin called it.

After the October Revolution the "captains" of world capitalism drew their own conclusions and in 1919 initiated political reforms and social concessions to the working people, such as an eight-hour work day, a paid leave, sickness and injury insurance, women's suffrage, increased pensions for the disabled and veterans of the world war, broader rights for trade unions, and so on. These concessions to the working class in the Entente countries, the USA and Japan, Lenin pointed out, "nevertheless retard the revolutionary movement in those countries and create some semblance of 'class truce'".⁴⁵ In his last works Lenin defined the main thing — from now on the historical competition between capitalism and socialism was shifting to the socio-economic sphere, to the sphere of "productivity of labour".

Beginning in 1921 both systems were as if marching from different sides and were definitely taking different routes to the same goal — NEP. Only, in Western Europe and the USA they proceeded from "classical capitalism" of the 19th century to "socialisation" in the form of state interference in socio-economic life, while in Soviet Russia they moved from 19th century classical Marxism to "capitalisation" in the form of admittance of private capital (national and concessional). Both systems were creating in the 1920s what would later be called a "mixed economy", which Lenin in his polemics with Bukharin in December 1922 on the monopoly of foreign trade called a "system of mixed societies".

It was this system, i. e., the mixed system of socialism and capitalism in the economy (but with the political dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR, while that of the bourgeoisie in the West) that Lenin at the end of his life persistently urged us to study: "If we fail to learn the business thoroughly ... it will prove that ours is a nation of hopeless fools."⁴⁶

In the hindsight of the historical experience of socialist development in the USSR the bitter truth should be recognised that the part of "the small group which might be called the Old Guard of the Party"⁴⁷ failed to understand and accept NEP as the "high road to socialism" not only in the USSR but throughout the world, and remained on former positions of "direct" world revolution and methods of "war communism". In this, not only in personal ambitions and the struggle for "Lenin's caftan" (which, of course, took place after Lenin's death) lies the *essence* of the fierce intrapolitical struggle of the 1920s in the All-Union Communist-

Party (Bolsheviks) and the Comintern, about which the Soviet press, regrettably, writes little today.

Admittedly, the most far-sighted politicians in the West regarded NEP as something more than a temporary tactical move. On April 2, 1921 the London-based newspaper *Nation* thus assessed the stand of the former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George: in his speech in the House of Commons concerning the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian trade agreement he evaluated NEP as repudiation of the former concept of direct world revolution, which already gave grounds for *de facto* recognition of Soviet Russia. In the editor's column the point was made that Lenin was unswervingly pursuing the same main goal of his, i. e., organising the entire Russian land on the principles of collective production. If Lenin managed to receive machinery and, specifically, if he carried out his bold plan for the electrification of Russia, he would turn backward individualistic peasants into Socialists within a matter of years.⁴⁸

Unquestionably, an ever broadening gap was being created between the ideological orientation to expectation of a world revolution and the actual basic everyday work to lay the foundations of socialism in one country with NEP methods.

Serious foreign scholars, such as former US ambassador to the USSR George Kennan,⁴⁹ have long pointed to the dualism of the USSR's foreign political activity from 1921 to 1934: the Comintern on the one hand and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on the other. However, since the times of *A Short History* Soviet historians of the USSR's foreign policy have stubbornly denied this real dualism.

Meanwhile, this dualism was candidly written about in the Soviet press at the very start of NEP. For example, the *Bulletin of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs* wrote the following about Polish reaction to the conclusion of the Riga Peace Treaty (from the newspaper *Kurier Polski* of October 4, 1921): "Foreign countries must properly assess the efforts which Poland is taking to preserve and consolidate peaceful relations with Bolshevik Russia. Peace with a state that recognises no norms of the civilised world, ... hates the political system of the rest of Europe and wishes to see it embroiled in flames and rebellion; ... ties with people with Janus' faces, one of which says, 'I am a member of a government and know nothing of the Third International' and the other, 'I am a member of the Third International and am not interested in the commitments of the government'." ⁵⁰

This dualism was manifest in the constant clashes from 1921 to 1925 between Comintern chairman Zinoviev and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Georgi Chicherin, the latter accusing the former of ill-considered statements hampering the normalisation of diplomatic relations with the West. As early as 1921 Lenin demanded the adoption of a special Politburo resolution prohibiting the leaders of the Soviet government and members of the Russian section of the Comintern from making public statements (especially to foreign correspondents) without Chicherin's sanction. However, judging by numerous facts, few reckoned with this decision. For example, at the Fifth Comintern Congress on June 17, 1924 Zinoviev stated: "...There is still no victory, and we still have to win over five-sixths of the Earth's land mass so that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could be all over the world." ⁵¹

This dualism definitely created formidable difficulties both in the day-to-day work of Soviet diplomacy, e. g., in Genoa, and in the talks with the Second International in Berlin and in The Hague in 1922.

Bukharin, who after the ideological defeat at the 14th Party Congress in December 1925 of the "new opposition" (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sokolnikov, etc.) that accused the Central Committee of having repudiated the ideals of world revolution and having slid down to positions of

"national-Bolshevism", briefly replaced Zinoviev as Comintern chairman (November 1926-1928), tried to reduce the contradiction between theory and practice to a minimum by renewing at the Sixth Congress in 1928 the Comintern programme adopted at the Fifth Congress in 1924.

This renewal was preceded by a profound theoretical analysis by Bukharin of new political and economic phenomena that appeared in postwar capitalism—elements of bourgeois reformism and "capitalist NEP" which he and his young comrades-in-arms from the Institute of Red Professors later framed in the theory of "organised capitalism".⁵²

Still Bukharin undertook his greatest efforts to combine the theory of world capitalist proletarian revolution and the practice of socialist development in one country via NEP at the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928. Substantiation of Lenin's NEP concept as the "high road" to world revolution became his main goal.

However, this was not only the last congress of the Comintern in the Leninist spirit but also the last year of NEP. The following year Stalin would send NEP "to the devil", and Vyacheslav Molotov at the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in July 1929 would call Bukharin a "right-wing deviant" and a "proponent of unbinding NEP and free commodity circulation, i. e., of ultimately unleashing the elements of capitalist development in our country", and would declare that Bukharin attacks our socialist economy.⁵³

What in the decisions of the Sixth Comintern Congress evoked such wrath from Molotov and Stalin standing behind him?

For one thing, the well-argued substantiation of the contention that NEP had proved its viability and yielded palpable socio-economic results. For another, Bukharin had once again censured the administrative-command methods of "war communism". Thirdly, he had grounded the stability of capitalism (up to that day Trotskyites had been arguing its inevitable collapse any minute) and advanced the theory of two world economic systems and shifted the question of world revolution from the plane of its constant stimulating through the Comintern to the plane of defence of the USSR by the international working class as "the sole homeland of the world proletariat".

The fifth section of the Comintern programme, entitled "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the USSR and the International Socialist [but no longer communist, as was the case at the first and second congresses—V. S.] Revolution" clearly defined the principle of peaceful competition of "the two world economic systems", and stated that "the main line here should be the line of the broadest possible ties with foreign countries, but within the limits of their benefit for the USSR".⁵⁴ Bukharin proposed extensively using the tactics of "economic manoeuvring" (credits, loans, concessions, etc.), drawing on such a lever as the Soviet foreign trade monopoly.

Regrettably, neither Bukharin nor his supporters in the Executive Committee of the Communist International and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) were able to complete their analysis of "organised capitalism", predict the world economic crisis of 1929-1933 and map out in this connection new tactics in the international working class movement. Even though during the discussion of the programme he rejected Zinoviev's "social-traitors" concept and stated that "it would be unreasonable to heap Social Democracy onto the same pile with fascism", and prophesied that "our tactics do not rule out the possibility of turning to Social Democratic workers and even some Social Democratic grassroots organisations" in the event of the threat of fascism,⁵⁵ there nevertheless appeared in the programme adopted at the Sixth Comintern Congress

the definition of international Social Democracy as the main enemy of the Communists and the USSR.⁵⁶

Later Bukharin admitted to Kamenev that Stalin ruined the programme for him in many places.⁵⁷ Obviously, this critical remark pertained to the toughening of the concept of capitalist encirclement: "the main trend in the policies of the imperialist powers is the trend towards encirclement of the USSR and a counter-revolutionary war against it for the purpose of strangling it and establishing a worldwide bourgeois-terrorist regime."⁵⁸

A year later at the Tenth ECCI Plenary Meeting Stalin would scuttle, through the person of Molotov, Bukharin's productive idea of a possible alliance with the Social Democrats, an idea which could have stopped fascism in Germany—Molotov called for efforts to smash Social Democracy, especially its left wing, for "Social Democracy was increasingly mutating into social-fascism".

An even more ominous role would be played by the concepts of "encirclement" and "counter-revolutionary war" on the part of world capitalism against the USSR, for this orientation of the Sixth Comintern Congress made it easier for Stalin to substantiate his "theory" that the class struggle exacerbates as progress towards socialism is made, this theory eventually claiming as victims both Bukharin and his political opponents—the Trotskyites from the leftist opposition of 1925-1927.

Thus the line of the Riga Peace Treaty and the NEP line as a *political* and *socio-economic* programme of "civil peace" within the USSR and in the international working class movement, lines charted by Lenin in 1921-1922, came to an end in 1928-1929. The return to the policy of "civil war" had begun.

However, the diplomatic function of the Riga Peace as an agreement affiliated to the Versailles system remained and even grew stronger in connection with the attempts by Nazi Germany to re-examine this system. But this is another topic, i. e., the struggle waged by Soviet diplomacy for collective security in Europe from 1934 to 1939.

**EPILOGUE, OR, IS IT WORTHWHILE,
IN THE ERA OF GLASNOST, TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THE
"ZIGZAG LINE OF HISTORY"?**

This article was already at the editor's desk when the No. 5 issue (Russian edition) of *International Affairs* appeared, carrying a round-table discussion on Soviet-Polish relations entitled "Closing the Gaps" (No. 6, English edition). The material of this discussion evoked keen interest both in the USSR and abroad. This was the first time that on the pages of such a prominent foreign policy journal (it is published in Russian, English and French) so much was said about the dramatic aspects of Soviet-Polish relations, beginning in 1920.

Ten days after the issue came out I happened to be in Paris, attending a discussion on the topic "The Thaw and *Perestroika*" at the Slavic Studies Centre at Paris University—Sorbonne IV. I was pleasantly surprised by the fact that the participants in the discussion—undergraduate and graduate Slavic majors—knew about this publication.

This was all the more important since the French press and television were creating an uproar right at that time, this past May, over Solidarity activities in Poland, not failing to use old "arguments" from the history of Soviet-Polish relations.

Incidentally, supporters of *perestroika* in France (there are many of them among scholars, lecturers and even journalists, although they are not setting the pace in the media yet) promptly respond to all our pub-

lications about the "gaps", and translate these materials into French.⁵⁹

It was all the more vexing to hear, even from our friends, let alone our foes, that sometimes, when filling blank spaces with our right hand, we try with our left to construct some new scheme to preserve them.

This likewise applies to the history of Soviet-Polish relations, specifically the march on Warsaw and the concept of world revolution. And it would be good if this constructing were engaged in by scholars who also 50 years after the publication of *A Short History* remained its "bar-risters". But no! The waters are being muddled by some of the historians and public figures who both today and yesterday have been doing a great deal for *perestroika* and the introduction of new thinking in international relations.

What serious Soviet or foreign student of 19th century Russo-Polish relations can do without the fundamental publication *Russian Foreign Policy of the 19th-Early 20th Century*, which has been put out for over 20 years under the editorship of Academician Alexei Narochinsky? But at the above-mentioned round-table discussion this respected academician calls into question the belief that Soviet power strove to spread the socialist revolution through Poland to Germany and the whole of Western Europe. In fact, such "opinions" (decisions of the second, third and fourth Comintern congresses) did exist; however, this was not the "official stand of the Soviet government", but the personal view of the Trotskyites and "Left" Communists.

I wonder what was the opinion—official or unofficial—of Lenin himself, when he was voting for the afore-mentioned "Manifesto" and the "Soviet-Polish War" appeal at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920.

To find Lenin's statements about world revolution one hardly has to rummage in archives—suffice it to open any of the last eight volumes of "V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*" and read the tables of contents and also the supplements (documents of the Second Comintern Congress) to the protocols of the Ninth Conference of the RCP(B), which were reprinted in 1972.

However, there is an excusable element to this stand. During the publication of the protocols of the Ninth Party Conference, the compiler of the collection, V. G. Semyonov, a senior researcher at the Institute of Marx, Engels and Lenin, for some reason left out Lenin's speech at the conference, alluding to the fact that "the verbatim report of Lenin's final speech was not properly edited",⁶⁰ although he did include in the publication of the protocols the entire unedited verbatim report of the debate of the evening session of September 22, 1920, where the chief wrangling over the future development of world revolution after the defeat at Warsaw unfolded.

However, if we take the collective effort *The Communist International. A Brief Essay*, which was published by the above-mentioned Institute of Marx, Engels and Lenin in 1969, we will not find any references at all to the founding documents of the Second Comintern Congress or even references to the "Manifesto" and the "Soviet-Polish War" appeal, although it is common knowledge that the Comintern was founded by Lenin and his comrades-in-arms in March 1919 precisely for the sake of world revolution. Nor is it fortuitous that Mikhail Gorbachev in his report on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution made particular mention of the role played by the Third Communist International: "The truth about it has yet to be restored in full, and its authentic and complete history has yet to be written. For all the drawbacks and errors in its activities and for all the bitterness the recollection of certain chapters in its history may evoke, the Communist International is part of our movement's great past."⁶¹

It is hardly worth it for us today, in this age of *glasnost* and *pere-*

stroika, to keep silent over or refuse to fill-in the blank page of the history of the Soviet-Polish War of 1920 and the history of the Comintern, moreover since all documents related to the Comintern have long been published and since 1956 have been accessible in any scientific library in the USSR, and naturally Polish and other foreign historians are well acquainted with them

And if we want to truly reject Stalin's methods associated with *A Short History of the CPSU(B)* with its "omissions" and falsifications of our history full of zigzags, then we must return to the Leninist methods of analysing foreign policy and not try to straighten out these zigzags, glossing over the efforts of the Comintern for world revolution in 1919, Lenin's vital turnabout in 1921 to 1922 as concerned NEP and the "civil peace" and Stalin's restitution of "war communism" and "civil war" against the people

¹ *Документы внешней политики СССР* Vol 3, Moscow, 1959, pp 245 258, 618 658

² *Воспоминания о В. И. Ленине* Vol 5, Moscow, 1969, p 19

³ V I Lenin, *Collected Works* Vol 31, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974, p 311

⁴ *Ibid.*, p 335

⁵ *Ibid.*, p 331.

⁶ П. Н. Ольшанский, *Рижский мир* Moscow, 1969, see also *Дипломатический словарь* Vol 3, Moscow, 1986, p 273

⁷ *Программа мировой революции (принята VI конгрессом Коминтерна 1 сентября 1928 г.)* Moscow Leningrad, 1929 p 163

⁸ *Десятая конференция РКП(б) Протоколы* Moscow, 1972, pp 362 363

⁹ *Ibid.* pp 32 33

¹⁰ Ю. Мархлевский, *Война и мир между буржуазной Польшей и пролетарской Россией* Moscow, 1921

¹¹ *Девятая конференция РКП(б)*, pp 354, 359

¹² *Ibid.* p 78

¹³ *IV Всемирный конгресс Коминтерна Избранные доклады, речи и резолюции*, Moscow Prague 1923, p 83

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p 196

¹⁵ *Девятая конференция РКП(б)* p 45

¹⁶ V I Lenin, *Collected Works* Vol 31, p 278.

¹⁷ *Девятая конференция РКП(б)*, p 45

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p 46

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p 75

²⁰ *Ibid.* pp 55 56

²¹ *Ibid.* p 37

²² *Ibid.* p 35

²³ *Ibid.* p 61

²⁴ *Ibid.* pp 69 70

²⁵ *Ibid.* p 51

²⁶ V I Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 32, 1965, pp 479 480.

²⁷ *Ibid.* p 480

²⁸ V I Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 31, p 275.

²⁹ V I Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 32, p 454.

³⁰ *Ibidem*

³¹ *Ibid.* p 481

³² *Программа мировой революции*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, p 168

³³ V I Lenin *Collected Works*, Vol 32, p 487

³⁴ *Ibid.* p 488

³⁵ V I Lenin *Collected Works*, Vol 33, 1966, p 431.

³⁶ *Ibid.* p 474

³⁷ *Коммунист* No 2 1988, pp 94, 96

³⁸ *IV Всемирный конгресс Коминтерна*, p 193

³⁹ *VI конгресс Коминтерна Стенографический отчет*, Issue 3, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, p 153

⁴⁰ *Коммунист*, No 2, 1988, p 96

⁴¹ *Коммунистический Интернационал в документах, 1919-1932 гг.*, Moscow, 1933, p 83 (Theses on Tactics adopted by the Third Congress).

⁴² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 33, pp 330-334

⁴³ *IV Всемирный конгресс Коминтерна*, p 9

⁴⁴ *V Всемирный конгресс Коминтерна. Стенографический отчет*, Part I, Moscow-Leningrad, 1925, pp 9 10, 143-172

⁴⁵ V I Lenin, *Collected Works* Vol 33, p 499.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p 458.

- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 257.
- ⁴⁸ Бюллетень НКВД, No. 75, 1921, p. 12.
- ⁴⁹ See G. Kennan, *The Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*, Boston, 1960.
- ⁵⁰ Бюллетень НКВД, No. 99, 1921, p. 9.
- ⁵¹ V Всемирный конгресс Коминтерна, p. 9.
- ⁵² Организованный капитализм (дискуссия в Комкадемии), Moscow, 1930.
- ⁵³ Международное положение и задачи Коминтерна. X Пленум ИККИ, Moscow, 1929, p. 293.
- ⁵⁴ Программа мировой революции, p. 185.
- ⁵⁵ VI конгресс Коминтерна, Issue 3, pp. 144-145.
- ⁵⁶ Программа Коммунистического интернационала, Moscow, 1933, p. 24.
- ⁵⁷ S. Cohen, *Boucharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*, New York, 1980, p. 303.
- ⁵⁸ Программа Коммунистического интернационала, p. 64.
- ⁵⁹ L'URSS en transparence. Série "Les Temps Modernes", Paris, 1987; "Le Renouveau des sciences humaines en URSS. La déstalinisation en jeu", *Problèmes politiques et sociaux*, Paris, No. 580, 1988.
- ⁶⁰ Девятая конференция РКП(б), p. 79.
- ⁶¹ Mikhail Gorbachev, *October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987, p. 72.

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

For a regular discussion in its Guest Club **International Affairs** invited:

Jack F. Matlock, US Ambassador in the USSR,
Juan Jose Bremer Martino, Mexican Ambassador in the USSR,
Oleg Bykov, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, deputy Director, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences,
Nikolai Kapchenko, deputy Editor in Chief, **International Affairs**;
Gerald Nadler, correspondent of UPI (USA),
Alexei Pankin, deputy Editor in Chief, **International Affairs**;
Hans Peter Riese, correspondent of the DWR broadcasting company, FRG,
Tomasz Piwowarun, correspondent of Interpress, Poland,
Steve Hearst, correspondent of CNN (USA).

"International Affairs": The Moscow Summit of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and US President produced an upsurge of emotions, expectations, statements and forecasts. How is this fourth summit viewed now that some time has passed and emotions abated?

Matlock. In fact, one of the Moscow summit achievements is that it was quite a success even though no major agreements were signed. I'm saying this because the main thing is to carry on a dialogue. Efforts must be made to understand each other better. And of course, discussion paves the way for agreement. It's a good thing for leaders to sign agreements. But, as a rule, the agreements they sign are ready even before they meet. Since a summit is important in itself, its essence doesn't consist in signing agreements but in discussing things and achieving greater mutual understanding. It seems to me that the Moscow summit was very successful in this respect.

Bykov. The Moscow summit, I think, was in itself a major event. The two sides exchanged ratification instruments bringing the INF Treaty into force and signed a protocol on the exchange. This alone was a big achievement.

But I subscribe to what the Ambassador said: great importance attaches to the very process of talks. I think it's also significant that at the beginning of this process—I mean all the four summits—the two sides saw to guaranteeing the attainment of a tangible agreement. This time they advanced much farther than they originally expected. The trend of the dialogue placed it in the mainstream of the permanent effort to work out specific accords.

I believe we will go on seeking agreement on a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons and on other steps towards disarmament, as well as working for the settlement of regional conflicts. It is equally important that Soviet-American relations are becoming more durable, more predictable, more constructive. Looking back at earlier stages of these relations—say, the seventies—we see that a summit necessarily registered what had been achieved, after which a very long pause usually set in.

What we see now is a continuous process of Soviet-American talks. I think the Moscow summit confirmed their continuity.

Piwowarun. The Moscow summit was necessary, of course. But the United States and other countries, including Poland, needed it in different ways. Poland and the United States are linked by historical bonds of friendship.

We've never looked on America as an enemy. Relations between us have always been good. But it so happened that in the early eighties they were badly damaged. There was even no ambassador in either country for a long time. Opinion polls taken in Poland today reveal President Reagan's great unpopularity. He is disliked by 42 per cent of the population. Besides, over 45 per cent of Poles consider that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is more sincere in seeking disarmament than Ronald Reagan.

That is why Reagan's trip to Moscow is bound to largely improve the American image in Poland because it showed that the United States favours disarmament for its part, at least to a degree. The result may well be a process of improvement in US-Polish relations. A change for the better may also come about in economic ties. Under all circumstances, the summit will change the attitude of our public to Reagan and the United States.

Let us ask ourselves from the purely human point of view whether the summit was necessary. I believe Ronald Reagan needed it more than others did. Nowadays every US president wants to go down in history. One of the US presidents was the first to go to China and the Soviet Union. President Reagan has scored four summits with Mikhail Gorbachev. This, too, will help him go down in history. Speaking of the fourth summit, I would say it demonstrated to the world that the dialogue between the two great powers is continuing and is a normal practice now. Holding no summit would have been abnormal. And this is what made the Moscow summit an event of historic significance.

Bremer. The opinion prevailing in the world is that the Moscow summit was very important and was crowned with success, not only for the Soviet Union and United States, but for the whole international community. I think one of the major results of the meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan was that they recognised the necessity for regular contacts between the two countries. The reason for this is the magnitude of the problems affecting their mutual relations and the fact that their solution demands a permanent dialogue and frequent contacts. I suppose the General Secretary and the President realise like anybody else that it's better to see once than to hear a hundred times and to talk to each other instead of about each other. It seems to me that everybody recognises the value of personal contacts and dialogue, of an open dialogue between the superpowers, and that the international community considers the very convening of Soviet-US summits most useful.

Riese. As a journalist I've covered many summits, including the four meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. I'm certain that all summits are potentially important. At this stage, however, it is more obvious than ever that regular contacts between the two superpowers go beyond their national interests. Since contacts and accords between them resound all over the world, they should be effected with due regard to the interests of other countries as well and ultimately of the whole planet.

Pankin. May I express my point of view on the issue? I was somewhat astonished to learn that during their terms in office French President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl of the FRG had met dozens of times. I see that as a sign of normal, tranquil, businesslike state-to-state relations. Something similar should, I think, become the rule in Soviet-American relations. The Moscow summit was possibly the first step or one of the first steps in this direction.

However, the emotional and propaganda stir over summits, which draw thousands of journalists, indicates how very far our relations are from normal in the eyes of international opinion. I'm not sure we stand to gain by encouraging such excessive expectations in the case of Soviet-American relations. The solution of current world problems depends on the Soviet Union and United States far less, I suppose, than the public, the press or even statesmen

believe. Relations between us should develop, as I see it, in favour of their playing a diminishing role in international relations.

This is why I attach particular importance to those sections of the Joint Statement that list a large number of bilateral projects and not to the ones dealing with the destiny of the world. The greater the number of such projects and the less they are ideologised and politicised, the more closely societies will be linked together by a whole network of concrete interests. This would clearly simplify the solution of other problems, such as that of disarmament.

Bykov. There are those who say the summit also had the effect of a propaganda show. I question that. It would probably be impossible to give up all propaganda. But what is propaganda? There is the expression "public relations". And there are processes tending to erode propaganda stereotypes, as we have seen. I mean stereotypes hampering relations between our two countries. Following Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Washington, where Americans saw a man differing from what many of them had imagined him to be like (one reason for the reappraisal must have been the change of climate in our relations), President Reagan came to Moscow, where many of our people had known him according to stereotypes used by himself in the past. You will recall that battered simile, "evil empire". Our people saw a somewhat different President in Moscow. This was in itself very useful. As for the possibility of the Soviet and American sides carrying on the dialogue more and more deeply and concretely, working out specific proposals and signing agreements, it is indisputable.

Riese. All that is important, of course. I recall a different summit, the Vienna meeting between Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev. It was very emotional. On signing SALT-2, they kissed. Nevertheless, that summit led off, as it were, a new round of cold war between the two superpowers. I think it isn't only a question of the President and the General Secretary achieving mutual understanding. It is also important to realise and appreciate the national interests of the other side. I believe the question how far the two powers appreciate each other's national interests will largely be answered by solving the problems that are still central to their talks.

Nadler. Every summit is a big event drawing the attention of the world. I don't quite agree with the suggestion that summits be held as frequently as possible. I think the more often they are held, the less their influence and effect will be. Look, for instance, at the meeting of the Big Seven in Toronto.

Pankin. I think we ought to try to proceed even now in a way suggesting that Soviet-American relations are normal. I mean, in particular, treating the US President as we would treat any other Western leader. What is more, I'm sure—I don't want to hurt anybody's feelings—that, say, Moscow University students would be interested to talk to Margaret Thatcher, Andreas Papandreu or François Mitterrand. But this is just a passing remark. Generally speaking, the more tranquil Soviet-American relations are, the fewer unjustified fears and equally unjustified expectations they will give rise to.

Bykov. Still, I would like to offer a comment on the primacy of Soviet-American relations, which is determined by reality when all is said and done. I think it would be wrong to artificially lower the level of these relations. There are world problems which right now it is primarily up to the Soviet Union and United States to solve. I mean disarmament and universal security. We have the biggest military potentials, and so it's with the two of us that solution should begin. As for diplomatic protocol, it is a matter of secondary importance. The point is not how leaders are received but that meetings between them really should produce concrete accords. For the time being, that is, at the initial stage of disarmament, there is just no alternative. Nobody is going to effect real disarmament in place of our two countries.

Kapchenko. I think to discuss whether the summit, at which no new agreements were signed, was useful or not means pushing against an open door.

The very fact that the summit took place, its international impact, its direct and potential significance tell their own tale. We should evaluate its character and results in the context of both the period of international development concerned and the period of internal development we are living through. Seen from this standpoint, the summit was an event of great moment.

It was said here that summits necessarily bear to a degree the imprint of propaganda shows. I agree with my colleague who described that as inevitable. Nevertheless, I don't think that is the main thing. It seems to me that lately, with Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to the leadership of the party, summits have differed substantially from the earlier ones. It was those other summits that assumed the character of big shows even though the participants signed agreements that could be expected to have far-reaching implications. Really, we should distinguish between appearance and essence.

AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

Matlock. Speaking of the main result of the Moscow summit, I would begin by pointing out that there was a real, substantive discussion of all items on the proposed agenda. What is more, the positions of the two countries on various issues drew closer together. This found reflection in the Joint Statement.

Second, the Soviet-US summit, the fourth in three years, confirmed the usefulness of regular contacts between the two countries' leaders. I cannot accept the view that these meetings have been too frequent. We should simply compare the state of affairs three years ago with what it is today. I admit that summits don't cover all the range of problems, but, even so, they generally play a very important and substantial role in furthering the dialogue between our countries.

Third, the Moscow summit, like the Washington summit before it, proved the usefulness of not only dialogue between leaders and between statesmen of the USSR and USA but dialogue involving the bulk of public opinion in both countries. And it's very important, as participants in this discussion have pointed out, that the public in one country should know the leaders of the other country better. This is why I don't think the Moscow summit can be described in the least as a propaganda show. It was an effort by the leadership of one side to convey important information to the public opinion of the other side. I feel that such effort by the General Secretary in Washington was very successful and so was the effort of the US President in Moscow. And we ought to recognise that it was a very valuable part of the summits.

Fourth, I would say that the United States and the Soviet Union now have a universally recognised agenda. In the past we have not always been at one on what this agenda should be, what questions should be discussed, but now we are. To be sure, we don't always arrive at a common view on what specifically should be done on these questions but still there is no underestimating the fact that such agreement does exist.

And fifth, there is no ignoring the usefulness of the agreements already signed. It was said here earlier that every agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States is significant and useful. Every agreement can be important enough in the sphere covered by it. This is true above all of bilateral agreements extending cooperation in various fields. In particular agreements specifying ways and means of exercising control over nuclear blasts and other agreements on similar important issues. This is no trifling matter, for those are highly important agreements.

Such are, in my view, the main results of the Moscow summit. I cannot agree with those who say that for our leaders to hold a summit every year is to meet too often. I think such meetings are the main or central road to settling relations between us.

Bykov. The Joint Soviet-US Statement details possible measures for con-

trol over cuts in SOWs. We all—I don't mean only those present here—seem to underestimate the change that has really occurred in this respect. I would call it almost revolutionary, meaning the process of carrying on talks and reaching agreement. At present there are no restrictions in principle where control, verification and inspection are concerned. What is still dividing our two countries over the drafting of a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in SOWs is sea-based cruise missiles. The hitch in this case is verification. But it isn't just a technical matter. It's apparently a political one as well. Incidentally, the US Navy insists on having a say, refusing to abandon its line, or to give information whether its ships have nuclear weapons on board.

There is fundamental mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States on both technical and other problems. As far as our country is concerned, its attitude to sea-based cruise missiles is perfectly explicit. Their presence can be verified. There are tested methods and technical means making it possible to ascertain whether a ship is carrying this or that nuclear weapon. It's a feasible task.

Strange as it may seem, our two countries have exchanged roles in this instance. We propose checking up on each other's activity much more widely and thoroughly. As for the United States, its stance is rather sceptical or even negative for the time being both on this and on the issue of banning and eliminating chemical weapons (meaning private production). I'm convinced that the whole Soviet-American dialogue points in the direction of applying the principle of carefully checking up on each other's activity and using all possibilities, including technical ones, to limit, reduce and eliminate both nuclear and conventional armaments. I believe this circumstance is highly important and should be used to the utmost.

Kapchenko. But is it possible or advisable always to draw a distinction between technical and political intricacies? Sometimes they are interlinked so closely as to make it hard to say whether a particular issue is political or technical.

Bykov. That interconnection does exist. All technical problems are generally linked with political solutions in one way or another, and where there's a political solution it ultimately proves decisive. However, political solutions also take account of the technical aspects of problems. I would say that even where there's an intention at a high political level to reach agreement the technical aspect, the possibility of putting the agreement into practice, cannot be ignored. And since there are also other aspects such as the need to work out definite legal documents and instruments and to agree and adapt technical details, it is clear that the matter has its peculiarities. Hence the need for time, reciprocal resolve, competence and experience to lend concrete forms to political solutions. At a certain stage in the implementation of a political solution, relatively independent work required at technical level.

Kapchenko. But can we, generally speaking, put it on record that the Soviet Union and the United States already have the political will to reach agreement on fundamental problems of disarmament, that they do want to reach it?

Bykov. I wouldn't go as far as that. We've been speaking of the next agreement, which should lead to a 50 per cent cut in SOWs. Both sides have the necessary political will and mutual understanding, I would even say they are agreed on the matter. This began at Reykjavik and was explicitly registered at the Washington summit. A relevant agreement is being drafted. As regards other aspects of disarmament, a lot has yet to be done. But as far as a 50 per cent reduction is concerned, a political decision will probably be less than enough even though many of the specific components of the agreement being drafted have already been agreed. Still, there are difficulties. We've already mentioned sea-based cruise missiles but there is a further serious matter which has yet to be fully settled with the US side. I mean the future agreement's wording of the Washington formula insisting that cuts in SOWs be effected

without the ABM Treaty of 1972 being infringed by either side. Indeed, this stipulation should be a component of the agreement. It calls for further work.

Matlock. I would like to make some points about whether conclusion of a treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons is hampered by political or technical difficulties. Solution of the problem is held up by both political and technical difficulties. As regards verification and control over compliance with the agreement being drafted, the main problems are technical. Nevertheless it seems to me that in principle there are no big problems. We aren't clear at the moment as to what we should do about sea-based cruise missiles. This is both a technical and a political problem. The Soviet Union proposes setting a limit to them, nor are we basically against that but we don't know how it should be verified. We cannot set a limit to these missiles without ensuring verification. And so we propose searching for another approach, one combining both political and technical solutions.

Pankin. I understand that the President's favourite saying, "Trust but check", was also Stalin's. We all know the result very well. I feel that the issue of verification is badly profaned today. Intricate and apparently very costly experiments are conducted to exercise control over underground nuclear tests although outstanding international specialists consider that existing national technical means are quite sufficient.

I think that, furthermore, many technical hurdles can be removed by political decisions. Why not agree, for example, that the two sides will have a definite (preferably a minimum) number of sea-based cruise missiles, and why not trust each other's word? What could discourage violations? The circumstance that if violations were revealed, as they inevitably would be, this would do enormous damage to the violator's prestige in the world. As for the cheated side, it wouldn't be endangered: the extra missiles couldn't be used anyway since the capability for retaliation will remain colossal in the foreseeable future, even after a 50 per cent reduction.

Matlock. Sea-based missiles are not strategic missiles. We feel, that, for purely military technical reasons, neither side is going to produce very many of them. There are natural limits to their role, we could simply declare our intentions, and that would be enough. But the Soviet side doesn't share our point of view. In any case, this issue should be no obstacle to signing a treaty on a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons. It must be admitted, however, that so far it has been quite a hard nut to crack. The problem must be solved, provided, of course, there is an adequate technical basis for it. But as a matter of fact, it's primarily a political problem.

SUPERPOWERS AND THE OTHERS

Piwowarun. Mention was made here of the problem of confidence in Soviet-American relations. But the problem is less simple than it might seem at first sight. You can trust a small country because were it to infringe an international agreement, you could impose various sanctions against it as well as use other forms of pressure. But in the case of two great powers verification is necessary because what could be done if one of them violated the agreement it had signed? Practically nothing. Indeed, this has occurred more than once. It follows that you can trust a small country but not a big one. You must keep an eye on a big country.

But to go back to what was said here about Soviet-American relations. For a small country it's very important how relations between two great powers shape up. Let us assume that Soviet-American relations deteriorate due to home policy requirements. These requirements in the case of the Soviet Union are not such as to induce it to seek a worsening of relations with the United States. But in the case of the United States they may be great enough to affect American-Soviet relations.

For a country such as Poland, Soviet-American relations are very im-

portant. If they are good we can look forward to our country improving its relations with France, the FRG, Britain and other countries. But if Soviet-American relations are bad it will be quite difficult for us to improve our relations with countries we want to cooperate with. As matters now stand, the Soviet Union takes account of our interests with regard to disarmament and other problems. We make proposals for our part. Let me remind you of them. In 1957 we advanced the Rapacki Plan but the chance it offered was missed. After that came the Gomulka Plan but it was ignored too. And now Poland has formulated the Jaruzelski Plan. The plan takes account of the course of Soviet-American talks. What is going on in those relations does not contradict our plan. But were they to deteriorate, the Jaruzelski Plan would be frustrated in its turn.

Riese. The situation in the world shows that unless the relations between the two superpowers are good, other countries cannot proceed unhampered. Take, for example, the situation in Europe, where there are two military political alliances. How are we to build a common European home in the circumstances, which is what Mikhail Gorbachev calls for? We cannot do this without the great powers contributing their share. We know from history that it's they who determine the area of "detente" while the smaller European countries merely follow them. But should a new cold war break out, the small European countries would be dragged into it against their will.

Thus the solution of key foreign policy problems depends on the two superpowers. On the other hand, no changes will come about in the international situation unless the superpowers realise that other countries have interests of their own and a right to choose their path of development. Europe is a divided continent. My feeling is that it will stay so for many years to come. Speaking of a common European home, I would say that one part of its roof belongs to the Soviet Union and the other to the United States but all European countries are divided anyway and depend on the will of two powers. If we bring about deep-going changes it will be the next step.

Matlock. That doesn't apply to the superpowers alone. Every sovereign state is willing to accept only those proposals that it considers acceptable. The role which the Soviet Union and United States are playing in the world is a different matter. There are problems which really concern mainly these two countries. For example, the problem of reducing strategic offensive weapons. We can and should consult other countries but it's perfectly natural that the Soviet Union and United States are first of all going to settle these questions on a bilateral basis.

As regards other international problems, they can only be solved on a multilateral basis. It would be wrong to imagine that individual countries, including the Soviet Union and United States as well as other countries, could effectively solve, say, the problem of reducing conventional armaments without participation of other countries concerned. This problem cannot be solved through bilateral talks, nor are we going to seek a solution to it in this way. When, during the summit, the General Secretary made a proposal for cutting conventional armaments the President replied that the matter was within the competence of the WTO and NATO and therefore the United States could not respond to the proposal favourably. It follows that not all international problems directly affecting many countries can be solved on a bilateral basis. And so it's very important to see which problems fit in with the framework of bilateral talks and which call for multilateral talks.

Bykov. I agree that there are problems which can only be solved by the Soviet Union and United States. I mean primarily strategic offensive weapons. Our two countries admittedly have the largest nuclear arsenals. Time was when people talked a lot about "collusion" between the two superpowers. It might be worth while looking into this so-called collusion. If it's in the interest of disarmament, if the two powers set an example and if they make no

attempt to impose their solutions on other countries but offer a common idea, initiative or concept, "collusion" between them is welcome.

It was said here that on Soviet initiative the Moscow summit discussed a new concept of common approach to the problem of reducing conventional armaments and lowering the level of armed forces and armaments in Europe. To be sure, this doesn't apply to the two powers alone but they can set a very good example of approaching the problem. We have allies, and so does the United States. We consult our respective allies. We also need to know the opinion of neutral and non-aligned European countries. It follows that decisions have to be made by all of us acting together.

The Soviet Union and United States set a positive example of such co-operation, nor is it anything like the mythical "division of the world" some Western politicians and journalists make it out to be. It's a positive process of bringing about disarmament and lowering the level of tensions. I'm not surprised in the least that the Soviet Union and United States, the biggest powers from the military point of view, are making common cause. The more often we act together and the more initiatives we take, the more likely it is that they will elicit the most different kinds of response in the world. But on the whole this is important to the extent that we are advancing towards disarmament and a healthier political climate in Europe and the world.

Nadler. The more often US and Soviet political leaders meet, the greater the chances of avoiding political mistakes. The past four or possibly eight years have seen some diplomatic gains in removing mistakes. It's the American press, for one, that writes about this. The deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe was a mistake, and the NATO countries reacted to it. And now we're witnessing a different result. It's a fruit of the diplomatic process we've been talking about here. We have one treaty for the time being. I think the importance of summits lies in avoiding mistakes.

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Pankin. My working concept is that at present the division of Europe, the existence of two blocs, is largely unwarranted because it's motivated by the existence of a military threat. I believe we can now dismiss all fears about NATO marching its hordes against the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union setting out all of a sudden to seize Western Europe. In other words, the two blocs as they now stand are unnecessary in today's world. But they are still there because people on both sides are afraid of each other. There are structures, habits, and so on. I feel that improving Soviet-American relations are gradually doing away with the sensation of mutual threat, thereby eroding the worst, that is, the military dimensions of the two alliances.

Nadler. It is wrong to imagine that the problem is traceable to this or that institution and that you have only to reshape some institutions for everything to be different. The point is that people must be allowed to choose the way of life they want. If they are there won't be any more wars. Who can guarantee that if an East European country were to choose its path it wouldn't be attacked? All alliances and blocs are pivoted on an axis around which other are made to turn.

Bykov. Speaking of the future of Europe. I believe the results of the Moscow summit and the fact that Soviet-American relations are improving will benefit the situation on the continent and not make it worse. The CPSU CC Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference state explicitly that in the past three years our bilateral relations with foreign countries have improved and that there has been no worsening of relations with any country. Each summit provides better conditions also for internal development in all countries of Western and Eastern Europe alike and improves the overall climate in East-West relations. Now that a fourth Soviet-US summit has taken place, it's more obvious than ever that we are coming out of at least the period of

confrontation. Cooperation is a long but generally positive road, and we are now entering upon it.

Riese. I agree. I hate to sound like a sceptic, but even the case of your country indicates how very hard it is to alter economic, political and other structures. It's all the harder at international level. Occasionally I get the impression that the General Secretary wants to accelerate both internal and international developments. But in the latter case not everything depends on one side. I think the more effectively you overcome internal difficulties, the sooner external ones will recede. External and internal affairs are interlinked. However, it seems that not all politicians in the West are responsive to changes in your country, not all of them are prepared to appreciate and accept the initiatives taken by Mikhail Gorbachev in the past two years. That apparently means that no attempt should be made to rush to accelerate foreign policy processes faster than home policy progress permits.

Bykov. We mustn't hurry, of course, mustn't try to quicken the pace of developments. Nor should we try to hasten the signing of an agreement that isn't ready. We need a sound treaty ready for signing. However, the many initiatives taken by our leadership today may be described as the art of politics rather than just politics. We mustn't rush events nor set ourselves tasks we cannot accomplish but, on the other hand, if we were to begin with small problems, at a low level, and to go back to what used to be a weak point of our policy, namely, a narrow approach and a bid to solve problems of minor significance, then the very complexity of international affairs and the enormous number of unsolved problems would resist us so strongly that the minor would taper off to zero. In this sense the Moscow summit was really a "well-done tango".

Bremer. It's obvious that the whole international community recognises the importance of the Soviet-American dialogue. The dialogue helps solve bilateral and international problems but by no means all of them. I believe, therefore, that it would be important to draw the whole international community into it. One of the main topics of the summit was disarmament. People in Mexico and other Latin American countries are of the opinion that the problem of disarmament doesn't concern the superpowers alone. The voice of developing countries must be heard because these countries, like the rest of the world, would have to pay dearly in the event of a nuclear conflict.

Hence the importance of both the Soviet-US dialogue on disarmament and UN participation in it. I think this calls for a multilateral approach focusing on unsolved problems in the relations between many countries and the Soviet Union. I mean the problems of confidence and verification. Allow me to remind you of the recent initiatives of the leaders of Sweden, India, Argentina, Tanzania, Greece and Mexico, six countries speaking in a measure for the whole international community. They proposed setting up a multilateral mechanism for control over disarmament. I think the international community could play an important role in this matter, in, say, control over compliance with the Soviet-US agreement on a reduction in SOWs now being drafted and with other accords. It's necessary to combine the possibilities of the great powers with those of the international community so as to help solve difficult problems in diverse talks.

Riese. Allow me a remark on the UN and the activity of the great powers in the organisation. It is clear that the great powers only approve of UN decisions meeting their interests. Take, for instance, the Afghan problem. The reason why it's being solved is not that the UN insisted on it. It's being solved because the Soviet Union has decided to withdraw from Afghanistan and the United States has accepted that approach. Without this the UN would have been unable to play any role.

Bykov. We may as well take up the problem of regional conflicts in this connection. The Moscow summit was fruitful in this respect but not because it concerned itself with any new problems. The important thing is that the two

sides discussed a whole series of persisting regional conflicts. Besides, it is important to note that discussion took place against the background of certain real advances towards their settlement. The settlement of the situation over Afghanistan is a reality now. It makes possible certain conclusions and a search for approaches to the settlement of other regional conflicts, to their unblocking. The policy of national reconciliation, for one, isn't applicable to Afghanistan alone. Similar opportunities present themselves in Kampuchea, Nicaragua and probably southern Africa as far as Angola is concerned.

Speaking of the role of the UN, I don't quite agree that the UN can do nothing until the great powers come to terms. Don't let us minimise the role of the organisation. It has appreciable potentialities, except that so far not all of them have been used. In the case of the situation relating to Afghanistan, we mustn't forget that the mechanism of complicated and very unusual indirect talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan was set going through the mediation and with the active assistance of the UN, its Secretary General and his representative. And it's equally important that the opinion of the international community on the Afghan question—an opinion reflected in resolutions passed by the UN year after year—created a definite political atmosphere and had its effect on the drafting of decisions concerning Afghanistan.

I think the UN could play a big role in the search for ways of settling other regional conflicts. This circumstance apparently found reflection at the Moscow summit during the exchange of views and in assessing the situation. With regard to Afghanistan the United States and Soviet Union have committed themselves as guarantors of the settlement arrived at. This constitutes their positive role. However, we shouldn't overlook an important trend such as the increased activity of countries situated in the region. I mean Pakistan in this connection. In Central America it's the Contadora Group and the signatories to the Guatemala accords. In Southeast Asia it's the countries of Indochina and the ASEAN nations. These are new developments which the Soviet Union and United States just must take into account in tackling the problem of regional conflicts.

Riese. I wouldn't like to belittle the role of the UN. Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that the whole process of talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan involving the UN revealed the impossibility of reaching agreement without the Washington summit. The two superpowers agreed that the Soviet Union would leave Afghanistan and that the United States would guarantee compliance with the agreement. The main thing is that the UN mechanism will be unable to function effectively until the Soviet Union and United States plus France, that is, the biggest suppliers of arms to the Third World come to terms. It would be well to stop arms exports to the Third World. No headway toward settling conflicts can be made until this is done, until the strongest reach an understanding. After all, we're witnessing no other cases of settlement at this stage with the exception of Afghanistan, and so I'm sceptical. There are no serious changes for the better in Africa, Asia or Latin America. Everything hinges on economic, political and other factors.

LESS COLD WAR, MORE DEMOCRACY

Pankin. I think the approach to the problem of human rights has two aspects. First, should it be a subject of state-to-state talks? Second, how effective is such a dialogue as a means of improving the human rights situation in both societies? The Soviet Union has recognised that human rights are a perfectly legitimate theme for discussion. You will all recall the sharply negative reaction to the Carter administration's approach. In those days we used to put human rights in quotation marks.

The other question is harder to answer. In the case of human rights, the only problems that can be solved are problems which society itself—not the state, not the administrative authorities, but precisely society—are mature

enough to cope with. No serious improvements, can come from without, from another country. Yet every society has its own agenda. Attempts to impose the criteria of one society upon another lead to absurdities. Americans are constantly criticising the Soviet Union over emigration. I personally consider that everybody should be completely free to enter or leave a country (with the exception of specified cases involving classified information). Emigration should be an ordinary human right irrespective of nationality. Even so, I don't think this is a matter of paramount importance in our society. What is more, as far as I know, people in our country generally dislike those who wish to emigrate. Frequent recourse to this theme in the West merely adds to this sentiment.

Another point is that every Soviet man or woman who arrives in New York or Washington for the first time is literally shocked at the sight of homeless, unemployed and hungry people, that is, at what is an obvious violation of social and economic rights. But I realise that no matter how convincingly we criticise the United States, our criticisms cannot make the Americans solve the problem of the homeless.

Generally speaking, the state of human rights shouldn't be judged according to whether or not they are infringed (for they are infringed in any society). The criterion should be how far society and its every member are in a position to end infringements as they uphold their rights. We in the Soviet Union are now evolving a mechanism for the defence of human rights. We aren't doing this under pressure but because we need it, because our society is ripe for it. I might as well add that many if not most of the new autonomous movements and socio-political clubs that have sprung up in our country try to keep away from Western correspondent. They don't want any support from you. They have no need for it. By the way, this is also the case in the West. For instance, peace movements which also advocate a democratisation of their societies try to keep away from the Soviet Union. And so the issue of human rights calls for a dialectical approach. It's fortunate that the problem is being discussed but, on the other hand, the forms which discussion takes injure the democratic movement rather than benefiting it.

Bykov. Little of what was said at the Moscow summit about human rights was new, as I see it. I think the summit merely continued what was begun earlier. But I believe just the same that we are making progress in this sphere as well although the US side, the President, was plainly influenced by what may be called the inertia of the past. Still, both sides are abandoning attempts to pose as righteous preachers, to teach and admonish each other.

I would say our side made such attempts in the past but they didn't help in really solving the problem of human rights in our country or elsewhere, let alone contribute to the Soviet-American dialogues. The US side stuck to that tradition also in Moscow. It would have liked human rights to be the key topic of the Moscow talks. As a result, a further clash of opinions occurred. Nevertheless, the Moscow summit showed that the role and area of this clash are shrinking. I suppose we may speak of some headway in this sense.

The Soviet Union proposed establishing a permanent forum for the discussion of these concrete problems. I would expect the US side to amend its position to one degree or another. After all, much of what it said in Moscow and what sounded like an accusation against us, was lagging behind reality. The democratisation process in our country has gone far over the past three years, which means that even in propaganda terms much of what the US side spoke about is outdated and so cannot work any longer. To be sure, we still have many unsolved problems in our country but we're solving them.

A question was asked here about the likely effect of the solution of the problem of human rights on Soviet-American relations and the situation inside our countries. I don't think the effect will be strong. The social development processes going on in the United States differ from those under way in our

country: they are primarily internal problems in either case. Their discussion at one summit cannot influence the situation. Of course, everything has some impact on either side but I don't think it can seriously alter the situation.

Pankin. It seems to me the dialogue on human rights has no particular effect on the situation, but an overall improvement in Soviet-American relations evidently allows much greater scope for the democratisation of practically all societies. Aren't the many instances of persecution and violations of human rights, especially political rights, a direct function of cold war? The fewer cold war battles the two societies fight, the more democratic both will be.

Bremer. I think it is worthy of note that the Moscow summit discussed within the framework of its agenda the problem of extending cultural contacts between the two nations. These contacts show an upward trend, and I believe livelier interchanges of citizens between the Soviet Union and the United States would help lessen distrust, which is largely a product of the lack of information about each other. Hence also all sorts of false stereotypes and various prejudices. I think there's a close connection between distrust and the problem of disarmament. More extensive contacts, personal ties and cultural relations are likely to become an important way of promoting a peaceful policy. It follows that summits and relations between the two powers could become more predictable and logical and therefore would be appreciated by all.

I wish to comment on the issue of human rights. I agree that President Reagan was maybe late. But then he didn't say anything the Soviet Union cannot stand. The reason why he was late was that, speaking to writers he mentioned Solzhenitsyn and Rostropovich. As far as I know, there has been a Soviet proposal to invite them to the Soviet Union. But maybe Solzhenitsyn's case is still under examination ..

Nadler. I don't at all regard Ronald Reagan's speech about human rights in the Soviet Union as interference in internal affairs. After all, he proceeded from the fact that, as far as I know, the Soviet Union approved certain documents on human rights, including the 1948 Declaration. And we know that it has signed the Helsinki Final Act.

As for a forum on human rights, I have misgivings about all forums as a journalist and a thinking man. I believe such problems can be solved only if there is a will. Nor can I agree with those who say there is no progress on this. You know that Germans, Armenians and Jews now travel to the West to see relatives. I would like Russians, too, to have such a right, although there are problems in this sphere if I'm not mistaken.

Bykov. Those are rather problems of a monetary nature.

Riese. We ought to settle problems in a businesslike manner. No seminar, working group or whatever else it's called can improve the situation. I think it's largely a question of inadequate information, as the Ambassador said. The shortage of information restricts the possibilities of the press, and for me this is more important than increasing the number of citizens' unlimited trips abroad.

I know that many Germans living in the Soviet Union want to emigrate to West Germany. I'm sure, however, that if they had a chance to spend a month or six weeks in the FRG and take their bearings there, roughly 80 per cent of them would return to their Soviet homeland. But they have no such chance. As a result, emigration is their only choice. If you talk to those who have emigrated to West Germany many of them will tell you they want to return. But they cannot, and this is what makes their fate tragic.

I've served as a Moscow correspondent for two and a half years, carefully watching developments here. The Soviet Union is on the way to cognising reality. We in the West should study what goes on in your country. I'm convinced that the West, too, is in need of perestroika. If the current process in

the Soviet Union continues and if all Soviet citizens have a better chance to visit abroad and see other countries in a few years' time the human rights issue will no more be restricted to the right to emigrate.

Piwowarun. There are more Poles who queue up to get exit visas than Soviet people who queue up for vodka. It's safe to say that 90 per cent of our young people would like to leave for a time for purely economic reasons. Be that as it may, over one million of them will have left by the year 2000. Emigration is losing us an enormous asset in the form of manpower that we are very unlikely to recover. This is a further economic problem facing our country.

Our government today issues passports for travel abroad without imposing any restrictions. The procedure takes just a few hours. The result is a new problem. This is why I think those who talk about the right to travel abroad should also talk about the right to enter a foreign country. But there is no such thing.

For many years past, we've been the target of psychological warfare, in particular over human rights. Yet the lists of "prisoners of conscience" drawn up in the West include very few people having a clear conscience. The lists comprise people who have disgraced themselves several times and should be in jail for their criminal offences. By contrast, I can't cite a single instance of anybody in the West mentioning the rights of Communists whose dignity is trampled underfoot and who are disgraced. There has never been such a thing. Yet all Communists aren't members of government, we in Poland have other Communists besides them. The general conclusion we must draw is that the West often interferes very grossly in the affairs of other countries on the pretext of defending human rights.

Hearst. I think what's going on in this country has caught many American leaders napping. I don't believe all makers of US foreign policy are prepared to respond properly to developments in the Soviet Union. Previously some people in our country imagined that we could bring about changes in Soviet policy. But now it looks as if the two sides have exchanged roles, with developments in the Soviet Union making our leaders reconsider their own positions.

WHAT IS AHEAD?

Kapchenko. I would like to ask our American colleagues a question which Soviet people in general and our readers in particular are very keen on. My question is: Will Soviet-American relations under the next administration tend to improve or to deteriorate? In view of the potential built up in our mutual relations, could that potential operate as an inertial force shortening the period of adaptation considerably after the advent of the next administration?

Matlock. I think there are fairly good prospects for the next US administration abiding in the main by today's foreign policy. Of course, we don't know who will win the coming presidential election but we do know from polls that over 70 per cent of Americans approve of the current policy toward the Soviet Union. This holds the promise of a fairly durable policy irrespective of the outcome of the election. I would say as much about the Senate, which ratified the INF Treaty by an overwhelming majority of 93 : 5.

All this goes to show that the foreign policy line of the present administration enjoys widespread support among the American people. I realise that right now I'm looking at the American scene from Moscow and not Washington. But I read the American press and talk to Americans who come here. At the same time, I must admit that Soviet-American relations aren't playing any particular role in our election campaign. It is known, for example, that the Democratic aspirant to the presidency, Michael Dukakis, has welcomed the

result of the Moscow summit and voiced the opinion that meetings with Soviet leaders should be held every year. I suppose Vice-President George Bush, who is a member of the present administration, approves of the summit for his part. And while we cannot say exactly or in detail what the foreign policy of the next administration will be, I still believe no major changes are likely.

Pankin. In conclusion I wish to thank all participants on behalf of the editorial staff for their contribution to an interesting discussion. Thank you very much.

AN ARDUOUS BUT NECESSARY PATH

(Continued from page 37)

⁴ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol 24, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1988 p 298

⁵ *Ibid*, Vol 4 1975, p 581 582

⁶ *Ibid*, p 298

⁷ *Ibid* Vol 25 1987, p 339

⁸ *Pravda* May 27, 1988

⁹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol 5 Moscow, Progress Publishers 1976 p 3

¹⁰ Mikhail Gorbachev, *October and Perestroika the Revolution Continues* Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987, p 59

¹¹ *Pravda* June 29, 1988

¹² *Political Report of the CPSU CC to the 27th Party Congress*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p 82

¹³ *Ibidem*

¹⁴ *Pravda*, May 27, 1988.

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THE 19TH ALL-UNION CPSU CONFERENCE: FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY

Report by Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze at the
Scientific and Practical Conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

July 25, 1988

I. THE PARTY'S THOUGHT AND WILL GEARED TO PERESTROIKA

Esteemed Comrades,

All of you remember, of course, the words with which Mikhail Gorbachev began his report at the 19th All-Union Party Conference:

"How to further the revolutionary restructuring and make it irreversible?"

The conference gave the answer to this fundamental question of our development.

In the drive to revitalise the country the conference brought together the processes of democratisation and radical economical reorganisation with reforms in the political system, this foremost guarantee of the irreversibility of the changes.

With its entire course, content and thrust the conference testified to the underlying principle, namely, that the party is the exponent of the policy-making goals of society and its vanguard political force leading the country to renewal.

Having enriched the ideas of the 27th Congress on foreign-policy strategy, the party at the conference gave foreign policy and diplomacy fresh orientations of principle. One of these uppermost orientations is the creation of an effective, constitutional mechanism for discussing foreign policy issues.

The conference reaffirmed our overriding priority—ensuring through political means peaceful and totally favourable conditions for carrying out transformations within the country.

The Gorbachev report singles out, on the basis of an analysis of the existing reality, trends which can define what the world will be like at the turn of the century.

They are:

democratisation, demilitarisation and humanisation of international relations;

an increasing shift in efforts to ensure security from the sphere of military-political solutions to the sphere of political cooperation;

utilisation of the scientific and technological potential for jointly tackling global problems;

(Abridged)

development of multifaceted and equitable contact among states and nations for the benefit of their mutual material and cultural enrichment and for consolidating the structure of universal peace.

To promote the deepening of these trends in world politics is our highest calling.

After the 19th Party Conference there emerged in society the prerequisites for a new political, social, cultural and moral reality in which we still have to determine our place.

The political reconstruction project requires of us clear-cut notions of what foreign policy will be like in the new superstructure and how it should work so as to promote the development of the base as much as possible.

Soviet diplomacy will have to take a look at its work from the standpoint of its democratisation, full primacy of the law and the elective bodies expressing the will of the people, greater openness, and better interaction with the public.

The 19th Party Conference summarised the main political, economic, social, cultural and moral results of the first three years of *perestroika*, focused on the underlying causes of sluggishness, and elaborated a set of measures through which these causes should be removed.

We, too, face similar tasks -we are to analyse the experience that has been amassed, examine the period since the April Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the 27th CPSU Congress, and map out ways, forms and methods of work which will deepen reforms in Soviet diplomacy and make them irreversible.

We intend to focus on the key philosophical and conceptual issues set before us by the practice of the past three years and on the working conclusions to be drawn from them.

A different, traditional structuring of discussions, which encompasses all areas of diplomatic work without exception, may lead to excessive fragmentation and dispersion of attention. These problems and areas are expected to be discussed and considered more pointedly and specifically at the sectional proceedings.

Now that we have agreed on the subject of the discussion, we would like to come to an understanding on its nature. Here we all have a model and example- the 19th Party Conference itself.

The conference was an open lesson in *glasnost*, a school of socialist pluralism, the initiation to democracy, the first baptism by political debate.

The conference was one enormous talented work, the exceptional nature of which was ensured by the extraordinariness of its participants. It called for, and presented to us, a worker-tribune, the original thinking of a party leader, the broad social vision of a collective farm chairman, the tempestuous intellect of a machine-tool engineer—commander of production, the triumphant, intelligent initiative of a scientist and physician, the civic-minded stand of a writer, and a diplomat's profound understanding of the essence of economic problems.

It showed who is who in the democratic competition of the intellect and spirituality. It brought out the fact that despite the years of sway of the administrative system and bureaucratic centralism, society, the country and the people in it are vibrant, and that the genes of talent and creativity have been preserved and are working vigorously for the revitalisation of the socialist homeland.

The conference testified to the fact that the revelation of different, at times polar, views does not weaken us; on the contrary, it makes us stronger.

Having expressed a vote of confidence to the leadership of the country, the party and *perestroika*, the conference established the principle

that no official today has a personal dug-out in which he could hide from criticism and the obligation to answer to the people.

Lastly, the conference helped us more than ever before to see clearly that more often than not the past directs its attacks against efforts to limit and weaken the power of the bureaucratic apparatus.

Having declared for a dismantling of a rigidly centralised system of state management oriented at the now unacceptable extensive methods of economic management, the conference proposed replacing it with a modern effective democratic organisational model.

The ways and methods in which it did this have given society an example of true government by the people and effective execution of democratic functions.

The conference was directly involved in the life of the country, and the life of the country was directly involved in it.

We would like very much for the style and spirit of the party conference to be conveyed to our meeting and for our dialogue to be just as open, pointed and, most importantly, creative. We want it to establish not the authority of an official or a rank but the prestige of thought of great significance to the state and society. The great thought without which, to quote the General Secretary, there is no big politics and no big results in it.

In this connection, I want to say a few words on a personal note. The conference evoked strong feelings in me. Listening to the report and the addresses of the delegates and reverting to the conference materials and documents, I constantly thought about us, about our endeavour. Will we cope with what people are expecting and demanding of us? At the stage of the reform of the country's political system *perestroika* is setting foreign policy and diplomacy such tasks which cannot be accomplished without a massive intellectual surge. They cannot be accomplished without bringing to light and gathering our creative forces.

At the outset of the restructuring drive we tried to provide them with incentives. This was the wonderful time of a fresh wind and spring renewal of foreign policy. The time of the April Plenary Meeting and the Party Congress, Paris and Geneva, Vladivostok and Reykjavik, the Statement of January 15 and the Delhi Declaration.

The time of bold decisions pertaining to the scrapping of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan.

For the first time in the history of Soviet diplomacy the leader of the party has met with a large collective of it. While visiting us, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke at a Foreign Ministry general meeting and mapped out the basic parameters and guidelines for our work. We reorganised structurally and in essence, amassing fresh experience and reaching new points of departure.

All the same, I admit that I experienced inner dissatisfaction. All this time the relatively high level of our work was kept up by the somewhat intensive efforts of a not very wide range of staff members. The circulation of ideas at all the floors of our building was patently weak.

Attempts to deal directly with the collective, with its opinion, evoked in response an enormous mass of papers which was far from the critical mass of thought.

Nevertheless, we decided to try once again. Approximately a week before the start of the 19th Party Conference the collective was again requested to speak out on the reforms in foreign policy and how they are proceeding in our ministry, in our system.

The results exceeded all expectations. Over 800 extremely interesting ideas and proposals concerning the entire spectrum of our work were received in literally a matter of days.

Like my colleagues, I experienced great joy when I saw how many people we have who think acutely and originally. What is particularly gratifying is that a large part of the proposals are coming from young staff members at the lower and middle levels. This means the reforms in the Foreign Ministry rest on a firm foundation and have a guaranteed future.

What, then, has happened? I think that our creative quest did not cease all these years. *Perestroika* has made greater demands of people, through promoting their development and the maturity of entire work groups. All the same, people were not confident that their ideas could be called for. What was needed was some very acute stimulant, some particularly powerful catalyst to set this force in motion.

This stimulant was the proceedings of the All-Union Party Conference.

The materials of this survey underlie our report, which is unquestionably a collective effort.

I want to single out the leading tenor of the material received. It is a sense of involvement, motivation and self-criticism. The critical mood is particularly revealing.

The retrospective nature of the criticism of foreign policy and diplomacy levelled in the Gorbachev report did not make the analysis of the present state of affairs carried out by our staff members any less acute. They note that the brake mechanism that evolved in years when inordinate centralisation and administrative-command methods predominated in foreign policy as well has yet to be torn down entirely.

The materials that have been submitted contain many examples of how the tenacity of stereotypes and conservatism makes itself felt in our Ministry as well. The sluggish thinking in our sphere, too, which was mentioned in the report at the Party Conference, rests on a lack of several variants. Comrades write that the lack of personal initiative is at times compensated for by a struggle of personal passions and ambitions, by a confrontation not of concepts and views but groupings and clans.

Our colleagues say that in the past even the most important decisions were taken behind close doors; to this day some comrades are unreceptive towards collegial and democratic discussion of problems. References to the fact that the dubious initiatives in recommending particular erroneous steps did not come from our department are untenable, too.

Reflections on the roots of conservatism are not devoid of humanness, and this is also very gratifying. We are what the times have made us. I, for one, do not consider myself a conservative, but I, too am well familiar with the inner conflict—are we doing everything right in our attempts to overcome the old ways? The responsibility is too great and the price of mistakes can be enormous.

When the point at issue is the future of the country, the appearance of different, at times diametrically opposite, points of view is a inevitable phenomenon.

It is important to understand this. It is important to search for and find in a person the seeds of good and help them germinate right through the extraneous features of dogmas and habits. Help them get rid of them—without the traditional severe criticisms, labelling, public censure, without moral and ideological intolerance.

Without understating the danger of conservatism, it is also important to realise the danger of leftist excesses and to forestall, just as patiently, attempts to solve all life's problems in one fell swoop. And we are encountering such tendencies, too.

It is high time to understand that complicated questions do not have simple answers.

The social reorientation of economic development in the 13th five-year plan period, the authors of the proposals say, should be accompanied by a re-examination of numerous definitions which overload our foreign policy and diplomacy with the ballast of primitively ideologised approaches.

Particularly great hopes are being pinned on galvanisation of the potential offered by science, education and culture.

The mass of proposals submitted by our colleagues patently exhibits solid conceptual and theoretical layers which touch upon issues of the new political thinking, the primacy of law, the creation of a law-governed state, human rights guarantees, and the functioning of a constitutional mechanism for nation-wide shaping of foreign policy.

We have been particularly intrigued by the comment to the effect that the innovative concept of socialism set forth in the report at the conference imposes limits on monopoly. The very monopoly that implants monolithic approaches dogmatism and a dangerous feeling of one's infallibility.

How can it be countered?

Here, too, almost everyone names democratisation, *glasnost* and the repudiation of inordinate secrecy as the most effective means.

Virtually no staff member of any division submitted proposals aimed at shrouding our work from public control. Quite the contrary, everyone declared for maximum openness in our foreign policy and in the workings of the ministry.

The point is clearly being made that democratisation in the country is a prerequisite for greater democracy in international relations.

For us this is above all democratisation of decision-making in foreign policy. Comrades propose introducing into the practice of the USSR Supreme Soviet open hearings on particular international problems and replies by the Minister and other Ministry officials to unofficial requests by deputies, and submitting for nation-wide judgement fundamental foreign-policy decisions through referendums and public opinion polls.

As far as intra ministry work per se is concerned, here democratisation is viewed above all as ensuring a pluralism of opinions at all levels, a repudiation of excessive absolutisation of "official" views, and wider involvement of operational personnel in discussions which should definitely precede the elaboration of decisions.

All this directly accords with the letter and spirit of the decisions of the 19th Party Conference and the requirements, formulated in the report by Mikhail Gorbachev, to the effect that Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy should absorb the collective thought of the Party and people and subject the objective processes in the world and our possibilities to discussion by the scientific community and by the public at large.

The conclusion drawn at the 19th All-Union Party Conference on heightening the role of political means of ensuring security has serious, two-fold consequences for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

First of all, a far greater responsibility is being imposed upon us for the assessments of the international situation we elaborate and for their promptness and veracity. Practical implementation of this tenet will require that our collective emerge to a qualitatively new level of scientific research and analytical work. In addition, there is a mounting need for a more precise, well-coordinated mechanism for elaborating realistic comprehensive assessments of the threats to our national security, a mechanism rid of external pressure from any quarter.

If this tenet is to be realised, both these tasks have to be tackled purposefully and in a planned manner.

Secondly, if priority of political means is to be ensured in actuality, it is imperative to analyse anew the role and place of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs within the structure of executive power by ensuring its greater activism, responsibility and effectiveness in shaping Soviet foreign policy in all areas.

Like domestic policy, foreign policy is elaborated by the highest party and state elective bodies. Its conduct falls within the realm of the appropriate foreign-policy institutions, which utilise specific professional instruments for the purpose. Collegiality, coordination and creative principles of cooperation are particularly imperative here. This is one facet of the matter. The other is that all these requirements presuppose a clear-cut demarcation of functions. It is incorrect to think that this guideline of the 19th Conference applies solely to cooperation among party, government and economic bodies and to legislative, executive and judicial power. It is directly geared as well to foreign policy, where a strict demarcation of rights, obligations and functions is also a prerequisite for greater effectiveness and efficiency.

People are thinking with the state's interests in mind, with a high measure of civic and political maturity. Today it can definitely be stated that the first three years of *perestroika* have not been in vain. And for us at the Ministry it has been a time of rapid strides, in a common course with the foreign-policy activity of the party and state, the main result of which is that the threat of war as been forestalled.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL MECHANISM OF ADOPTING FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND GUARANTEEING THEIR CORRECTNESS

Comrades,

Our talk is meant for many institutions.

Of course, our Ministry, our diplomatic community, is one of them. At such an important stage as the present one is, it would not be superfluous to take a look at ourselves from all angles.

Today, when diplomacy is dealing with a substantially greater volume of tasks, when it is reassessing a great deal, it is obliged to explore and establish the closest possible ties with science.

The point at issue in effect is a merging of science and diplomacy

This conference is geared directly to the scientific community, and it is not for the sake of eloquence that it is called a scientific and practical conference.

The participation of prominent scientists in our conference will make for mutually beneficial dialogue which, we hope, will impart an impetus to new and promising ideas capable of stimulating diplomatic practice and scientific research and an interweaving of the two.

Lastly, our proceedings are meant in fact, primarily, for the Soviet public, for absolutely all Soviet people.

The nation-wide interest in our work has been enormous, Comrades. The public is becoming more exacting with regards to it. Nation-wide participation in foreign-policy making is an urgent need.

The personality cult, subjectivism and voluntarism, phenomena of stagnation, lack of *glasnost*, distortion of socialist ideals and principles, a shortfall of political culture, and vestiges of the elitist mentality spawned a "buffer of silence" around Soviet diplomatic institutions. The caste introversion of some of their employees, mendacious guardianship and excessive secrecy, the complete lack of information about their inner workings, and the artificially implanted premise of infallibility went far in the years of stagnation to alienate the people from foreign policy and foreign policy from the people.

Soviet diplomacy, the main purpose of which is the well-being of the nation, is duty-bound to explain itself to the people. It is obliged to plan its work in accordance with the nation's expectations, hopes and aspira-

tions. It must be responsible to it for its actions and moves. In the law-governed state which we are building this is a mandatory norm for us.

The first question we are addressing to the three audiences, namely, the essence of Soviet, socialist diplomacy, has not been posed rhetorically and for the uninitiated. Practice is in dire need of an answer to it precisely in today's reforms in political, state and social structures. The question and answer, for that matter, have directly to do with the economy—its present and how we would like to see it in future.

Naturally, we will have to touch upon the past, as charting a course for the future begins with a deep-going analysis of the path that has been traversed.

Let us take as the epigraph to this part of our talk a quote from Mikhail Gorbachev's report at the Party Conference about the enormous merits of Soviet foreign policy before the country, socialism and mankind.

For a number of respectable reasons, such as the preparations for the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the intensive cycle of talks last autumn and this past winter, we did not have a jubilee meeting to mark the 70th anniversary of the Soviet diplomatic service. However, we celebrated its jubilee in a big way—with a number of impressive achievements.

All of these achievements were conditioned by history and prepared through the efforts and talent of generations of Soviet diplomats. Some of our veterans are here, and many are with us in spirit. I would like on our common behalf to express my heartfelt gratitude to them. A debt of grateful memory impels us to make mention of those who are no longer with us. In the vestibule of the Ministry there is a memorial plaque with the names of diplomats who fell during the Great Patriotic War. Comrades have proposed—and we support this proposal—to perpetuate the memory of the diplomats who perished during the years of the Stalin repression.

Out of respect to the sacred memory of the fallen we are duty-bound to speak about the mistakes of the past which were also named at the 19th Party Conference. We are obliged to do this for the sake of the present and the future.

This will largely be a painful but, we would like to believe, healing process.

Before we begin I think we should agree on things of exceptional importance methodologically.

History is sculptural. A single-dimensional perception of it, the so-called fresco vision of the past, is fraught with mistakes that are extremely dangerous in our day. Let us take historical events in all their diversity, with all their shades, with their positive and negative sides.

We will be merciless in pronouncing a verdict against crimes, repressions and abuses of power. There can be no justification for this. Yet there were also decisions that were not associated with abuses. In these instances it is necessary to display a readiness to understand the considerations that prompted our predecessors to take a particular foreign-policy decision.

When evaluating the lessons of the past, we are duty-bound to take account of the nature and system of power that predominated at the moment the decisions were taken, and specific historical circumstances.

For example, after the Great October Socialist Revolution there were situations in which the question arose of whether or not to furnish military assistance to the revolutionary proletariat of a number of countries. Some were in favour, pointing to the ideas of world revolution and proletarian solidarity; others were against, weighing the country's actual possibilities against the highly complicated international situation and the specifics of the moment.

Were these political mistakes or excesses of mood? How are we, in retrospect, to judge this?

We are not the last generation in history, and we ought to be mindful of the fact that others will come after us and will also judge our endeavours, the objectivity of our assessments, and our miscalculations.

Integrational processes are developing rapidly in Western Europe. From the standpoint of our national interests we are not at all indifferent to what they lead to and the reality we will have to face. The dire need for prognostication is more than obvious. However, to this day no one in a single subdivision of the Ministry is engaged in this problem in earnest. Some things have been done, of course, but there has been no detailed analysis.

What is this, if not a miscalculation, the consequences of which can be formidable for us?

The Iran-Iraq War is another example. It is in its eighth year, and all this while we have been exploring ways and means of ending it. Possible scenarios were worked out, but none predicted the massed American presence in the Persian Gulf.

A miscalculation? Definitely. Can it have consequences? Yes, it can. We will be judged sternly for them, and our sternness with regard to the past will not be taken into consideration. Without a clear-cut analysis condemnation of the past turns into empty words. If the verdict of the present against the past is to be fair as well as severe, it must also be kept in mind that in foreign policy almost nothing can be achieved by unilateral actions.

It will be recalled that the diplomatic openness proclaimed in 1917 failed to garner support from without.

It will be recalled that the proposal of the Soviet government to the ambassadors of the Entente countries, the USA and several other states on November 21, 1917 to immediately conclude a truce and begin peace negotiations went unanswered.

Our universal disarmament system which was advanced at the Genoa Conference of 1922 did not evoke a response either. Nor did the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks conducted from April to August 1939 on conclusion of a mutual-assistance pact for the purpose of bridling fascist aggression yield any results.

If the Soviet Republic wanted to deal with other countries, hold talks and conclude treaties, it was forced to do this in forms acceptable to them.

Reverting to the past is imperative for us in order to derive lessons which can shield us from mistakes today and in future.

Reverting to the past is necessary if we are to understand the complicated legacy we have received and what we should augment and what we should scuttle.

In our analysis of the past we intend to proceed from the belief that the principled line of Soviet diplomacy on the whole followed the general direction that is dictated by the very nature of socialism and its orientation to peace.

There are a good many issues about which we can definitely say right now: "Yes, the decisions taken on them were erroneous." But there are also such matters as "blank spaces", which we can remove in no way other than on a bilateral basis.

While declaring a pluralism of views and supporting it in every possible way, we do not have the right to ignore the nature of the historical process, in the formation of which a multitude of forces is taking part, and among them ours is not always the decisive one.

In our efforts to get at the root of the tension that emerged in the world before and after the Second World War, it would be totally incor-

rect to overlook the fact that for all the growth of the share of the Soviet Union on the international scene, the determining factor in world affairs was the behaviour of the imperialist powers and the anti-Soviet orientation of their activities and their hostility and ambitions to suppress Soviet power.

The scenario of the early development of atomic weapons pursued precisely this aim. The nuclear epilogue of the most destructive war became the prologue to a policy of nuclear blackmail, brinkmanship and brazen anticommunism.

Humanity pronounced a stern verdict against the American bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But it still has to ascertain in full how crudely these two explosions distorted its identity and life, how they changed its path to the future by sharply turning postwar development towards the nuclear arms race and towards an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty.

We do not have the right to forget about this when appraising our foreign policy of those years.

Nor can we dismiss the authoritarian practice of absolute personal power, a practice which ran counter to socialist ideals and was alien to them, and the primacy of scholastic schemes of the ideocracy, which did much to harm our own national interests.

The issue of diplomacy and its goals, functions and responsibility should be considered in the specific historical context. No matter how rule-book-pat this issue may seem, another reason why it would not be superfluous to consider it is that entire periods in history have deposited in our consciousness distorted notions about the profession which were conditioned by confrontational approaches and by administrative injunctions and a dogmatically ideologised manner of acting.

Lenin's Decree on Peace, repudiation of secret treaties, and the appeal for openness were the centrepieces of Soviet foreign policy. They thereby promoted directly the affirmation of progressive universal notions of diplomacy.

Notions of the tasks facing it, namely, to ensure the normal functioning of the state in the international arena as a sovereign, independent and territorially integral formation in conditions that were optimal for its political, economic and social development. Notions of the overriding goal of establishing and improving the state's relations with the rest of the world, with all its neighbours.

From the very outset Soviet diplomacy was guided by the truth that the state does not exist outside the rest of the world, and if this world is hostile to it, it will cooperate with it nonetheless. This cooperation is effected through diplomats, too.

During the first months and years of Soviet power, when it was unable to maintain contacts with the outside world, our diplomacy spoke with it in the language of its decrees, publications of the secret treaties of tsarist Russia, and the "Appeal to All the Working Moslems of Russia and the East". It spoke with it in notes of protest permeated with conviction about the rightness of the cause of the revolution.

Any diplomacy, all the more so socialist diplomacy, actively projects the political and social ideals of its state and its cultural and moral values. By upholding and advancing them, diplomacy makes its contribution to the formation of international law and of the norms and rules of interstate contact and universal behaviour.

It is through diplomacy that a state establishes its place in the world community. With the aid of diplomacy a country adapts to the surrounding international environment. Conversely, one of the prime functions of diplomacy is to influence this environment and make it as comfortable

as possible for its country, though not to the detriment of anyone else, of course.

Diplomacy must know and do a great deal; there is one thing it cannot do—allow situations to arise in which the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independent existence of the state are undermined. An armed conflict, all the more so war, is a failure for diplomacy. But even in such a turn of events it is duty-bound to work to keep the damage as slight as possible, end the conflict as quickly as possible, and eliminate its negative consequences.

It was in this key that Soviet diplomacy started out. It brilliantly exhibited anti-dogmatism and a readiness to pursue a creative policy that took the realities and demands of the times into account.

The formation and consolidation of the anti-Hitler coalition, the accomplishment of the wide-scale task of postwar organisation of the world, the international conferences in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, and the founding of the United Nations were brilliant triumphs for it.

Soviet diplomacy has to its credit persistent actions thanks to which the world received extremely important agreements limiting the arms race.

In the chronicle of the Soviet diplomatic service's achievements are the Moscow Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin, and the Helsinki Final Act, which inaugurated the European process.

Let us recall the role played by Soviet diplomacy in posing the question of eliminating the colonial system and in resolving this problem.

We were not to blame that after Hiroshima and Nagasaki there was the Fulton speech initiating the Cold War.

We should ask ourselves with regard to this question, too, whether we did everything correctly at that time. On the whole, we did.

However, we would not be honest with one another if we did not say that under the circumstances not all possibilities were used in full to limit the scope and acuity of this confrontation and to prevent the appearance of the "iron curtain", which cost us dearly.

A frank analysis of the history of Soviet foreign policy will bring to light the ineluctable impact distortions in Soviet domestic affairs had on our line in the international arena of the 1930s and subsequent years. Each departure from Leninist principles in domestic policy had a serious negative influence on Soviet diplomacy. The tyranny and repressions of the 1930s undermined confidence in Soviet stands and initiatives and blackened the image of the Soviet state and our foreign policy with it.

The problem was compounded by a distortion of the principles of internationalism and relations with the communist and working-class movement and an incorrect appraisal of the role and possibilities of world progressives. The unequivocal assessment of European Social Democracy as an accomplice of fascism served to undermine the united anti-Hitler front, which had severe consequences.

The analysis of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar period that was made in the report at the 19th Party Conference is stimulating deep cognition of the factors of the negative influence on the image and actions of Soviet diplomacy. Serious damage was inflicted on it and, by implication, to the country, by administrative-command methods, disregard of special, professional knowledge, and an undemocratic secretive willful style of taking decisions affecting millions of people, the priority of military over political means of countering imperialism, and the inability to see through its manoeuvring to draw us into an arms race fraught with economic attrition for the USSR.

There gradually took place an erosion of functions uppermost for diplomacy, their forced delegation to other command spheres.

This resulted in a weakened vision of world realities and of interstate relations that were taking shape across the globe, a vision of the image of the country which was being formed by its actions internally and externally.

The consequence was the establishment of a tendency to ignore professional recommendations about the nature, orientation and structure of international ties that would accord with national security interests and the political, social, cultural and moral values of Soviet society.

The "image of the enemy" which we are expending so much effort on debunking today emerged as a counterbalance to the real image of the Soviet people, contrary to its friendliness, valour, wisdom and self-sacrifice. Belief in its creative peaceability was undermined by repressions, lavish promises to "bury you" incorrect steps regarding friends, and the preaching, during the detente period, of an erroneous, I would say anti-Leninist view of peaceful coexistence as a specific form of the class struggle.

Foreign policy was conducted in the name of the people. But was it always to the benefit of the people? The habit of "door slamming" that established itself in the 1950s echoed in the stereotype of the behaviour in the early 1980s, when the departure from the Geneva talks hastened and facilitated the formation of the second strategic front in Europe standing opposed to us.

The decision of the 19th All-Union Party Conference to establish a constitutional mechanism for discussing and adopting major foreign-policy decisions was attained through suffering by our people. It was attained after the painful experience of Afghanistan, a drop in living standards, and the damage done to the good name and organic ideals of socialism.

The conference decisions on control by elective bodies on the basis of a democratic procedure was attained through the suffering of our diplomacy as well. Implementation of this decision will fully restore its authority and its original, intrinsic functions.

This is taking place in optimal domestic and external conditions, in the atmosphere of the revitalisation following the April Plenary Meeting, and in view of the real results in revamping international relations.

This is taking place in the context of sweeping changes conditioned by the taking in Stockholm of agreed-upon confidence-building measures in the military sphere, the establishment of comprehensive control over disarmament as a norm of interstate relations, and a re-examination of traditional outlooks on the place and role of humanitarian cooperation in ensuring peace and security.

The prerequisites for cardinal political reforms have been created in conditions when the new political thinking has charted the vector of Soviet foreign policy, when realism, a balance of interests, priority of universal human values, the idea of equal security for all and dealing with all as equals, the primacy of international law and the exclusive supremacy of political means over all other vehicles for handling international affairs have become the components of foreign-policy strategy.

Dialogue, an understanding of the fact that the country's security can be guaranteed most reliably by lowering the military confrontation level, with mutual consideration of one another's interests, and a readiness for comprehensive mutual control have helped break what seemed to be a hopelessly closed circle. The share of trust, which is solidly being promoted by *glasnost* and *perestroika*, has increased manyfold in the atmosphere of peace.

Over the past three years humanity has witnessed a host of proofs of our resolve to steadily implement the programme for phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, the system of comprehensive security, freedom of choice, the idea of a common European home, ade-

quate defence and non-offensive defence, a revamping of relations in the Asia and Pacific region, settlement of regional conflicts, withdrawal of troops and bases from foreign territory, confidence-building measures, and the idea of science's direct involvement in world politics.

The 19th Party Conference itself is all but the most convincing of our arguments attesting to our aspiration to build a new edifice of peace. Proceeding from the letter and the spirit of its resolutions, we are duty-bound to work towards the creation of such a decision-making system as would best ensure our national interests and national security.

III. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Several weeks ago an event took place whose importance and scope cannot be rated too highly. The point at issue is the start of work by inspection groups to monitor compliance with the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

The visit of inspectors to installations that until recently were top secret is now taken for granted in international affairs.

This fact reflects a giant leap in human thought from traditional notions of national security to new criteria for ensuring it at the global level.

The world is learning to live according to new rules because if it follows the old rules it can find itself facing the threat of self-destruction.

These rules call for bringing national interests in line with the legitimate interests of other countries and not divorcing national security from universal security.

It turned out that our national interests will be ensured better if we open our nuclear installations to foreign controllers and if we, for our part, cross the threshold of foreign nuclear facilities ourselves.

This may seem unbelievable, but it is a fact.

In just the same way the scrapping of Soviet intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, provided the Americans do likewise simultaneously, actually strengthens our security. Sergei Akhromeyev adduced arguments on this score in his interesting article in *Pravda*.

This datum is hard for the traditional mentality to accept, for it is based on just as traditional a postulate—the more a state arms itself, the more reliably it makes itself secure against any chances.

We need the new political thinking as a philosophy and as an instrument of a secure world not only in the practice of interstate relations. The principles of the new political thinking underlie our domestic revolutionary transformations. It is in this cohesion that it brings out most vividly the direct dependence of a country's foreign policy on its domestic affairs.

What we have before us is a full gamut of vitally important categories united by the term "national interests".

Linked closely with the objective trends in the development of an integral and interdependent world, and with the material and spiritual progress of civilisation, national interests are a highly dynamic category.

The revolutionary conclusion of the 27th Party Congress on the priority of universal human values has made it possible to look at it in a new light. This concept imparts fresh content to the philosophy of peaceful coexistence as a universal principle of international relations.

The new thinking views it in the context of the realities of the nuclear age. We are well justified in refusing to regard it as a specific form of the class struggle. Coexistence, which is grounded on such basic principles as non-aggression, respect for sovereignty and national independence, non-interference in internal affairs, etc., cannot be identified with the class struggle. This does not disaffirm, of course, the laws of

the class struggle and the tenet that a country's policies are shaped by the interests of the classes that rule in it. However, these class interests can and should have universal interests as a common denominator.

Generally speaking, equating interstate relations with the class struggle is hard to combine with recognition of the real possibility and inevitability of peaceful coexistence as a supreme universal principle and mutually beneficial cooperation among states with different social systems.

The concept of freedom of choice which, as was pointed out in Mikhail Gorbachev's report at the 19th Party Conference, figures prominently in the new thinking and reflects the objectivity of historical development and the unacceptability of power politics in all its forms and manifestations as historically obsolete. Including as a tool for suppressing the aspiration of the people to freedom and independence.

The affirmation and implementation of this concept are in the highest interests of the revolutionary and national-liberation movements.

If one's own national interests are to be assessed correctly and ensured, it is imperative to comprehend trends in the overall development of humanity.

If the thesis about the growing unity of the world and about its diversity and interdependence is correct, and it certainly is correct, it follows from this that our national interests require that this process be furthered.

If the thesis that nations can realise themselves by following the historical logic of social development, and it, too, is surely correct, our interests consist in being one of the untiring forces of world and contributing to the development of the integrational principles in the spiritual and material spheres of universal existence.

If humanity is moving towards unity of diversity and to a community of equals freely choosing their own path, and it is definitely proceeding towards this, our interests consist in consolidating in every possible manner our unique socialist individuality and essence and in making them more attractive to the rest of the world.

If humanity is capable of surviving today solely in conditions of peaceful coexistence, and it is definitely incapable of ensuring itself a future in the conditions of permanent confrontation, then should we not conclude that the rivalry between the two systems can no longer be viewed as the leading tendency of the modern age?

Advancing to the forefront today is a growing trend towards interdependence of the states of the world community which, as was pointed out in the Gorbachev report at the 27th CPSU Congress, "confrontation between capitalism and socialism can proceed only and exclusively in forms of peaceful competition and peaceful contest."

The ability to augment material boons rapidly on the basis of advanced science and engineering and distribute them fairly, and to restore and defend through joint efforts the resources needed for the survival of humanity is becoming a matter of decisive importance at the present stage.

The transition to socialist forms of organisation of society does not ensure such capacities in and of itself. The socialist states will have to harness their potential for self-development in the competition and prove through their successes on the economic front and higher productivity of personal and social labour that socialism can give a person more than any other socio-political system can.

Herein lies our main national interest. It is only in such a commingling that the category of national security and all its aspects can and should be considered.

As we have been able to see over the past three years, national security has a host of components, including some that are highly unexpected at first glance.

From both the methodological and practical standpoints it is extremely important for us that in the Gorbachev report matters of defence development were considered in the context of democratisation of foreign policy and in close connection with the problem of a secure world.

As was pointed out at the Party Conference, one of the most unfavourable phenomena of the period of stagnation that had a negative effect on our international positions, was the lack of coordination which sometimes existed between the military and policy areas.

Defence is the overriding priority of a state. This is too serious for us to permit ourselves superficial judgments about what is called upon to reliably defend the people and to give solid and unerring guarantees of the protection of the peaceful labour of Soviet people. Under no circumstance will we allow military superiority over us. The conclusion drawn at the 19th Party Conference that the threat of war has been forestalled does not contradict the conclusion that the threat of war has yet to be removed. No illusions are harboured on this score.

It is all the more imperative to gain a clear understanding of what poses the greatest peril to the country. Most realistically, it can arise in the event nuclear weapons are used. The natural conclusion, therefore, is that we must see to it that these weapons do not exist altogether. This goal was formulated as a political task in the Statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee of January 15, 1986. At the 27th Party Congress it was proclaimed as the focus of Soviet foreign policy for the years to come.

Our diplomacy warmly applauded it, having accepted this action programme unconditionally. We are implementing it purposefully and according to plan, and are scoring certain achievements through joint efforts. But there is a brake mechanism at work here, too. It is created not by some opposition but by the tenacity of the old thinking, obsolete professional notions, and disregard for the fact that "the international conditions in which we have entered the new, major phase of our revolution differ substantially from what was at the previous stages". *

A short historical excursus is in order here.

The Great Patriotic War exerted a decisive influence on the formation of our notions of security. Having paid a high price for our freedom and independence, we derived lessons from the war that predetermined the main strategic, above all military, institutions of our security. We believe, however, that many of these lessons are not being reassessed clearly enough in the light of recent experience.

Many of them remain open to discussion to this day. They do not fall under the topic of our discussion yet we feel that some aspects of past experience, the most important ones should be touched upon in tandem with today's realities.

The world war showed that the stockpiles of weapons of the side subjected to attack were not of decisive importance for rebuffing the aggression. It turned out that any advantage enjoyed by the aggressor can be reduced to nought if the state possesses a developed industrial and scientific and technological base.

The experience of the war also attests to the fact that the outcome of the conflict on the technological level is determined by the state's capa-

* Mikhail Gorbachev. Speech at the February 1988 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee.

city to develop fundamentally new means of warfare, more effective weapons, communications and control systems.

The postwar experience is beginning to introduce substantial changes into the possibilities of force. Even if the force is superior, more often than not it does not give the aggressor the planned result, and in instances it becomes a sort of boomerang which strikes its own positions.

One cannot but recall here that the problem of the Iran-Iraq border was settled in its time through diplomatic channels, by political means and that a mutually acceptable compromise was found back then. The attempt to doctor up the diplomatic solution through military means ended in tragedy for both the Iranian and Iraqi peoples.

It is incorrect and even dangerous to appraise the strength or weakness of another state using the traditional indices without taking into account the staunchness and will of its people for resistance, or to assess them on the basis of superficial data.

The entire postwar period gives us a clear but still poorly analysed picture.

There have been a host of "small wars" in forty-odd years after the Second World War. However, none of them has given the side that used force any solid political or other results. Quite the contrary, all of them and each one individually only served to complicate the problems around which the conflicts had arisen, and to create new ones. Even if the map of the world has changed, it has only been in minor details. These changes have not been formalised either politically or juridically. And in all these instances the existence of nuclear weapons and even their presence in the arsenal of one of the belligerents failed to affect the situation.

It can thus be claimed that war and armed conflicts in the nuclear-space age objectively lose the functions of instruments of rational policy. It is only in very rare cases that such threats lead to some changes in the behaviour of a state to which a threat is being posed.

The general conclusion on the senselessness of the use of force in the nuclear-space age and the possibility to counter it on a more far-flung political basis is so obvious that it has made it possible to pose the question, in the broad philosophical sense, of creating a system of comprehensive security that would imply sweeping democratisation of international relations and internationalisation of many processes and would be aimed at strengthening the integrity of the world. A system in whose creation we are assigning the decisive role to the United Nations. Without getting into a detailed exposition of the principles behind this system, let me remind you that its draft was set forth in Mikhail Gorbachev's article "Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World". The guideline of the 27th Congress for creating a comprehensive system of security was buttressed not only by the breakthrough at Reykjavik but also by the very fact of the signing of the INF Treaty and the start of practical disarmament.

During the discussions held in connection with the elaboration of the various aspects of this concept, the notion of "reasonable sufficiency" and what constitutes it emerged to the forefront.

Another highly important aspect of the Party Conference in our opinion is that it declared in favour of qualitative changes in our defensive development—as regards the personnel of the armed forces as well as hardware and military science.

Ability, not numbers, reliance on quality, not solely on quantity, general development and high level of the scientific and technological infrastructure, not size of armaments and contingents—this is what guarantees the reliable defence and security of a country.

Qualitative parameters must become foremost. The technological and economic superiority of one side increases the vulnerability of the other.

"Reasonable sufficiency" and the concept of non-offensive defence are indeed based on the demands of reason and common sense concerned with the problem of ensuring reliable national security.

Aside from all else, one of the reasons for the arms race imposed on us by the West was the hope for economic attrition of socialism. This facet of the problem was in its time countered by self-assured statements that we would respond to any challenge.

The truth which Mikhail Gorbachev pointed to in his speech at the Foreign Ministry meeting in 1986, namely that the tenet, one that has established itself in the hearts and minds of some strategists, that the Soviet Union can be just as strong as any possible coalition of states opposing it is absolutely untenable. To follow this tenet means patently to act contrary to the nation's interests.

This being the case, it is imperative, by implication, to amend our approaches to the ways and means of ensuring our national security.

We have agreed that war cannot be a rational instrument of politics.

But can the arms race be such an instrument? It can, indeed. An enemy can be exhausted and bled white through an arms race, but at the cost of one's own economic and social base being undermined.

This conclusion is so obvious that if we sidestep or touch upon it only superficially we will not help strengthen our own security at all.

Here, too, at the confluence of politics and economics, there is coming to the fore the economic aspect of national security, in the light of which the question "What is security in the modern world?" is hardly scholastic.

The answer is as true as it is traditional—a country's security is above all the existence of properly trained and equipped armed forces capable of executing the mission defined by the military doctrine of the state, provided, of course, that this doctrine defines the mission of the armed forces realistically and optimally.

However, this as reality proves to us every day, is not the entire answer. For today more than ever before the capacity of the armed forces to fulfil their mission depends directly and chiefly on a strong economy and highly developed science.

Today, what is instrumental to the security of a country is not so much its stockpiles as its capacity to develop and produce new things. In other words—reserves of scientific thought, reserves of technological possibilities, reserves of production capacities, reserves of skilled manpower.

Without the mechanisms of *perestroika* being brought into play it is hard to speak of ensuring peace and the nation's security.

Having posed the question in precisely this manner, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed at the 27th Party Conference that security today should be ensured more and more by political means. In practical terms—through arms limitations and reductions, a system of reliable control and broader confidence-building measures, and also through easing and settling conflict situations and eliminating dangerous bones of contention in interstate relations.

If we are to be able to work effectively in all these areas, we should have, above all for ourselves, a correct understanding of existing realities and of the threats which became or are becoming the substantiation for particular far-reaching decisions.

The lack of exact, complete and true statistics has been preventing us from pursuing a reasonable economic policy. Nor can foreign policy be effective without complete and true information.

As far as veracity and fullness of information and honest, unbiased analysis, or lack thereof, are concerned, we have mostly ourselves to blame. However, we need assistance from our colleagues, too. The country's foreign policy is not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone. All its practical achievements of recent years are the fruit of well-coordinated actions by several foreign-policy departments functioning under the guidance of the party. If contentious issues do emerge, they are dealt with in the course of businesslike, comradely discussions, the hallmarks of which are openness, creativity and collegiality.

This cooperation is particularly important in the national security sphere.

The staff members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not claim an exclusive right to know literally everything. However, they must know literally everything that applies to their sphere of competency. Major innovations in defence development should be verified at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to determine whether they correspond juridically to existing international agreements and to stated political positions.

From the decision of the 19th Party Conference to create a constitutional mechanism there obtains the need to introduce a legislative procedure in accordance with which all departments engaged in military and military-industrial activity would be under the control of the highest nation-wide elective bodies. This applies to use of armed force outside the country's borders, defence development plans, and openness of military budgets where they are linked mainly with the problem of national security.

The respondents in the survey conducted at the Ministry called to mind the fact that any carelessness in the military sphere, which in the past was devoid of democratic control can, in the context of acute mistrust and universal suspicion, cost the country a great deal and have most severe economic side-effects.

In shaping a system of foreign-policy priorities, the Soviet leadership is making disarmament—nuclear, chemical and conventional—its cornerstone.

It should be reiterated that under no circumstances does this do away with the need to strengthen the nation's defences in every possible way. The peace of Soviet people must be protected fundamentally. The point at issue is the root principles of defence and how they should be understood in today's conditions.

In this context I would like to express several considerations in the way of formulating a question.

It is in everyone's, including our own, interests to seek to have the military activity of all countries confined to their national boundaries. This stand has been stated by us and is already being implemented. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and troops from Mongolia is the most graphic illustration.

The same idea is expressed in the proposals to dismantle military bases on the territory of other countries and also to dissolve opposing military-political alliances.

The agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and its implementation is unquestionably beneficial for the USSR, as also for Europe, the USA and all other states. We consider it a major contribution to the strengthening of security because thanks to it the American nuclear presence has been moved away from our borders. Not only has it been moved away; the possibility of deploying the two classes of missiles anywhere in the world in future has been ruled out. If it is taken into account that these missiles are of different value from the standpoint of Soviet and American security, this is indeed a considerable success.

However, while being gratified by it, we cannot but recall that the

second strategic front against us in Europe was created not without our help. Its appearance could have been averted if our own national interests had been correctly assessed at that time.

I would like to adduce another example. What were we guided by when we continued to push for quantity in chemical weapons over the past 15 years? This cost an enormous amount of money and diverted substantial production capacities, manpower and other resources.

Who calculated the price of this work?

Today, in order to destroy chemical stockpiles, we have to incur new expenses and build the appropriate facilities.

Lastly, what impression did we create of ourselves and our intentions when we continued stockpiling weapons which we ourselves characterised as the most barbaric? Considerable damage was done to the country's reputation and image.

To the retort that this was concern for the country's security, we shall reply that this was the most primitive and distorted notion of what strengthens a country and what weakens it.

Even an elementary technical level of knowledge would be sufficient for realising that chemical weapons are more dangerous for us and for European states than for the United States. Rivalry in this sphere has proved profitable for the USA, as geographical factors are not in our favour. Such examples could go on and on.

Now let us touch upon another issue, one no less important for national security, namely, the economic cost of political decisions, or, the economic profitability of foreign policy. In it each step has its own value, which either adds to or subtracts from the "budget" of the country's well-being. At times we have found ourselves on the liabilities side of the political balancesheet owing to crude and ill-considered actions.

We still have to investigate whether we did all we could to avert a confrontation with China. Another question: What has this confrontation cost the two great socialist powers economically?

It is high time to learn to take into consideration the economic variants of political models. We will deal with this problem later, but for now, let us return to disarmament.

We have seen for ourselves how important an energetic, open stand *vis-a-vis* reduction of troops and conventional arms in Europe is. It is here that the key to resolving many major security problems lies.

The proposals which the socialist countries advanced at the Political Consultative Committee Conference in Warsaw provide a sound basis and possibility for the start of a historic breakthrough in East-West relations. Today the focus is on the Vienna meeting, where a mandate for talks on disarmament and confidence-building measures in Europe is to be elaborated. We believe that this long-awaited goal is at hand.

The Soviet platform is as strong as ever. Most importantly, it is geared to eliminating the most acute concerns of the sides and at forming fundamentally different mutual relations in the sphere of European security.

It is hard to say, of course, how things will turn out. There is still no agreement in NATO on the essence of these talks. Perhaps they are taking their time on purpose. Whatever the case, it would not hurt us to ask ourselves what kept us from proposing a similar programme earlier, say, at the beginning of the 1980s? Even then it would not have run counter to our own security interests and those of our friends. Evidently, the spirit of confrontation was too strong—it kept us from taking a broad view of even our own interests.

Another important point for us: are we deriving lessons, do we realise what lost opportunities in arms limitations and reductions are costing us? What losses are sustained from fruitless talks?

It is quite probable that the West deliberately deadlocked the Vienna talks on armed forces and armaments reductions in Central Europe. But we seemed to unwittingly play up to it with our insufficiently flexible and dynamic stand at the talks.

Fourteen years of talks for nought—this is more than real opportunities bungled; it discredits the very principle of talks.

Many losses of this kind could have been averted if interpretation of national security interests had not become the exclusive province of several departments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs included, which, moreover, were shielded from criticism, as was the case in the past.

Among the components of national security the 19th Party Conference shed light on such a facet of it as relations with other countries. "In the years of *perestroika*," the report read, "we have improved or initiated relations with a large number of states, neighbouring and distant. And we have worsened relations with none."

If you will, these words are the formula for the only correct standard for diplomatic work, namely, to improve contacts, establish new ones, and not ruin existing ones.

The overriding task of diplomacy—to seek friends for the country or at least not acquire enemies—has been filled with new, rich content. The means for accomplishing this task have been broadened and improved accordingly. Most importantly, a sophisticated system of priorities has taken shape in this process, namely:

- to comprehensively develop relations above all with the socialist countries;

- to pursue a course for broader contacts with developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement;

- to conduct energetic dialogue and talks with all countries without exception on the main areas of world politics.

It is not my purpose here to provide a detailed analysis of the totality of these priorities and each one individually. I consider it necessary, however, to take a look at interstate relations from the standpoint of national interests and security.

It is in their context that today too, or rather, especially today, at the stage of *perestroika* and renewal, that the world socialist system and the socialist community are our great and invaluable heritage and at the same time a heritage of humanity as a factor of peace and progress.

To augment and perfect it and to develop allied ties means to make the world more reliable and more secure. It means to become strong and to guarantee implementation of our peace-making guidelines.

This is how we seek to work in all areas.

In the sphere of ideas, acceptance or rejection of which makes a definite difference to whether the goals of the general progress of socialism are reached.

In the economic sphere—the ensuring of scientific self-sufficiency and technological independence as prime guarantees for a future without worry over the life and destiny of socialism. The coordinated, joint advance of the socialist community countries to the forefront of scientific and technological progress, developed forms of economic integration that meet the demands of the times, enrichment of direct scientific and technological and production contacts, and bridge-building with the economic communities of the West have at long last acquired the nature of a programme.

New, coordinated approaches have also been mapped out in the sphere of the superstructure. The political, legal, cultural, ideological, and social aspects of socialism's existence, young people, trade unions and public organisations have moved into the spotlight. We do not have the right to disregard as something inessential the sentiments of spiritual

commonality, hopes and sympathies evoked by *perestroika*, democratisation and *glasnost*. The flush of enthusiasm which we observed in Warsaw recently is clearly sweeping barren soils aside, creating fertile ground for the rich sprouts of a better future. Yet even this does not do away with the obligation to take a critical look at the past.

The structure of our allied relations with the fraternal socialist countries took shape during the first postwar decade. Naturally, it mirrored the features of that period, specific notions of the nature of allied commitments and of the juridical procedures that formalised these commitments.

In the period that followed much was done to consolidate the alliance of fraternal countries on the basis of equality and respect for sovereignty and independence. The Statement of the Government of the USSR of October 30, 1956, can be singled out in this sense.

In practical terms, however, it was far from always that coordinated political principles of mutual relations were implemented. A lack of collective thinking and decision-making, formalism, window-dressing and insufficient consideration of development specifics and an inability to understand them inflicted damage to the common cause.

After the April Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee cooperation with the socialist countries took on fresh political qualities. It is characterised by great dynamism, genuine respect for the right to independence, and an atmosphere of equality and motivated attention to one another's experience.

The socialist community countries are going through a rather difficult period of search for ways to harness socialism's potential in full. A great deal of difficulties have accumulated. However, today, when new political thinking has found a support in the fraternal countries, too, the situation is changing for the better.

Today, when peaceful coexistence has been proclaimed the supreme universal principle of interstate relations, and freedom of choice the key element of the new political thinking, the need to reassess a whole series of stereotypes is becoming increasingly obvious.

In the efforts to resolve the Afghan problem answers have been received and given to many questions.

It was only after the Afghan leadership was able, in late 1985, to arrive at the final decision regarding the nature of the April Revolution as a national-democratic revolution and evaluate the prospects realistically on this basis that a political settlement became possible.

The policy of national reconciliation, whose importance extends far beyond the bounds of Afghanistan, was born.

We believe that the Afghan problem will be resolved for the benefit of the Afghan people. The withdrawal of Soviet troops is in progress. There are no Soviet troops in twenty of the country's provinces and in so important a centre as the city of Jelalabad. The government of President Najibullah is reaffirming its viability.

A ray of hope has arisen in the complicated world of regional conflicts; a sort of model for settling them has taken shape.

Of course, different conditions exist in different countries; hence ways of settling conflicts also can be different.

All the same, talks between the main sides involved in a conflict, the formation of an institution of international guarantors, national reconciliation—all this is valuable political experience.

Nor can one dismiss a purely psychological factor, namely, that the solution of one problem stimulates search in other areas. In any event, we have every right today to speak of a "wave of shifts", of a qualitatively new situation having arisen.

In Central America, a formula for resolving an involved set of problems has been found. Its practical implementation has begun. This is an extremely difficult process, but progress is being made, and this, of course, inspires hope.

In Kampuchea, a variant of a solution based on a policy of national concord is appearing. The trend there is, by and large, positive.

While realising how much we abuse the word "breakthrough", we cannot help applying it to what is presently taking place at the multilateral talks on a settlement in the south of Africa. At long last the political mechanism has been set in motion here, too, offering hopes for peace in Angola and for Namibia's independence.

Perhaps it is still too early to speak of an end to the Iran-Iraq war in the immediate future. We would like to believe, however, that Iran's consent to Security Council Resolution 598 is the start of the road to peace for this country and for Iraq. The impression is being increasingly created that a political situation is beginning to take shape in the Middle East which would lead to a turning point to a comprehensive settlement on a collective basis.

There have been changes for the better on the Cyprus issue.

It seems that conditions are maturing for more substantial dialogue on the Korean Peninsula.

Unquestionably, progress towards a lessening of tensions and settlement of regional problems will not be even and smooth, but this progress has got underway and is proceeding along a broad front. Afghanistan has triggered off a chain reaction.

Our diplomacy is duty-bound to do all in its power to promote peace processes. We will be faithful to the Leninist principle that the orientation a country opts to adhere to is its internal affair. It charts its own path, its own model of development itself. We, while remaining committed to the ideas of the national-liberation movement, do not export revolution.

There are other forms of export-import and other forms of assistance and cooperation—the only possible ones—implementing which we can in actuality support the consolidation of an independent state. It will be more correct to assess critically how effective such assistance is and the extent to which it corresponds to our possibilities, and how realistic are the commitments we have made towards other countries.

Here I want to talk about a problem which, as far as I know, is extremely rarely addressed by researchers.

The point at issue is the image of a country as an important aspect of its existence in the international community, in the modern civilised world.

I am referring to a country's reputation as a significant element of foreign policy, as a component of state interests and national security.

The image of a country in the eyes of the world is shaped definitively and above all from the overall orientation of its policies, from the values and ideals which the country upholds and implements, from the extent to which these values and ideals are in harmony with the predominating universal notions and norms and with its own conduct. When someone says that he cannot forego his or her principles, he or she must realise that principles must materialise in the everyday life of society, the well-being of citizens, their standard of living, and observance of their civil rights.

We should not pretend, Comrades, that norms and notions of what is proper, of what is called civilised conduct in the world community do not concern us. If you want to be accepted in it you must observe them.

We have to face up to the issue of politics and morality, of morality in politics, of bringing the ideals of society in line with its practice.

One cannot help but recall here that at the dawn of Soviet power our diplomacy won the highest prestige not only because it flawlessly fulfilled the progressive guidelines of its state—behind it stood their country, which was truthful and right in the eyes of the world. A country which practised what it preached.

Let us recall the meanders of world public opinion about our country. The October Revolution. "Hands off Soviet Russia!" The workers of the world were uniting to support the world's first worker and peasant state. The world's progressive intelligentsia viewed our revolution as a ray of hope and the dawn of a new age.

The 1930s. Mass repressions undermined the faith of many in the justice and veracity of socialism.

The Second World War and the victory over fascism. The gratitude, admiration, love and respect for the country that stood firm in the unparalleled war and saved the world from unexampled danger peaked again.

Then came the tragic developments in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

There were other events, too. They wound up doing enormous damage to us, to the good name of our country.

Today we are shaping a foreign policy that will forever rule out the very possibility of our conduct being incongruous with our ideals.

Today our country is appearing before the world in a completely new light. Humanity is viewing its image differently. We have a host of problems; we have inherited a difficult legacy and it will not be soon before we deal with it, but it is truly impressive how quickly our country's good name is restored.

Also impressive and gratifying is the enormous "advance" of trust and support which world public opinion is prepared to give—and is giving—to our *perestroika*. There is no prophet in his own land, however.

Sometimes one hears the view that we pay too much attention to what the outside world will say about us. In this connection I would like to stress the following. In separating wheat from chaff we cannot exhibit indifference to what others are saying and thinking about us. For our self-respect, our well-being, our position in the world hinge largely on the attitude of others towards us as well.

However, there is more to it than this. You can't live a full life if you don't consider it correct and righteous yourself. If you don't respect yourself you won't achieve much in the economy or the cultural sphere. The image of a country is its economic example through which it can and should influence world affairs. The image of a state is its attitude to its own citizens, respect for their rights and freedoms and recognition of the sovereignty of the individual.

The 19th Party Conference made this problem, too, a priority, a prerequisite for the success of the restructuring drive.

We are revamping our approach to human rights not because someone is pressuring us or speculating on this theme but because this approach is in tune with the ideals and principles of socialist society.

The resolutions of the 19th Party Conference predetermined extensive work in reorganising juridical structures and creating a mechanism of legal guarantees where everything is decided by the law and only the law, not by someone's will, even in the higher echelons of power.

This applies above all to the formation of constitutional mechanisms, to reforms in criminal law, the preparation of legislative acts on the press and information, freedom of conscience, entry into the country, foreign travel, and many other endeavours that have been begun or mapped out. Considerable work has to be done to establish solidly the principles of presumption of innocence, competitiveness of the judicial process, and full guarantee of the right to legal council.

We have no intention of teaching lawyers. We touch upon the sphere of jurisprudence only to the extent that is necessary to protect the interests of our country in the international arena. To do so we also need faultless positions regarding law-enforcement agencies and their adherence to laws which should not run counter to our political statements.

Aside from practice the point at issue is a theoretical elaboration of highly subtle issues which to this day have been tackled in too general a way, without nuances being taken into account, which often developed into very acute problems.

It is extremely hard to combine public and civic activism with the traditional function of defence of the state's interests. Now riding the wave of openness and democratisation are what I would call ferments whose nature is alien to socialism and which are harmful to openness and democratisation.

We have to find such facets as would enable the citizen—the holder of social, economic and legal rights—to make unhampered use of them and to be reliably defended against any arbitrary act.

And, on the other hand, we have to outlaw any anticonstitutional encroachments.

We have become convinced that it is erroneous to pin labels on something in advance, *a priori*. The reverse projection of the "image of the enemy" on their own screens is unacceptable to Marxists, whose method is oriented at taking an objective view of things free of all sorts of delusions.

The "image of the enemy" in all its dimensions is hampering the revamping of international relations on the principles of morality and civility, the development of productive dialogue, and clear-cut consideration of interests. Having chartered a course for lessening confrontation, we are saying to the capitalist countries: "Let us be honest opponents, not enemies. If you are prepared to settle our disputes peacefully, we can be partners, too."

Herein lies strength. The strength of wisdom, the strength of far-sightedness. But in no way weakness.

IV. STRENGTHENING TIES WITH SCIENCE AND CULTURE; PUBLIC RELATIONS

History has repeatedly shown how doomed systems are that are closed to an influx of fresh ideas.

Today, when the transition from industrial-technological societies to science and information-oriented ones is becoming par for the course in the leading powers, confinement of the intellect to dogmas and bans causes a state to fall behind.

The intellect increases dramatically in value when it also becomes ferment for politics, when critical decisions cannot be taken without profound, all-round scientific study.

In all frankness, we ought to admit that several of our foreign-policy doctrines, concepts and ideas of the past, and of current times, for that matter, were inspired by purely time-serving considerations. As was pointed out at the Party Conference, topics were imposed on science which were not intrinsic to it and which it did not need. It was in effect divorced from diplomacy *per se*. At best it either coexisted with diplomacy without intersecting with, or submitted its recommendations "after the fact".

Foreign policy could reproach a number of scholars, too, with their unenlightened absolutism.

Pluralism is incompatible with monopolism in science.

The situation has been changing for the better over the past three years.

When the April Plenary Meeting and the 27th Party Congress demanded fresh approaches to practical diplomacy of us, many outstanding scholars took a decisive part in shaping new stands. And we found a host of brilliant colleagues in a wide range of areas of our work in the person of modest research associates without high-sounding titles.

We view science not only as a competent partner but as a reliable ally as well. It acquired this quality as a result of the internationalisation of scientific thought by having become an independent subject of international relations and a factor for putting an end to confrontation and the arms race. Foreign policy and diplomacy have a vested interest in revitalising the world fraternity of the men of science and in a free exchange of ideas, an exchange that removes the barriers of enmity and mistrust.

At one time politicians disregarded the warnings of Albert Einstein. Today politicians do not have the right to such deafness.

Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy are open to Soviet and world science. The point at issue is how to integrate it into our practice.

Politically, we are talking about fulfilling the guideline of the Party Conference concerning direct involvement of science in politics.

Professionally, we are talking about a system, forms of cooperation, and determining areas of mutual interest. The problem of strengthening the scientific foundation of foreign policy can be solved on the basis of mutually beneficial, permanent and planned contacts. And, in the broader picture, we are referring to the sphere of fundamental theoretical investigations in key areas of foreign policy and to preliminary expert studies for major diplomatic actions.

Science has its proposals on this score. We do, too. Of course, they should not be regarded as being canonical or definitive—foreign policy is dynamic, and this is what a scientific proposal should be. But a clear-cut plan is needed here as well.

Now a few words about a system. A year ago we established a Scientific Coordinating Centre designed to maintain constant ties with scientific centres in this country and abroad. The idea is being advanced of a special subdivision for scientific and technological cooperation which could engage in the whole gamut of global problems, which are exerting an increasing influence on foreign policy and diplomacy. Examples are ecology, alternative sources of energy, and outer space, which have already become subjects of diplomatic talks and interstate relations. The sad experience of the years of stagnation, when we stood idle during the technological boom that drastically changed the alignment of forces in the world arena, is impelling diplomacy to keep a keener eye on the present and the future.

The idea of maintaining ties with science on a contractual basis—a business and creative partnership with clearly defined rights and obligations of the sides—seems promising. Partnership agreements could include material and financial commitments and arrangement of business trips and exchanges with the Ministry's assistance and at its expense. This should be given thorough consideration.

Incidentally, excessive regimentation and bureaucracy in arranging business trips have been peculiar to foreign ties in the Soviet scientific community.

It is our belief that scientific institutions should have greater freedom of contacts.

It is expedient to return to the practice whereby the most talented Soviet scientists worked for long periods in the leading foreign research

schools. And foreign scientists should be given an opportunity to work here.

The experience of our cooperation with the World Laboratory, in the organisation of which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the USSR Academy of Sciences rendered considerable assistance is interesting in this respect.

The survey conducted before our meeting revealed the following picture of the needs of diplomacy which is far from exhaustive, of course.

In the history and theory of foreign policy: a scientific analysis of past experience and a study of "blank" and "obscure" areas. To begin with, we could compile a list of them and designate the range of issues around which debates are raging to this day.

We could open the archives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and give scholars access to them by obtaining the requisite resources, providing the material base and carrying out the preliminary technical work.

In the sphere of international law: development of an integral concept of the primacy of international rule of law and strengthening of world law and order, and greater effectiveness of mechanisms of control over compliance with international agreements. The question of correlations between international and domestic legislation is becoming acute.

There is a multitude of problems of mutual interest in the disarmament sphere and in other areas.

The list could go on and on. Aside from it there is a host of problems that are important to us, such as the economic aspect of foreign policy and diplomacy.

We are interested in a forecast of the demographic situation for the turn of the century and its possible influence on the geopolitical situation.

Over the years Soviet diplomacy has amassed enormous experience and developed a specific, diplomatic, technique and an original negotiating mechanism. The art of diplomacy continues to be perfected and studied. Our experience is being examined and enriched by foreign centres. It is high time for us, and above all the Diplomatic Academy and the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations, to tackle this problem.

The above considerations about science fully apply to culture as well.

We have to consult experts about how to apply the potential of culture in diplomatic practice. A great deal is being talked about culture today, but mostly in a narrow sense, namely, exchanges, tours by performers, exhibitions, all sorts of cultural events. While these are necessary in and of themselves, it is only in the context of the country's top priorities that they can fulfil their basic mission.

Culture is an energetic and skilful ambassador of peace.

A healthy national culture gravitates towards overcoming national borders, for, if it closes itself off in them it cannot tell the world about itself, its wealth, its sources and bearers. It must go into the world in order to work for its unity and bring to its country the riches it has acquired.

We have already said, and would now like to repeat, that humanity is entering a period in its development when the advantage will ultimately be on the side of the society which possesses the greatest intellectual and creative resources and which is capable of generating the leading ideas of the day.

The times demand that the task obtaining from this be formulated in the imperative mood—socialism must be ensured global leadership in the intellectual and cultural sphere; our society must become a world leader in innovative ideas in the main intellectual fields.

In past decades command methods inflicted considerable damage on culture. Primitive, vulgar "theories" of the so-called rivalry of cultures

also did much harm. There is cultural expansion on the part of some countries, but there is eternal cultural heritage. Why should it be subdivided into "national" and "foreign"?

The phenomenon of *perestroika* has evoked an unprecedented intellectual upheaval in the country, with culture being a major part of the efforts to upgrade socialist society.

The role of the Soviet intelligentsia is more important here than anywhere else.

Take humanitarian issues, for example. The sphere of human rights is close to the intelligentsia in spirit and character. "Protecting the conscience and the soul" is the prime endeavour of each genuine writer and artist. Thanks to the intelligentsia we dispose of an enormous potential for working in the humanitarian sphere on the global and national levels.

Cultural ties are called upon to mirror precisely the transformations taking place in the country.

We have plenty to tell the world about ourselves, about renewal in our society, about the extremely rich cultural and spiritual life of the constituent republics and of all the nationalities and ethnic groups inhabiting the country.

A well-considered cultural policy in the sphere of foreign relations is obliged to utilise to the maximum what is built into the very nature of the Soviet intelligentsia. International contact is a natural need. Ideas are born—or die—in free intercourse. At one time, when we restricted it, we programmed a certain lag. Intellectuals can be provided with greater access to the foreign public by creating a reliable system of unofficial international contacts among cultural figures.

With this in view we should take a new look at the structure of our relations with international and national non-governmental organisations.

The record has shed fresh light on the possibilities of people's diplomacy. At the third special session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament we could see for ourselves how great its opportunities are for shaping innovative approaches to the problems of peace and how strong its influence on politicians is.

Lastly, a few words about our own public relations and about studying, registering and shaping public opinion. A special centre has been set up at the Ministry on the basis of our higher school. The Institute of Sociological Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences is helping us form this service. It has already carried out a number of interesting investigations, the findings of which are taken into consideration in our work. In the broader context, we are talking about the creation of a mechanism that would make it possible to correlate public opinion with planned foreign-policy actions, and to shape public opinion.

The proposal to keep the public regularly informed of discussions on foreign policy issues and to hold open socio-political hearings at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deserves attention. There is an idea to form a public diplomacy club and other very interesting ideas.

Attending this conference are prominent Soviet journalists specialising in international affairs and major political observers. This is our first, and I hope not the last, meeting in such a format.

It is my conviction that every diplomat should be a publicist and every publicist a diplomat—in terms of knowledge in our field, of course. This is an ideal that has been personified by many of the people in attendance here.

The union of diplomacy and journalism is all but the lengthiest in the system of foreign-policy institutions. It is unique in terms of the means and possibilities it has for influencing public opinion, and it is indispensable and perhaps the most effective.

It is a union whose members have to elaborate an up-to-date model of cooperation which fully accords with the principles of *glasnost* and democratisation, and a pluralism of opinions and independence of judgments.

The rights and obligations of the sides here are absolutely equal and their interests the same.

We are aware of the nature and content of debates among experts in world affairs about how international journalism should take the place that befits it. We also know the reasons why it is still unable to stand on a par with domestic journalism, even though it disposes of brilliant creative resources. Many of these reasons have for too long not depended on its civic and professional orientation. Many to this day objectively preserve their constraining influence.

We criticise international-affairs commentators and they criticise us. And thank God there is criticism. This means that something is indeed changing. Just imagine someone just ten years ago trying in an editorial column of a newspaper to complain of excessive secrecy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs!

We are prepared to throw the Ministry doors wide open. You will be able to see this for yourselves when you come to our sections and departments and meet the people working there. They also need business contact with the leading international affairs observers and their knowledge, experience and advice. The task being posed is as follows—in planning a particular foreign-policy action, to take into account the opinion not only of scholars but of the top Soviet experts on world affairs. We have to think about how to inject pluralism of views and assessments into Soviet international journalism, too, and how to verify our course and line with them. This problem is by no means a simple one, but let us think how we can tackle it.

I am convinced that our profession is just as heroic as those to which film-makers devote such fervid attention. However, to realise that you don't need a thriller with a charming star playing a diplomat. Suffice it to visit the Soviet Embassy, say, in Lebanon, where people work amidst exploding shells, or the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York—operating in the hub of world politics, let alone Kabul where Soviet diplomats' life and work require courage and endurance.

V. THE USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND PERESTROIKA: RESULTS, PROBLEMS, TASKS

I will now dwell on some areas of reorganisation within the Foreign Ministry. I will try to illustrate this with findings from the aforementioned survey.

Our *perestroika* is a constant process; it is not limited in time. Its goal, as was pointed out at the January 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, is to make diplomacy more effective and to help bring it more fully in line with the energetic activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state on the international scene.

To accomplish this task we are upgrading the structure of the central apparatus and the foreign institutions of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, revamping and improving personnel, and raising the professional standards of Soviet diplomats.

What results have been registered?

In the broadest sense, the current structure of the Ministry and its new functional and territorial-branch subdivisions are being increasingly geared to the uppermost priorities of foreign-policy strategy. Independent structural units have been established in a number of areas, such as

disarmament, humanitarian issues, the non-alignment movement and information. The Evaluation and Planning Department has been reorganised; it is being consolidated markedly and its staff members are acquiring a taste for working on large topics and original ideas.

The "blank areas" are being removed from the geopolitical map of Soviet diplomacy. The concentration of our attention on key issues for us has been underscored by the very expansion of levels. To this end we have set up, for example, departments for the socialist countries of Europe, for Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific and Southeast Asia, Southern Asia and other regions, the Soviet Embassies Directorate, and the Non-Alignment Movement Department. Major tasks have been set to the reorganised Department of International Law.

Most of the people interviewed believe that the structural changes have exerted a positive influence on the overhaul of foreign policy. At the same time a rather large part (approximately 30 per cent— and this is a subject for serious consideration) do not see the result of the positive influence on it.

Results for us are the most important thing. The emphasis that has been placed on effectiveness of work is justifying itself.

As we have already seen, the conclusion of an agreement or the solving of a problem is not always the natural result of even well arranged talks or discussions. It is imperative to involve reserves of personal and group diplomacy.

Let us recall how the Geneva talks on nuclear and space-based arms dragged on. Who, say in July 1986, could have predicted the way they later developed? After the Reykjavik summit that autumn realistic chances still had to be made use of.

In an analysis of the succeeding twelve months the following main elements clearly came to the fore:

- a clear-cut vision of the goal of the talks and a determining of an acceptable price for its achievement with due account for national security considerations;

- an understanding of the reasons behind the actions of the other side; dynamic development of our own stands and the creation of a psychological atmosphere of expectation of success;

- firmness in important aspects of the accord.

No less instructive is the experience of reaching agreements on Afghan settlement, in which a wealth of highly complex and contradictory factors had to be taken into account.

In both instances—the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and the Afghan settlement—the role played by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was the decisive one behind the success that was achieved.

We need to summarise this invaluable experience and integrate it in practice and science.

The attainment of a high end result is also served by the establishment of progressive work criteria and an ability to conduct a dialogue with partners and rivals without limitations and bans on topics and problems.

Most of those who were interviewed stated that they received an opportunity to make a specific contribution to the reform in foreign policy within the framework of their divisions. To the question of whether the prerequisites for this have been provided, most answered in the affirmative. We are concerned, however, that almost a quarter of the respondents—23 per cent—believe that conditions for displaying personal initiative have yet to be created.

I think that we have succeeded in restoring a correct understanding of the Party spirit of the diplomat, an understanding which presupposes,

in addition to an active civic stand and high general and special culture, resistance to attempts at interfering in matters that fall under the jurisdiction of the diplomatic service.

Incidentally, I want to make particular mention of the fact that the Party organisation of the Ministry is becoming more and more involved in the reorganisation effort within the Ministry. Party members have become more active, which is evidenced by the findings of the survey as well.

Experience has been accumulated in democratic discussion and collective decision-making. Eighty-three per cent of the respondents say that today, in the atmosphere of *perestroika*, they can evaluate the state of affairs critically without hindrance.

By and large, the reorganisation has justified itself. Say, without the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Department we hardly would have coped with the volume of work that was required of us in this foremost sphere. What is more, this division now has to handle a considerable amount of additional work, namely, coordinating control and inspection. Here other departments and ourselves will have to function in a completely new mode. Today everyone has to get accustomed to the everyday reality of large-scale checks.

The departments for humanitarian and cultural ties and international economic relations have found themselves in the new structure. The latter has been formalised in an organisational and methodological centre for a qualitatively new arrangement of the economics service.

I would like to dwell on this point.

The economic aspect of international relations is being spotlighted today. Here some of our approaches have to be re-evaluated.

The short-sightedness of past decisions is obvious. One example is our country's non-involvement in international economic organisations. Today we are suffering considerable losses because of it.

We have to enter the mainstream of the world economy; however, this is not all that easy to do now. A great deal has to be changed within the country. But first we must know specifically what we stand to gain and what we stand to lose. Precise calculations are needed. A policy based on these calculations will be functioning more purposefully.

Some things have already been done. We have changed our attitude to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and have established relations with this organisation and with the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements. An extremely important agreement on the establishment of official relations between CMEA and the EEC was signed recently. This is in effect a step towards overcoming the economic split in Europe. A breakthrough has been made, but we must act expertly, with greater persistence and initiative.

Economic units have been set up in the departments and sections of the Ministry. They are far from perfect, but their value is unquestionable. Today territorial subdivisions are reacting with greater precision and skill to requests by embassies regarding economic issues, and they are getting their bearings better in the activity of regional and bloc economic amalgamations.

The formation of the structure of the central apparatus and foreign institutions has not been finished.

It appears necessary, specifically, to conclude the concentration of disarmament problems within the framework of the Disarmament Department by transferring to it the entire gamut of problems pertaining to chemical weapons, nuclear tests and so on.

As has already been pointed out, there is now a need to unite in one division the elaboration of perspective problems of scientific and techno-

logical development and all matters of international scientific and technological cooperation.

Evidently, the structure of the humanitarian department will have to be amended somewhat with due account for the experience that has been amassed. Here progress is being made in human rights, but problems of cultural cooperation have remained on the periphery. In connection with this it is being proposed to allocate a major special division for it. It is with good reason that the issue of allotting an independent structural unit for the USSR Commission for UNESCO Affairs is being raised.

We will be broadening our territorial sections. We shall set up two large departments on the basis of three African and two Latin American ones.

We must also revert to the matter of a "typology" of the structure itself and gradually unify it.

Staff members propose filling administrative vacancies (department chiefs and heads of other divisions) on a competitive basis. Not only our staff members but also experts not employed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could apply.

Let us consider that today we have announced a "contest" for the posts of chief of the following departments: for scientific and technological cooperation; for work with Soviet embassies; for African countries; for Latin American countries; and the Cultural Department.

Establishing close contacts with the foreign ministries of the Soviet republics, we continue to set the goal of drawing on their rich possibilities to increase the share of the republics' involvement in the foreign-policy process, in international economic, scientific and cultural cooperation.

Now a few words about the Ministry's foreign institutions.

A great deal was said about the effectiveness of their performance both at the May 1986 Conference and at the full-scale session of the Collegium and Party committee in 1987. A great many issues were brought up, as you well remember.

The quality of diplomatic information was one of them.

The quality of the information which we are receiving today has improved. In most instances it is more objective and, I would say, more truthful.

The accent on a search for points of contact with foreign partners is a new element in it.

All the same, for all the growing abundance of information the problem of quality is still acute. Preoccupation with quantity is tenacious not in the economy alone.

There is still a drastic shortfall of analyses of tendencies and deep-going political, economic, social and cultural processes, demography, education, science and technology, and social consciousness. With rare exceptions embassies do not know, and do not have access to, the major scientific centres and higher educational establishments of the host countries, nor are some of our staff members duly concerned with matters of sociology and forecasting.

Feedback from foreign institutions has improved of late. Ministry officials are visiting the areas of their jurisdiction more frequently. The Collegium of the Ministry is closely monitoring the performance of the foreign institutions and studying and generalising their experience. This is helping them to find new interesting approaches to information and propaganda work abroad, to reorganising the embassy structure, and to improving the performance of the councils under the ambassador—on the example of the embassy in Poland, etc.

New officials are being appointed to most Soviet embassies and consulates. I foresee that the political reforms will introduce into the practice

of the highest Soviet elective bodies regular reports to people's deputies by ambassadors and public defence of the policies they pursue. Evidently, appointments will become competitive.

The draft Provisions on the Diplomatic Service has been prepared.

This document will be widely discussed among our staff. However, even now I consider it necessary to dwell on two points. The first concerns young people, the second our senior employees. The fact that the average age of our attaches is over 30 is abnormal. Intelligent personnel remain "junior assistants" for too long. Advancement of truly bright and efficient people is hampered by formal, time-regulated barriers in the diplomatic service. They should not be an impediment to them. Other benchmarks are needed here. If a person has proved himself we will give him an opportunity to rise higher, bypassing one or two compulsory steps on the service ladder. People should be promoted not for length of service but for merit.

The second point is how to maintain and better utilise colleagues who are completing their diplomatic service. How can we make their departure from the service as painless as possible? When they retire they should remain with us and take part in personnel training and in research.

I think that the provisions on the diplomatic service should provide for an age ceiling at which every diplomat should tender his resignation, and the Collegium decide whether or not to accept it.

Now a few words about the Collegium. I think that today this is indeed a body of collegial, democratic discussion adopting very important decisions. In effect all major issues are handled through the Collegium. At one time we complained of the tacitness of Collegium members, department chiefs and section heads. Today they seem so eager to speak that the problem of setting time-limits for discussion has arisen.

Organisation of working groups headed by deputy ministers has become a common practice. Our operational meetings conducted by the Minister every Monday have become an indispensable element of our working procedure and the process of preparing major proposals.

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about myself. As a member of the staff, I not only have a right, I am duty-bound to say how it feels to be working in our ministry. It is difficult but nappy life and rewarding work. There are results, there are prospects, there is support from colleagues—what could one wish for other than more impressive results? However, I am plagued by a sense of dissatisfaction with myself.

What am I dissatisfied with? There are many very important problems which I want to have a thorough knowledge of myself. I want to get at the heart of them and receive first-hand information. Regrettably, I do not always succeed in this.

There are also matters in which more energy, persistence, initiative and promptness should be displayed. I feel certain shortcomings here.

Lastly, there is personnel work. Although much has changed for the better here, I am not confident that all problems have been licked. I would like to see matters decided without undue haste and be considered from all angles so as to reduce mistakes to a minimum. But this doesn't always happen.

There is also a sense of duty to the collective. I would like to have more frequent and deeper contact with people, to learn first-hand what they think about our work and their part in it. This hasn't been successful, and for me it is an indicator of certain trouble, namely, that the mechanism has yet to be fine-tuned to allow time for direct contact with people, for trips about the country and meetings with work groups, before which the Foreign Minister is duty-bound to report about his own work and that of the entire diplomatic service. And another thing—we have made many promises and assumed many commitments. We have not

followed through on all of them. We still have many debts, and it is my first and direct obligation to pay them in full.

On the palette of *perestroika*, among the colours in which the new image of socialism is being painted, yours and mine should be among the strongest, most expressive and most exact. For it is primarily through us that it can express itself to the outside world as a system to whose nature and interests the desire for peace and cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries and for the establishment of normal, civilised relations among all peoples and states is intrinsic.

We cannot rest on our laurels. We have to go further. The main question put to the country at the 19th Party Conference—How can *perestroika* be made irreversible?—is addressed to us, too. The chief conclusion drawn at the conference about the irreversibility of *perestroika* likewise applies to us.

It is our conviction that the overhaul of international relations, given a definite revamping of Soviet policy and diplomacy, is irreversible, too.

It is irreversible because it is proceeding in the mainstream of change and renewal within the country.

Because by following the course charted by the Party, it expresses the aspirations of the people.

Because it has enlisted their support, received a mandate of confidence from the Soviet and world public and formed an alliance with the finest minds in science and culture.

Because within external policy and diplomacy itself the enormous potential of intellect, talent, competency, experience, professional dignity and corporative integrity has been brought into play.

We would like to believe that our meeting today will enrich these acquisitions.

The conference went on in eight sections. Over three hundred people joined in the debate. They included the foreign ministers of Union republics, chiefs of directorates and heads of departments of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, ambassadors, scholars, journalists, public figures. On July 27 the deputy foreign ministers of the USSR leading the sections presented accounts of the debate. Below are summaries of these.

First Section. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

ANATOLI KOVALEV, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

Allow me to begin with a personal impression. Now that the conference has entered its third day, I feel that we have made some gains. What I mean is not only the stock of ideas or better realisation that *perestroika* has already registered some tangible advances at the Foreign Ministry, but the fact that we are now more critical of ourselves, of shortcomings in our work. We feel less satisfied than before, and this is something which the main report put so explicitly.

The First Section discussed Soviet foreign policy priorities. The discussion was uninhibited and punctuated with uncommon opinions and sharply critical assessments. True, it was somewhat patchy, but then this implied that there was no preset pattern.

My main impression is that the discussion went on in the spirit of a collective search for answers to both the pressing current and the long-range international questions raised at the 19th Party Conference by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and other delegates and by conference resolutions. There were diverse opinions expressed, views differing in substance or shading. The discussion centred on the intimate connection between the requirements of the country's internal development and its foreign policy tasks, primarily that of bringing out and using material potentialities for *perestroika*, of ascertaining in what sector and by what means Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy can help accomplish these tasks.

The discussion followed the lines indicated by Eduard Shevardnadze's report in terms of politics, philosophy and applied diplomacy. Occasionally it went beyond the range of subjects outlined in the report. This was only natural, since the report was formulated so as to allow scope for constructive quests and to encourage unhampered application of the intellectual potential of both the collective body and its every member.

Speakers supported the main premise of new political thinking, namely, the priority of universal values in the nuclear and space age. They stressed the need to seek complete realisation of the principle of peaceful coexistence as the highest universal principle of state-to-state relations.

Many speakers took up the rapporteur's thesis that the contest between the two systems today is not the decisive contradiction in international relations. Accordingly, they declared for reappraising our foreign policy priorities, including those written into the Constitution of the USSR.

Discussion extended to the effectiveness of new thinking today. Opinions varied from rather pessimistic to exclusively optimistic ones. However, everyone wanted our foreign policy actions to be aimed not

only at achieving positive results but at actually producing them, specifically by rousing public opinion to qualitatively much greater effort and by using people-to-people diplomacy

Attention was given to an aspect of the mechanism obstructing the shaping of our foreign policy. It was said to be the practice of inter-ministerial coordination. While conceding the necessity for such coordination, speakers suggested more coordination at the supradepartmental level with due regard to strategic priorities and scientific forecasts.

There was an interesting debate on how *the image of our country* is changing in the world under the impact of *perestroika*. A noteworthy fact cited in this connection was that Mikhail Gorbachev is popular among Americans; 80 per cent of those polled think highly of him. As regards the Soviet Union itself, the relevant indicator is a mere 20 per cent. This discrepancy makes us stop to think whether our diplomacy and our media have been doing everything possible to translate the appeal of our *perestroika* policy and the popularity of our leader into national prestige.

Speakers pointed out that we had merely "scratched the surface" of the allegations about the Soviet military threat. Belief in this "threat" had deep roots in the social consciousness of the West, and the best antidote was openness, especially in respect to our military activity, which meant that we should make our military spending public and demonstrate the defensive nature of our military effort.

In dealing with diverse aspects of the reputation of our country, speakers also broached in rather sharp terms the question of the permissibility of using armed force within alliances of states, that is, of the need to dispel the mistrust generated by the so-called doctrine of limited sovereignty.

There is a further aspect. In striving to destroy the "enemy image" current in the West, we have so far done little to destroy a similar stereotype in our own country. It was said that one thing could hardly be done without the other.

Currently *glasnost* helps *perestroika* more than many other things do, and diplomats, scholars and journalists alike were at one on this. However, it was also said outright that there were whole sets of problems which the media were still barred from making an objective analysis of. That is likely to elicit an oversensitive response from this or that friend of our country. We must admit that this is a delicate and complicated matter.

Many speakers called for a conceptual assessment and planning of all our regional, economic, environmental and humanitarian activities. There was an obvious tendency towards a conceptual and comprehensive approach and a generalisation of the experience gained to date. Hence many proposals for holding conferences on specific policy subjects and on the geographical principle, in particular conferences on European problems.

Opinions concerning priorities in the *US sector* differed on some points. One of the speakers (not the ambassador in the United States) said that a pause was likely to set in in the development of our relations with that country and that it should be used for stepping up our efforts in Western Europe. Another speaker rightly took a stand against any pause in our dealings with the Americans. The prevailing opinion was that if we are "targeted" on the United States, this is a reflection of objective reality.

There was a lively debate on the US military presence in Europe. One of the speakers confidently predicted an early US withdrawal from Europe. His opponent said that no such thing would ever happen. The

overall view was that no attempt to dissociate Western Europe from the United States could bear fruit.

The *European sector*. Practically all speakers acknowledged that lately this sector has been pushed to the sidelines by our activity towards the United States. Everyone stressed the significance and promise of the idea of a *common European home*. Many specific and useful ideas were voiced, ranging from the Arctic to Mediterranean angles. All speakers came out for more vigorous contacts at all levels, including the top level, with West European countries—large, medium-sized and small, NATO members and neutral nations alike—for more extensive ties with the military, political and economic alignments of West European countries. Confidence that Europe is at the threshold of a new stage in its history was the keynote.

The section regards a reduction in *conventional armaments* as the *No. 1 problem* in our relations with Europe.

It was said that a political gesture ought to be made and that it might be worth taking unilateral steps by cutting our armed forces in Europe. However, some speakers considered that cuts should be made on a reciprocal basis.

In this connection many pointed out that there is no way to reduce conventional armaments in conjunction with the United States alone, that is, without European participation, and that attempts to do so would merely damage our general interests on the continent.

The *Asia and Pacific region* (APR) was the object of interesting if few comments. The region was described as becoming a "new citadel of industrial and civilian society". Emphasis was put on the importance of relations with Japan.

Note was taken of the notion that our country has a chance, if only by virtue of its geostrategic situation, to become in the long run something of a *bridge* between Europe and the APR.

The First Section approached all problems from the standpoint of security and national interests, primarily those of the Soviet Union, of course. The prevailing view was that national interests are the incontestable category from which both practice and theory should proceed strictly and very realistically. It was admitted—I believe justly—that in terms of both theory and practice the theme calls for more fundamental research than has been done to date.

Many speakers, especially ambassadors, pointed very frankly or even sharply to numerous shortcomings in the *foreign economic sphere*. They think very little has so far been done. The vagueness of priorities often gave way to a spate of instructions, decisions and delegations. There had already been too much of all this. The task was to do business properly and to cooperate on a solid basis.

We heard in the section some far-reaching proposals, such as for setting up special economic zones, opening subsidiaries of transnational corporations and granting concessions.

Some speakers drew attention with justified concern to the serious proportions of the *global ecological menace*. Environmental problems are coming to form a whole front extending from the White to the Black Sea.

Leading officials of the foreign ministries of some Union Republics contributed their share to the discussion. Among other things, they accused our foreign economic agencies of rarely enlisting the participation of the Republics in joint ventures and foreign trade. They pointed out that the Foreign Ministry of the USSR did not supply Republics' ministries with adequate information on the situation in neighbouring countries or on opportunities for direct ties with them. One of the ideas voiced

was that the extent of a country's civilisation was indicated by the multinational composition of its diplomatic missions.

The records of the First Section are a component of the work of the whole conference. Other sections may have filled the gaps left by our section. Not all who wanted to speak had a chance to do so. They therefore submitted their remarks in writing. The speakers' views and proposals, many of which are marked by novelty of approach, personal commitment to *perestroika* and a critical tenor, need to be thoroughly analysed in the Ministry's echelons and our embassies and other missions abroad as well as in research institutes. This will take time—a couple of months or possibly longer.

The outcome of the discussion may be stated as follows: the foreign policy priorities of the Soviet Union are the priorities of *perestroika*.

Second Section. DEVELOPMENT OF USSR RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

IVAN ABOIMOV, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

The section discussed questions concerning the development of relations with socialist countries, one of the priority lines of Soviet foreign policy. There was an intense and useful exchange of views on the situation in the socialist world, the trends of development in socialist countries and the manner in which our relations with them are shaping up.

Central to the discussion were the *perestroika* going on in the Soviet Union and the processes of renewal in other socialist countries aimed at improving the system. All speakers agreed that this is now a key issue determining our relations with friends, creating a qualitatively new situation and offering new opportunities for more effective cooperation.

It was stressed that the serious shortcomings in foreign policy listed at the 19th Party Conference also involved our work in the socialist sector. We must learn the lessons of the past to avoid a recurrence of mistakes.

Socialism today is faced with formidable and fundamentally new problems. It is safe to say that they bear on the very destiny of socialism, on the ability of the system to meet the challenge of the times by putting its potentialities to use. All this calls for new approaches to cooperation between socialist countries and for a new conception of this priority of the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

Speakers pointed out the multiformity of the socialist world and the need to renounce dogmatic approaches to its development problems, to engage in intensive work on the theory of renewing socialism and generalise socialist practice.

Much attention was given to ways of strengthening the unity of the socialist community countries. Participants in the discussion stressed the need in the new situation to both consolidate the alliance and go further in democratising cooperation between its members, the two lines being seen as a single dialectical task.

At the same time, it is obvious that the increasing democratisation of mutual relations brings out more clearly than before the existence of certain contradictions between socialist countries because at times their national interests do not coincide on some specific issues. Speakers there-

fore emphasised the need to respect national interests, take account of the peculiarities of each country and maintain a balance of interests.

It was noted that the atmosphere and political content of relations between socialist countries have changed since the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC. The collective line in this respect was defined at the Moscow meeting of the CMEA countries' party leaders in November 1986. The new content of our mutual relations necessitated new, more dynamic and businesslike and less predetermined forms of organising them.

For all that, an analysis of the situation indicates that cooperation with our friends has not yet reached a true turning point.

There persist some elements of formalism and ostentation. It was said that work in socialist countries required great competence of Soviet diplomats and that special attention should be devoted to training personnel for the socialist sector of our diplomatic service.

Steps to improve cooperation within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation were discussed with keen interest. Attention was drawn to the substantial and favourable changes that have come about in the activity of the WTO in recent years. The alliance now has a multilateral mutual current information group and a special commission on disarmament. The spectrum of questions discussed by the alliance has widened. Changes for the better have occurred in the functioning of the WTO Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers Committees. However, the present mechanism of foreign political and military cooperation within the alliance apparently falls short of exigencies.

Some new proposals were made to improve the WTO's work. Their main purpose is to increase the political functions of the alliance and search for an optimum balance between the conceptual and practical aspects of its effort. Note was taken of the need to carefully study the proposals of the allied countries for improving the working mechanism of the WTO.

Speakers put on record a considerable increase in the socialist countries' initiatives on the international scene and their active role in the solution of many security problems at both global and regional levels. They said that this made it necessary to set up a coordinating mechanism such as would allow the socialist countries' foreign policy initiatives to be promoted more effectively and on a realistic basis, and that we should work out our foreign policy initiatives and proposals more thoroughly in collaboration with our allies.

The significance and role of Asian socialist countries in international affairs are growing. Speakers analysed the situation in Southeast Asia and the Asia and Pacific region as a whole. In the case of Soviet-Chinese relations note was made of the growing sphere of common interests from the point of view of approaches to economic development problems. It was said that more attention should be paid to China's concrete experience and achievements.

Analysis extended to the state of our relations with the DPRK, Laos, Mongolia and Vietnam. It was emphasised that Soviet-Cuban cooperation needs to be made more effective.

Altogether, the discussion showed that presently the new stage of cooperation calls for serious theoretical research and for an integral concept of developing our relations with each particular socialist country.

The "health" of the socialist countries' economies is a powerful factor for their standing in world politics, the progress of *perestroika* and the promotion of their initiatives. This subject and the state of Soviet economic relations with socialist countries were prominent in the debate.

Common concern was voiced about the slow rate of restructuring of the socialist economic integration mechanism of the CMEA countries and

about the lack of appreciable progress towards evolving new forms of cooperation and carrying out the Comprehensive Programme for Scientific and Technological Progress.

In this connection proposals were made for Soviet ministries and departments to show a keener sense of responsibility in searching for ways out of the situation. Many participants held that there should be no hesitation in amending decisions that have not proved satisfactory enough.

As the CMEA countries differ in the level of preparedness to reshape the mechanism of mutual cooperation and establish a common socialist market, most speakers declared for seeking progress on these matters together with the countries concerned. Many of them said that the success of restructuring the international mechanism was hinged to a considerable extent on improving the economic mechanism of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Participants in the discussion dealt with problems of humanitarian and cultural cooperation between socialist countries and of direct contacts between work collectives as well as ordinary people. There was some progress but it was far from sufficient. It was necessary to advance step by step towards removing barriers to communication and closer ties between fraternal peoples, extending the material basis for reciprocal visits and allowing full scope for cross-border cooperation.

A number of speakers called on the Soviet media to cover life in socialist countries without glossing over difficulties.

The discussion also produced many other ideas and proposals requiring analysis.

Third Section. THE MILITARY-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY

YULI VORONTSOV, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

The discussion held in this section centred on key problems of security and disarmament. Participants spoke of the relevance of the problems of security and disarmament raised in Eduard Shevardnadze's report and proposed steps to strengthen our position on them.

The discussion was lively, there were uncommon opinions as well as new and interesting approaches. Suffice it to say that the 41 participants who spoke dealt with nearly 150 questions relating to nuclear disarmament, military doctrines, cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments, naval armaments and regional security problems, primarily those of the Asia and Pacific region.

Much attention was paid to anti-ballistic missile defence. Spokesmen for the Foreign Ministry and research centres concerned themselves with, for instance, the trend of the relationship between offensive and defensive armaments at lowering levels of nuclear confrontation, in particular as a result of the coming 50 per cent reduction in SOWs.

Problems of strategic stability held an important place in the discussion. There was a proposal for the Soviet Union and United States to evolve a common concept of strategic stability and for a common interpretation of it by the WTO and NATO. The idea was expressed that the process of reducing strategic armaments as well as of conventional armaments and armed forces should be based on the criteria of strategic stability. Speakers stressed the need to put on a practical basis research into the impact of new weapons on strategic stability.

Proposals were made for diverse kinds of long-term nuclear disarmament strategy, with due regard to the West's continuing commitment to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. One of them favours reducing nuclear armaments to a minimum level to be agreed with the United States. Speakers concerned themselves with ways of bringing Britain, France and China into nuclear disarmament talks. A view was expressed that a major cut in Soviet and US strategic armaments and the introduction of rigid controls on their modernisation could result in European nuclear powers revising their attitude to participation in nuclear disarmament.

There was an in-depth critical analysis of the problems of military doctrines. All speakers stressed the need to make a careful study of the defensive character of the Soviet doctrine and to back relevant political statements with concrete changes in military planning, troop structure, combat training, and so on. Many expressed the view that the Soviet Union should make its military doctrine a precise expression of its military concept covering nuclear and conventional weapons as well as the whole range of problems of military buildup and rid the doctrine of its fragmentary, patchy character. It was suggested that account be taken of criticisms of the thesis about a "crushing repulse", often seen in the West as implying offensive action and admitting of the possibility of inadequate response to aggression, whereas our defence doctrine rules this out.

Particular interest was taken in the problem of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. It was noted that the course and outcome of relevant talks would strongly influence prospects for disarmament in general and for nuclear disarmament in particular. Many speakers called for a careful study of the military, political, social and economic effects of reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe on the situation in both the western and the eastern parts of the continent. It was suggested that it might be advisable to apply a multi-variant forecast of the impact of the likely effects so as to be able to choose the optimum variant.

Generally speaking, the question of working out many alternative solutions to security and disarmament problems in both the nuclear and the non-nuclear spheres received much attention. Speakers emphasised the need for long-term forecasts of the evolution of the situation, such as a situation where tactical nuclear weapons and a minimum number of SOWs are left or where no tactical nuclear weapons are left but SOWs are there, as well as for forecasts of the social and political effects of drastic cuts in conventional armaments. There were proposals for forming a standing group to be entrusted with comprehensive prognostication in the sphere of international security and disarmament under the aegis of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, for a broad discussion on military policy and doctrine and for the publication of a comprehensive work on Soviet military policy.

Some speakers called for greater participation by Soviet representatives in the work of international institutions on security and disarmament problems. It was suggested that an international research centre of this nature be set up in Moscow.

The problem of naval armaments received a good deal of attention. Speakers pointed to the adverse effect of the naval arms race on both the overall military-strategic situation in the world and regional conflicts. Most speakers considered that a more vigorous and consistent effort must be made to include these subjects in security and disarmament talks. As far as naval forces are concerned, the Soviet position on them was said to be far more preferable than the American position, both politically and in terms of publicity. There is a need for greater consistency in spelling out the actual situation in this respect, in revealing the difference

in structure between Soviet and US naval forces, the limited extent of our naval presence in areas where the United States has major naval striking forces, and so on.

Speakers emphasised the need to specify our proposals for reducing naval activity and building confidence at sea. Special attention was called to the importance of seeking not only a reduction but the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons on the seas, which would contribute to strategic stability.

There was a detailed and substantive discussion of the main security problems in the Asia and Pacific region. It was said that implementation of the initiatives taken by the Soviet Union in Vladivostok two years ago would have gone a considerable way towards strengthening peace and security in the APR but they had not been put into practice. Further research was needed to bring about a decisive change for the better in building up stability and security in the region.

Some speakers proposed disclosing data on the military power balance between the Soviet Union and the United States in the APR.

An analysis was made of the record of the struggle for disarmament with due regard to current tasks, specifically the lessons of the 1932 World Conference on Disarmament, the experience of postwar years, the talks on SALT 1 and SALT 2 and the ABM Treaty.

There was a most emphatic call for more extensive information on our armed forces. Speakers pointed out that excessive secrecy in the military sphere unwarranted by security needs did great political and moral damage to our country. They said that an end must be put at long last to an absurd situation where data on our armed forces known to the rest of the world are kept secret from Soviet people, including those specialising in military-strategic problems.

Virtually all speakers urged closer contacts and greater coordination between diverse Soviet agencies concerned with security and disarmament matters. They felt that too little has been done so far and that progress on some things is lacking while others should be radically changed. It was proposed that a nation-wide supradepartmental disarmament agency be set up to coordinate and direct the efforts of diverse entities.

Fourth Section. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY

VICTOR KOMPLEKTOV, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

The discussion ranged over a wide spectrum of problems concerning the Soviet Union's position and potential role in the world economy; problems and prospects of *perestroika* in foreign economic relations; steps towards a more effective Soviet role in international economic organisations; the world economic order: new aspects of the Soviet approach to the realities of this order and to ways and means of improving it.

Among those who gave reports and joined in the debate were leading officials of economic agencies, Soviet ambassadors, staff members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scholars and spokesmen for foreign trade organisations and joint ventures.

The discussion was characterised by a comparison of opinions and a search for new, non-traditional approaches of a conceptual and practical nature.

The focal thesis was that of increasing the role of political means of safeguarding security. In the case of the economy it is a question of pulling down the wall that for years has divided our economy from the outside world. There is also the problem of the foreign policy component of the overall effort to bring about a qualitative change in our economy and, accordingly, in our place in today's world.

It was stressed that solution of the problem of international economic security depended on political, economic and scientific factors.

The discussion, which may be said to have had three dimensions—theory, economic practice and foreign policy—brought out differing points of view and the range of *problems of principle* requiring a comprehensive solution from the standpoint of national interests.

First, all speakers considered that to promote its foreign economic relations, the Soviet Union should use the whole range of ways and means of participating in the international division of labour that world practice has shown to be right. This conclusion was drawn in discussing the course of the restructuring of the Soviet economic mechanism and in searching for ways to enhance its role in the world economy.

Second, economic levers and instruments must be inseparable if we want to solve our foreign and internal economic problems. The fundamental problems in this respect are those of revising price formation and establishing a system of wholesale trade.

Generally speaking, we have now come in practice to understand this problem. We know how we must proceed, and we see the useful effect of comparing the level of our development with that of the world economy. However, we lack a complete conception of specific variants of applying these key components of economic policy, and we do not have estimates of the short-, middle- and long-term results of their application. Incidentally, these may differ very greatly in regard to both the domestic economy and foreign economic relations. This theme has so far been left out of substantive theoretical and practical analysis.

Third, we need to see clear in the whole set of economic management levers such as would effectively guarantee the interests of the state and of society as a whole in the context of maximum economic autonomy for enterprises. In other words, we need a management system based on economic principles so as to enable our foreign political infrastructure to function more effectively. We must comprehensively concentrate efforts on this sector.

Fourth, a question yet to be answered concerns our relations with developing countries, especially with friendly ones. Participants in the discussion voiced the opinion that due to the imperfections of economic cooperation with the Third World countries, we, unfortunately, often bring on economic unprofitableness even in the case of profitable enterprises, thereby causing political damage as well. The matter calls for comprehensive economic and political analysis in general as well as in each particular case. It was proposed that we should define with greater precision which part of cooperation should be commercial and be based on real economic interests and which will take place on favourable terms. It is also important, of course, to take account of our political priorities, a sphere in which the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is obvious.

To diversify forms of economic cooperation with developing countries, it was suggested that we also cooperate with Western firms. Practice has already prompted us to do so in some cases.

Fifth. The role of our foreign missions in the new conditions of economic management, specifically their contribution to the pursuit of state interests, is a separate big problem. Many of them are now searching for concrete opportunities to increase Soviet exports, to extend trade turnover and develop new forms of cooperation. The information supplied by the

embassies helps detect gaps in the reform of our foreign economic relations, find out its deficiencies and amend decisions made earlier.

It is necessary to press forward with this process, seeing to its proper coordination with the activity of trade missions.

The discussion in the section brought forward a number of *practical problems* which can and must be solved now.

On the very first day of the conference, an urgent question was raised about supplying our foreign staffs and business partners with information on conditions and procedures of the economic activity of Soviet enterprises and organisations at home and abroad.

The section considers that information for reference as well as normative information of an applied nature on our economic reform and the restructuring of our foreign economic complex can be prepared and disseminated at home and abroad by specialised agencies whose work is oriented to foreign countries and which command up-to-date facilities, such as the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, V/O Vnesh-torgizdat, ECOTASS and possibly the Novosti Press Agency.

The ongoing adoption of standards regulating foreign economic relations has created an uncommon situation. But while they are generally sound enough and an effort is being made to perfect them, the practice of, for instance, setting up joint ventures is asserting itself on its own, occasionally following a parallel course as it were. This is probably natural. Discussion produced fresh evidence of the paramount importance of the human factor. Nor is it accidental that foreign businessmen who are familiar with Soviet organisations and have long been connected with them often say that what matters is not merely rates or standards but the terms of each particular project. Where a project does not work, they add, we may infer that it was drawn up poorly, because in each specific case the Soviet side showed flexibility and pragmatism when interested.

At the same time, participants in the discussion questioned the fairness of some of our standards, in particular those concerning the share of the foreign partner in a joint venture.

A further question that came under discussion was whether we have not lately tended to neglect partnership in foreign joint-stock companies as a form of cooperation. Incidentally, this form is nothing new for us and holds a big promise. Commenting on the role of these companies, speakers said that they believed their significance was going to grow, in particular in the matter of gaining a foothold beforehand on the markets of countries belonging to Western integrational alignments. This view on the potential role of mixed joint-stock companies is shared by a number of Soviet embassies, from which our Embassy in Great Britain stands out in level of conceptual and practical proposals.

It was in both conceptual and applied terms that questions were asked about our attitude to transnational corporations and banks. Is everything in this sphere as simple as we have believed traditionally? Speakers pointed out that currently intra-company exchanges of the transnationals account for some 40 per cent of world trade. It was through their channels or under their control that the main flow of technology between nations was effected. This trend was likely to intensify in the decade ahead, and our economic science should therefore make an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of it.

The section raised the issue of our cooperation with international economic and financial organisations, such as the IMF and IBRD. However, the issue was not analysed in adequate measure for lack of time.

Most participants were of the opinion that economic and political interests call for a reappraisal of the contemporary role and potentialities of these organisations and for a study of variants of establishing direct

relations with them. This is no simple matter. Many speakers took a stand against overhasty decisions, suggesting that we should proceed stage by stage. There has been some research, and it is apparently time to think of using it in practical terms.

It transpired during the discussion that we have failed to pay proper attention to the international aspect of sociology, informatics, ecology and other lines of scientific thought. We need to assign them a proper place in our scientific infrastructure and put them in the service of our foreign economic and foreign policy interests. Unless we do so, we are likely to lag dangerously behind and be taken unawares by the qualitative transformation of our civilisation into one having to do without traditional sources of energy, facing problems of the so-called critical parameters (demographic, food and others) and those of an information revolution. The Foreign Affairs Ministry must join in as actively as possible and even initiate research into the conceptual and methodological aspects of our participation in the solution of these problems, informing our embassies accordingly.

It was noted with regret that for now we have only just indicated our stand on demographic and food problems. Yet a number of countries have already made appreciable progress in analysing the economic and other aspects of these problems. A careful study of global problems could provide us with a further political incentive to their solution at national and regional level.

Of the many *practical proposals* put forward in the course of discussion and meriting serious analysis, the following may be singled out:

It was proposed that the state of affairs in the area of our foreign economic relations be discussed in its totality at a plenary meeting of the CPSU CC. Foreign economic relations are gaining in political importance in view of the growing trend towards a slackening of military confrontation, and so we must work out a far-reaching national programme for the buildup of our export potential and for a judicious import policy.

Although we have an established set of standard-setting acts, participants in the discussion called for the adoption of a law on Soviet foreign economic activity. They also proposed drafting an economic code of the Soviet Union, to incorporate the law on state enterprises, the law on cooperatives, the law on individual labour and standard-setting acts covering every aspect of foreign economic ties.

Speakers agreed that against this background an idea could be formed of the main lines of exerting socially fruitful centralised and economic influence on the work of each participant in foreign economic relations. It was proposed that foreign economic activity as far as the formulation of fundamental political principles and guidelines is concerned be discussed on a regular basis by the appropriate commissions of both chambers and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The section did not examine the regional aspect of relations with foreign countries as a separate question but some speakers touched on it. Specifically, there was a proposal to specially discuss at a high political level current problems of integration and the socialist division of labour. The reason for such a discussion was given as the growing competition which socialist countries come up against on the foreign market and the changing conditions of relations with Western countries and their economic organisations.

Worthy of note is the idea voiced in the section and prompted by the experience of Soviet embassies about the desirability of switching our established trade and economic cooperation with foreign countries from traditional fields to advanced economic spheres conditioning scientific and technological progress.

Most participants in the discussion supported the proposal for much greater accessibility of our statistics on foreign economic affairs. Another proposal which won support was that in this sphere we should effect a breakthrough comparable to that accomplished in the area of military information.

With due regard to the existing pattern of Soviet exports, which is likely to be preserved, the section discussed a proposal for stepping up contacts with other countries relating to oil and gas markets. Speakers noted the lively and interesting presentation of this matter by some of our foreign missions.

It is most noteworthy that participants in the discussion searched vigorously for additional possibilities of promoting foreign economic ties. They rightly pointed out, too, that we must not forget about the objective advantages of our economy. These include primarily the huge capacity of our home market and the considerable amount of work we have done in various fields of science and technology. However, this last factor can bring only temporary benefit, and so the important thing is to use it flexibly and efficiently.

The range of problems that were discussed or indicated and the vast diversity of possible solutions showed that we must greatly intensify in both research and practice the search for optimum solutions; most importantly, we must join efforts on literally an everyday basis.

The economic aspect of foreign policy is coming to the fore. A task facing foreign policy is to contribute to the social and economic progress of the country. Its performance in this respect should be assessed according to the extent that it helps productively secure or save resources.

Fifth Section. LEGAL, HUMANITARIAN AND CONSULAR ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ANATOLI ADAMISHIN, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

I support the opinion that the discussion held in the section was free, lively and critical.

One in three participants in the section's work took the floor.

The section discussed a wide range of ideological, theoretical and purely practical questions raised in the Minister's report. The spectrum of opinions was wide enough. One of the participants cited interesting data obtained by polling specialists in international affairs. It appears that even members of this profession adhere to six fairly different approaches. Socialist pluralism of opinions is a reality today.

What the participants were unanimous on was their civic commitment to radical democratic changes in the country. The connection between these changes and the efficiency of our foreign policy and the image of our country generally is more obvious than ever.

I would like to single out what I see as particularly interesting opinions, and I ask beforehand to be excused if I overlook anything.

There was a principled, occasionally a philosophical debate on the concept of universal values, the place and role of our country in the evolution of world civilisation, the desirability and possibility of our fully joining the world family of nations as a country with a distinctive past and distinctive values and dedicated to humanism. Special emphasis was laid on the imperative need to foster the people's civic consciousness.

It was said that conceptually we may be described as sitting on two chairs. On the one hand, there is our new thinking, whose categories we have yet to adequately work out. On the other hand, we are still fettered by many outdated ideas and postulates. There is a vast amount of theoretical work to do, and speakers—both scholars and Foreign Ministry people—showed a great interest in it.

The concept of a legal state is one of the key problems. A serious attempt was made to define its attributes. It was pointed out that such a state should reflect the will of all people and not just certain segments. The conclusion drawn was that effective mechanisms must be evolved to enable the people to express their will.

One of the main attributes of a legal state was described as respect for international law, which implies full reflection of international legal obligations in internal legislation and compliance with them. It was therefore proposed that a competent agency be established to ensure the conformity of enacted laws to international obligations and standards. The opinion was expressed that the constitutional supervisory committee proposed by the 19th Party Conference should be a body independent of any influences, including departmental ones.

Another international aspect of a legal state is public, democratic discussion of foreign policy problems and decision-making on them according to a procedure to be precisely defined by law. Regrettably, the subject was not elaborated on.

Some speakers said that we were only just shaping a democratic system of drafting laws and that this highly important matter was still settled behind closed doors. We need a strict scientific analysis of draft laws. The Foreign Ministry should under no circumstances stay out of the drafting of laws relating in one way or another to our country's external commitments. Our legislative system was urged to hasten the democratic drafting of laws on trips to and from the Soviet Union, migration within the country and freedom to believe, think, publish and receive information.

A further major problem is the legal and humanitarian aspects of a comprehensive international security system and the need to ensure the primacy of law in state-to-state relations. Mention was made of specific legal means of assisting the formation of this model of international relations, it being noted that this still calls for much research.

All participants agreed that the Soviet Union should join still more actively in international humanitarian cooperation. There can be no confidence without such cooperation, nor can security be durable in the absence of confidence.

It was indicated that more extensive participation in humanitarian exchanges would help us more quickly improve both our domestic legislation and our practice. In the process we could draw on both positive and negative experience, that is, on what had proved its worth and what we must renounce. It was proposed that we join in the international control system envisaged by covenants on human rights (Optional Protocol, so-called Procedure 1503).

It is very important to evolve general principles and criteria of human rights for socialist countries. This is almost the only group of countries lacking a system of mutual legal obligations in the humanitarian sphere.

An interesting idea was advanced about confidence-building measures in this sphere (bilateral consultations, reciprocal visits, discussions, reports, study visits, exchange of experience).

It was suggested that the role of the Soviet public in international humanitarian ties be greatly increased.

Attention was called to our continued treatment of much of the information on our humanitarian problems as classified, with the result that

international dialogue is handicapped. For instance, we are very slow in releasing crime statistics. We carry out acts of goodwill but give them little publicity, as in the case of the recent amnesty, whose results we have failed to publish in full.

Speakers also concerned themselves with organisational problems of our work in this sector, shortcomings in the training of legal personnel and the fact that we do little to add to the bank of information on violations of human rights in capitalist countries. They called for the publication this year of a collection of key documents on human rights. Critical remarks were levelled at Soviet embassies which take no interest in everyday work in humanitarian area.

With regard to cultural cooperation speakers rightly insisted on bringing about a qualitative change, on evolving a new, democratic concept of cultural exchanges, ending command methods, granting creative people proper independence and renouncing the "residual" approach to cultural exchanges with foreign countries. Both numerically and qualitatively, those in charge at the national and local level are hardly equal to fulfilling these new tasks, which are much bigger now than before.

It was demanded that the powers of the Union Republics with regard to external relations, including cultural ties, be extended. Incidentally, spokesmen for the Republics took an active part in the debate, so that virtually every region of the country had its position stated.

There was quite a heated discussion on consular matters. Proposals were made, especially by young people, for extending the powers of the Union Republics' foreign ministries in issuing papers to citizens going abroad, for completing the drafting of a multilateral document on reciprocal visa-free trips by nationals of socialist countries, for extending the present simplified procedure of travel to the Soviet Union by businessmen and members of the scientific and technological community to foreign participants in cultural, sporting and other exchanges.

Some speakers expressed the view that the Soviet Union would do well to explore from the political and legal points of view the possibility of becoming a party to the multilateral Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963. Our long-standing principle of concluding bilateral conventions does not produce the results we seek. More often than not, we get proposals from other countries to build consular relations on the basis of the Vienna convention (signed by 125 countries to date, including nine socialist states).

The question was asked whether it was not time to consider holding a European conference to discuss cooperation in the consular sphere and sign a European consular convention.

It was a shortcoming of the discussion that some papers were read for the record rather than for any other purpose and left the audience unimpressed, discouraging response. But those papers were fortunately few.

Nearly all speakers wanted to be sure the discussion would not go unheeded. They suggested specific forms of continuing the work begun, in particular by forming, say, joint working groups of research and practical workers to discuss various urgent questions.

In short, I believe both the immediate result was good and the groundwork was laid for achieving even better results.

Sixth Section. POLICY TOWARDS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS

LEONID ILYICHEV, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

This section brought together over 180 participants in the conference. More than 30 people, including nine scholars, took the floor. The rest of them were ambassadors and senior staff members of the Ministry. Regrettably, the representatives of government agencies who were invited to take part in the discussion failed to do so. Ten participants submitted their papers to the section secretaries.

We all agree that this was, in effect, the largest ever meeting of diplomats and scholars concerned with problems of the Third World—a complicated, contradictory and, indeed, explosive world.

There is no denying that we have yet to eliminate vestiges of traditionalism, for some of the papers read were mere accounts. But generally speaking, the debate was lively and free.

We heard many interesting ideas, assessments, proposals and criticisms.

Attention focussed on four themes:

- key problems of the Third World;
- settlement of regional conflicts;
- the non-aligned movement today;
- relations between the Soviet Union and developing countries.

The results of the discussion may be summarised as follows:

Speakers repeatedly stressed that the so-called Third World, whose social, economic and political composition is extremely diversified, had entered a difficult, even contradictory stage. It was strongly influenced by both centripetal and centrifugal forces. Serious problems have gone from bad to worse, threatening new political, economic, ethnic and religious conflicts.

Interference from without and an expanding arms race at the regional level are aggravating the problem.

Not one of the participants in the discussion took exception to the statement that our science and diplomacy had failed to fully predict many of the current processes in the Third World. For instance, contrary to expectations, the working people of developing countries and the proletariat of capitalist states have not formed a class alliance.

It so happened, as was apparently justified, that speakers devoted special attention to the concept of socialist orientation and the problem of implementing it. Many opposing views were voiced.

Speakers were for a thorough study of the phenomenon as a variant of a freely chosen path to development by young independent countries.

There was a critical examination of our established approach to Third World countries; of our political, economic, trade and military relations with them. It was said that we should develop relations with these countries on realistic lines, with due regard to the peculiarities of each particular country and, first and foremost, to our actual possibilities.

The problems of settling regional conflicts received special attention. These conflicts affect political stability and the economic and social situation in the countries concerned, and the international situation in view of both the Soviet Union and the United States being involved in these to one degree or another.

An analysis was made of the prospects and likely ways of settling conflict situations in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Kampuchea and Central America.

Some speakers, stressing that according to new thinking political settlement is the only reasonable way out of conflicts, said it would be unrealistic to devise anything like a universal model in view of the unique nature and peculiarities of each conflict.

At the same time it was pointed out that the settlement of any conflict would help end other conflicts. The signing of the Geneva Accords and the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation were described as contributing to the search for a political settlement of other regional conflicts as well.

Mention was made of certain advances towards a political settlement in the Middle East, Kampuchea and Southern Africa.

It is important to follow up these advances.

Parallel or joint efforts by the Soviet Union and United States and the mechanism of Soviet-US consultations in the making are called upon to play an important role in the settlement of regional conflicts. This is a new reality, one that is not quite clear in some aspects but, even so, it is necessary to step up efforts.

Our section put it on record that the role of the non-aligned movement as an independent factor in world politics is growing in the context of favourable changes on the international scene. The movement has not lost its anti-imperialist spearhead, and so active participation by socialist and progressive countries in it is in keeping with our interests.

We must intensify cooperation with the non-aligned movement in order to make fuller use of its potentialities in the interests of solving current problems, above all those of disarmament and of restructuring international economic relations.

One of the ways of raising the level of this cooperation is, as the outcome of the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament suggested for its part, to do more sustained preliminary work among non-aligned countries in formulating and promoting major Soviet initiatives.

In discussing relations between the Soviet Union and developing countries, the emphasis was put on the need to considerably reshape their every aspect.

The absence of proper ties between Soviet research and cultural institutions and Soviet missions abroad was seriously criticised, for this tells on the quality of our analysis of the situation in the countries concerned and on forecasts of their development.

It was suggested, primarily by ambassadors who took part in the debate, that in deciding current questions, greater account be taken of the opinion of embassies and that the need to supply them with information and encourage feedback be borne in mind. The effort of the Soviet Embassies' Directorate was commended in this connection, it being suggested that the Ministry's territorial departments should step up their information work.

I am certain that the restructuring of the Ministry already effected or yet to come will make the interaction of the Ministry and our foreign missions more effective.

In conclusion I wish to underline that the section drew many interesting theoretical conclusions and put forward equally interesting proposals all of which were recorded in the minutes and will be carefully studied.

Seventh Section. DIPLOMACY, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS: THEIR ROLE IN ENSURING UNIVERSAL SECURITY

VLADIMIR PETROVSKY, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

This section discussed diplomacy in its various manifestations and interconnections: bilateral and multilateral, crisis and preventive, secret and public, professional and people's.

Diplomatic problems were analysed in terms of the interests of *pere-stroika* in our country and the foreign policy tasks set by the 19th Party Conference.

A lively dialogue, based on equality, was held among diplomats, scholars and journalists. Special mention should be made of the contribution of young people. The consensus of opinion was that the conference, the first broad informal meeting of its kind, had proved its worth. The debate was not characterised by controversy but by joint reflections on and a search for solutions to the problems facing our diplomatic service.

Much attention was devoted to new political thinking and the concept of universal security. Pointing out the changes that have come about in our approach to foreign affairs, participants in the discussion expressed the hope that new political thinking would not become a battered slogan with no real deeds to back it. They said that the ideals we aspire to could only be achieved gradually, by dint of painstaking effort, and that our desire to attain these ideals must encourage the accomplishment of what can be done starting now. It was suggested that we draw up a programme for peaceful alternatives to the arms race in every sector.

In connection with new thinking, many speakers called for filling in the gaps in recent history and for extending openness to foreign policy. Opinions about studying history varied. Some believe that we should not go too far in probing into the past but should concentrate on what is important today. Others said that we needed a complete record of all facts of history comprising both our achievements and our failures. I fully agree with them. This would enable us not only to form a truthful idea of our past but to draw lessons from it for the future.

Participants in the debate pointed to the direct connection between growing openness and our image abroad, the elimination of the notion that the Soviet Union is a closed, unpredictable and hence hostile country. They acknowledged that a good deal has been done to this end, and the foreign policy sphere is no exception. But this was clearly less than enough. There was an imperative need to release information on military buildup and planning as well as on Soviet activities in the UN specialised agencies.

Speakers pointed out the enhancing role of diplomacy in today's interdependent world as a means of increasing mutual understanding and reaching agreement. Each diplomatic school showed in the process its style and distinctive character.

Ours is an open style respecting others' opinions. A country's style abroad is said to be inseparable from its style at home. In other words, you cannot adhere to double standards.

The relationship between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy was discussed with keen interest. Speakers were of the opinion that a reasonable balance should be maintained between these two varieties of diplomacy. New foreign political thinking precludes by its very nature an approach viewing the world solely from the standpoint of Soviet-American relations. It presupposes a vigorously developing multilateral process along with a bilateral one. Speakers noted that international mechanisms would gain in practical significance as the world community paid increasing attention to global problems.

There was an involved discussion on the theory and practice of negotiations. It was admitted that the traditional concept of bargaining at the negotiating table, which involves the formulation of several reserve positions, is ceasing to meet present-day requirements and tends to slow down the pace of talks. However, no alternative to this model of talks had yet been evolved. Mentioned as a possible variant was a search at the early stage of talks for a model of solution based on the principle of agreeing subsequently ways of advancing to it. In all circumstances it is necessary to ensure that talks outpace the growth of the problems in hand and are aimed at reaching solutions, at achieving concrete results, and not at securing advantages.

Speakers noted the importance of the increased attention we began paying to the United Nations since publishing Mikhail Gorbachev's article on September 17, 1987. It was said that we must actually stop using the UN as a purely propagandistic forum and assessing its effort according to the number of resolutions passed by it rather than to the number of agreed joint moves. Emphasis was laid on the need to ensure the fulfilment of resolutions adopted by the UN and other international organisations.

Consensus as a means of drafting and adopting documents came up for lively discussion. Most speakers recognised this to be the most fruitful method now of agreeing the positions of various countries. They noted, however, that making an absolute of consensus might translate into granting the right of veto to one or two states and that consensus did not imply renouncing our fundamental interests.

It was suggested that the experience of international conferences in the matter of organisation and procedure could be used in democratising our political life. I consider this a very interesting idea.

The success of our diplomatic activity must be planned at home, it was pointed out. What was meant was not only the policy of *perestroika*, democratisation and *glasnost* but speedy completion of the renewal of the approach of other departments to international affairs.

The human factor is an equally important requisite for the success of our diplomacy. It was discussed in very broad as well as in applied terms. It was said that we needed to know well what sociological type of individual our diplomatic service would require in the 21st century and how to organise the training of such personnel. Special attention was called to the need to combine the principles of competence with those of social justice in personnel policy.

Competence was said to imply not merely knowledge and skills but a high professional standard plus commitment to the interests of the country and comprehension of its internal tasks. This was lacking in particular when the decision to deploy SS-20 missiles in Europe was taken. The fact that in training future diplomats no attention is given to psychology, the art of public speaking and certain other subjects was described as hard to understand. Dissatisfaction was expressed at our appointment of those for work in the secretariats of international organisations.

Speakers emphasised the need to form a "corps of negotiators" that would include people expert at carrying on multilateral conference work.

They called for an end to the practice of limiting the admission of women to the Moscow State Institute for International Relations and the Diplomatic Academy.

There was a businesslike discussion on the problem of relationship between diplomacy and science and the press. Scholars themselves said that our foreign policy activity has got little help from science. It is highly important for science both to react promptly to current problems and to work out long-range concepts of the evolution of international relations.

Proposals were made for establishing an institute of international law and an institute of international organisations. I think this is correct, we are for the primacy of international law and for an increased role of multilateral diplomacy. Besides, such institutions are common in the West. The United States has a dozen of them. Perhaps we ought to experiment by setting up a joint institute of international law and international organisations.

Journalists specialising in international problems were urged to shed unnecessary restraints and to both help our people more in seeing clear in world affairs and serve as a system of early warning on various problems and a source of alternative proposals.

The Foreign Ministry was asked to establish a system of briefings for the Soviet press.

Emphasis was laid on the importance of people's diplomacy, of public participation in foreign policy activity, with more and more new people joining in it. It was also stressed that use must be made of the experience gained while preparing and holding the Moscow Forum For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity.

Many speakers called for the convocation of other scientific and practical conferences, in particular on the problems of reasonable sufficiency and effectiveness regarding our foreign policy.

While the discussion as a whole was satisfactory, this section was plainly overburdened with themes. Some of these, such as information and propaganda, received little attention. The important theme of crisis and preventive diplomacy was barely touched on.

I believe that for the future we should analyse both the content of the discussion held and the methods used. It is important to draw in practice on the valuable political knowledge provided by the conference.

It is to be hoped that from now on cooperation between diplomats, scholars and journalists, moreover, joint creative efforts by them, both of which marked the conference, will be a permanent factor.

Eighth Section. MEETING THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

BORIS CHAPLIN, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

The debate was as intense as in other sections even though opinions did not vary greatly, it being ultimately admitted by all that a greater effort must be made to meet the material, technical, economic and social requirements of our diplomatic service.

To begin with, it was said that the ongoing renewal of foreign policy and diplomacy should be accompanied by the more efficient organisation of labour and management and that we needed a new type of apparatus equipped with up-to-date information technology. The solution of these problems is particularly important now that the leading powers are going through a transition from industrial-technological to scientific information societies and objective world processes necessitate scientific approach and deep analysis.

The *role of information technology and computers in diplomacy* therefore aroused great interest in this section. Information was said to be main resource in the functioning of every echelon of the Foreign Ministry, so that in view of its growing amount, the new demands made upon it and the trend of international relations it is impossible to replace extensive by intensive working methods and accomplish the tasks facing the Ministry without computers and up-to-date means of communication, without setting up an automated information system. Furthermore, it was stressed that our opponents and negotiating partners already have these facilities and that unless we act promptly to end our lag in this sphere, we will find it hard to achieve diplomatic parity, so to speak, meaning the provision of equal conditions for analysing situations and making decisions.

Particular attention was devoted to the problem of carrying out as effectively and as speedily as possible the recent decision to establish an automated department information system at the Foreign Ministry. It was pointed out that the emphasis is now shifting from form to content, to defining the functional purpose of the system. The question was asked: Should the information system stick to the existing technology of information processes and the management system formed in the conditions of manual labour or discard all that is outdated methodologically and organisationally and thoroughly reshape these processes? The answer can be found and the problem of meeting the information requirements of the system solved only with the joint efforts of all the echelons and foreign missions for which the Ministry's information system is being set up. Speakers insisted that the system be brought into being in strict conformity with existing standards and according to one project, without singling out any of its components or setting up parallel ones.

In this context the section also discussed the use of computers in Soviet foreign missions. With reference to numerous requests from Soviet ambassadors, it was said that information work in our foreign missions would be automated within the framework of setting up an automated information system based on national facilities. Testing models of the system will begin this year in several embassies, and the large-scale introduction of computers into our foreign missions is planned for 1989 and 1990.

In discussing *working conditions and the Ministry's social infrastructure*, speakers noted that in spite of certain advances, this sphere still falls short of requirements and is below standard in some important respects. They said that to translate the social policy that has been framed into reality as early as possible, work must continue on building up the Ministry's material and technical facilities.

The material conditions of our foreign staff were described as essentially normal. However, criticisms and proposals were made concerning the current system of pay. Basic salaries are fixed without proper regard to economic conditions and their level takes little account of changes in the cost of living abroad. As a result, our employees suffer financial difficulties in a number of countries. We must not forget that over half of them serve in countries where the climate is most unfavourable or the military-political situation is complicated. Under these circumstances,

one way to solve the problem could be granting the Ministry a permission to use for this purpose its foreign exchange savings which are currently withdrawn at the fiscal year end. This would be consonant with the principles of the economic reform under way in our country.

There was a discussion of the *Ministry's immovables abroad*, having a cost of over 550 million convertible rubles.

It was said major improvements are needed in the proper maintenance of premises and housing. The existence of restrictions and personnel quotas, the absence of an adequate maintenance staff and insufficient use of local labour have an adverse effect. This explains the virtual absence of maintenance personnel in a number of embassies, which inevitably tells on the state of our property.

Many criticisms were offered concerning the *designs of our buildings abroad*. The standard style of architecture of new Soviet embassies was said to be out of keeping with the changes coming about in our country. We need new architectural approaches to the designing of our missions, which also means meeting safety requirements.

Some ambassadors took a stand against appointing a principal designer and suggested adopting a competitive system of selecting projects, giving the matter maximum publicity, drawing embassy and ministerial personnel into discussion, taking account of regional and national peculiarities and enlisting the service of the design and construction firms and enterprises in the country of station.

As land in the Soviet Union is not subject to sale and purchase, it was proposed that a form of making plots available to foreign countries be evolved such as would be equivalent to the acquisition of land by the Soviet Union abroad. It is necessary to work out a scientifically valid method of specifying the value of land in the Soviet Union, primarily in Moscow, as well as a method of fixing rent for both land and premises.

The section concerned itself with the *status of diplomatic couriers and mail*. The problem is gaining in urgency because the UN is completing the drafting of a convention some of whose provisions require further specification since they may complicate the performance of a service made important by developing international relations.

It was suggested that the document regulating the nature and volume of diplomatic mail be revised.

The proposals that were made call for further analysis. Be that as it may, the frank exchange of views that took place in the section and the constructive atmosphere and critical tenor of our conference are bound to help us take a fresh look at many problems of supplying the social, economic, material and technical needs of the Ministry and its foreign staff more effectively.

Question from the audience. The current stage of our relations with the outside world is adding greatly to our consular work. This year, for example, our embassy will have to issue from 90,000 to 100,000 visas. The very form of Soviet visa is outdated, no other country in the world uses so complicated a form. We have asked for steps to modernise our consular operations, in particular by thoroughly simplifying visas. What has been done to meet our request?

Answer. We are now working on that. Many things will be made easier with the introduction of an automated system. As regards the broader issue of revising the procedures of issuing visas, handling passports, and so on, we plan to simplify them as much as possible.

ON PERSONNEL POLICIES

VALENTIN NIKIFOROV, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

While personnel questions were not singled out for discussion in this section, they were understandably ever-present at our conference. After all, *perestroika* in the foreign policy sphere and hence at the Foreign Ministry is no automatic process. There are concrete individuals behind our current achievements and setbacks. The evolution of the international situation, the efficiency of our foreign policy, the trend and pace of formation of our relations with other countries will largely depend on who succeeds us.

I will not repeat what the situation in regard to the Ministry's personnel was three years ago and what was done to improve it. This was stated openly at our earlier meetings.

We now have good reason to put it on record that the Ministry's personnel policy has undergone a notable change for the better. We are restoring the Leninist principle of selecting, placing and educating people entirely in accordance with their professional, political and moral qualities. Our foreign missions and ministerial headquarters are being taken over, as a rule, by young, energetic people meeting present-day requirements.

What is important is that we have ended the discrepancy between words and deeds in personnel matters and moved from rhetoric to real work. As a result, the climate at the Ministry and in our foreign missions is healthier now, with people working more efficiently and imaginatively. It follows that the line formulated two years ago at the ministerial conference which was attended by Mikhail Gorbachev and was aimed at eliminating shortcomings in solving personnel problems is receiving ever stronger support among our employees. We are therefore resolved to carry it on.

However, conversations with people and a poll taken shortly before the conference showed that some diplomats, especially young people, are dissatisfied with the pace of change. Many officials still take a wait-and-see stand on personnel matters. There are also those who resist change, and this shows up in our everyday work. Not everything is happening as we have planned. We still come across instances of protectionism and appointments made behind closed doors. These phenomena have taken new forms, including latent ones that we occasionally fail to detect. Evidently, there are still shortcomings which we must remove if we want to head off new difficulties.

First among the problems facing us is that of reserve personnel. Reality itself has put it on top of the list. The replacement of numerous leading diplomats in 1986 and 1987 was a forced step resulting from the period of stagnation. While necessary, it exhausted to a considerable degree the reserve available at the time. We now need to select and promote on a systematic basis young, particularly gifted diplomats for appointment to key jobs. In so doing, we must rule out all subjectivism. It is necessary to set up a streamlined, well-considered and comprehensive system of training.

It would be wrong to say that we have done nothing to this end. We have been taking steps to improve plan discipline and to replace and transfer personnel according to a reasonable balance between the principles of specialisation and rotation. We must admit, however, that planning as a whole is still our weak point. And we have only just begun long-range planning.

We will have to set up a mechanism of diplomatic service encouraging diplomats to steadily raise their qualifications, to build up their potential as experts. Graduation from the Diplomatic Academy, special courses and other forms of study should in time become obligatory stages in the career of every diplomat. Nor should we shun foreign experience, including diplomatic personnel formation in leading Western countries. But in this matter we count primarily on aid from our own science, for this problem is one of national magnitude.

The Foreign Ministry should employ gifted people who can fittingly represent our country abroad. We are badly short of people well familiar with all the secrets and subtleties of diplomacy, equal to fulfilling their tasks promptly and efficiently, well-informed and possessing a high standard of culture. This task must be tackled by the educational institutions and personnel service of the Ministry. We have all that we need for accomplishing it, specifically every opportunity to select the best, and we must use it wisely.

As regards curricula for the academic years to come, I believe nothing could provide a better basis for compiling them than our conference. The conference may be said to have given us a social assignment up to the end of this century. The exchange of opinion held at the conference on the development trends of international relations and the tasks of Soviet foreign policy revealed to us the changes in personnel requirements that have come about. We have reason to presume that in the years ahead the demand for experts in disarmament and security problems will steadily grow. We will have to draw up a special curriculum for the training of disarmament experts at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations and the Diplomatic Academy and to give jobs at the Foreign Ministry to graduates of military academies and staff members of research centres of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Furthermore, the growing significance of law in international relations necessitates stepped-up effort to train international lawyers. We need more of them at the Ministry, in our foreign missions and among our negotiators. The diplomatic service is also in need of experts in public, civil and labour law.

Now that we are devoting greater attention to the United Nations than before, we are likely to increase the number of diplomats familiar with the activity of international organisations, its principles and content. The Soviet Union has virtually adopted a new personnel policy towards these organisations. The problem of length of stay, once acute, no longer exists. Henceforward our people can serve in secretariats for five to eight or more years or even sign permanent contracts if necessary. Many social problems may now be dismissed as solved.

Diplomacy today is unthinkable in isolation from economic activity, and we therefore need more people knowledgeable in this sphere. Every diplomat's intellectual background must include knowledge of the economic problems of his country and of international economic and financial relations. We are also in dire need of professional economists. The Diplomatic Academy will have to provide relevant training to a part of our diplomatic staff. For the personnel departments, those diplomats should be considered promising who combine sound knowledge of the countries and regions concerned with a good grasp of global international problems and speak two or possibly three languages. Special efforts must therefore be made to train diplomats specialising in problems of socialist countries, meaning those of both Europe and Asia.

The computerisation process at the Foreign Ministry is likely to lead to a change of balance between diplomats versed in the humanities and diplomats specialising in technology, engineering included. The establish-

**CLOSING SPEECH BY MEMBER
OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU
CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE
ON JULY 27, 1988**

This speech has no pretensions of being a detailed summary of our scientific and practical conference—this work was done fundamentally and skilfully in the addresses by the deputy ministers who headed the sections.

All I would like to do is express some general considerations, give some assessments, and return to some of the main points of the report and to the ideas expressed at the plenary session and the sectional sessions.

Our discussion is drawing to a close. In my opinion, a very interesting picture has taken shape. I would call it a mosaic though with a clear-cut, integral and orderly composition. There is a number of very expressive, brilliant and unexpected details I can also adjudge this from my personal impressions, which I gleaned at the sessions of one of the sections. Irrespective of the extent to which I agreed with the statements made by the speakers, all or almost all of them were impressive in their originality and depth. If one can speak of charm in so serious an audience as ours, the pronouncements heard here evoked precisely such a state—charm through thought.

In the past we grew so sick and tired of banalities that the discovery of an enormous fruitful layer of live ideas is becoming a great joy and instils great hopes.

I believe that Stepan Chervonenko made an apt point—and I fully agree with him—when he said that our conference reaffirms the deepening intellectualisation of diplomatic work and of the diplomatic service as a whole. I will take the liberty of noting that in this respect our discussion revealed a direct link with the 19th Party Conference; I would say it was an organic link—and not at all by virtue of its being devoted to it, but essentially by its nature and content. The entire gamut of the problems considered at the conference—precisely the entire gamut, and not only foreign-policy matters—was mirrored in our debate to one degree or another.

As far as the main trend in our discussion is concerned, literally every speech, even the remarks that were made were imbued with one concern—how to help *perestroika*, how to make it irreversible, how to create the most favourable external conditions for implementing the domestic development plans elaborated by the Party at the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, at the 27th CPSU Congress and at the 19th Party Conference.

The picture, I repeat, was very expressive, but hardly rosy. Critical tones predominated. We did not expect anything else, nor did we want it.

If the goal was to analyse critically foreign policy and diplomacy in the light of the guidelines of the 19th party conference, I believe that this goal has been attained.

And if we sought to map out together the most promising and

strongest ways and methods of revamping foreign policy and diplomacy, we have succeeded in doing, or at least planning, this.

I will dwell briefly on several of what I believe to be problematic issues that were considered at our conference.

Science and its merging with diplomacy and foreign policy. The conference reaffirmed not only the topicality of this task but also the possibility for accomplishing it. The addresses by the scientists themselves convince us of the objective need for this.

The idea of diplomacy and foreign policy as a sphere of scientific research was expressed here. At the same time the tenet of science as a full-fledged subject of foreign policy stood out in bold relief.

The idea of thermonuclear fusion, for example, unquestionably belongs to researchers engaged in the natural sciences. However, it was one of the leading topics at the Geneva summit and the subsequent contacts and, accordingly, a subject of big-time politics which objectively brings closer the stands of the two "arch" rivals—the Soviet Union and the United States. Agreement on the developing and implementation of the project has already been reached. The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan and Italy are becoming involved in the construction of the first reactor. There are many interested parties. Thus, by internationalising, a scientific idea becomes a political factor in the efforts of many countries towards a better future for all.

Science has supplied politicians with military-technical instruments for shaping foreign policy. It is also capable of providing them with the tools for forging peace.

Another example is the comprehensive system of international peace and security. Regrettably, we were unable to discuss all aspects of comprehensive security at the plenary session and the sectional sessions. Perhaps next time we will manage to focus on this problem. But we can say even now that we have attained a great deal in advancing this idea through the United Nations. However, many still regard this concept as sheer propaganda—propaganda in the bad sense. A nihilistic attitude towards the possibility of its realisation is being manifested in our country, too. Even top experts are talking about the uncontrollability of the world in the event existing stockpiles, above all nuclear ones, are scrapped.

Meanwhile, our forecasts indicate that the non-offensive doctrine, the principle of reasonable sufficiency, and the implementation of a formula on forces adequate for defence but inadequate for attack are capable of putting the idea of comprehensive security into practice. The appropriate scientifically-calculated and substantiated models could materialise it. Such studies are being conducted in Western countries, specifically, in small West European countries. Even today they amply show the viability of the idea of non-offensive defence. The prestige and possibilities of Soviet science and foreign policy are such that they can provide it broad scope internationally.

Our conference revealed a characteristic trend towards interdependence between science and diplomacy, diplomacy and culture, and professional diplomacy and people-to-people diplomacy. Detailed discussions on all these problems were held.

Simply put, we cannot perform our functions in full without each other. The practice of social and state orders to science always pursues the goal of supplying policy with the best instruments for shaping the most favourable conditions for the nation's development. Divorced from this posing of the goal, the possibility of science's self-realisation as a material force looks problematical. The point at issue is not services, but mutual vested interest in the progress of the country, in the progress of science, foreign policy and, if you will, of the whole of humanity.

Let us take history as an example. Without repeating the correct, but trite ideas about the past, without which there is no future, and without removing pall of vagueness about the past, we will be unable to prognosticate the future. What will we be able to tell the world about our intentions if we conceal the truth of history from it? This problem was discussed very vigorously in almost all the sections.

For example, the prestige *perestroika* and its leaders enjoy has sharply turned public opinion in many countries in our favour. This is unequivocally shown by the findings of public opinion polls, including in the United States.

However, certain roadblocks of the past are preventing this tendency from deepening.

Removing them is well within the capacity of historians working in tandem with foreign-policy departments and with their colleagues from other countries.

The point at issue is a tendency and a line. We need a system of priorities, a stage-by-stage approach, a knowledge of what has to be done first and foremost, at the current juncture, and what can be put off until tomorrow. We must definitely take into account the degree to which our partners, neighbours and friends are prepared to set about this complicated, delicate and very sensitive work and handle it collegially.

The practice of joint publications of documents on bilateral relations has proved itself. Considerable experience has been amassed in this sphere. We could undertake on the same basis the publication of historical materials and documents, White Books that would shed light on the dark areas in our relations with a particular country. I would like to reiterate that this work should have a bilateral foundation.

We are proposing cooperation to historians. At the Historical Diplomacy Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs we could form mixed commissions of historians and diplomats studying specific historical aspects of foreign policy.

This is just one of the forms. We are prepared to meet and analyse, together with you, all aspects of our future cooperation.

On theory. If by virtue of its specifics diplomacy is selective in its approaches to the present, science is universal. It is obliged to study the world in the complex integrity of all its interweavings and mutually repellent factors. If it acts selectively, it will give practice a distorted picture and set it on the wrong path. On the other hand, a universal, comprehensive approach to world development trends will help practice make the correct choice.

Here we have been amply shown how fallacious it is to determine the nature of a state from the standpoint of its adherence to the primacy of law if of the class-based approach alone is applied. History knows bourgeois, capitalist societies that are a far cry from being oriented to a law-governed state. A law-governed state, like civility in relations with citizens, is a universal category, a universal value, a universal ideal.

Protecting itself against encroachments from without and from within, the state defines the legal means of its defence and this defence, incidentally, also presupposes the defence of its own citizens against arbitrary rule and lawlessness. Otherwise, it will not shield itself against crises or guarantee its future. We believe that it is only in this sense that a law-governed state can be spoken of as a class category. And it is only in this sense that we perceive the building of a law-governed state as the highest class interest of socialist society.

We must likewise approach a definition of modern development trends from the standpoint of new political thinking. Few will dispute the point that the class struggle is its mainspring. But let us ask ourselves whether its forms are all that immutable. If we are honest with our answer, we

cannot but admit that the scientific and technological revolution, the sweeping structural shifts in the world economy and the transition to science- and information-oriented societies have influenced the nature and forms of the class struggle as well.

Here many interesting and pointed remarks were made concerning the relations between analysis and forecast and the need for us—both in science and in diplomacy—to address ourselves to forecasting. Without forecasts it is now impossible to shape a scientifically-substantiated foreign policy. We do not have the right to ignore forecasts and hold on to inflexible dogmas. Most importantly, we do not have the right to disregard the fact that the development of military technologies, stockpiles, the nature of modern weaponry and the steady trend towards improving them have posed before mankind the problem of self-destruction.

The only alternative is the struggle for the survival of humanity. In it lies the supreme class-based interest for the Soviet Union and for socialism.

"The course of history, of social progress," I quote the Political Report to the 27th CPSU Congress, "requires ever more insistently that there should be *constructive and creative interaction between states and peoples on the scale of the entire world*. Not only does it so require, but it also creates the requisite political, social and material premises for it."

This conclusion by the Congress does not remove the problem of the competition and rivalry between the two systems. However, this rivalry is increasingly being subordinated to a mounting tendency towards interdependence among the states of the world community, and it is in this tendency that the real dialectics of modern development lies.

It is in this context that peaceful coexistence can be viewed not as a special form of the class struggle but as a form of realisation of our supreme, class—if you wish—interest, namely, the creation of decent, truly human material and spiritual living conditions for all nations, as the primary duty to our own people, the ensuring of our planet's habitability, and a thrifty attitude towards its resources.

The strength of this class interest, and it is growing, lies in its full concurrence with universal interests.

We say that nuclear weapons threaten humanity and for this reason we are seeking to destroy them. But after we attain this we will not rid mankind of the threat. There exists a danger that is no less formidable—alongside the nuclear-chemical front, there has gradually formed, as one of the participants in the debate figuratively put it, a second front—the ecological front.

From what standpoints should the impending catastrophe be approached? From narrow dogmatic ones? That would be absurd. The ozone layer and the biosphere cannot be subdivided into socialist and capitalist. They are united, and international efforts to save them and to close this "second front" should be just as united. And if we are able to organise and head these efforts, the goal of which is to save the world, and if they are crowned with victory, this will be the loftiest class mission of socialism. If socialism fulfils this mission, it will truly have carried out a world revolution.

It will carry it out, by promoting the establishment of a just ecological order, economic security, and a solution to global problems.

On freedom of choice. I have already mentioned this and I want to reiterate that by pressing for freedom of choice, by implementing this idea in the modern world, and by affirming in the minds of politicians, statesmen and the world public the right of each nation to choose freely its own path of development and socio-political system, we are rendering the most efficacious service to the national-liberation movements.

We will be protecting this norm against violations through all political means, with full respect for the principles of non-aggression, sovereignty and non-interference, and by drawing on the possibilities of world communities and organisations. A different approach, as Lenin put it, would mean a complete break with Marxism, which always denied "pushing" revolutions which develop in step with the growing exacerbation of the class contradictions that spawn revolutions.

I think that an understanding and interpretation of the principle of freedom of choice, an understanding that is scientific and in the spirit of conclusions drawn at the 19th Party Conference, will also give us an answer to a question which was heatedly debated in our discussion, namely, socialist orientation.

We have to build normal relations with all countries, being mindful that each state, each nation itself defines the nature of its own political, economic and other systems.

You may have noticed that my report also focused on the effectiveness of our cooperation with the developing countries. If spheres of cooperation are analysed, very many shortcomings will be revealed. How should we continue building our relations with these countries without changing our political line? We must work to make our cooperation as effective as possible. On this point ambassadors spoke out, charging that although we invest thousands of millions in assistance to the developing countries, we are little concerned with the effectiveness of this aid. Is this correct? I think that the main thing is to build normal relations both with countries which, as we say, are committed to socialist orientation, and with countries which have opted for other guidelines; but in all cases we should press for effective cooperation.

Now a few words about our negotiating style and the technique and art of diplomacy. Interesting remarks have been made about this here. We were gratified to learn that some Soviet research institutions, among them the Institute of the United States and Canada and the Institute of the World Economy, are engaged in this problem in earnest. It is regrettable, however, that our own research centres have not taken up this matter. Because of this the system of communications and relations between theorists and practical workers is especially topical.

We would like to see greater attention focused on the role played by the human factor in diplomacy. If it manifests its strength or weakness anywhere, it is in the sphere of the art of attaining the possible.

The importance of personal aspects is growing in today's transition from confrontation to the search for a balance of interests. There is an increasing emphasis on such qualities as professional, special and general culture, honesty, decency, sincerity, respect for partners, and the ability to get along even with the most unacceptable opponents.

Diplomacy must be able to deal with everyone. This requires certain skills. Here we have plenty of work to do. This may be an exaggeration, but my own observations and experience tell me that our negotiating mechanism and our work in international organisations require sweeping reforms.

We have to scuttle some obsolete methods inherited from the past.

It was also pointed out that we devote a great deal of attention to Soviet-American relations, and too little to other, no less important relations. There is a certain logic at play here. Four summit meetings over a short span and 28 meetings on the foreign minister level are indeed unprecedented. Today the military are "competing" with us, and this is a good thing—defence ministers, chiefs of staff, etc., are meeting, and discussions of matters on the expert level are beginning. Contacts in other departments are being established. Why is this taking place? We will not be able to halt the arms race, lessen tensions in the world, and resolve

the central issues of the day, the problems of saving civilisation from a nuclear catastrophe, if we do not establish relations with the Americans on the basis of constant dialogue and contacts.

However, any list is an abnormal situation, all the more so for the ship of foreign policy. The reforms apace in foreign policy presuppose actions on a broad front. We have much room for improvement here, too. What is abnormal is that for many years there have been no visits by the Foreign Minister to the key countries of the Near and Middle East, and there have never been any to the countries in the south of Africa, where complicated processes are taking place.

Many ambassadors raised this question with good cause, calling our attention, specifically, to the need to step up dialogue with small European countries.

We are not working efficiently enough to develop relations with neutral states either. I accept this criticism. We will try to rectify the situation.

On pluralism of views in our international journalism. There is no real *glasnost* if there is no freedom to evaluate issues and events independently. We do not pretend to have a monopoly of views and we decline the role of censor, but it should not be forgotten that the principle of openness is based above all on the priority of national interests.

Also, it seems that the departure from a confrontational approach to analysis is not to everyone's liking. It is easier to fume than to reflect. Simplistic schemes and crude clichés are still in currency. A striving not for the triumph of truth but for a touch of sensationalism to boost the author's ego is noticeable at times in essays on historical topics.

There are many problems, and they are not simple. For now, I have but one request—a greater sense of responsibility and closer cooperation. If it is true that a publicist is a person who writes letters to society, let his letters not worsen relations between society and the rest of the world.

Today we are not viewing history through a keyhole and are not hiding our present behind the "iron curtain". Let's consult on what to do to enable the international affairs commentator to acquire unofficial sovereignty at long last. We have an entire set of proposals on this score. I am ready to discuss them with you in greater detail. We should meet more frequently and jointly determine our attitude to particular developments.

I would like to comment briefly on a statement that was made here. Some of my friends and colleagues said that *perestroika* has yielded the most notable results in foreign policy.

I want to state with full responsibility that some of the recent successes in foreign policy scored under the guidance of the Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee are a direct result of the domestic reforms, a result which is not isolated from the *perestroika* processes of democratisation and *glasnost* but which are directly stimulated by this process. All our achievements are derivatives of these processes which in themselves are as of today the chief results of renewal in society.

A good beginning has been made at our conference. Together with our colleagues from other departments, scientists, cultural figures and international-affairs observers we have set about an extensive analysis of the tasks facing Soviet foreign policy at the stage of *perestroika*. The plenary and sectional sessions of the conference were addressed by one out of every three conferees, or 306 people. Today, when we have at our disposal a huge host of ideas, evaluations and proposals, we must use them intelligently, in a proprietary manner. This is no easy matter.

The materials of the conference will be elaborated and its results discussed at a special sitting of the collegium. We will make these materials available to our staffs, Foreign Ministry headquarters and its missions. We will try in one way or another to publish the text of the debates, with

an eye to including each important idea. We now have materials on the basis of which we could launch very interesting work in the ministry subdivisions and at the embassies.

During the preparations for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference upwards of 1,000 proposals were submitted from the central apparatus alone. We have to find a form in which staff members could acquaint themselves with them. This is our common asset, our wealth. We need to summarise, process and make these proposals and materials of the recent discussion the heritage of the entire staff and that of our colleagues from other departments.

We will evidently need to set up working groups for specific areas (they should be headed by deputy ministers and members of the collegium), which will arrange the practical implementation of the ideas expressed here and will establish cooperation with research institutions.

The expedience of and need to continue the discussions launched here are obvious. Evidently, this can be done at seminars, symposiums and meetings concerning more specific topics. We intend to plan and hold a series of small conferences on problems of individual regions which will consider the subject matter in greater detail.

At the conference we failed to pay back all our debts. Thus, we did not manage to talk about the performance of the union ministries of foreign affairs. And, in the broader sense, about the place and role of the Union Republics in foreign policy and their practical involvement in its formation and implementation. The potential which the union republics have need to be brought into play. We also owe a debt to our missions abroad. This was discussed to less an extent than our staff members would have liked. I will, however, point out that what we have held here was not a staff meeting but a scientific and practical conference whose tasks and goals required the posing and consideration of major conceptual problems without which no embassy or consulate can structure its work properly. I have already talked, in the report, about new documents devoted to the work of ambassadors and embassies. The role, authority and responsibility of ambassadors as the main coordinators and organisers of all our work abroad are enhancing.

Our conference was held at the Institute for International Relations. We did not choose this location by chance, for the sake of convenience in organising the discussions. As a stage in the development of Soviet diplomacy, the conference is addressed to the younger generation as well. We would like to hope that the graduates of the institute—the future of our diplomacy—will become imbued with the spirit of the discussions held here, and that the conference materials will help them come to know the essence of foreign policy and the finer points of Soviet diplomacy.

We shall try to make all the materials of our conference available to the students of the Diplomatic Academy. It will be a good thing if we also convey to them the principles of the high standards of the polemic which manifested themselves so fully here during the past few days.

Yes, the level of the debate here was very high. There were some acute moments; there was a heated polemic, but the opponent's view was respected. This is unquestionable proof of democratisation.

Let the heated debate continue, but in an atmosphere of respect, propriety and the highest culture.

I would like to thank all of you wholeheartedly. I thank everyone who helped us organise the conference, who with his or her participation made it an exceptional event.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED PEASANTS' PARTY IN THE POLISH FOREIGN POLICY

Roman MALINOWSKI

The greater diversity of specific features in the countries building socialism, the richer socialism itself, for their experience is valuable for the socialist community as a whole. In Poland, this national specific enriching the entire socialist system is the coalition of three political parties. One of them, the United Peasants' Party, brings its historical experience, achievements and modern political and economic thinking into the strategy of the country's socialist development.

The political system of the Polish People's Republic is based on the constitutional provision that at the basis of people's power is the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. The leading role in this alliance is played by the working class and its party—the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP), the major political force in building socialism. The PUWP carries out its mission in alliance with two other political forces—the United Peasants' Party (UPP) and the Democratic Party (DP).

The alliance of workers and peasants is the most important political guarantee of the advance of our socialist society. The coalition system of exercising power is coordinated by the commission on interaction of the PUWP, the UPP, the DP and other progressive forces in society, which is a characteristic feature of the political system in Poland. In this coalition the UPP has a position in keeping with the status of the peasantry in the social make-up and is the spokesman of this social class, which is displayed also in its protecting the interests of the farmers as a group of people of a similar trade.

The UPP does not claim to be the sole spokesman of the farmers—half a million of them are represented in the PUWP. A common attitude to the matters related to building socialism and to the interests of the whole nation and a common agrarian policy account for the common approach of the PUWP and the UPP to the major goals of agriculture and meeting the material and cultural requirements of the rural population. This was confirmed at the joint Plenary Meeting of the PUWP Central Committee and the UPP Supreme Executive in 1983, which charted the main directions for their common agrarian policy and adopted a programme for developing agriculture and agricultural production complex and achieving the country's self-sufficiency in food by 1990. Both parties expressed unanimity on providing social, economic and political conditions for the development of the countryside and farming. On the joint initiative of the UPP and the PUWP, the provision on farming protection by the state and ensuring its stability was included in the Constitution.

Roman Malinowski is a prominent Polish political figure, Chairman of the Supreme Executive of the United Peasants' Party; in 1985 he was elected Marshal of the Sejm (parliament) of the Polish People's Republic.

Naturally, though there are common views on the main issues, the parties may have different opinions on ways of achieving the goals set and solving economic and social problems.

The UPP history mirrors the history of the peasant movement in our country. It originated and was formed organisationally in the latter half of the 19th century when Poland was deprived of independence, divided among the neighbouring empires: tsarist Russia, Prussia and Austria. This historical background and the prevalence of peasants in the population determined the character of the peasant movement and called for its self-organisation.

The first peasant party was formed in Poland in 1895. It advanced slogans of struggle for national liberation, social justice, education, and social and economic rights for the peasants.

The growing peasant movement contributed a great deal to the struggle for the free Motherland and promoted restoration of the independent state in 1918. For this reason the peasant parties took part in governing the country until 1926, and Vincent Witos, an outstanding leader of the peasant movement, was the country's Prime Minister for three terms between 1920 and 1926. Another outstanding peasant politician, Maciej Rataj was Marshal of the Sejm in 1922-1926.

When Jozef Pilsudski seized power in a coup in May 1926, the peasant parties were most active in the opposition, protesting against the trampling of freedom and democracy and the infringement of civil rights of the peasants. After World War I there were several peasant parties which united in the Peasants' Party amidst the class battles in 1931.

The peasants and their movement helped a great deal in the struggle waged by our people against the Nazi invaders during the occupation. They set up the paramilitary organisation Batalionu Chlopski, which in 1944 had a strength of over 160,000 people. These fighters took an oath of allegiance and conducted several thousand armed actions. Polish peasants fought on all fronts in World War II, joined the ranks of the national Wojsko Polskie (Polish Army), which was being formed on Soviet land, and contributed as much as they could to the common victory over the Nazis won due to the Soviet Union and its heroic people. The peasant leaders were among the members of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa (National Assembly), the Polish underground popular body, and of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity formed in 1944 by its council.

Having experienced a period of split and a difference in opinions on the character of social and political changes to be effected and the future system in the country, the peasant movement united and formed in 1949 the United Peasants' Party. The party approved the goals and principles of building a socialist system, seeing in it an opportunity to exercise real people's power and give effect to the main ideals of the peasant movement.

The coalition system of exercising power is associated with the establishment of People's Poland. The idea of a coalition was carried out already in the years of Nazi occupation, when peasant leaders and democratically minded progressives were represented in the Krajowa Rada Narodowa together with Communists. The interaction of the progressive parties and other advanced forces in the coalition was a major factor of uniting the politically and ideologically differentiated society for rehabilitating the country after war devastation and building the foundations of the socialist economy.

Soon, however, the principle of coalition and partnership was distorted. The tendency of limiting the political activities of the parties that are loyal allies of the PUWP emerged then and began to grow, while the

sphere of their work was reduced to routine economic matters. The UPP was occupied merely with agricultural production measures and was setting forth the PUWP's decisions in the countryside. The reforms carried out in Poland after 1956, comparable in international terms with the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, removed from the agenda the question of disbanding the allied parties.

An important turn in the allied relations between the PUWP and the UPP occurred in the early 1980s. That was caused by the situation in society and the alignment of forces in that hard period that preceded the imposition of martial law. In the situation of acute confrontation and the offensive of the anti-socialist forces the Polish peasantry came out resolutely to oppose the destructive tendencies. The farmers were deeply convinced that their social position and material conditions, for all the difficulties and shortcomings, were a result of socialist transformations. The prestige and influence of the UPP in that hard situation confirmed its worth as an ally and partner of the PUWP.

The UPP today has a membership of about 520,000. Over 66 per cent of it are peasants, most of them working on individual and family farms, and there are members of agricultural production cooperatives and state farms. Almost 25 per cent of the membership are intellectuals, people employed in the state apparatus and the economy, and those working in science, education and culture. A growing group (9 per cent of the membership at present) consists of workers servicing agriculture and those employed in the processing industry and forestry.

"The United Peasants' Party is a political party of the working peasantry. It has grown from the traditions of the years-old peasant movement for national liberation, social emancipation, and the country's independence and the traditions of working for the benefit of the countryside and the whole people and of carrying out activities in the name of building People's Poland." This is how the essence of the UPP is defined in the ideological declaration adopted by its 9th Congress.

Ideological declaration, political programme and other basic documents of the UPP, including the resolutions of its 10th Congress, determine the triple function of the party: a political party expressing and protecting the political, economic, social and cultural interests of the peasants; a creative force taking part in determining, and sharing the responsibility for the destiny of the country in the framework of the executive coalition; and a broadly understood social movement inspiring our people to work for the benefit of the countryside, farming, and the socialist state.

Acting through its members in government bodies and social organisations at all levels, the UPP influences their activity and development, promoting various forms of people's power. After the 1985 elections there are 106 UPP deputies in the Sejm, that is 23 per cent of all its seats. A UPP leader (now Chairman of the UPP Supreme Executive is traditionally elected Marshal of the Sejm. Its representatives head four permanent Sejm commissions: for legislative proposals; agriculture, forestry and the food producing complex; the social policy, health protection and physical culture; and transport and communications.

The UPP has four deputies in the Council of State elected by the Sejm. Of them, two occupy the posts of Vice-President and Secretary of the Council. Peasant representatives are in the Socio-Economic Council under the Sejm, in the Constitutional Tribunal and the Tribunal of State, and in the Supreme Board of Control of the Sejm. UPP members occupy the posts of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission.

The UPP share of seats in the People's Councils ranges between 16 and 19 per cent, depending on the number of the population and its stru-

ecture in terms of social status and trades and professions. In nine of the 49 Voivodships (districts) they have been elected chairmen of the Voivodship National Councils and are appointed heads of eight Voivodships, and deputy heads in 37 of them (the head of a Voivodship is appointed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers following a recommendation of the Voivodship National Council).

The UPP comes out resolutely for the further development and improvement of the coalition system. The PUWP, too, has expressed its will to do this. In a resolution of its 10th Congress it pointed out that the coalition system, based on the alliance of the PUWP, the UPP and the DP, has proved its worth in the history of People's Poland in the hardest time; it is stable and reflects both unity and diversity of our society, meeting its vital interests.

Addressing the 10th UPP Congress, Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, pointed out: "We continue the best traditions of our alliance. And we reject all that has not justified itself and has grown outdated. The coalition is an inalienable unit in the Polish model of socialist democracy, a sound element in the mechanism of our pluralism. It is open to dialogue, concord and cooperation with all forces and groups working for the supreme interests of our people and the socialist state... We see the role of the PUWP in the coalition as an expression of the historical, systematic and class logic of building socialism. We reject conducting, which is good for an orchestra, but not for politics. Genuine alliance requires that the partners be aware of their originality, or their rights and duties, so that their cooperation would be marked by loyalty and mutual respect. Precisely such a coalition, functioning on all levels, and also the strong UPP operating in its framework, effectively serve socialist Poland."

The 10th UPP Congress highly assessed Polish political system, pointing out that socialist pluralism is expressed in the absence of doubts and reservations on the broad spectrum of common questions pertaining to the country's system and its foreign policy and to loyalty to the alliances. But at the same time there are many questions on which the difference of opinion and diversity of proposed solutions serve the interests of the country and release initiative.

We stress that the interests of the peasantry coincide with those of the working class, of all working people. This does not imply unification, nor does it remove contradictions caused by the differentiated character of society and differences in the living and working conditions.

It was also noted at the 10th Congress that socialist pluralism helps to build up the allied coalition and enhance the leading role of the PUWP. The strength of its individual partners makes the coalition stronger, while their weakness makes it weaker. The UPP has always said that its strength is also the strength of the PUWP, and the strength of the PUWP is the strength of the UPP. While united they express the might of the workers and peasants in the socialist state and help it to grow stronger.

Our experience of interaction within the coalition has shown that the practice of political activities, of the development of democracy and of carrying out reforms is ahead of theory. In this situation of the rapid growth of new quality, when new principles are introduced in the functioning of society, there occurs a conflict with theory which interprets the present developments according to the standards of the period of economic stagnation and the time when social thought was ossified. The interpreters of the works of Marxism classics have become slaves to routine and juggle with quotations, trying to squeeze the realities of the

dynamic scientific and technological revolution at the end of the 20th century into the laws and forms corresponding to the realities of the early 20th century, and ignore the new social phenomena if they do not suit the old stereotypes and notions.

In Poland, as in the entire socialist community, large-scale reforms are being effected in home and foreign policy, in the economy, in culture and in the organisation of social life. Thoroughly studied, generalised and explained, they can be a strong argument for the peoples in the non-socialist world as they choose their own path of development, helping them to avoid mistakes.

The 27th Congress of the CPSU, which rejected the thinking and practice of the stagnation period and marked a return to the Leninist principle of analysing the real economic and social situation, gave a great impetus to creative endeavour in the sphere of theory. The innovatory approach to concepts and practice is most valuable, for this means that the entire organisation of the socialist state and society should meet the concrete demands of the scientific and technological revolution, the economic and ideological challenge of the West, and the need to effect a qualitative change in the material conditions in the life of society and to ensure an all-round development of the individual.

The ideologists of new thinking point to the need for renewal and qualitative changes in the present-day communist and working class movement, in the organisation of the life of the state and society. They are champions of partner cooperation of all forces of progress and invite not only the fraternal communist parties but also the parties of Socialists and Social Democrats, Labourites, and members of other trends in political thought and action, all who hold dear the achievements of human spirit, to join in the common search for a concept of world development.

The UPP highly values this direction of strategic thinking among Communists, seeing in it a fresh impetus and opportunities for its own activities and development, a chance to win over allies for socialism from among peasant and other kindred parties which are called centrist, liberal and other democratic parties having peasant roots.

Our memory of the recent past imparts special value to the thought expressed at the meeting of the representatives of parties and movements at the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution: "A more perfect culture of relationships among progressive forces will be required, culture which would make it possible to accumulate all the diversity of experience and help understand the world around us in all its multiformity and contradictoriness. The 'arrogance of all-knowing' is akin to fear for being incapable of solving new problems, and is a sign that the habit of rejecting outright other points of view is tenacious."²

The experience of Poland and its course of socialist renewal, concord and reforms can be fairly valuable for the experience of the socialist system in general. By using the example of our country it is possible to revise the role and significance of a multi-party system in socialist countries. This especially pertains to the functioning of this system by exercising power by a coalition, and to the role of the UPP, which has its own programme of active participation in the development of socialist Poland consonant in the main questions with the programmes of the partners in the coalition. We are an independent peasant party, an ally of the party of the working class in building socialism, and have ceased to be a party of one social group, though we represent, above all, the interests of the peasantry and always give priority to problems of the countryside and farming. The number of people of other social classes and groups is growing in our party. In order really to perform our chief functions, influence decision-making and be aware of its share of responsibility, the UPP should grasp all questions concerning the state and society. In isolation

from these matters it is impossible to represent effectively the interests of the peasants and take part in the work for the benefit of the socialist Motherland and socialism itself.

The greater share in responsibility and government and broader account for problems concerning the state and the whole people confirm the evolution which the peasant parties in the world have gone (or are going) through. This is also a result of the decrease in the rural population and the peasantry, while the position of farming and the food producing complex in the economies of some countries and the world as a whole remains firm and is growing stronger.

The UPP attaches great significance to cooperation in the elaboration and implementation of the foreign policy of Poland, to the extension of contacts with various parties, with the socio-political forces and movements of socialist, capitalist and developing countries. No wonder that this cooperation has increased after 1980, which is seen, among other things, in greater external contacts of the UPP. This is a result of the course of socialist renewal, of restoring partner relations with the PUWP and thus of the role played by our party in foreign contacts. Besides, the development of the international situation, including the situation around Poland, faced the UPP with a special task of countering the processes that are negative for the socialist Motherland.

In that hard period for our country we came out to frustrate the attempts to impose on Poland international isolation and a policy of sanctions, and sought to provide favourable external conditions for overcoming the crisis, winning over new partners, and putting an end to unfounded assessments and stereotypes with regard to Poland.

The continuing stabilisation and democratisation of social and political life and the economic reform increased trust in our country and led to the normalisation of our foreign relations. An immense role in the effectiveness of these processes, in overcoming the crisis in Poland and the hostile attitude of the West was played by the support extended to us by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. That support and confidence in the transformations going on in Poland made it possible to restore our country's broad participation in the international dialogue and cooperation. And the UPP's foreign policy activity was developing on this basis.

This work follows the main principles of Polish foreign policy elaborated by the Communists, radical peasant leaders and other left forces way back before People's Poland even emerged. The main content of that policy is alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and the striving to promote contacts and cooperation with all nations, and the foreign policy backing for the supreme state interests of our people, for security and the development of Poland. At the same time, Poland's foreign policy is a platform for concord among all our people. In this sphere there is no difference of opinion among the main political forces—there is general unanimity and understanding of foreign policy interests among the social forces. The principles of foreign policy, its main directions and goals, our alliances and the place of Poland in the socialist community, in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, were not called in question even at the time of stormy debate in 1980-1981.

Foreign policy activity enables the UPP to be present on the international scene, to spread knowledge about Polish specifics and, above all, to avail itself of the opportunity to express its opinion and advance its position on all the main issues of the modern world. The foreign policy activity of the UPP is an expression of the process of the socialisation of the policy pursued by Poland, which is discussed by the commission on interaction of the PUWP, the UPP, the DP, and other progressive forces

in the country. Polish foreign policy is pursued not only by the government bodies officially set up for the purpose, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also through all forms of foreign contacts, including ties between public, scientific and sports organisations, as well as through tourism and private trips.

In this context, the foreign contacts of the coalition parties have an increasing role to play. This pertains also to the inter-parliamentary activities of the Sejm, in which UPP representatives take an active part. The Sejm's contacts with the parliaments of all countries have become an important area of activity in pursuing Polish foreign policy, playing a special role in periods of difficulties in official contacts. This is expressed in the initiative of holding a meeting of chairmen of the parliaments of European countries, the USA, and Canada in Warsaw. It is called upon to become a weighty element in the broad East-West dialogue. The growing interdependence of countries is seen from the fact that peaceful coexistence is no longer enough today, and there is an insistent need for active and many-sided cooperation for solving regional and global problems of our time.

The foreign policy activity of the UPP is typical of a peasant party in a socialist country, allowing it to conduct dialogue with various political circles, with peasant and other kindred parties. The UPP is expanding contacts with these parties because, first, they are a significant political force influencing decision-making in their countries, and some of them, for instance, the Centre Party of Finland, play a meaningful role, no matter if these parties are in the government or not. Second, this is important for discussing the international situation and major problems facing the world. In this way we can see better the differences dividing us and find easier what we have in common among us, especially on matters concerning the destiny of mankind.

The UPP uses its foreign contacts to propound the philosophy of new thinking in international cooperation, the peace initiatives of our community, and the Soviet Peace Programme. In our meetings and talks with representatives of other parties we invariably emphasise that giving effect to the Polish initiative—known as the Jaruzelski Plan—on arms reduction and confidence-building in Central Europe would be a major step on the path of building a European system of security and cooperation. Besides, the carrying out of the plan's provision on changing the character of the military doctrines of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, making them purely defensive, could have a favourable effect on the international climate.

The UPP is active in promoting ties with parties in other countries, maintaining bilateral contacts with about 50 peasant and kindred parties and organisations, and has what can be described as organised cooperation with 30 of them.

It maintains especially close contacts with the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (BAPU) and the Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany (DFPG). The experience of Poland, Bulgaria and the GDR is a straight answer to the allegations often spread in the West that the Communists look for allies only in the period of struggle for power and "get rid" of them later. Apart from anything else, the practice of Bulgaria and the GDR has shown that the political existence of the peasant parties is justified also when farming is completely socialised.

Cooperation between the UPP and the BAPU began way back before the war with the meeting of Vincent Witos and Alexandre Stamboliiski, outstanding leaders of the peasant movements in Poland and Bulgaria. Under people's power both parties signed an agreement on bilateral cooperation in the international arena.

The UPP's cooperation with the DFPG is of much the same character. It started in 1957, when they joined the hard process of building entirely new relations between the peoples of our countries. In the declaration signed as they marked the 30th anniversary of their relations the leadership of the UPP and the DFPG noted the big positive contribution of their parties in this process and in the promotion of good-neighbour, friendly relations between Poland and the GDR.

Of great significance to the UPP and the entire peasant movement of Poland is cooperation with the Union Council of Collective Farms of the USSR. The political significance of this cooperation exceeds the institutional limits of bilateral relations. A good example of that was the appeal of the CPSU Central Committee to the delegates of the 10th Congress of the UPP, in which it stressed that "the big contribution made by the peasant movement in the revival of the Polish state is known well in the Soviet Union. Relying on these progressive, democratic traditions, the UPP today takes an active part in pursuing the course of socialist renewal and national concord, meeting the vital interests of People's Poland."³ That appeal stimulated a wide promotion of direct ties between representatives of the farms of Poland and the Soviet Union and their organisations in both countries. It will help bring closer together village populations of our countries, enabling them better to understand each other and cooperate in solving the economic and social problems facing the rural area, farming and the food producing complex.

In recent years the UPP has established contacts with peasant organisations in other socialist countries where unions of farm cooperatives are a form of peasants representation. These well-developing ties make possible to obtain fuller information about each other, explain their differences and specific features, share experience and promote cooperation. Such relations are maintained with the farming organisations of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania in Europe, Mongolia, DPRK, Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos in Asia, and Cuba and Nicaragua in Latin America.

We set great store by cooperation with the peasant and kindred parties and organisation in Western countries. Among our traditional partners are the Centre Party of Finland, the Radical Liberal Party in Denmark, the Austrian Peasant Union, the Agrarian Party of Greece, the Italian Peasant Confederation, and the German Peasant Union in the FRG. Recently we established contacts with the Centre Party in Sweden and the Democraten'66 party in the Netherlands.

Our contacts are the closest with the peasant parties and organisations in developing countries, since relations with them are major area of Polish foreign policy. This concerns above all the peasant parties and organisations of Arab countries. Mention should be made here about contacts with the Indian National Congress (I) and the All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Union) and with peasant organisation in other Asian, as well as Latin American and African countries.

Speaking about the foreign policy activity of the UPP, I should mention a few of its other significant features. The UPP exerts influence on the shaping and growth of the interstate and intergovernmental ties of Poland, facilitating their establishment, and creates a favourable climate for them. In the well-known conditions when isolation was imposed on Poland, the foreign policy activity of the UPP often served as the only channel of official political contacts with some countries of the West. Besides, personal contacts of UPP leaders, who took an active part in the hard process of normalising relations with Western countries, are significant for the external contacts of our country.

The UPP members are most energetic in the foreign policy activities of the Polish Sejm and in cooperation conducted in the framework of the

Inter-Parliamentary Union. They display initiative in the work of the societies of Poland's friendship with foreign countries and peoples. This concerns above all the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society. Chairman of the UPP Supreme Executive was elected the head of the council of this society. UPP members are active also in the work of the Polish Peace Committee, in the foreign ties of the Patriotic Movement for National Revival, in cooperation among young people, and in international meetings.

Naturally, we follow with great interest Soviet *perestroika*. Recently, this optimistic and well-disposed interest has been further stimulated due to two major events: the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU and the visit paid by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Poland. It has been generally recognised in Poland that the conference was a major political event not only for the Soviet Union but for all socialist countries, as well as for the entire socialist system as a social integral whole. Of course, first of all it turns a new page in the history of the Soviet Union. But at the same time, due to the tremendous significance and potential of the Soviet Union that forum is bound to make an impact on the international climate and consolidate international trust and cooperation.

There is no doubt that due to *perestroika* and Mikhail Gorbachev's moves in the field of disarmament the world has entered the stage of accelerated positive transformation. The conference fortified this trend while expanding the ideological and political base of *perestroika*. In the internal life of the country it spelled both the dismantling of purely administrative methods in socio-economic structures and the creation of solid foundations for the further democratisation of society and economic reforms.

As we see it a major aspect of *perestroika* is qualitatively new relations between the socialist countries, a departure from the show-off in reciprocal relations and consolidating these relations by establishing the most extensive and honest contacts between nations and promoting socialist economic integration.

In this context we welcome the results of the visit paid by the Soviet leader to Poland. The open and businesslike nature of the visit and his personality, all his meetings in Poland, as well as the talks he held, allow to believe that this is an event of truly historic magnitude for the further development of bilateral cooperation, friendship and alliance.

There is no doubt that the visit to Poland was of global significance as well. The disarmament proposals advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Polish Sejm which were subsequently supported at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation confirmed that in their foreign policy the socialist countries are invariably guided by the principles of new thinking, while sparing no effort in order to solve the problem of ensuring comprehensive security and advocating the right of nations for decent life and promoting cooperation in tackling global problems. These proposals mostly dealing with the task of building a common European home and setting up a centre whose goal would be to mitigate the military threat and forestall aggression were in tune with the Jaruzelski Plan and consonant with the proposal of Marshal of the Sejm to convoke a meeting of the heads of parliament of Europe, the USA and Canada.

At the Soviet-Polish talks and, later on, at the meeting of the WTO Political Consultative Committee great attention was paid to an acute problem of establishing effective global cooperation in tackling ecological problems. And this is quite consonant with the demands put forward at the international meeting of peasant parties which was held last March. Incidentally, the UPP warmly welcomed the kind words by Mikhail Gorbachev about our party which is a vigorous participant in the process of

renewal and promotes Polish-Soviet friendship and the realisation of our foreign policy goals.

We, in Poland, have been working for eight years now for the socialist rehabilitation of the country, a process which is expected to blend socialist principles with our traditions, experience and national aspirations. The United Peasants' Party which is a full-fledged participant in the internal life and foreign policy of Poland makes a major contribution to carrying out transformations, democratisation and reforms.

Our socialist renewal is consonant with *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the Soviet Union. There is one goal and a similar essence lying at the core of the two initiatives: to release the entire potential of socialism, put into practice its diverse ideas and create such social structures which would most fully meet the needs of our nations and be on a par with the requirements of the 20th century.

In general, this century places the same demands on our quite dissimilar countries. Consequently, two conclusions are in order: first, all of us should share the universal values of socialism and common achievements; second, we need different solutions taking into account specific features of each country. The result will be most fruitful: the enrichment of the theory and practice of socialism.

¹ *Trybuna Ludu*, March 23, 1988.

² *Pravda*, Nov 5, 1987.

³ *Dziennik Ludowy*, March 24, 1988.

STATEMENTS BY SECTION CHAIRMEN

(Continued from page 57)

ment of the Centre of Information Technology at the Ministry was the first step in this direction.

We must give serious thought to drawing more women into the diplomatic service.

A promising line besides certification is the filling of definite vacancies on a competitive basis. We have already announced some vacancies. We plan to extend this to other categories of employees. A fair competition between people who have gained adequate knowledge and experience, unlike earlier "contests" between parents and acquaintances, is bound to meet public approval, for it will accord with the principles of social justice.

This, then, is how the trend of personnel requirements may be described in the light of the results of our conference.

Parity and Reasonable Sufficiency

Alexei ARBATOV

Strategic balance and reasonable sufficiency, defence doctrine and military stability—all these are more than the specialised jargon of experts on the development or limitation of arms. The point at issue is notions affecting the deep-going problems of Soviet national security, the prevention of nuclear war, and the prospects for *perestroika*.

1. THE "COMPETITION STRATEGY" CONCEPT

THE TREATY ON eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has opened the way for progress towards fresh major accords on a broad spectrum of disarmament issues. It is impossible, however, to underestimate the complexity of both the disarmament problems on the agenda and the post-INF political situation. Alongside the patent positive changes in the attitude of the public and political circles in the West towards dialogue with the Soviet Union, a certain part of the ruling elite of the USA and countries allied to it has been persistently advancing of late the tenet of the effectiveness of "power politics" regarding the USSR. The idea of strong-arming the USSR is based chiefly on the concept of "competition strategy", which is a modernised version of the traditional policy of "economic exhaustion" of the Soviet Union in the arms race. The point at issue is the purposeful development of weapons a response to which would cost the USSR much more economically, both in relative and in absolute terms.

This approach was eloquently manifest in the report submitted by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy called "Discriminate Deterrence" (January 1988).¹ The commission included such prominent figures as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Albert Wohlstetter, Samuel Huntington, James Holloway, Andrew Goodpaster, John Vessey. The same was advocated, in an ultra-right-wing tone by former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in his *Foreign Affairs* article exalting the principles of power politics.² The same approaches, in more balanced and lower-key terms, were proposed by Senator Sam Nunn in the journal *NATO Review*³ and many other members of the American military-political establishment.

Grounding power politics on "competition strategy", foreign politicians and experts are calling attention above all to the objective economic superiority of the USA over the Soviet Union. Although economic indices are calculated differently, there are, for example, assessments to the effect that at present the gross national product of the United States is twice as high as the Soviet GNP and that the gap will widen even more by the year 2000.⁴ According to other estimates, the USA has an 80 per cent edge over the USSR, and the NATO countries as a whole have an aggregate GNP that is 170 per cent higher than the Warsaw Treaty states, and the figure rises to 220 per cent if Japan is included

in the Western bloc. In terms of manpower, the North Atlantic alliance has a 40 per cent advantage over the Warsaw Treaty.⁵

The full volume of Soviet military expenditure will become a matter of record in the near future, after the historically established arbitrary prices in the civilian and military spheres of the economy are regulated and tabulated. However, taking into account the above advantages of the USA over the USSR and NATO over the Warsaw Treaty, the West is already drawing the conclusion that even if the efforts and expenditures of the sides on maintaining parity are approximately equal in absolute terms, in relative terms they are costing the East double, or even triple, due to its economic lag behind the USA and its allies.

Drawing on the established differences in the economic positions of the two sides and in a bid to do all in its power to increase the burden of the arms race for the USSR with specially oriented military programmes, the West is striving in the foreseeable future to put the Soviet Union before a quite definite dilemma—either reconcile itself to military superiority of the USA and its allies (including formalisation thereof in inequitable arms limitation agreements) or face economic upheavals under the onus of increasingly costly military competition.

2. HOW IS PARITY CALCULATED?

CAN THE SECURITY of the USSR and its allies be ensured at lower cost despite Western attempts to wear out the USSR, which are now manifest in the "competition strategy" concept?

In the context of the reforms under way in the USSR the task is being advanced here of ensuring security chiefly by political rather than military means, the point being accords in the sphere of disarmament. It is now planned to determine military needs according to the principle of reasonable sufficiency. These principled tenets are raising highly complex and acute questions. Specifically, what is the correlation between the material military balance, on the one hand, and politics and diplomacy, on the other, as security factors? Is there an alternative to parity as the foundation of the national security of the USSR and its allies? What alternative is there to parity as the basis of arms reduction talks and as their outcome at each stage of lowering the military potential levels? Lastly, what is the difference and connection between parity (equilibrium) and reasonable (or defensive) sufficiency?

The record has shown, however, that while treaties are of enormous importance in strengthening universal security and lessening the threat of war, they do not automatically lead to reductions in arms spending. If we are talking about reductions in weaponry, especially strategic, a saving is registered through expenditures on the exploitation and material and technical supply of the nuclear weapons being reduced. The bulk of their cost—for development, production and deployment—has already been paid and cannot be recouped with their removal and dismantling (which, incidentally, entail certain expenses, too).

Individual public figures and scholars in the USSR are advancing at present the idea that security does not require equality of military potentials with the other side. Considering the absurdly high levels of destructive arsenals that have been amassed, and the exhausting and destabilising nature of their further buildup for the sake of maintaining parity, it is proposed to proceed on the principle of reasonable sufficiency and drop out of the West-imposed race for parity, which is understood as equality of military potentials.⁶

On the other hand, in a number of statements and articles by Soviet authors (especially military) the point is made that security today can be ensured solely by approximate military equality or parity, no matter

what level it may rise to. Precisely it, these authors contend, is what is used to determine the limit of reasonable sufficiency of the military potential of the USSR and its allies, but on minimal levels, which now depends on the possibility of agreements with the West.⁷ Thus, confinement of military potentials to the limits of reasonable sufficiency is being made dependent on the stand of our partners in talks. It is good if they demonstrate goodwill. But what if they do not? If they do not follow the logic of reasonable sufficiency, are we doomed to a race to increasingly high, ever "less reasonable" levels of parity, which will then steadily lose its functions as a factor of military-political deterrence?

In the former instance concern arises over whether our security is reliable if we give up the parity we achieved with such difficulty and at such expenses and whether the West deals with us as equals. In the latter the reasonable sufficiency principle is equated with parity and made dependent on the West's goodwill, the short supply of which was what raised the issue of an alternative to the increasingly dangerous and wasteful raising of military balance levels. But we shall not rush to conclusions—it is useful in such instances to recheck the basic premises.

Parity is most patently manifest at the highest, global level of the military correlation of forces—the balance of strategic offensive weapons (SOW) between the USSR and the USA. Soviet attainment of parity by the early 1970s was the only possible point of departure for mutual reduction and limitation of arms. Parity has been preserved for almost two decades and is normally understood as an approximate equality between the USSR and the USA in the basic, most graphic indices, specifically, in the number of strategic vehicles and nuclear charges that can be delivered with a single launching (sortie). The USSR and the USA are at present on the verge of a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic weapons, to a level of 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 charges for each side.¹

However, until an agreement is reached, maintenance of equality in SOWs can hardly boil down to preservation of the existing correlation of forces in delivery vehicles and charges. Washington is linking its desire to alter the existing balance in its favour not with increasing the number of delivery vehicles or nuclear charges but with replacing the existing systems of weapons with new, much more effective ones that would provide an opportunity to fulfil new strategic tasks. The main point at issue is greater American chances for delivering a preventive (disarming) strike and waging a "limited and protracted" nuclear war at the global level.

However, inasmuch as the new generation of US strategic weapons (MX ballistic missiles, Trident-2s, Midgetmen, sea- and air-based long-range cruise missiles, B-1B and Stealth heavy bombers) are much costlier and harder to produce than the previous generation, the overall number of delivery vehicles will decrease, while the overall number of warheads will grow at a slower pace, and in the mid-1990s will begin tailing off (due to the mass dismantling of obsolete systems). **

* The correlation between the USSR and the USA in SOW delivery vehicles and nuclear charges as of 1988 stood at 2,490 to 2,260 units and about 10 000 to 14 000-16 000 units respectively (*Pravda*, February 8, 1988).

** Over the longer term, the West wants to tilt the strategic balance through qualitatively new anti-ballistic space-based weapons involving systems operating on new physical principles (laser beam, etc). Although the technical feasibility and the financial and economic acceptability of a wide-scale ABM system with space-based elements seem extremely dubious, research and development in this area will also exert a destabilising influence.

Thus in practice maintenance of parity consists not in increasing, to keep up with the USA, the number of strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads, but in carrying out programmes for modernising strategic forces within approximately the quantitative bounds in response to the development and deployment of new weapons systems by the USA. What is more, even 50 per cent reductions in SOWs and observance of the treaty limiting ABM systems will not rid the Soviet Union of the necessity to take certain measures to ensure its security. Obviously, embodiment of the reasonable sufficiency principle in the present-day context likewise appears highly ambivalent, and we shall return to this matter below.

A balance in armed forces and conventional armaments is perhaps the sphere that is the most difficult for expert analysis. Inasmuch as the point at issue is the European theatre, most Western official and unofficial evaluations boil down to the contention that the Warsaw Treaty has an advantage in virtually all quantitative and geostrategic parameters, while its lag in several qualitative aspects is decreasing noticeably⁸.

According to official Soviet assessments, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty have approximately equal strength in personnel and artillery. The Warsaw Treaty has an edge over NATO in tanks (by approximately 20,000 units) and in defence interceptors. NATO has an advantage in the number of combat-ready formations (divisions and brigades), fighter-bombers (1,400 aircraft more), fighting helicopters, and anti-tank complexes. On the whole, there is an approximate equilibrium or parity in conventional weapons.⁹

The alignment of forces in Europe, an alignment highly complex in the composition of participants, number of elements and multifacetedness of assessments, took shape over four decades under the influence of different factors—hence the asymmetries and disproportions. But evidently it can be characterised as equilibrium only in the most general and approximate appraisals. Why are precisely the existing asymmetries shaping into overall parity? Where are the statistical or dynamic (obtained through modelling possible hostilities) substantiations for this? After all, there are also asymmetries in the naval forces between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO in the seas washing Europe, but in this sphere there is no equilibrium, with NATO's superiority being recognised everywhere.¹⁰

In just the same way, more detailed and well-argued proof to the effect that the Warsaw Treaty's advantage by exactly 20,000 tanks that has taken shape in Europe balances out NATO's edge by exactly 1,400 assault tactical aircraft would be of great importance. Does this Western air force advantage, with due consideration for the role played by aviation in modern warfare, perhaps outweigh the East's superiority in tanks (with due account for the effectiveness of modern anti-tank guided weapons), as well as anti-aircraft defence and other parameters? For example, Air Force Marshal N. M. Skomorokhov noted that "even though we are talking about parity, in several military spheres we lag behind the USA and its NATO allies".¹¹ Opposite views are being voiced by many Western experts as well.

Exactly what alignment of forces of the two blocs in individual categories would correspond to the principle of complete equilibrium in this region will be ascertained only at the outcome of the talks on reductions of armed forces and armaments in Europe. When an agreement is reached there will also be an opportunity to assess the original correlation of forces by way of a reverse count.

For now, what is much more important than general assessments of a military balance in Europe is the clearly formulated stand of the USSR and its allies which was expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev when

he proposed urgently "exchanging all information and assessing it, pinpointing asymmetry in the armaments and troops, and setting about solving problems... It is imperative to sit down at the negotiating table and start eliminating asymmetry and imbalance so as to lessen confrontation drastically."¹²

Whereas the correlation in armed forces and conventional arms is difficult to appraise in all details in military-strategic categories in Europe, this is a task still more complex with regard to the Asia and Pacific region.

On the one hand, in the Far East and in the West Pacific there is confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States with the involvement of the latter's allies (Japan and South Korea), which chiefly encompasses naval and air forces. On the other hand, deployed along the more than 7,000-km long border are land troops and air force of the USSR and the People's Republic of China, which number over 120 divisions, 15,000 tanks and 5,000 aircraft.¹³

Is there a military equilibrium in the Asia and Pacific region to speak of? The overall military potential of all the other powers in this region in most criteria evidently exceeds the Soviet, especially considering the American forces and means that can be transferred from the West Pacific and from US territory. However, China is not allied with the USA, Japan and South Korea, and to a certain extent these countries oppose one another militarily and politically. At the same time all these states officially voice the view of the existence of "Soviet military superiority" over each of them.

The above assessments suggest the following conclusion of no small importance—a military equilibrium or parity can be spoken of only with respect to one, albeit the most essential detail, of the overall global military-strategic picture. The point at issue is the correlation between the strategic offensive weapons of the USA and the USSR, although here, too, a balance, like the tendencies threatening it, are going through increasingly qualitative rather than quantitative (number of delivery vehicles and charges) changes. At other levels, above all in Europe and the Asia and Pacific region, the formula for battlefield nuclear weapons, armed forces and conventional arms is too complicated and contains too many unknown quantities to speak *a priori* about absolute parity. Also ambiguous, by implication, are our military needs as one of the components of ensuring security.

To assess the burden of military confrontation in the theatres of Eurasia it is necessary to reassess the view of conventional weapons as being less expensive than strategic nuclear systems. Several types of conventional weapons are comparable with strategic ones even in terms of the cost of one type. For example, one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier costs over 3,000 billion dollars—more than the most expensive strategic Ohio-class submarine. The cost of a modern cruiser is as high as 800 million dollars, that of a multipurpose submarine 700 million dollars, a fighter 40 million dollars, and a tank 3 million dollars a unit.¹⁴ More importantly, conventional weapons are much more diverse in types, are produced and deployed in much larger consignments than strategic systems, wear out faster during manoeuvres and everyday use, are replaced with new modifications more frequently, and require much more resources for maintaining the personnel and for material and technical supply. US expenditure for maintaining and developing the armed forces and conventional weapons annually comprises upwards of 65 per cent of the military budget. Strategic offensive weapons, the enormous cost of individual programmes notwithstanding, account for less than 15 per cent of annual military budget allocations. (The SDI

programme now consumes slightly over one per cent of annual military budget outlays.)

The main economic onus of maintaining the USSR's military capability at the current level is linked not with strategic offensive systems but with armed forces and armaments in the European and Asian theatres and in the surrounding seas and oceans. This means that the chief economic costs of the arms race are conditioned not only and perhaps not so much by the task of maintaining parity as the basis of security as by the specifics of the strategic and operative situation and by assessments of military needs at the regional level.

Proceeding from the situation that has taken shape, adherents of "competition strategy" are more than counting on Western predominance in general economic indices, the figures which have been adduced above. The stake of the adherents of "competition strategy" at present is being made in decisive measure on three circles of economic attrition of the Soviet Union in the arms race: geostrategic, operational-strategic, and organisational-technical. According to the proponents of an arms buildup, it is they as an additional triple burden that should augment the role of the objective economic and other advantages of the USA and its allies and ultimately tip the scales in favour of forces opposed to the Soviet Union.

3. CIRCLE ONE—GEOSTRATEGY

THE OBVIOUS conclusion to be drawn from the above considerations is that the main difficulty in ensuring the security of the USSR and its allies lies not in the difficulties involved in maintaining military balance worldwide. At the root of the problem is the fact that in the situation that has been taking shape in recent decades the Soviet Union has, drawing primarily on its own resources, to take part in military confrontation simultaneously with many opponents (which include all the other major world powers situated near or far from Soviet borders), and in the entire range of armed forces and armaments.

With the United States there has been competition in strategic offensive weapons (in future, if events develop in an unfavourable direction, measures will have to be taken in response to the American space-based ABM systems). With the USA and third nuclear powers there has been rivalry in intermediate-range weapons* and diverse tactical nuclear weapons on land, sea and in the air. In size of land troops and quality of their armament, as well as in tactical aviation we have to counter NATO in the European direction and also the USA and other powers in Asia. In naval forces, including the ocean-going fleet, increasingly intensive competition is developing in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans with the USA and the naval powers of Western Europe and Japan. What is more, the USSR traditionally devotes much more attention than does the West to maintaining and perfecting the country's wide-scale system of anti-aircraft defence, and, in accordance with the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems is preserving and modernising the anti-aircraft defence system around Moscow.

* Even after implementation of the INF Treaty nuclear forces of third countries and medium bombers of the USSR will remain.

** This article leaves out with another problem which does not fully fall within the framework of the global military-strategic alignment of forces and deserves a special study, namely, assistance rendered by the socialist countries to the national liberation movement. However, attempts at economic attrition of the USSR are apace along these lines, too. Hence, specifically, the desire of certain Western circles to hamper a settlement of the situation around Afghanistan and to drag on the war in

Still another conclusion obtains from this. The underlying cause of the increasing topicality of the dilemma of military security and the Soviet economic development outlook is conditioned not only and not so much by the fact that the USSR is inferior in economic and scientific and technological potential. The main thing is the specifics of the geostrategy of the present-day military confrontation in which the Soviet Union has come into play on many fronts. In such a situation, even full equality with the USA in economic indices, in all spheres of science and technology, could not have seriously changed the essence of the problem. Most likely this would have resulted solely in bigger military efforts and greater cohesion among the opposing grouping of states. If, say, the United States were in our shoes, it would be facing nearly the same problems we are encountering today.

A certain divergence emerged in the 1970s between the real economic and political priorities of the national security of the USSR, on the one hand, and its military-strategic course, on the other. This fact was brought out in no uncertain terms in the documents of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: "Our foreign policy, too, has born the imprint of dogmatism and a subjectivist approach. It was allowed to lag behind the fundamental changes in the world, and fresh opportunities for lessening tensions and promoting understanding among peoples were not taken advantage of in full. Seeking military-strategic parity, we did not always draw in the past on the possibilities for ensuring national security through political means and as a result allowed ourselves to be drawn into the arms race, which could not but affect the country's socio-economic development and its international position."¹⁵ This conclusion is all the more just with regard to the military situation at lower but still more expensive levels than strategic parity. In other words, the optimal correlation between the economic, international-political and military foundations of security was broken. The latter developed increasingly at the expense of and to the detriment of the first two.

The correlation between the strategic offensive potentials of the USSR and the USA remains the centrepiece of global military-strategic confrontation as the foremost aspect of security. However, a disproportionately large part of Soviet resources were channelled into confrontation in nuclear and conventional armed forces and armaments in the Eurasian theatres, as well as with the West on the seas and oceans, including near the conflict-ridden areas in the developing world. Evidently, all this is what inspired militarist circles in the USA and other countries to take up "competition strategy", hoping to use the arms race to wear out the USSR economically and isolate it politically. The military-political anomaly of the situation that was taking shape was manifest in the fact that never in its history did the Soviet Union have such a mighty defence potential as in the late 1970s-early 1980s, yet our concern over security heightened constantly in the last decade.

Historical analogies are always arbitrary and applicable to a limited extent. However, it is not fortuitous that P. Kennedy's book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Empires* has drawn great attention in US political quarters of late.¹⁶ The author draws on the examples of the Hapsburg Empire, Napoleonic France, Britain, the "queen of the seas", and Kaiser Germany to show how the great powers grew strong and then fell great powers whose military might ultimately overstrained their economic possibilities and forced other states to unite and deal with the most powerful opponent through joint efforts. Its fall occurred more often than

that country, which has already cost the Soviet Union 50 000 killed and wounded and 50 billion rubles.

not as a result of coalition wars. Nuclear weapons rule out today such a path of restoring the balance of forces; war has ceased being a continuation of politics by violent means. But war has "avenged" politics for this, the latter having been to an unprecedented extent militarised and subordinated to military-strategic plans and considerations. The arms race has largely arrogated itself the functions of former wars, undermining as it does the economic foundations and political security of powers, albeit more slowly and with less blood, but steadily and with an incomparably greater risk for the whole of humanity.

The experience of the past three years, however, rather amply bespeaks the fact that with the new political thinking, the unshakeable course of the Soviet Union for domestic reform, and its flexible, far-sighted foreign policy, unfavourable trends can be slowed down considerably in the foreseeable future and then brought to a halt—even if the West remains ahead in a number of objective economic and other parameters.

Neutralising the threat to security at the most important, strategic level of the military balance would make it possible to save considerable resources and reduce spending on secondary areas of military confrontation. An optimal solution to this problem not only will not lessen security but can greatly strengthen it by cutting short the dangerous and wasteful spiral of the ongoing military confrontation between the USSR and all the major world powers in all categories of armed forces and armaments.

The enormous quantitative levels and the destructive force of conventional arms and armed forces and their saturation with tactical nuclear ammunition make extremely unlikely a lengthy wide-scale conventional war between the major military-political alliances in Europe or the Far East without it rapidly escalating into a wide-scale nuclear exchange.

Proceeding from this, requirements regarding the size of tactical nuclear ammunition (which has long overstepped the bounds of local "superdestruction") and quantitative levels of conventional armed forces in Europe can be reduced substantially. This approach would open the way to considerable mutual reduction of the armed forces and armaments of the two opposing alliances.

In line with the principle of reasonable sufficiency, there is every cause to work towards reducing the military confrontation level in the Sino-Soviet border area up to complete demilitarisation. Of course, this should not be detrimental to the security of other countries (Mongolia, Vietnam, India). Such a troop reduction in the context of the existing accords with China and without any preliminary conditions from any side would exert a great positive influence on Sino-Soviet relations and on security in Asia.

At the same time so sweeping an overhaul of the geostrategy of the current military confrontation would undermine the main stake of "competition strategy" proponents, namely, attrition of the USSR in every area of military confrontation. In the long term, the Soviet Union's security can be ensured much more reliably by improving political relations with neighbouring states and developing economic cooperation with them, the path to which would be opened by a considerable reduction of military confrontation and by its full elimination in a number of regions.

4. CIRCLES TWO AND THREE—STRATEGIC PLANS AND MILITARY PROGRAMMES

RELIABLE DETERRENCE to a probable nuclear aggression through maintenance of strategic equilibrium is a definite priority of our security and defence policy, strategy and armaments programmes. Until nuclear

weapons are eliminated fully everywhere, the above task remains the main earnest of security and should be accomplished, no matter what the expenses involved. Reliable defence capability of the Soviet people and its socialist gains and those of the USSR's allies remains our chief priority, and here cost is no object.

However, although security is priceless, the cost of its ensuring is ultimately expressed in quite definite expenditures of material and manpower resources. Heightening the effectiveness of their utilisation, improving the strategic "capital-output ratio" is an imperative in today's *perestroika*, where greater emphasis is being placed on the economic and political aspects of security as envisaged in the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th Party Conference.

The definite need for reliable defence does not deny, rather it enhances the importance of the reasonable sufficiency principle. Indeed, how many missiles, aircraft, tanks, ships and soldiers are needed for adequate defence? A simple comparison with the forces of probable enemies does not provide an answer; after all, forces and weaponry are deployed not for a "competition at an exhibition" but to execute definite combat missions in the event of war. For this reason the question that has been posed has to be answered with another question: sufficiency for what, for the accomplishment of what strategic and operative tasks?

The present-day military doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty makes the inadmissibility of war, conventional as well as nuclear, its centrepiece. Defence, not offensive actions, is the cornerstone of the strategy and operative planning. The sufficiency principle presupposes realistic prerequisites regarding how probable war is, how it can start, what goals are attainable in it (considering present-day military-technical realities and the destructive power of weaponry), and how great the "reliability margin" for executing tasks, with due account for unforeseen circumstances, should be.

Today the reasonable sufficiency principle is being made the cornerstone of the Soviet approach both to reduction of nuclear arms in conjunction with the other powers and to the maintenance thereof at the requisite level in the event new agreements are not concluded within very short time limits. However, the point at issue is not, so much the quantitative levels of strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear charges as the combat tasks of the USSR's strategic forces, the capacity to execute which ensures reliable prevention of a nuclear attack. Defensive adequacy at this level, as General of the Army Dmitri Yazov, USSR Minister of Defence, has pointed out, is ensured by the capacity to do unacceptable damage to an aggressor with a retaliatory blow in any conditions of a nuclear attack.¹⁷

Therefore, what we are specifically talking about is how great is unacceptable damage for the USA, the likelihood of which would unconditionally forestall a first strike by it. According to some estimates, 400 megaton-class nuclear charges can destroy 80 per cent of the industrial potential of each of today's major powers (killing off as much as 30 per cent of their population in the process), let alone the secondary consequences of a nuclear exchange of that magnitude. The Soviet SOW system today numbers some 10,000 nuclear charges. Considering their various yields and other factors, the above level of losses can probably be inflicted by just 10 to 20 per cent of the available Soviet strategic means. The conclusion is that the strategic balance has an enormous "safety margin" against attempts to reach a real advantage by resorting to unpunished nuclear aggression.

However, statement of these factors should not be perceived as an appeal to reduce strategic forces unilaterally. It is all the more impossible to disregard the political role of nuclear equilibrium, which

is what remains the point of departure for SOW reduction talks. However, obtaining from the above considerations of sufficiency is the posing of the issue both of far-reaching steps towards mutual SOW reductions or measures in response to American military programmes if the USA would not agree to such an accord.

Thus, the view is being expressed that within the framework of the present approximate quantitative parity, the creation of armaments analogous to the ones the USA is developing is hardly conducive to the maintenance of the equilibrium and is not at all in tune with the principle of defensive adequacy. The American systems are designed to serve the strategy of a first, disarming (pre-emptive) strike and the force of a Soviet retaliatory blow and the waging of a "limited and protracted" nuclear war. Thus, according to the logic of reasonable sufficiency retaliatory measures should not pose an analogic threat to the USA (otherwise the impetus for a first strike will grow on both sides), but ensure the neutralisation of the American threat through greater viability and stability of the Soviet strategic forces and their warning, control and communication systems.

Implementation of such measures is promoted by the circumstance that invulnerability does not have to be ensured for all strategic weapons in full. They are not being set the task of destroying the US strategic forces, which furthermore would now hypothetically be launched in a first strike. Suffice it to guarantee the viability of merely a certain part of them required for causing unacceptable damage to the aggressor in a retaliatory strike. Precisely this will be the factor for preventing a sudden strike until the nuclear armaments are completely scrapped through agreements by the great powers.

As it was shown before, the strategic arms race is taking place chiefly in terms of existing weapons systems being replaced by newer ones, with the USA invariably initiating these cycles. However, while taking steps in response to maintain parity, the Soviet Union is, judging from the information that is available, introducing many more types and modifications of weapons systems, producing them in large batches and replacing them for newer models more frequently. For example, according to the Joint Statement adopted at the Washington meeting in December 1987, it is clear from the tabulation rules for warheads on the missile systems of both sides that for the six US SOW systems (Poseidon, Trident-1, Trident-2, Minuteman-2, Minuteman-3 and MX) the Soviet Union has 13 missile systems (SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-17, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, SS-N-23, SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-24 and SS-25).¹⁸

Contrary to the widespread Western propaganda claim, the above facts and figures do not attest to Soviet ambitions to superiority. Evidently, they reflect a certain shift between the deployment of the Soviet and American programmes, and the development specifics of the USSR's strategic forces. These factors do show, however, that by virtue of established practice the Soviet Union most likely bears a greater relative economic burden in maintaining the balance than does the USA due to the latter's attempts to tilt it. And this despite its substantial strategic balance "safety margin", which in principle should benefit the side which strives to seek it while impeding attempts to break the parity.

For us consideration of the above elements opens up a possibility, irrespective of the readiness and desire of the other side to reach agreement on disarmament and contrary to plans to exhaust the Soviet Union economically, to reliably ensure national security at lower costs. The saving through quantity of arms and diversity of their types could be used to raise quality. This fact was pointed out by Mikhail Gorbachev

in his report at the 19th Party Conference, when he stressed that the effectiveness of our defence development must henceforth be ensured primarily through qualitative parameters—in relation to hardware and military science, as well as in the composition of the armed forces. It should guarantee the reliable security of the Soviet Union and its allies and be implemented strictly in accordance with the USSR's defence doctrine.¹⁹ This is the most effective way of making the US attempts to alter the alignment of nuclear forces in its favour not only strategically hopeless but also economically prohibitive. Unquestionably, the undermining of American hopes for economic attrition of the USSR in this sphere, in addition to other considerations, would also substantially heighten interest in equitable mutual limitations and reductions in the United States.

The hopes to wear out the USSR economically are mostly linked with the operational, strategic, organisational and technical specifics of maintaining a military balance in armed forces and conventional armaments.

Contrary to Western propaganda allegations, NATO has patently offensive elements of armed forces not only in its navies and tactical aviation but also in its land forces. However, against the backdrop of developing the reasonable sufficiency principle it would perhaps be best to neutralise this threat not through the advantage of the 20,000 tanks which the Warsaw Treaty has in Europe but through diverse highly effective anti-tank systems. All the more so since to balance out NATO's advantages of 1,400 strike tactical aircraft and fighting helicopters, fighters and anti-aircraft rockets and artillery would be better than tanks.

Military experts correctly point out that the tank, like any other weapon system, can be used both for offensive and defensive purposes. This is borne out by highly important episodes from the Second World War, such as the Battle of the Kursk Bulge in 1943. Referring to the history of the past world war and a number of local wars after it, some experts contend that an enemy will hardly be routed entirely through defensive actions alone and that the mighty potential of a counter-offensive is imperative for defence.²⁰

These arguments are based on the grim historical experience which we obtained at an enormous price. However, this experience requires constant creative development in the light of the realities of the nuclear-space age and the present-day military balance. Today war cannot be won by an offensive either, if we take this to mean "complete rout of the enemy". No war between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty—either nuclear or conventional—can be won at all. Even if a war involving conventional weapons were to begin, it would become a catastrophe for Europe in and of itself and moreover would quickly and inevitably develop into a global nuclear cataclysm. Neither wide-scale offensive actions within the framework of a theatre of hostilities nor a protracted global war between East and West are realistic at all. It is for this reason that the prevention of war on the basis of reliable defence is the overriding goal of the Warsaw Treaty's military doctrine.

The West is waging a campaign concerning the threat posed by the "offensive might" of the Warsaw Treaty which rests mainly on its tank advantage. However, despite the impressive possibilities of the tractor-building and automobile industry of the USA and Western Europe, NATO has for many years not even bothered to try and catch up to the Warsaw Treaty in tank quantity. It prefers investing in land-, helicopter- and other aircraft-based guided anti-tank missiles, forcing the other side to constantly modernise its tank fleet. If foreign statistics carried in the Soviet press are to be believed, the USSR has a total of 53,000

tanks, and the other Warsaw Treaty countries another 14,000.²¹ Then what amount of resources should be spent and in what quantity should tanks be produced to modernise such a fleet?

Evidently, the level of reasonable sufficiency as applied to conventional armed forces should be determined by the task of ensuring an adequate defence potential to prevent a potential aggressor from counting either on a breakthrough deep inside the territory of the Warsaw Treaty countries in rapid conventional warfare or on impunity in the event the war escalates into a nuclear conflict.

As to the potential for counteroffensive, there would be, probably, a lesser demand on its strength in case of a reliable front-line defence. Indeed, during the Great Patriotic war the Soviet Union won the victory due to counteroffensives in all the fronts. But such operations would not have been called for and huge losses avoided, were it not for the fact that in 1941—1942 the Germans pushed on to Moscow and the Volga because of our unpreparedness for war, Joseph Stalin's crude political and strategic miscalculations and 1937 repressions against the army.

And had the two sides rebuilt their armed forces on principles of defence, no attack would be possible at all, and so there would be no need of a counteroffensive potential. To dash the plans of power politics proponents in the USA and elsewhere it is imperative to break the three circles of the economic attrition through arms race and cast off the triple burden borne by ensuring Soviet national security, a burden conditioned by the purposeful policy of the West and its attempts to take advantage of some of our traditional approaches to these problems. These measures are sure to galvanise the anti-militarists and peace supporters in the West as well, which will substantially impede the on-going buildup of the military might of the USA and its allies.

The *perestroika*, which has encompassed all spheres of Soviet society, including foreign policy and the USSR's course for disarmament, is also necessarily being advanced in the area of Soviet military doctrine, strategy and military development. Democratisation in decision-making and greater openness in discussing military issues are, too, prerequisites for effective and sweeping reforms as well. Their goal is to bring military policy more in line with economic and international political realities.

This author, to be sure, makes no claim at presenting "the one and only correct" point of view. His deliberations are but fuel for thought and for a constructive discussion of the subject that for so many years was treated as "classified". Those years are now past, and many security issues seem worthy of reviewing anew in the spirit of the new time and new political thinking.

Accords on disarmament issues are a paramount area of the security strategy and of changes in our political relations with other powers. As far as their economic benefits are concerned, this hinges to a greater extent on the revamping of military policy, which will determine the redistribution of resources saved as a result of disarmament measures.

However, confining oneself to this conclusion would imply underestimating the dialectical connection between a revamping of military policy and the policy of disarmament. Without the former the latter will inevitably encounter mounting difficulties. The foes of disarmament are certain not to fail to take advantage of any pretext to deadlock the talks once again. Conversely, military reform, materialisation of the principles of non-offensive defence and reasonable sufficiency will ensure extensive progress in disarmament and implementation of the principles of mutual and universal security.

- ¹ *Discriminate Deterrence Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy*, Washington, January 1988
- ² *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No 4, Spring 1988, p 716
- ³ *NATO Review*, No 3, June 1987
- ⁴ See *Discriminate Deterrence*, p 7
- ⁵ Compiled from *Military Balance 1986-1987*, IISS, London
- ⁶ See А. Адамович, Г. Шахназаров. *Новое мышление и инерция прогресса Дружба народов*, No. 6, 1988, pp 192-193
- ⁷ See В. Г. Куликов *Доктрина защиты мира и социализма*, Moscow, 1988, p 82
- ⁸ See Senator C. Levin, *Beyond the Bean Count*, Washington, 1988, pp 15 16
- ⁹ *Правда*, Feb 8, 1988; *Whence the Threat to Peace* Moscow 1987, p 86
- ¹⁰ See *Whence Threat to Peace*, Moscow, 1982, pp 86 88
- ¹¹ *Литературная газета*, May 11 1988, p 10
- ¹² *Правда*, Dec 12, 1987
- ¹³ See *Разоружение и безопасность. 1987, Гжегодник*, Moscow, 1988 p 485
- ¹⁴ See "Effects of Weapons Procurement Stretch Outs on Costs and Schedules", CBO Nov 1987, pp 43 57
- ¹⁵ *Правда*, May 27, 1988
- ¹⁶ P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Empires* New York 1987
- ¹⁷ *Правда*, July 27, 1987
- ¹⁸ *Правда*, December 12, 1987
- ¹⁹ *Правда* June 29, 1988
- ²⁰ *Moscow News* No 8, 1988, *Красная звезда*, Sept 25, 1987
- Правда*, October 13, 1987.

VIEW FROM BUDAPEST

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a new level if the grassroots in the two countries take an active part in the solution of this task, and have a bigger say in policy-making.

Milestones in taking advantage of the new opportunities for cooperation were the Budapest visit by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolai Ryzhkov, the recent working visit to Moscow by General Secretary of the HSWP, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Hungary, Károly Grósz, and his talks with General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev. This meeting stated that the Soviet-Hungarian relations are marked by growing mutual understanding and confidence, active study of each other's experience, and growing exchange of information. Both sides reaffirmed their determination to deepen and improve our relations and set the immediate priorities, especially in the economic field.

To sum up, I would like to stress the main thing. Today both objective and subjective conditions are favourable for the mutually beneficial Hungarian-Soviet cooperation becoming a major motive force in the qualitative development of our societies.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Javier PÉREZ DE CUELLAR

Secretary-General of the United Nations

INTRODUCTION

The role of the United Nations in world affairs is to respond to the needs of its Member States and its peoples, at the same time that it is adapting to historical change. This double obligation and this two-fold ability are what make the United Nations a unique intergovernmental organization. No international organization has ever had the broad membership the United Nations has, nor has the pace of political, economic and social transformation ever been so rapid.

The world is changing so quickly today that change itself has become a subject for study. The nations and peoples of the world are interdependent and the waves of change send out their ripples to every corner of the earth. In this situation, the United Nations remains the only international organization capable of co-ordinating global perspectives, and the United Nations Charter remains the most universally accepted document for setting the legal framework for contemporary international affairs. Despite its shortcomings, the United Nations is indispensable.

A FORUM FOR MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

The United Nations provides a forum for debate and negotiation for the representatives of 159 member states, and for observers from non-member states, international organizations and liberation movements recognized by the General Assembly. Nations which do not have bilateral representation, or may be experiencing difficulties in bilateral relationships, are able to talk to each other at the United Nations. The United Nations also provides vital facilities and services that enable nations and peoples to communicate and to negotiate. The meeting services, interpretation, translation and reproduction facilities of the United Nations are unprecedented in the history of international diplomacy.

The United Nations has a unique perspective on world affairs. With a membership of 159 States, it can observe and discuss international issues and make widely-supported recommendations for advancing the common welfare. Each year the United Nations General Assembly considers a broad range of items, and takes into account views from States of varying political, economic, social, cultural, philosophical, and ideological persuasions. In many instances, the General Assembly adopts its recommendations on those items by consensus.

Through this process of multilateral diplomacy, the World Organization enables the international community to assemble, analyze and evaluate data; understand issues and problems; and to clarify the options available to States, jointly and severally, for dealing with those

issues. The United Nations enables States and international organizations to share their experiences in dealing with common problems. What we have at the United Nations, therefore, is a continuing process for recording the collective experiences and insights of the international community, and for fashioning, for future action, policies and strategies that are informed and inspired by this knowledge. The United Nations is especially constituted to offer intellectual leadership.

It is in this way that we are able to deal with the new social problems that arise from rapid economic and technological transformations. It is in this way that we are able to respond to serious problems such as the growing threat of drug abuse, trafficking in narcotics and the AIDS pandemic. Without the United Nations, it would be difficult to find an international organization to co-ordinate the highest levels of knowledge and experience.

From the stock of collected data, shared experiences and policy recommendations offered over a period of time, the United Nations can develop a new international ethos for the conduct of States and peoples. It is in that manner that a common concern for peace, development and human rights has entered the international ethos. We take pride in the fact that we have fashioned a new international morality against gross violations of human rights and developed an international legal code providing various forms of guarantees of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In the same vein, the magnitude of the achievements of the United Nations in codifying, and progressively developing international law has no precedent in history. On land and sea, as well as in outer space, the United Nations, in the past 40 years, has helped to construct a legal network to regulate a wide range of transnational activities and to set forth international laws, rights and duties. International security, in its widest sense, fundamentally depends upon respect for, and compliance with, international law.

PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

For 43 years, since the inception of the United Nations, we have avoided a world war. The United Nations, with its continuous message of peace, with its framework for the pacific settlement of disputes, with its numerous methods for maintaining communication among nations, with its fact-finding missions and the use of the Secretary-General's good offices, has played a valuable role in the avoidance of a world conflagration. While the United Nations is not able by itself to impose peace in a situation where the belligerents refuse to cooperate, it is certainly available to assist in the maintenance of international peace and security, and it remains dedicated to the goal of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war. For 43 years it has made a difference. And if its role in the peace process has not been omnipotent, it has always been undeniably constructive. Those who chasten the World Organization for not having totally prevented conflict seldom pause to consider how much worse the situation might be if there had been no United Nations.

Of course, there are still regional conflicts, but wherever the parties involved have been willing to enlist United Nations assistance, the prospects for settlement have been increased. In the Middle East, Security Council resolutions still form the soundest basis for a just and durable solution. In the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the good offices of the Secretary-General provide one of the few means of communication respected by both sides. And in the situation relating to Afghanistan, the personal representatives of successive Secretaries-General played

an integral part in the process that led to the recent conclusion of the Geneva Accords. The critical role of the United Nations as peace-keeper and peace-maker is continually evolving. Support for that role among Member States of the Organization is growing.

At the same time, we must admit that the Security Council, the primary organ of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security has, over the years, all too often found itself unable to take decisive action to resolve conflicts. Its resolutions have often been defied or ignored by those who feel strong enough to do so. Frequently, the Council has seemed unable to generate the support and influence necessary to ensure that its decisions are respected, even when those decisions are taken unanimously.

There has, however, been a determined effort by the members of the Security Council recently to concert their efforts on behalf of peace. With greater co-operation among the members of the Council, and the permanent members in particular, the Council might find a means for keeping an active watch on potentially dangerous situations and, where necessary, initiate discussions with the parties concerned *before* a crisis is reached. That way it might be possible to defuse a crisis before it degenerates into violence.

The Council should, therefore, consider streamlining its practices and procedures, so that it can act swiftly and decisively in crises. For example, when a potentially dangerous situation is identified, a fact-finding mission might be quickly dispatched both to gain a detailed knowledge of the problem and to signal to the interested parties the concern of the United Nations as a whole. The Council might also consider establishing a multilateral nuclear alert centre to reduce the risk of a fatal misinterpretation of unintentional nuclear launchings or, in the future, the chilling possibility of isolated launchings by those who might clandestinely gain access to nuclear devices.

For my part I have recently established within my Office, a new unit to help me to identify situations which are likely to engender conflict or provoke a humanitarian crisis. I am determined, within the possibilities available to me under the Charter, to do whatever I can to help prevent conflicts.

I am keenly aware that, ultimately, the prevention of conflicts can be greatly advanced by global disarmament. I am, therefore, encouraged by the agreements that have recently been signed between the United States and the Soviet Union—agreements reached out of a conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. This fact, as well as the outcome of the 1988 third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, must provide a stimulus for negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons further and to conclude agreements on other disarmament issues and other categories of weapons.

It is important to continue progress towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, perhaps accompanied by the establishment of an international seismic monitoring network to verify compliance with such a treaty; to promote regional nuclear-free zones; to finalize the drafting of a convention of chemical weapons; and to prevent an arms race in outer space. Work should also continue to strengthen regional measures in support of peace and disarmament, including the designation of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as confidence-building measures such as those adopted by the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

Agreements at the multilateral level for confidence-building and for arms limitation or reduction will require multilateral verification. This is an area in which the United Nations could make a significant con-

tribution. It could provide assistance in the implementation of verification provisions under multilateral treaties in ways agreeable to the parties concerned. It could co-ordinate international deliberations on the questions of verification and provide technical advice and research. On the whole, the involvement of the United Nations in the search for generally acceptable and effective forms of verifying compliance with agreements and the expansion of its advisory and information functions could make possible the establishment, in the future, of mechanisms of verification under its auspices. Furthermore, the use of United Nations Military Observers and United Nations peace-keeping forces offer a major potential in monitoring and verifying compliance with agreements reached for settlement. This is an area where we would welcome the creative potential of thinkers and experts devoted to the cause of disarmament.

DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

In dealing with development and social progress the United Nations provides a forum for considering issues of concern to Member States, for the early identification and analysis of emerging problems and for the harmonization of the actions of nations. It also provides a multilateral framework for supporting national development efforts, in particular through its operational activities for development.

The Organization's activities are informed by a genuine appreciation that all development problems are different facets of the same reality, and that those problems pose a threat to all countries and are urgent. The United Nations seeks to provide the stimulus, the forum and the intellectual leadership for formulating a global economic framework to ensure the development and growth of all countries.

The need to ensure sustainable development, which includes preserving the earth's ecological balance, will be one of the central themes for the coming decades. The earth's ecological balance faces challenges from all sides. Desertification and deforestation and the threats of national and transnational pollution and contamination will increase unless our awareness of the interrelationship among resources, development, environment and population is translated into active policies for national and international development. Widespread poverty and excessive consumption are risks for the stability of the environment. Balanced growth, judicious consumption and the satisfaction of basic needs will be indispensable elements of sustainable development in the future.

The achievement of sustainable development will depend upon our approach to the complex and critical relationship between disarmament, development and international security. Disarmament and international security go together. Dynamic economic and social development would become much more possible by re-deploying human and material resources that are now devoted to armaments. And a worldwide system of international security will be greatly enhanced by adequate economic and social development.

The concern of the United Nations that development should be aided by arms limitation is rooted in the Charter, in the wake of the devastation of World War II. Article 26 of the Charter speaks of promoting "the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources". The United Nations is faithful to that goal. It has always been concerned with development, and as the number of developing countries in the United Nations has swelled, more and more ener-

gies and resources of the United Nations have been directed to solving the problems of those countries.

In the same spirit, social and economic progress must be an integral part of any development strategy. While there has been significant achievement in the 20 years since the proclamation of the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, much remains to be done. In recent years the international community has adopted international plans of action in the fields of social welfare, aging, disabled persons and youth. These international instruments have mapped out comprehensive programmes against which nations can measure their efforts towards improving social conditions for specific groups. At the international level the United Nations continues to urge the implementation of the measures set out in these basic instruments.

Important development programmes have also been elaborated by the specialized agencies in their respective spheres. For example, the World Decade for Cultural Development (1988-1997) is proceeding under the auspices of the United Nations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The International Labour Organization is elaborating programmes to deal with the critical issues of employment. The World Health Organization has established the goal of health for all by the year 2000, and the Global Strategy for the prevention and control of AIDS forms the basis for a United Nations system-wide effort to extinguish this disease, which has reached pandemic proportions and threatens devastating economic and social consequences.

The United Nations will also maintain its efforts to eradicate drug abuse. Action against illicit drug use is essential to the well-being of all people, especially young people, to the international control of crime and, in many cases, to the security of individual nations. The Declaration of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, proclaimed in 1987, was a welcome expression of the political will of nations to combat the drug menace in all its forms. The United Nations is making practical recommendations on the basis of the framework provided by the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control, with the ultimate goal of strengthening action and co-operation at the national, regional and international levels.

All these actions by the United Nations are part of a broad effort to promote the welfare of all peoples. International co-operation for development remains in the forefront of the Organization's goals. Hunger, poverty, disease, unfulfilled promise and wasted potential afflict the world's poorest directly, but their effects also impoverish all humanity. The political independence won in the 1960s and 1970s must lead to self-sustaining economic growth if the legitimate aspirations of all peoples for better standards of life in larger freedom are to be fulfilled. The achievement of these goals will require an international economic environment conducive to development and to correcting present imbalances. The elaboration and implementation of a new international strategy could provide a valuable opportunity for Member States to agree on the most appropriate strategic approaches to development in the next decade. An important concern must be the integration of all sectors of the population, especially women, into the development process.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the dignity and worth of the human person, are at the core of the philosophy of the United Na-

tions. Indeed, the peoples in whose name the Charter of the United Nations was proclaimed, expressed their common determination at San Francisco "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small". In proclaiming that determination, the peoples and their leaders were looking ahead to a future in which human beings would be at the centre of a world dedicated to the ideals of freedom and respect for human dignity.

Today, thanks to the efforts of the United Nations, no State can avoid international accountability for the way it treats human beings, whether they are its own citizens, nationals of a foreign State, or stateless persons. The State's performance is tested by reference to internationally proclaimed norms contained in an international code consisting of instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two international Covenants on human rights.

On the basis of specific human rights treaties, Governments regularly submit to the United Nations and its organs reports on the measures which they have adopted to comply with international standards on human rights. These reports are scrutinized, with the co-operation of international experts who draw upon the experience of different countries and try to help in resolving difficulties.

Each year, the United Nations processes thousands of complaints. Where I or my staff feel that we can help in a case or situation, we intercede on a humanitarian basis; some complaints are handled by the Commission on Human Rights, which seeks to establish a dialogue with the Governments concerned and makes recommendations. Where a country has accepted procedures of individual petition provided for under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the appropriate United Nations organ may also receive and examine individual complaints, and provide an authoritative pronouncement.

The General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights openly discuss complaints of alleged violation of human rights. They have adopted resolutions expressing concern about various situations, or establishing organs of fact finding, conciliation or good offices in respect of such situations. In recent years, situations in every region of the globe have been dealt with.

In the sphere of human rights, the United Nations has proven itself in a remarkable way. Nevertheless, a great deal remains to be done. The key challenge which the international community faces as it approaches the end of the twentieth century, is that of the "implementation" of human rights. The norms which have been universally adopted must be applied everywhere in the world. Gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, regrettably, have been a feature of our century. They must continue to receive priority attention. We must seek to ensure that every situation of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms which takes place in the world is addressed by the international community and that the collective wisdom, advice and assistance of the international community is made available to a Government in difficulty. We must not only deal with violations which take place. We must even prevent them from occurring in the first place.

In the long term, the prevention of gross violations of human rights can best be assured by universal ratification and application of the relevant human rights instruments. The United Nations human rights programme is a unique focal point for the promotion and protection of human rights universally. One of its prime objectives is to induce every Government to ratify basic human rights instruments and to live up to the obligations deriving from them.

Another leading concern of the human rights programme is to help people throughout the world to claim and defend their internationally recognized rights. Thus, a programme of information focuses public attention worldwide on basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. Concomitantly, the United Nations increasingly makes available its advisory services and technical assistance programmes to Governments, to assist them in the establishment of national infrastructures for the promotion and protection of human rights.

THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE

The founders of the United Nations foresaw that the Organization would be served by an independent, international civil service, a Secretariat which would be neutral and non-political as it performed its functions. Article 100 of the United Nations Charter states clearly: "In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization." It goes on to add: "Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities."

Unfortunately, the independence of the international civil service is under strain. The United Nations Charter clearly gives the Secretary-General the responsibility of appointing all the staff of the Secretariat in consonance with regulations established by the General Assembly. The paramount consideration in such appointments shall be to secure "the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity", with due regard being given to "the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible."

Sadly, even Governments that profess their dedication to the principle of an independent international civil service, have sought to exercise pressure for the recruitment of their nationals. This trend must be reversed and the Secretary-General's authority over the Secretariat must be respected by all. In particular, the distribution of functions between the legislative and the executive branches, so essential to sound management, must not be blurred. Member States would do well to permit the Secretary-General to perform his duties as Chief Administrative Officer without undue interference or political pressure.

Another serious problem for the international civil service is that of claims to "inherited posts". The organs of the United Nations have expressed themselves categorically against this concept, in principle and in practice. Thus, in its latest pronouncement on this topic, the General Assembly, in its resolution 42/220 A (II), reaffirmed that "no post should be considered the exclusive preserve of any Member State or group of States and that the Secretary-General should ensure that this principle is applied faithfully in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution." The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "in order to preserve the principle of equitable geographical distribution and of rotation in the upper echelons of the Secretariat, to ensure that equal opportunity is given to candidates of all Member States when making appointments to all posts in the upper echelons". Furthermore, the Assembly reaffirmed that the Secretary-General "in making appointments to the upper echelons, should strive to appoint only a candidate from a Member State other than that of the incumbent..." unless there are exceptional circumstances with regard to the desirability of equitable geographical distribution.

The practice by some Governments of making supplementary pay-

ments to their nationals employed in the Secretariat is yet another threat to the integrity, independence and impartiality of the staff of the United Nations. Those Governments feel that without such payments they would not be able to encourage qualified nationals to serve the United Nations. Such payments, however, tend to obligate the individuals receiving them to their Governments rather than to the World Organization and thus decrease their independence. They are also a breach of the staff regulations, and both the International Civil Service Commission and I have called for the abolition of this practice. Unfortunately, it persists.

Recently, there has also been discussion about the balance between career and fixed-term staff. There are those who argue that instead of having a majority of long-term, career officers, there should be more staff members on secondment to the Secretariat. Others favour a predominantly career civil service. The middle-ground between these alternatives is of course, to have some of each. The ratio of career appointees to fixed-term appointments has fluctuated over the years. At the end of 1986, about 60 per cent of United Nations personnel were career appointees. Nevertheless, the percentage of staff with fixed-term contracts has been increasing of late. It is my belief that qualified and dedicated personnel should continue to be offered permanent contracts, and that career appointees should continue to be a majority of the United Nations staff. I, therefore, especially welcome the recently expressed interest of the Soviet Union in making more of its nationals available to serve with the United Nations as career employees.

Thus far, I have referred to issues affecting the independence and the professional integrity of the international civil service. It is distressing to report that even the physical integrity of international civil servants has been under attack. I am extremely concerned over the arrest and detention of a number of staff members by certain Governments, often without charges. The recent practice of taking staff members hostage is equally reprehensible and I cannot condemn it too severely. Those holding our staff members must stop this violation of international law and elementary decency and release their hostages.

THE WORLD IN THE 1990s AND BEYOND

During the lifetime of the United Nations, we have seen enormous improvements in the quality of life of millions of human beings. Nevertheless, measured against the ideals of the Organization, the current state of world affairs is, in many respects, still disturbing. The system of collective security envisaged in the Charter has not realized its full potential, and violence and instability persist throughout the world. International law is often set aside and human rights are violated everywhere. The oppressive system of *apartheid* is still in place. Heavy and unproductive expenditures on arms continue. Poverty, misery, and hunger are widespread. The number of illiterate people remains high. Disparities within and among nations remain a source of frustration and instability and the continuing deterioration of the environment threatens to diminish the world that future generations will inherit.

At the same time, we can happily cite positive factors that have the potential of transforming the current situation. The world-wide elimination of hunger, poverty and ignorance is within reach of human power and ingenuity. Improvements in communications and the spread of information have enlightened the world as never before. We have gained further understanding of the links among issues such as peace, development, the environment, resources and population. There is a growing appreciation of the interdependence of nations and the need for collective action to solve common problems. The positive contribution of non-government-

tal organizations and the importance of popular support for international co-operation are increasingly recognized. In short, whereas the problems we face today may be acute, the technological and political means for solving them are present to a degree never before in history. A new thinking can result in enormous benefit.

New technology and knowledge are breaking down barriers and bringing peoples face to face in ways once thought impossible. Beneath the seas and in outer space possibilities are opening for peaceful and productive enterprise through international co-operation. The potent force of science and technology can be for the benefit of all if properly harnessed and directed. It is essential that all be able to share in these advances and that they are not used to the detriment of humanity.

The nature of international security issues may become subtler and more difficult to address. We will need increasingly to understand better the disparate nature of the origins of conflicts. In some cases, the underlying cause of strife may stem from the rivalry of the great Powers; in others, structural anomalies left by colonialism may be at fault. Societal pressures resulting from inadequate economic and social development could be the primary cause of instability in some areas. Ethnic or religious factors can cause tensions that lead to violence among countries and peoples. It will be necessary to develop the means to anticipate impending political crises and to create conditions conducive to harmonizing divergent interests.

In the area of disarmament and arms control, progress will depend on two factors. First, individual countries, the United Nations and other international organizations must achieve a greater sense of security among nations by reducing conflicts. Secondly, all countries, including both major arms suppliers and developing countries, must resist the temptation to buy and sell more arms.

The growing sense of the interdependence of nations should help the world community act together on common problems. In consequence, international law will be even more important and nations will have to renew their efforts in law-making and codification. A framework of international law is especially important in dealing with international terrorism, where causes are manifold, but where a solution requires a common approach and joint action.

Another effect of growing interdependence could take the form of intensified international co-operation on human rights and humanitarian and social efforts. Problems of injustice, poverty and human suffering are of the human condition. All countries, cultures and peoples have much to contribute to their solution. Efforts to advance and expand economic and social development must continue. Adopting and carrying out policies to that end is primarily the responsibility of national Governments, both in developed and developing countries. Progress will require a successful resolution to the problems of debt, commodities and resource flows, and the establishment of conditions in which all countries can play their full part in the global production and distribution of commodities, goods and, increasingly, services. An increased sharing of advances in technology and access to capital markets should also assist in this process. The development of human resources will require special attention, including action to eliminate the absolute poverty of so many in developing countries.

The continuing expansion and diversification of global production and distribution as well as the creation of larger and more integrated economic communities will result in significant changes in the structure, functioning and management of the world economy. The reorientation of the international economic policies of major centrally-planned economies will have to be taken into account. There will be a need for a greater shar-

ing of responsibility for, and benefits from, world economic management, especially if the obstacles impeding progress in developing countries are to be removed.

Social issues will call for more intensive international co-operation as many local problems arise from the same global phenomena or take on similar characteristics in countries with different social systems and at different levels of development. Major shifts in population structures, rapid urbanization, technological advances and the transformation of economic and occupational structures will require major adjustments in social policy, the redirection of resources and institutional change.

Greater understanding of the nature of development should focus attention on the complementarity between physical investment and human resource investment, with a greater stress on social programmes that enhance the productive capacity and the participation of all members of society. Institutional reform should be directed towards providing better incentives and equitable reward for performance, as well as promoting the well-being of more vulnerable groups in society. At the same time, the world community must continue to stand by to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and those suffering the effects of natural and man-made calamities.

These complex, varying and often contradictory trends in economics, politics and technology will help shape the next decade. Nation States will, of course, continue to play a leading role in the conduct of international affairs in the future. But there are persuasive reasons for pragmatic Governmental decisions to work together in the common interest, and this should logically lead to greater reliance on international organizations. The United Nations must function in the next decade so as to encourage rational choices through the effectiveness of its programmes and the capacity that it offers for multilateral problem-solving and conflict resolution. The effectiveness of the Organization in meeting this challenge will depend on the support of its Member States and their commitment to making full use of the potential of the United Nations and to carrying out agreed programmes of common action.

CONCLUSION

As one of the founding members, the Soviet Union has always played an active role in the United Nations. As a permanent member of the Security Council, it shares a special responsibility to ensure that the purposes and principles of the Charter are respected and that international peace and security are maintained.

I am encouraged by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's strong reaffirmation of the Soviet Union's commitment to the ideals and objectives of the United Nations and of the importance of its role in international relations. I have also been impressed by the constructive position of the Soviet Union on a wide range of activities of the United Nations, including peace-keeping, the role of the International Court of Justice and the universal realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. I believe there are opportunities now for significant progress on critically important problems, if we can realize the full potential of the United Nations. The Soviet Union can undoubtedly play an important role in this process.

VIEW FROM BUDAPEST

Below is an interview the Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Várkonyi gave to *International Affairs* journal.

International Affairs. Comrade Minister, could I start by asking you a personal question? How and when did you become involved in Hungarian foreign policy, how did you become a diplomat?

Péter Várkonyi. You have to go back to 1945 when Hungary was liberated by the Soviet Army. This put an end to Hitler's occupation and the tyranny of the Hungarian fascists, and triggered off deep-going social changes, marking a historic turning point in the country's destiny.

The early postwar years were formative ones for our diplomatic service when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic was established. The people's government trained personnel for it relying on the assistance of the Communists who had experience in international relations and recruiting enthusiastic, young people dedicated to our system and eager to learn. Of course, most of them came from working class and peasant backgrounds. It couldn't be otherwise because most career diplomats of the old regime had had their personal and political reputations tarnished during the events preceding liberation. And at any rate they would have been incapable of representing the people's government which had espoused a new ideology.

This is the general background. I was one of those young people. As a school pupil I already took an active part in the progressive youth movement. I joined the Communist Party of Hungary in February 1948, at the age of 17. I was elected secretary of the youth organisation in a district in Budapest. After graduating from secondary school, the party promoted me to study at the Foreign Affairs Academy which I finished at the age of 20. After this, I worked as a diplomat in the Hungarian Embassy in Washington and then in London. This is how my life became linked with the people's foreign policy of Hungary. Since that time I have regarded diplomacy as my vocation.

International Affairs. It would be interesting to know the sources of the foreign policy of People's Hungary, and how its international ties have evolved.

Péter Várkonyi. The establishment of people's government brought about historic changes in foreign policy. Hungary's orientation in international affairs changed. The Soviet Union and the other East European countries which embarked on the socialist road like ourselves became our natural partners and allies. Immediately, intensive and many-sided relations started developing with those countries. Before long, political partnership and cooperation in mutual economic assistance led to the signing of bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual aid.

Eventually a common denominator for all these relations became the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—the first institution for our multilateral cooperation.

All this was vital for Hungary because in this way it received invaluable help in economic rehabilitation, in creating and strengthening the system of people's democracy. The Soviet Union's role has been outstanding: without its support and disinterested aid our country would have taken much longer to heal the wounds of war and to stand on its feet.

The picture would not be complete if we did not mention larger European and world political factors of the time. To begin with, as a new social system

was becoming established in Eastern Europe, the advocates of confrontation in the western part of the continent were gradually seizing leadership from those who were committed to preserving relations of peace and cooperation with us. The cold war and the growing militarisation divided Europe into two parts. Strengthening the collective defence of the socialist countries was unquestionably the purpose of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation set up in response to the formation of NATO. This forced move highlighted the military confrontation and division of the European continent.

It should be said, however, that the growing hysteria over the war threat and mutual isolation were due in part to the mistakes of the leaders of the socialist countries, their ideological extremism and voluntaristic methods in politics.

To sum up the consequences of all this for Hungary one should note conflicting trends: on the one hand, we were winning new friends and allies, and on the other, our international ties were becoming more narrow and the field of Hungary's international activities shrank compared to the previous period. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, came a "thaw" in international relations. Then came a tragic turn in our postwar history: at a time when we were prepared to expand our system of international relations, social tensions in the country brought about by gross errors of the leadership and distortions of the socialist system developed into a counter-revolution. The top priority foreign political aspect of the policy of consolidation in the wake of these events was not to increase our share of participation in the world affairs, but to ensure the political recognition of our system and our government in the world community. At that difficult juncture we owed much to the solid support of our allies—the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

International Affairs. Comrade Minister, could you tell us a few words about what the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and you personally experienced during those tragic events?

Péter Várkonyi In 1956, after completing my four-year assignment abroad, I was working in the press sector at the Foreign Ministry's Information Department. During the counter-revolutionary events I was often the only working member of the sector's staff. I can say that at that period I came under severe moral strain.

It seemed that the people who had seen their faith and enthusiasm betrayed, had irretrievably lost all confidence in their government. It seemed that we had lost the moral strength to oppose the dregs of society who were capable of sweeping away everything that had been created by the people's efforts during the preceding ten years. All I can say is that the new revolutionary government of workers and peasants, and Soviet assistance, which came at the eleventh hour, saved Hungary from a bloody civil war and a possible invasion from the West.

International Affairs. People's Hungary stood its ground and overcame the crisis. The policy of consolidation was one of the party's instruments in mending the situation in the country. What exactly was that policy and how can you assess it?

Péter Várkonyi. One of the first organisations of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party to contribute actively to consolidation was set up at the Foreign Ministry. The efforts we made at the time were basically aimed at internal consolidation, restoring the confidence of the masses in their party, and strengthening the party's leading role, drawing up and realising a sound programme of social and economic development that would ensure a broad alliance of social forces and subsequently their complete unity. Such a programme was eventually developed. That this policy was a success is witnessed among other things by the fact that the Hungarian People's Republic gradually overcame its international isolation and began to restore normal state-to-state relations with non-socialist countries.

This required painstaking work in foreign policy and active diplomatic efforts. The progressive development of relations with the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and the firmness of the Warsaw Treaty system provided a necessary basis for that. At that time we needed an honest foreign policy, reliable and based on principle. In addition to open allegiance to the Warsaw Treaty another element of this policy, which still holds today, was interest in and readiness to develop peaceful relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of mutual benefit. This shows that our foreign policy has from the outset been geared to seeking peace and disarmament.

Internal consolidation, based on strong allied relations and a consistent foreign policy began to bring early fruit. For example, in 1960, along with the leaders of the socialist countries, our party's leader delivered a bold and dignified speech to the United Nations despite the efforts to blow up the so-called Hungarian question.

International Affairs. As far as we know, you were personally involved in that episode.

Péter Várkonyi. Yes, I was a member of the Hungarian delegation. I interpreted János Kádár's speech into English. Thus, I was an eyewitness to the eventful weeks. Those were memorable weeks. That year's UN General Assembly was unprecedented in terms of the number of political leaders from various countries present, and the speeches by the leaders of the socialist countries dramatically changed the whole atmosphere in the UN which until then had been an "American voting machine".

Significantly, at that time the Hungarian delegation were not allowed to leave the city limits of Manhattan, so János Kádár could not accept Nikita Khrushchev's invitation to spend a week-end at the Soviet Ambassador's villa on Long Island. Yet even at that time there were influential political circles in the USA which were aware of the fallacy of the confrontation policy. Cyrus Eaton, a business tycoon and an outstanding campaigner for peace and cooperation, invited János Kádár and members of the Hungarian delegation to dinner at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, where the conversation centred not so much on the past and the present but on the future and its opportunities.

Going back to the process of foreign policy consolidation it can be said that during the 1960s we managed in effect to normalise and indeed enhance our relations with the majority of developed capitalist states, including the NATO countries. Building on our internal development, our economic successes, the growing social cohesion, a predictable and honest foreign policy, by the end of the decade we had a streamlined system of international relations, commanded a measure of respect and enjoyed world prestige. This was due in large part to the fact that as a member of the Warsaw Treaty we contributed to the vigorous steps of the allied system to promote international peace and security. As a result Budapest became the venue from which our joint appeal was launched which eventually led to the convocation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

International Affairs. Much time has passed since then. Have the Hungarian foreign policy guidelines changed in any essential way over the past decades?

Péter Várkonyi. No. And this confirms that our foreign policy takes into account both the true national interests and international realities. Its basic elements have remained unaltered for several decades. This is one factor that makes our foreign policy reliable and predictable. Its entire history proves it.

The international situation, the emergence of global parity of forces, the development of East-West relations favoured our foreign policy goals. Until the latter half of the 1970s we witnessed and contributed to the gradual improvement of relations. The balance of forces between the two systems, notably between the USA and the USSR led to the recognition of mutual interests in preventing war. As a result, cold war relations were gradually

superseded by agreements based on reciprocal interests. Treaties were signed that provided the basis for greater international security and for nuclear disarmament—the ABM Treaty, the SALT-1 and the SALT-2 treaties. (The USA never ratified the latter, but it complied with it in practice.)

The series of bilateral agreements which put a legal seal on the *status quo* after the Second World War made it possible to settle and to promote bilateral relations between European states with different social systems, and marked the beginning of the European process whose foundation was provided by the Helsinki Final Act. Today the process, and the Helsinki document, are equally factors determining long-term perspectives for the world. This is proved by the fact that they withstood all the tests brought about by the deterioration of relations between the two great powers and the attempts to revive the spirit of the cold war.

To us, European problems come first because, as I have pointed out, Hungary's basic national interests lie in preserving and expanding international ties, which means creating and maintaining stability in world affairs and an atmosphere of trust. I need hardly explain the implications of all this for such a geographical, economic, cultural and historical region as Europe. That is why we have always sought to develop our links with European countries. In other words, our foreign policy could be described as Eurocentric.

This presupposes the preservation and development of bilateral and multilateral relations with all the socialist countries. Our joint initiatives multiply Hungary's efforts towards European security and confidence many times over.

A qualitative change in international affairs is now possible due to new political thinking which is gaining ground everywhere. By the same token, the processes of renewal and the policy of reform pursued in most socialist countries provide a good basis both for bilateral and multilateral cooperation among the socialist countries and for social and economic acceleration in each of them. I think there is every ground for saying that the way our relations with the Soviet Union have recently developed can serve as a progressive example in cooperation among the socialist countries based on mutual respect and exercise of national interests.

I hardly need argue that we are interested in full-scale development of relations with all European states. I think all our efforts in the interests of European dialogue and detente provide ample proof of that.

Our relations with all the countries of Europe and North America have been settled and are free of problems. We are now working to improve their quality. We seek, among other things, to establish economic cooperation with all our partners, to match the balanced higher-level political relations. Today this presupposes not only the weakening and eventual lifting of quantitative technological restrictions on the part of advanced capitalist countries, but our own efforts to improve our own economy, to make our goods competitive, to remove internal obstacles to modern economic cooperation.

The recent national conference of the HSWP, which strengthened mass confidence in the party and made the necessary personnel changes for further renewal, created conditions for all this, and for the much-needed improvement of the political system. I am sure that by implementing reform we will be able to meet all our commitments concerning the putting of cooperation within the world socialist system on a new basis and raising it to a qualitatively new level.

The realisation of reforms will help us to meet the challenge of multilateral cooperation with the countries belonging to a different social system: to gradually eliminate our economic, scientific and technological lag, and to catch up with the major trends of world economy.

Naturally, our relations with non-socialist countries are not confined to economic cooperation. We are aware that an equally important condition for international peace and security—along with eliminating military confrontation—is cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and humanitarian

fields. This is the end served by our long-term and consistent efforts aimed at maintaining bilateral and multilateral dialogue. In keeping with this line we have from the outset been involved in discussions on security and cooperation in Europe and we view the corresponding forums as the most acceptable form of all-European cooperation. We have never slackened our efforts to maintain dialogue even when the development of East-West relations and detente were at a low ebb due to the worsening of Soviet-American relations in the late seventies and early eighties.

International Affairs. Looking at the developments in the world today such an approach appears to be almost prophetic. How do you see further development of the international situation?

Péter Várkonyi. Life vindicates the correctness of our foreign policy aimed at maintaining a dialogue, although I wouldn't go so far as to say that we had the magic gift of foreseeing the future.

Simply, at a time when tensions grew and the relations between the great powers worsened, we assessed the possibilities of our small country and decided that dialogue was the only reasonable approach which, to the best of our abilities, we could use to preserve and stabilise international ties. Many other small and medium-sized countries acted in a similar way. All this showed that both sides had a profound interest in maintaining detente, and that small and medium countries have their own responsibilities, and their own potential for contributing to more stable relations, preventing confrontation and a relapse into cold war.

Today it is our responsibility to take part in maintaining the processes which ensure a major change in international relations, coexistence and cooperation of countries with different social systems, to contribute to resolving global problems.

The basis for this is provided by the processes of *perestroika* and renewal which got under way in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries as part of new thinking. On the other hand, these processes are in line with the growing awareness in the developed capitalist countries of the interdependence of the world and the common responsibility for its destinies.

The key role in this is played by Soviet-American relations and the regular political dialogue at the highest level and growing cooperation. A breakthrough towards military security was the signing and implementation of the first treaty to destroy a whole class of nuclear weapons. In addition to its military aspects, the treaty destroying medium- and shorter-range missiles has great political significance: it confirms in practice that agreement can be reached in the field of disarmament and it paves the way for further measures in this direction.

Another important fact is that the Soviet-American dialogue covers all the major issues of world politics and bilateral relations including the settlement of regional conflicts and human rights problems. The agreement on settlement over Afghanistan creates an historic precedent for eliminating all crisis zones whose existence has an adverse effect on international relations. In our view the main guarantee of steady improvement of the international situation is decisive, constructive, flexible and purposive actions by the Soviet Union, and the fact that it was to a large extent due to these efforts that the Soviet-American dialogue became permanent, marking a change from the period of confrontation to the period of cooperation. We therefore consider the meeting of the two leaders in Moscow a milestone in disarmament despite the fact that no new agreements were signed. It is important that the summit strengthened confidence between the two sides and built up political capital for further actions. The Soviet Union's commitment to nuclear disarmament guarantees that a new agreement will soon be signed.

The results in the disarmament field, the development of Soviet-American relations and the growing awareness of the interdependence of the world open up new prospects for international dialogue and cooperation.

We believe the best opportunities for dialogue exist in the European continent. The development of the European process makes it possible for every state of the continent to contribute towards international security and co-operation.

In the disarmament field the problems of nuclear weapons and cuts in conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe are interrelated. An early solution to the latter problem is a precondition for the solution of the entire set of problems. The format of negotiation which is already emerging at the current consultation of 23 countries representing the Warsaw Treaty and NATO could well provide a sequel to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, and ensure the success of the Vienna meeting. Be the final document, whose general outlines are clear, adopted it would enhance the prospects of European cooperation in every field, including economic, cultural and humanitarian. It would have a positive impact on the situation in Europe and the world, give an impetus to the favourable processes and would ensure the start of disarmament negotiations and progress at them.

To this end, all the socialist countries should work vigorously towards an early adoption of the final document in Vienna. The Hungarian side will seek to contribute with a sense of responsibility towards international dialogue and positive processes in the world in accordance with its interests, foreign policy principles and capabilities.

It is our belief that the development of international affairs bears out the validity of the foreign policy we have pursued so far and shows that it corresponds to our national interests and to international realities, and consequently, to the common interests of the socialist community. Accordingly, we seek to expand our activities and our relations. We would like to take full advantage of cooperation, to promote contacts with all partners.

I would like to cite as an example our cooperation with our neighbours. Whatever the social system in our partner country, we have achieved major progress in promoting friendship, mutually beneficial economic cooperation and direct contacts. Only one country is an exception.

It so happened that many Hungarians live in the territories of neighbouring countries. Practice has shown that they, like the ethnic minorities living in Hungary provide a link, a kind of bridge between our countries, adding new colours and diversity to our cooperation. The solution of the nationalities question on a fair basis, concern for the life of Hungarians living outside Hungary is a fundamental principle of our foreign policy, and this could not be otherwise. Hungary lost not only two-thirds of its territory, but one-third of its population by the Treaty of Trianon and the peaceful agreements after the Second World War. These Hungarians did not leave their homes, but became citizens of other countries. This is a historical fact we recognise, a fact we cannot and do not want to change.

All we want is that while being useful citizens of their country they should be allowed to preserve their language, their traditions and their links with their country of origin. The aim of our policy is not to build up tensions or interfere in internal affairs, but quite the contrary: we would like the ethnic minorities, despite the contradictions rooted in the past and the existing realities, to become factors of cooperation and confidence among states. The only way to achieve that is to guarantee their individual and collective rights, and to provide conditions for the preservation and development of their cultural and ethnic traits.

We therefore must speak up on behalf of the largest ethnic Hungarian community—the Romanian Hungarians. We believe that the development of socialism on the basis of civilised norms and Leninist principles will help to eliminate the current discrimination against Romanian Hungarians and attempts to forcibly assimilate them. The current tensions could be overcome on this basis. The sincerity of our intentions is proved in the eyes of the world public

by our own nationalities policy, our carefully considered, balanced and consistent actions over many decades.

International Affairs. My last but by no means the least question. You have mentioned the new possibilities for Soviet-Hungarian ties. Could you speak in more detail about the state of cooperation between our countries and its prospects.

Péter Várkonyi. I think two factors are decisive for our relations today. On the one hand, the Gorbachev policy and the reforms getting under way in other socialist countries, including Hungary, amount to the recognition that a comprehensive and not only economic renovation of socialism is an objective necessity. I would sum up their essence as follows: to restore and preserve socialism's competitiveness.

The other factor is that we are boldly searching for new methods and means of achieving that goal. I have already mentioned it when I spoke earlier about the example of our relations.

The effect of these factors on our relations is already being felt. The more specific features are revealed in the development of socialism in our respective countries the more we seek to study each other's methods and the possibilities of applying the approaches that have justified themselves. This accounts for the rapid growth of mutual interests.

Effectiveness and development are the watchwords in our relations. We are restructuring the channels, institutions, methods and style of interaction accordingly. In all our contacts, including those at the highest level, protocol gives way to open, substantive, sincere and concrete exchanges of opinions, to a genuinely working approach.

We also see contacts spreading to a lower level, for example, to the level of republics and regions. New forms of cooperation, notably joint ventures, are acquiring growing significance. At the same time personal contacts are growing everywhere.

These processes are gaining momentum. The new conditions of economic management prompt new forms of cooperation and greatly influence the state of our internal affairs and stimulate their evolution.

Perestroika and **glasnost** influence all the spheres of Hungarian-Soviet relations. The public ideas about each other's country are changing dramatically and are becoming richer. Instead of the simplistic picture we have got used to which stressed only achievements, **glasnost** makes it possible to speak about the diversity of our life with all its problems. Mutual education about the reality in the two countries could be greatly advanced by people-to-people contacts, which incidentally corresponds to the European trend as manifested in the CSCE process.

We are only beginning to tap all the opportunities. Our future will depend to a crucial extent on how we will use these opportunities. The recent conferences of the CPSU and the HSWP have shown that the changes in our countries which will determine the long-term perspective for our societies are going in the same direction as far as the main goals and trends are concerned. The 19th Conference of the CPSU reaffirmed the decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU and pronounced itself resolutely in favour of **perestroika**, democratisation and reform of the political system. The relevance of the conferences goes beyond the Soviet Union as it enriches the reform-oriented thinking throughout the socialist world.

The most important result of the HSWP conference was its statement that there is no alternative to the reform of the socialist society. The priority in this country, like in the USSR, is practical deeds: the implementation of economic plans, the building of a socialist legal state and the expansion of socialist democracy.

Our relations and cooperation will have all the greater chance of rising to

ON THE HISTORY OF TANK ASYMMETRY IN EUROPE

Vitali SHLYKOV

The lack of major progress in reductions of conventional forces and armaments is becoming particularly notable against the background of the INF Treaty that came into effect recently.

All the Western nuclear powers are making it clear that not only will they not agree to any further steps to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe; on the contrary, they will stockpile and perfect them so long as there exists what they allege to be the Warsaw Treaty's advantage in conventional weapons. The question of a Soviet edge in tanks is being raised most frequently and persistently. Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the US Senate Armed Forces Committee, for example, poses this question sharply. "Soviet tank forces in Europe are the most destabilizing part of the overall operation.. " As Nunn puts it, Americans should clearly understand that only a Western threat to initiate a nuclear exchange is what is preventing the Soviet Union from using its overwhelming superiority in tanks for destabilising and intimidating the West."¹

The Soviet stand on the tank asymmetry issue is more low-key. The Soviet Union does not deny the edge in tanks it and the Warsaw Treaty have. According to data released by the USSR Ministry of Defence, the Warsaw Treaty in Europe has approximately 20,000 tanks more than the NATO countries. However, the Soviet military leadership believes that this does not tilt the overall balance of forces in Europe, since on the whole "there is an approximate balance, approximate parity"² between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in conventional weapons. As far as individual disproportions on one side or the other, as, say, in tanks or strike aviation, Soviet military experts believe that they do not undermine the overall equilibrium. In the assessment of the USSR Ministry of Defence, the Warsaw Treaty's tank advantage is balanced out by the NATO advantage in anti-tank missile complexes (100 per cent), fighting helicopters (50 per cent) and strike aviation (by 1,400 aircraft). In this connection, it is the conviction of Soviet military officials that an elimination of the Warsaw Treaty's tank edge should be accompanied by an end to NATO's advantage in the above hardware.

Official information on the course of the talks on reductions of conventional armaments, tanks included, is extremely scanty in comparison to, say, information on nuclear weapons. As far as can be judged from press reports, the West refuses to decrease its anti-tank

means and strike aviation, as it considers them a response to the Warsaw Treaty tank edge. However, some Western experts are voicing appraisals that call into question the importance of the very problem of eliminating the tank asymmetry owing to the fact that over 80 per cent of the Warsaw Treaty tanks are obsolete models, while NATO, not the Warsaw Treaty, in fact enjoys an advantage in the number of the latest tanks.³

As the record of the Vienna and other talks on conventional weapons reductions has shown, such debate over the superiority of this or that side in individual types of armaments can continue endlessly. It is only to be hoped that new thinking will ultimately extricate the talks from the quagmire of squabbling and boring enumerations of tanks, aircraft and other hardware and set them on the path of specific negotiations towards reaching the accords all the nations of Europe are awaiting. Of course, this will require a comprehensive approach aimed both at identifying individual asymmetries and at determining the overall correlation of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO in Europe in order to eliminate the imbalances, lower considerably the armed forces level and create a non-offensive structure of these forces on the continent.

This author would like in this article to touch upon only the one issue that is most extensively being debated—the tank asymmetry, or rather, its historical aspect. What is the cause of the current imbalance of 20,000 tanks in Europe in favour of the Soviet Union? How and why has the current tank asymmetry emerged on the continent?

The answer to this question has two aspects—the prewar and the postwar. We shall dwell in detail on one of them—the prewar. This will also help us shed light on several unknown pages in our historiography pertaining to the period preceding the Great Patriotic War.

Most readers, in any event Soviet ones, will probably be surprised to learn that the tank asymmetry, if taken to mean the quantitative Soviet tank advantage, has existed for over half a century, with the exception of some periods of the Great Patriotic War. This surprise is explicable, especially considering that Soviet military historiography and war memoirs argued and continue to argue that one of the main reasons for the Soviet Army's failures at the start of the war was the Nazi's overwhelming qualitative as well as quantitative superiority in military hardware, above all in tanks.

This tenet is buttressed with the statistics announced right after the war, namely that Germany together with its satellites hurled against the USSR 4,300 tanks, against which the Soviet Union was able to pit, in its border districts, only 1,475 tanks of new types (KV and T-34). Admittedly, it is sometimes mentioned in passing that at the start of the war Soviet troops had "also a considerable number of tanks of obsolete design".⁴ It would be inferred here that a "considerable number of tanks of obsolete design" possessed such poor fighting qualities that it is embarrassing for a serious historian or military commander even to write about them, all the more so to take them into account.

If, however, minimal curiosity is displayed, it can be established without much effort that concealed behind all this division of Soviet tanks into "new" and "obsolete" is a reluctance to acknowledge the fact that as of June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union had a many-fold tank advantage over the Nazi forces.

It has been confirmed factually that Germany (not counting its satellites) allotted for the attack on the USSR 3,582 tanks and assault

guns from the total of 5,639 tanks and assault guns it had as of May 1, 1941.⁵

Official figures on the number of tanks the USSR had at the start of the war have not been published. According to Western estimates, they numbered over 20,000, i. e., approximately six times as many as the Nazi invasion army had. According to the same estimates, beginning in 1932 and right up to the start of the Second World War, Soviet industry produced an average of some 3,000 tanks a year, with the exception of the 1938-1939 period, when repressions against military-industrial personnel led to a decline in tank production.⁶

On the whole, however, according to American estimates, Soviet industry produced during the prewar decade more tanks than all other countries combined.

Confirmation of these facts can be found in Soviet sources as well. Thus, Marshal Georgi Zhukov points out in his reminiscences that as early as 1937 the Red Army had 15,000 tanks and baby tanks (production of baby tanks in the USSR was discontinued in 1933). What is more, according to Marshal Zhukov, 2,271 tanks were produced in 1938, while from January 1, 1939 to June 21, 1941 another 7,000 tanks came off the conveyor.⁷

At secret talks with the British and French military missions in August 1939 the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to set between 9,000 and 10,000 tanks against Germany in the European part of the USSR alone. For comparison's sake, as of September 1, 1939, Germany had only 3,000 tanks, of which some 300 were medium and the remainder light, including 1,500 T-1 machine-gun tanks, the production of which had been halted by that time due to their low combat qualities.⁸

An idea of the quantity of the tanks in the Soviet forces at the start of the war can be obtained by other means as well. Thus, it follows from official Soviet statistics that at the start of the Great Patriotic War the number of KV and T-34 tanks, i. e., tanks of the latest design, comprised some 9 per cent of the Red Army's overall tank fleet. The number of KV and T-34 tanks produced by June 21, 1941, is known—1,861 (1,864 according to other figures). Simple arithmetic shows that the Red Army's overall tank fleet had to amount to not less than 20,700 units.

It is also known that as of the moment of the German invasion the Soviet Union had 61 tank divisions (58 in the mechanised corps and 3 separate divisions), each of which was, according to the wartime establishment, supposed to have 375 tanks.⁹ Multiplying 375 by 61, we get 22,875 tanks. Of course, some divisions might not have had a full set of tanks, and others might have been at the stage of formation. However, the very number of Soviet tank divisions speaks volumes. What is more, in addition to tank divisions, the Soviet forces had a large number of separate tank brigades, regiments and battalions.

The fact that Germany allotted 19 tank divisions (it had a total of 21 at the time) bespeaks the alignment of German and Soviet tank forces. One Nazi division had, according to the establishment, from 147 to 209 tanks, i. e., half the number in a Soviet division.¹⁰

The productive possibilities of the Third Reich's tank industry were very modest, too. Even after the start of the Second World War Germany was able, for almost an entire year, from September 1939 through April 1940, to produce only between 50 and 80 tanks a month, and it was only beginning in May-June 1940 that it reached the level of 100 tanks a month¹¹, which was half of what the Soviet Union turned out as early as 1932. Germany simply did not have time for creating a powerful specialised tank industry.

In the time of the First World War Germany, unlike France and Britain, had failed to introduce mass-scale tank production. During

**Production of Tanks in the Main Countries,
1940—1945**

(without self-propelled guns and assault guns; USSR, 1943—1945, including self-propelled guns)

	USA	USSR	Germany	Britain
1940	331	2,794	1,469	1,399
1941	4,052	6,590	3,256	4,844
1942	24,997	24,668	4,098	8,611
1943	28,197	24,000	6,083	7,476
1944	17,565	29,000	8,466	2,476
1945	11,985	25,448	988	

that period it turned out only 100 tanks, while the figures for Britain, France and the USA were 2,800, 5,300 and 1,000 respectively.¹² After the First World War, Germany was forbidden under Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles to produce or purchase abroad tanks or other armoured hardware. The first German tanks were clandestinely designed and tested under the guise of develop-

ment of tractors and other farm technology. Thus, the T-I light tank designed by the Krupp firm in 1931 was officially called a "small tractor" or "farm tractor", and the T-III tank—a "medium tractor". Mass production of tanks, let alone open testing in the forces, right up to the point Hitler tore up the Treaty of Versailles, was totally out of the question. For this reason Germany was able to set going large-batch tank production only after the seizure in 1938 of the Skoda plants in Czechoslovakia which had gained considerable experience in producing what were the most advanced tanks in the West at the time. However, even after Czechoslovakia was overrun and even after the French tank plants were seized in 1940 Germany was unable to catch up to the USSR in tank production.

The scope of the lag of German tank production is also evidenced by the fact that the Soviet Union continued to outstrip Germany in tank production even after the USSR lost an enormous part of its territory and a number of tank plants were evacuated to the East, which was linked with a disruption in the routine ties in production cooperation. In 1942 alone the Soviet Union produced more tanks than Germany did during the entire Second World War (see table).¹³

Thus, there could be no Soviet lag behind Germany either in the number of tanks in the forces or in their production on the eve of the war. Marshal Zhukov even believed that before the war tank output was increased to the detriment of other areas of the production of hardware for the armed forces.¹⁴

The myth alleging that the Germans had more tanks of the latest design at the start of the war is totally untenable as well. The simplest comparison of the tactical and technical specifications of Soviet tanks, including the "obsolete" ones, with the German tanks shows that the Soviet Union enjoyed an advantage here, too.*

A. N. Latukhin, the prominent Soviet expert on armaments, states: "The technical inferiority of German tanks came to light during the very first days of the Great Patriotic War... The tanks of the Nazi army

* Of the 3,582 tanks allotted by the Nazi command for the first strike against the Soviet Union, some 1,700 were T-I and T-II light tanks.

The T-I weighed only 5.4 tons and had frontal armour 13-mm thick and non-artillery armament (two machine guns). The tank was designed back in 1931-1932.

The T-II was not much superior to it in its combat capabilities either. It weighed 8.8 tons and had two 20-mm guns and 15-mm thick frontal armour.

The combat characteristics of the T-III and T-IV medium tanks, which numbered some 2,800 in the invasion army, were modest, too. The T-III weighed 19.8 tons and had a 37-mm gun and 30-mm thick frontal armour. The T-IV also had frontal armour only 30-mm thick at the start of the war, although it weighed more (24 tons) and had more powerful armament (75-mm gun).¹⁵

had weak armour and, sizewise, were rather large targets on the battlefield. The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that Soviet anti-tank rifles readily pierced the T-III's armour at distances of up to 600 metres, and the 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun destroyed this tank at 800 metres. As far as our anti-tank and especially the 76-mm guns are concerned, their shells smashed the armour of the T-III even at 2,000 metres."¹⁶

This is what B. L. Vannikov, the former People's Commissar for Weaponry, writes in his memoirs about the German tanks of the initial period of the war: "Stalin had before him reports indicating that the Nazi armies were attacking with far from first-class tank hardware—they had the captured French Renault tanks and obsolete German T-Is and T-IIs, whose participation in the war Berlin had not originally envisaged."¹⁷

And now let us take a look at the supposedly obsolete Soviet tanks that were pitted against these tanks of Hitler's. The T-26 light tank, one of the most widespread Soviet tanks of the start of the war, surpassed the Nazi light tanks in all parameters, and even the T-III medium tank in armament. The T-26 weighed 10.3 tons, its armament was a 45-mm gun, and its frontal armour was 16-mm thick.

The Soviet forces also had a large number of BT (cruise tank) wheel-and-caterpillar tanks, about 7,000 units of which were produced from 1932 through 1941. With the exception of their first modification, the BT-2, which was equipped with a 37-mm gun and whose production was discontinued in 1933, the BT tanks were equipped with a 45-mm gun, and some of them with even a 76-mm howitzer. BT-series tanks weighed from 14 to 15 tons (American experts grouped them in the middletank class) and had frontal armour of 20-mm thickness.

In speed and range BTs not only far outstripped all tanks of the Second World War period; they can readily compare to the latest models of modern tanks.

An important modification of tanks of this series—the BT-7M (also known as the BT-8), which was put out between 1939 and 1941 in a batch of 1,000 had a running speed of 62 km per hour on caterpillar tracks and 86 km per hour on wheels. The Nazi tanks, had a maximum speed of 40 km (T-I), 45 km (T-II), 55 km (T-III), and 40 km (T-IV).

The difference in range was still more impressive: BT—600 km, T-I—200 km, T-II—300 km, T-III—165 km, T-IV—200 km, T-V Panther—180 km, T-VI Tiger—100 km.¹

Aside from the T-26 and BT light tanks, the Soviet forces had a large number of T-28 medium tanks that were quite comparable even to the German T-IV in the basic characteristics. Thus, the T-28 weighed 28 tons, had 30-mm thick frontal armour and was equipped with a 76-mm gun.

The Soviet Army also had a heavy tank, the T-35 (weight—50 tons, armament—one 76-mm and two 45-mm guns, frontal armour—30 mm).

We shall adduce but two assessments of these supposedly hopelessly obsolete tanks, which no Soviet military historian even wants to consider. One appraisal was made by American experts, the other, by a Soviet specialist.

The American tank experts Zaloga and Grandsen write that during the German invasion in 1941 approximately one-third of the Soviet tank fleet consisted of BTs. Although many historians call the BTs and the T-26s old junk, they unquestionably surpassed in most of their

* Typically, as the Germans shifted to defence, their tanks' endurance declined and the famous Tiger was in fact no longer fit for offensive operations

specifications the most numerous German tanks, the Pzkwf-I and Pzkwf-II, and their guns reliably destroyed even the Pzkwf-III.¹⁸

This is what the Soviet expert, in this case Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov, writes: "Tank production grew rapidly. Five thousand were put out during the first five-year plan period; by the end of the second five-year plan period the army had as many as 15,000 tanks and baby tanks. All these vehicles stood out for their high fire power and speed. At that time our possible enemies did not have machines of the same type that were comparable in these qualities."¹⁹

One may object, of course, that this high assessment by Marshal Zhukov of the quality of Soviet tanks applies to the end of the second five-year plan period, i. e., to 1937. However, what changed from 1937 through 1941 with regard to the quality of Soviet and Nazi tanks? The T-I, T-II, T-III, T-IV appeared prior to 1937 and Soviet military men and designers were well familiar with them, so Marshal Zhukov's appraisal is entirely applicable to them.

The only change to come about was the appearance of a new generation of Soviet tanks—the T-34 and KV, the decision on whose batch production was adopted on December 19, 1939 and which began arriving in Western border districts in the latter half of 1940. Over 1,860 units (639 KVs and 1125 T-34s) alone had been put out by the start of the war.²⁰ The experts are unanimous in their view that these tanks were altogether unparalleled worldwide. The KV weighed 47.5 tons and had a 76-mm gun and frontal armour between 75 and 100-mm thick. The T-34 weighed 31 tons, was equipped with a 76-mm gun and carried frontal armour between 45 and 52-mm thick. In battle both tanks were virtually invulnerable for the T-IV guns, let alone the T-I, T-II and T-III.

The very appearance of these tanks, the finest in the world, became possible solely thanks to the high technical level of their predecessors. The fundamentally new location of the armour sheets, which made for the high impenetrability of the T-34 and which became classic in world tank engineering, was first tested on BT tanks. The world's first tank diesel engine, the famous V-2 which was installed on the KV and T-34, came to them from the "obsolete" BT-7M, while German tanks, including the Panthers and Tigers, fought the entire war on fuel-guzzling and inflammable carburetor engines. The T-34's transmission was also borrowed from the BTs, etc.

The specifications of the Soviet prewar tanks were the result of a long-term, cogent and purposeful strategy for developing Soviet tank engineering, the foundations of which were laid back in the late 1920s-early 1930s, when the post of chief of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was occupied by such farsighted and creative military men as I. P. Uborevich and M. N. Tukhachevsky, and the Red Army Department of Mechanisation and Motorisation, which was formed in May 1929, was headed by such ardent tank enthusiasts as I. A. Khalepsky and K. B. Kalinovsky. It was Khalepsky who was able, during his lengthy business trip to the USA in the late 1920s, to describe in the M 1930 tank created by the talented designer Walter Christie and rejected by the US Army those qualities which met most fully the needs of future warfare—speed, range, and mechanical dependability. For until 1937 Soviet tank engineering did not develop for the sake of creating ever more sophisticated and powerful machines, but was subordinated to a strict and clear-cut strategic vision.

In the late 1920s Soviet military theory was the first in the world to appreciate the powerful offensive potential of the still very primitive

tanks of that time. What is more, Tukhachevsky and his colleagues made haste to bring their ideas to fruition. In 1929 Deputy Chief of Staff of the WPRA V. K. Triandafilov submitted for discussion his "deep operation" theory, which called for the wide use of tanks at the fastest possible rate for the entire depth of the enemy's defence. In July 1929 the USSR Revolutionary Military Council adopted a resolution "On the System of Equipping the WPRA with Tanks, Tractors and Other Armoured Vehicles", which provided for the establishment of a tank industry in the country and the production of an entire family of tanks—baby tanks and small, medium and large (heavy) and bridge-laying tanks. As early as 1931-1933 the industry was introducing the production of the T-27 baby tank, the T-26 light tank, the T-28 medium tank and the T-35 heavy tank. Amphibious tanks went into batch production beginning in 1933.

Introduction of the BT tanks proceeded at an especially stepped-up pace. The first two undercarriages of the M 1930 tank that Khalepsky purchased from Christie were sent to the USSR in December 1930. On May 23, 1931, prior to the conclusion of the assembly of the first two tanks on the basis of the M 1930 undercarriage (they were named BT-1), the Revolutionary Military Council adopted a decision to equip the Red Army with BTs; in November 1931 the first BT-2 tanks took part in the holiday parade, and in 1932 396 BT-2 batch tanks rolled off the conveyer.

In parallel with introducing mass production of the new hardware, the tank forces acquired an organisational structure that met the requirements of the "deep operation" concept. In 1930 the USSR created the world's first tank forces formation—a mechanised brigade, and in 1932 the world's first mechanised corps. By the start of 1936 the Red Army had already had four mechanised corps (500 tanks in each), six separate mechanised brigades and just as many separate tank regiments, not counting the 15 mechanised regiments of cavalry divisions and over 80 tank battalions and companies in the infantry forces.

At the same time, Britain, the homeland of tanks, only in 1932 formed in the first experimental tank brigade. In 1937 Germany had only three tank divisions and even in late 1939, after the start of the Second World War, six tank divisions of 300 tanks each.²¹

Tukhachevsky was a proponent of decisively terminating any act of aggression at its initial positions. It was for this that he needed, among other things, BT tanks with their speed that were unattainable for foreign tanks and enormous range. He did not need tanks for passive defence. In the only instance when BTs were used in keeping with their designation, i. e., offensively and in an "integral mailed fist", as was the case at Halhyn-gol under Zhukov's command, they demonstrated their complete superiority over the enemy, including its tanks (the medium Japanese tank, the 89 type, and the latest innovation of Japanese tank engineering, the 97 type).

The following question naturally arises in this connection: Why was it that although we had had a many-fold advantage over Germany in tanks, considerably surpassed it in the qualitative indices of the Soviet machines, and had brilliant experience of tank operations at Halhyn-gol, we lost almost our entire tank fleet during the first months of the war, as we failed to take full advantage of the mighty potential the tank forces enjoyed?

The main reasons lay in the deformations which had taken place in the country in the latter half of the 1930s and had done considerable damage to the Red Army, its tank forces included. Everything that

Tukhachevsky and other creators of the Soviet tank forces and the authors of concepts of their utilisation worked on for so long a time had been ruined. The "deep operation" theory had been scuttled as the handiwork of "enemies of the people", the mechanised corps disbanded and their commanders shot. Launching of production of the T-34 had been postponed. Only sixty-eight per cent of the total tank allocations for 1938 had been spent.²² But then the People's Commissar for Defence Kliment Voroshilov was able to proudly report at the 18th Party Congress in March 1939 that from 1934 to 1939 the size of the cavalry in the Red Army had grown by 50 per cent (another 80-plus cavalry divisions were formed in the latter half of 1941).²³

Admittedly, under the impact of German victories in the West, which amply showed the effectiveness of massive use of tanks, it was decided in 1940 to form anew the mechanised corps that had been disbanded. Nine of them were put together in 1940; each of them under the wartime establishment was supposed to have 1,031 tanks, and in February-March 1941 the formation of 20 additional corps of the same composition began. However, an inability to control large tank groupings due to what was in effect the total decimation of the top command personnel of the tank forces led to a situation where as early as autumn 1941 the mechanised corps, as well as the tank divisions incorporated in them, were again disbanded. This is how General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko, who was appointed to the General Staff in 1939 from the post of tank battalion commander, justifies this decision in his book *The General Staff During the War Years*: "During the very first months of the war the members of the General Staff came up against a severe shortage of tanks in the country. However, the enemy, while enjoying an advantage in the air, continued advancing and operating with powerful tank spearheads in a bid to tear the Soviet defence to pieces. There arose the question of whether the organisational structure of the forces corresponded to the conditions that had taken shape.

"What was to be done in that particular instance? We figured approximately as follows the Soviet infantry was a real force capable of administering a rebuff to the Nazi tanks and motorised infantry. For stability it was imperative to provide it with ample anti-tank artillery and tanks. Major tank support could be realistically furnished through smaller formations, units and subunits, i. e., tank brigades, regiments and battalions, not corps operating independently. That was the option we chose."

In reality, this decision meant that the Soviet tank forces which as it was, had been generally thinned out during the first months of hostilities (according to official figures, as of December 1941 there were only 1,300 tanks left on the active front), were weakened even more, for they began to be used in a scattered fashion, having been evenly distributed among infantry units, i. e., in the least effective way.

Meanwhile, right up until the end of the war the Germans strove to use their tanks concentratedly, even on the defence. For example, in the Ardennes offensive in December 1944 the German forces slapped together a grouping of 970 tanks and assault guns and, with almost no fuel or air cover, were able to inflict a major defeat to the Anglo-American troops despite the latter's overwhelming advantage in aircraft, tanks and artillery.

As the above American experts Zaloga and Grandsen have noted, the heavy losses of Soviet tanks at the start of the war were due not to their boscience but to their incorrect use and to the "relative inexperience of their crews, the appalling deficiencies in their officer cadres in the wake of the purges, and the debilitating lack of spare parts."²⁴

The supreme Soviet command's lack of a clear-cut concept for use of tanks can be traced throughout the greater part of the war. Thus, when another in a series of decisions was adopted, in spring 1942, to create large tank formations (corps and armies), they came to incorporate infantry, in effect foot divisions that were incapable of chasing after tanks, as a result of which these tank corps and armies proved unfit for carrying out any deep offensive operations.

It was only in summer 1943, during the Battle of the Kursk Bulge, that tank formations were created which met the requirements of the theory of "deep operation", i. e., which had a motorised infantry, self-propelled artillery and other reinforcement means enabling large tank groupings to operate independently deep in the enemy rear.

However, even these tank groupings were frequently used for handling tasks for which they were ill-suited. Among other things, they were utilised for assaults on large cities which were ideal natural anti-tank fortifications. A classic example was the storming of Berlin, in which 6,250 tanks, or almost twice the amount in the entire Nazi invasion army in 1941, took part.

It comes as no surprise that given such a wasteful utilisation of tanks the Soviet tank forces suffered impossibly heavy losses throughout the war. Although the tank losses, like the other Soviet troop losses, are still blank spaces in the history of the Great Patriotic War, approximate figures for these losses can be obtained even on the basis of available indirect data.

It is a known fact that as of early 1945 the Soviet Union had 11,800 tanks and self-propelled guns on the front. If we consider that Soviet industry produced over 80,000 tanks from June 1941 through December 1944 and (a total of 102,800 tanks and self-propelled guns were produced throughout the war years) and if the USSR's 20,000 prewar tanks and the 12,500 tanks it received under lend-lease (7,000 American, 4,300 British and 1,200 Canadian) are added to this figure, we can imagine the scope of the Soviet tank losses over this period.

An approximation of the Soviet tank losses can be arrived at in another way as well. The authors of the Soviet work *Military Strategy* write that the mean monthly irretrievable losses of Soviet tanks during the past war amounted to 19 per cent of those available on the front.²⁵ If we take, say, summer 1943, when there were 10,200 Soviet tanks on the front, as a point of departure, this means that the Soviet Union lost over 20,000 tanks every year of the war.

Typically, the Soviet forces apparently suffered the heaviest tank losses in 1943-1944, i. e., when tanks of prewar design were no longer in service, and exclusively the latest tanks, including the modernised T-34/85 (with an 85-mm gun) and the most powerful tanks of the war period, the famous IS-2 and IS-3 (Iosif Stalin) with a 122-mm gun (the production of light tanks in the USSR had been discontinued by that time), were reaching the front.

Whereas as early as 1942 and the first half of 1943 Soviet troops enjoyed a numerical advantage in tanks over the Germans (there were 3,882 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns at the front in May 1942, 5,080 in November 1942, and 10,200 in summer 1943 against 3,229, 5,080 and 5,850 German ones respectively), beginning in late 1943 the numerical edge in tanks went over to the enemy. Thus, in early 1944 Hitler had 5,400 tanks and self-propelled guns on the Soviet-German front, and 7,800 as of July 1, while on the Soviet side there were at the front 5,258 and 7,100 tanks and self-propelled guns respectively, i. e., much fewer than in summer 1943.

By the start of 1945, when there were 11,800 Soviet tanks and self-

propelled guns against 8,000 German ones, the Soviet Union regained the numerical advantage in tanks.

Stalin was fully aware of the entire tragedy of his having brought the tank forces to ruin and annihilated military personnel. The series of victories scored by the Nazi tank spearheads in Poland and Western Europe in 1939-1940 was like a bolt out of the blue. These victories were being won not at all thanks to the quality and quantity of the German tanks. The German generals were acting according to the same scheme based on the "deep operation" theory. However, acknowledging this would have meant affirming the veracity of "enemies of the people". It was simpler and safer to explain away the successes of German arms by the number and might of German tanks. The whole of Stalin's entourage began competing with one another in describing the might of the German tank armadas. Particularly "outstanding" were the intelligence officers who reported that the Germans were modernising their tanks with guns of 100-mm-odd calibre and with new armour that was several times stronger than was the case. This incredible "information" proved sufficient for discontinuing production of the Soviet 76-mm anti-tank guns, the best in the world, as useless against German tanks.

The degree of the Soviet military leadership's ignorance of the military and economic possibilities of other countries, or rather its stubborn reluctance to see reality, astounds us to this day. Thus, prior to the Second World War the possibilities of Britain and France for producing tanks were estimated at 30,000 and 18,000 tanks per year respectively.²⁶ In actuality, however, Britain put out 42 tanks in 1936, 32 in 1937, 419 in 1938, 969 in 1939, and, in 1940, when it was doing all in its power to replace the loss of all its tanks at Dunkerque, Britain managed to produce 1,399 tanks.²⁷

Direct estimates of Germany's tank-producing capacities, which the Soviet General Staff were guided by on the eve of the war in planning its own tank needs, have not been published. However, there is highly telling indirect information: in February 1941 the General Staff submitted to Stalin figures justifying the urgent need for forming additional 20 mechanised corps with 32,000 tanks, including 16,600 KV's and T-34s. Evidently, the General Staff thus figured that it needed for war with Germany, with due account for the "obsolete" tanks, no less than 50,000 tanks (a figure which, incidentally, corresponds to the NATO estimates of the present-day Soviet tank fleet).

Stalin and the General Staff were just as far off the mark in their assessment of the qualitative characteristics of the Nazi tank fleet. No tanks with 100-mm guns appeared right up to the end of the war. But then former Nazi general Erich Schneider was able to write with complete satisfaction after the war that "despite a number of flaws in design, the German tanks fully proved themselves in the first years of the war. Even the small T-I and T-II tanks, which were not slated to take part in the war, showed themselves to be on a par with the others."²⁸

Sufficient time has elapsed since the end of the Second World War to deal once and for all with the myths concerning Germany's quantitative and qualitative superiority over the USSR in tanks, aircraft and other weaponry on the eve of the war and thus to throw light on these issues.

First of all, it should be unequivocally acknowledged that Stalin was the author of the first myth—alleging the Nazi forces' quantitative edge in tanks. His purpose was to exonerate his guilt for having brought the tank forces to ruin and decimated the tank command personnel, which

led to enormous losses and failures in the first period of the Great Patriotic War. Speaking on November 6, 1941 at a jubilee meeting on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, he pointed directly to the German tank edge as one of the two reasons for the Soviet forces' failures (Stalin named the absence of a second front as the first reason). He said: "The other reason for the temporary failures of our army consists in our lack of tanks and, in part, aircraft. In modern warfare it is very difficult for infantry to fight without tanks and without sufficient air cover. Our aviation is superior to German aviation, and our glorious flyers have covered themselves with glory as fearless fighting men. However, we still have fewer aircraft than the Germans have. Our tanks are superior to German tanks, and our glorious tankmen and artillerymen have repeatedly caused much vaunted German troops with their many tanks to take to flight. But once again, we have several times fewer tanks than the Germans. Herein lies the secret of the temporary successes of the German army. It cannot be said that our tank industry is functioning poorly and gives our front few tanks. No, it is operating very well and is turning out many superb tanks. But the Germans are producing many more tanks, for they now have at their disposal not only their own tank industry, but the industries of Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and France. Without this circumstance the Red Army would have long ago smashed the German army, which does not go into battle without tanks and fails to withstand strikes by our units if it does not have a tank advantage."²⁹

Stalin entrusted the invention of the second myth—Germany's qualitative superiority in contemporary tanks—to his military entourage and his tried-and-tested cohort of historians. However, his personal involvement in this is likewise unquestionable.

For one thing, this myth enabled Stalin to write off to the "obsolescence" of Soviet tanks his complete unpreparedness for the war and the actual loss of the entire huge Soviet tank fleet during the very first months of the war. For another, this myth made it possible to heap the blame for the military defeats on the military commanders who had been exterminated by Stalin. It is with good reason that all the official works on the history of the Great Patriotic War began patently pointing up the tenet that only from 1939-1940, i. e., after the almost total replacement of command personnel and the conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Hitler, urgent measures to equip the army with the latest weaponry were taken.

Thirdly, it allowed the fact to be veiled that even though the Soviet Union enjoyed an enormous tank edge over Germany through the 1930s, it let slip, through the fault of Stalin, a real opportunity to make the war completely different and incomparably more favourable for itself. It is not hard to visualise the course the war would have taken if the "obsolete" Soviet tanks had been used by the commanders of Tukhachevsky offensively, in an "integral mailed fist" and with appropriate support from bomber aviation and airborne troops, in the development of which the Soviet Union had been the world leader until 1937-1938 and which Stalin also had brought to ruin on the eve of the war as the handiwork of "enemies of the people".

The myth about the technical backwardness of the bulk of Soviet military hardware on the eve of the war is astonishingly tenacious and continues to be maintained in Soviet historiography.* Is the true new-

* Even so serious a scholar as Colonel-General D. A. Volkogonov takes it for granted that on the eve of the war the Soviet Union's "new aircraft, as well as new tanks, amounted to no more than 10 to 20 per cent of the overall number". (*Pravda*, June 20, 1988).

ness of weaponry determined solely by the year it goes into service? Who divided prewar arms into "new" and "obsolete"? When did this happen and, most importantly, why? Is it not clear even from the notes of People's Commissar Vannikov that Stalin used everywhere the criterion of newness he had established to remove hardware that was dependable and had been applied practically by the forces?

The record of the Second World War shows that even then the decisive criterion of the belligerents' armour was not so much the quantity and quality of their combat machines as the nature of the military doctrine of the states, the organisation and ways of using armoured forces, and the degree of preparedness of their personnel. The record of history has shown that tanks are an offensive weapon, massive use of which has unpredictable consequences. An objective historian must reckon with the fact that Hitler overran almost the whole of Europe with a ridiculously small number of tanks, tanks that were of very mediocre quality even for their time. It can also be inferred from this experience that given a passive defence, no tank superiority can give a country any guarantees of security or even simply palpable advantages against an enemy that adheres purposefully and decisively to an offensive strategy.

An analysis of everything that happened to the Soviet tank forces on the eve of and during the Great Patriotic War prompts the following reflections: it is not difficult to imagine that with such a level of military losses many emerged from the war feeling an insatiable need for tanks. It is in the huge tank losses of the period of the Great Patriotic War that lies one of the reasons for the Soviet preoccupation with tanks and the appearance here of the "tank mentality" that led to the postwar tank asymmetry in favour of the Soviet Union. This, however, is a separate question which requires consideration in its own right.

¹ *Air Force Magazine*, August 1987, pp. 45, 46.

² *Правда*, Feb 8, 1988.

³ *Правда*, Oct. 13, 1987.

⁴ *Советская Военная Энциклопедия* (further СВЭ), Vol. 2, Moscow, 1976, p. 55.

⁵ В. И. Дашинцев. *Банкротство стратегии германского фашизма*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, p. 147.

⁶ Arthur J. Alexander, *Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United States*. Santa Monica (Cal), 1976, p. 35.

⁷ Г. К. Жуков. *Воспоминания и размышления*. Moscow, 1969, pp. 143, 205.

⁸ В. И. Дашинцев, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 316.

⁹ СВЭ, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, p. 661.

¹⁰ СВЭ, Vol. 7, Moscow, 1979, p. 662.

¹¹ В. И. Дашинцев, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 553.

¹² СВЭ, Vol. 7, p. 652.

¹³ *Armor*, March-April 1981, p. 45.

¹⁴ Г. К. Жуков, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

¹⁵ А. Н. Латухин. *Противотанковое вооружение*. Moscow, 1974, p. 12; СВЭ, Vol. 7, pp. 656-657.

¹⁶ А. Н. Латухин, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 12.

¹⁷ Б. Л. Ваников. «Записки наркома», *Знамя*, Jan. 1988, p. 141.

¹⁸ *Military Modelling*, Feb. 1982.

¹⁹ Г. К. Жуков, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

²⁰ СВЭ, Vol. 7, p. 662.

²¹ Arthur J. Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

²² *История Великой Отечественной войны*, Vol. 1, p. 415.

²³ Г. К. Жуков, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

²⁴ *Military Modelling*, Feb. 1982.

²⁵ *Военная стратегия*, Moscow, 1963, p. 427.

²⁶ Г. К. Жуков, *op. cit.*, p. 103; *Вооруженные силы Британской империи*, Moscow, Gosvoenizdat, 1938, p. 29.

²⁷ *History of the Second World War. Statistical Digest of the War*, London, 1951, p. 148.

²⁸ *Знамя*, Jan. 1988, p. 141.

²⁹ И. В. Сталин. *О Великой Отечественной войне Советского Союза*. Moscow, 1943, pp. 23, 24.

Alexandra Kollontai (1872-1952), a well-known Soviet diplomat and the world's first lady ambassador, was active in the revolutionary movement in Russia. She was the People's Commissar for Social Security in the first Soviet government, headed the Women's Department of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and was Secretary of the International Women's Secretariat of the Comintern (Communist International). In the autumn of 1922 she was transferred to the diplomatic service. It was then that she began to keep a diary. After the World War II her records were deposited in the archives, where they lay unpublished for nearly forty years. Evidently in the late 1940s the diary was edited, mainly by adding to it recollections stressing the role of Stalin in the author's life. *International Affairs* jointly with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU CC and Historical Diplomacy Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry now starts publishing extracts from the diaries of Alexandra Kollontai.

DIPLOMATIC DIARY: A RECORD OF 23 YEARS

Part One. 1922-1923, Norway

When the Party appointed me Counsellor to the Mission in Norway in the autumn of 1922, I knew nothing about diplomatic work nor even had an idea of what diplomacy really was.

Naturally, we all read and reread Chicherin's notes addressed to the governments of bourgeois countries. We liked those notes, resolute and caustic in tone, based mainly on Lenin's ideas. We realised (though not all of us) that the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty of 1918 was a most clever diplomatic move made by our young Soviet country. That treaty helped stabilise the nation, it dealt a blow to internal enemies, to counter-revolutionaries, and foiled the plans of external enemies, the imperialist interventionists. One had to have Lenin's political insight, his firmness of purpose and courage to make such a move. The party taught us to be proud of every, even minor, success on the diplomatic front in those first years. But I was not very interested in diplomacy. It was a special sphere of activity far removed from me. I did not associate it with my nine years of work as a tribune of Bolshevism and left-wing Zimmerwald ideas in various countries during the active struggle against imperialism and war. It simply did not occur to me that the work I was doing then was actually very closely associated with diplomacy. I identified diplomacy, as I saw it, with people like Talleyrand, Metternich, Briand, and Lloyd George whose activity, marked by mutual deceit and perfidy, proceeded in salons and grand congress halls.

But, of course, we have our Chicherin, and Lenin himself guides the Soviet Republic's foreign policy. To be sure, we scored a splendid diplomatic victory in Genoa in 1922. The imperialist powers joined hands in an attempt to force the Soviet Republic to make concessions

and collude with them. But we outwitted them and stunned them with the Rapallo Treaty signed between the Soviet Republic and Germany. That was a frontal diplomatic blow at our enemies. It was a triumph for the working class not only of Russia, but of the whole world. But how Soviet diplomacy had achieved that was not clear or understandable to us, for we were inexperienced in foreign policy and in assessing the actions of the world forces struggling in the arena of international politics.

It was easier to understand the all-out war in the battlefield against the imperialists, the driving away of the interventionists and their White Guard slaves than to understand those achievements made by the Soviet state in diplomacy, because our diplomacy, we believed, was new and different from that of bourgeois capitalist countries. How can one achieve success and win victories over the capitalists without strikes and barricades? How was it possible to reach an agreement with the world hostile to us, and where should we draw the line in these conspiracies not to lapse into opportunism?

This was extremely vague to me in 1922.

The diplomacy of the imperialists is based on the violence of great powers over weaker ones, on colonial rule and on the desire to wipe off the face of the Earth the "seat of social revolution", that is, the Soviet country.

Can there be diplomacy between the Soviet socialist country and the countries of capitalism?

These questions naturally arose when I tried to grasp the tasks of my new work as a Soviet diplomat. But one thing was clear: our chief task was to secure peace and prevent another war against us. In this I shall find the sympathy and support of the working class in every country. That is not new to me.

So what will I discover and learn in diplomatic service? I learned to be careful and vigilant during my underground party activities. And I learned to see people's worth, to size them up during many years of my wandering around the world as a political refugee and an ardent campaigner for our ideas and principles. Conditions abroad are not new to me. I met with a lot of enmity there as a revolutionary and know the price of friendship or enmity in foreign lands. My work will be mainly guided by the Party, and communication with Moscow will be constant. So, diplomatic service will not differ at all from any other work in Soviet Russia.

When I was told at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs about the difficulties and subtleties of diplomatic protocol, I smiled inwardly. The "rules of etiquette" was a salon art of behaviour. I had mastered its fundamentals at an early age and only hoped that we, Soviet people, would introduce our own innovations and simplifications in this sphere.

After talking with Stalin about my duties in Norway, I had an even greater wish to start the job. I would cope with this task, too, for it is not harder than that of winning for the Soviet country the sympathy and support of millions of women, than that of giving effect to my old dream—mother and child care by the state. It is not harder than leading to revolutionary struggle the workers of Petersburg and convince the sailors of the Baltic Fleet and soldiers at the front to fight in 1917 for the victory of Lenin's April Theses and the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Party.

The essence of Soviet diplomacy and its goals were the same. Only the methods were different. I would manage that, too.

This was what I thought and how I felt as I took up diplomatic service.

HELSINGFORS *

October 9 (diary)

So I have crossed our border. My heart contracted as the train slowed down, running along a bridge over a rivulet called the Sister River. I had left the world's first republic of workers and peasants. Behind me were five stormy years of the revolution, five years of struggle, tension and agitation, but also victories and achievements. The revolution had won. Left behind the Sister River was also my intimate, great and agonising past, my life with Pavel. **

On the border bridge I told myself—that border was impassable in my relations with Pavel. I shall come back to Moscow, perhaps soon, but never to Pavel. Nobody knew what it cost me.

Now there was a different world around me. It was not like our Soviet world. But the good and useful thing was that it would help me to know my worth and pull myself up once again. I was running away not from Pavel, but from that "self" which had almost stooped to playing the hated role of an enamoured and suffering wife.

I was all alone and without the inquisitive eyes of Zoya, without my caring secretary. It was better this way. I was bathing in a pool of loneliness. I could accumulate fresh forces for work and struggle on my new path only from the depth of my own heart and not from any other, even a loving one.

This path was new and a bit frightening because it was unknown to me. But deep down I felt full of cheerful confidence and I was looking boldly ahead into the future, which was still a mystery. But I found the struggle to overcome difficulties and found my own way in the new conditions interesting and exciting.

Before the train reached Leningrad I had finished an article for *Molodaya Gvardia*. I handed it over to the courier who serviced our special purpose carriage.

In Vyborg I did not go out on the platform, our carriage was surrounded by the Finnish police. The Finnish border and customs authorities behaved quite decently, there was no trouble which I had been warned about. We have already signed an agreement with Finland and so we have, *de facto*, goodneighbour relations with it.

In Helsingfors I was met by the officials of the Soviet mission. Soviet envoy Comrade Chernykh had left on business. I was put up in the Soviet mission, a prodigious five-storey building. In the vestibule stood our guards, and on the pavement in front of the house I saw Finnish policemen. Were they protecting us, or spying on us?

I was given a charming guest room. It is light, tidy and warm. The vast tile stove had been heated since morning, and the room smelt of resin and cleanness. I had my breakfast in the common dining room at the mission. It was immaculately clean there, too, nobody smoked, it was unusually quiet, people spoke in low voices. The waitresses were Finnish girls in white pinafores.

I agreed with the secretary to give a report in the evening. They missed Moscow and wanted to hear the news. But I agreed to talk only about the successes of the women's movement at home and in the Comintern countries.

It was a bright, crisp autumn day. I would go out before dark. I refused to be accompanied by our guards.

* Now Helsinki—*Ed.*** Pavel Dybenko, Alexandra Kollontai's second husband—*Ed.*

October 10 (from a letter to a friend) *

My first letter is to you, my irreplaceable friend. So I am in capitalist Finland with its White Guard atmosphere. I live in the mission with our people and hear the usual talk and jokes, just as in our offices in Moscow. But outside the mission is a world hostile to us. Outwardly they all are polite to us, but yet another border incident was provoked by Britain and France a few days ago. In the streets I often see White Guards speaking loudly in Russian. They are well dressed and their manner is insolent, as if they are not refugees here, but victors. It is sad to see it. Why do Finns put up with all this? They say, Mannerheim is their protector and patron. When I hear Russian being loudly spoken, I avoid meeting them.

I like walking round Helsingfors. I am not alone here. In Helsingfors I meet myself at different periods of my life. Now it is a young girl accompanying her mother on a visit to her Finnish friends living in beautifully appointed apartments, which are more modest than ours in Petersburg, but cosier. I was surprised to see that in the evening they would light not lamps but a multitude of candles in candelabums to welcome the "honorary guest", that is, my mother; and a peculiar play of light and shadows would flicker on the walls. I am brought back to the time I wrote my book *The Life of Finnish Workers* and met with Ursin, a Finnish workers' leader, and Tovio. And, finally, there were my trips on party assignments to battleships in 1917. There were clashes, fierce battles with Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and the joy of victory when the number of votes for the Bolshevik resolution was increasing at every new meeting. The influence of the Centrobalt ** with the Bolsheviks at the head was growing. Then there was the editorial office of our newspaper *Volna*, and the meeting with Pavel...

Don't think, my dear, that I walk about Helsingfors accumulating recollections. I am just idling. For the first time in all these years I do not hurry anywhere, and nobody demands articles or speeches from me.

Just imagine: the first thing I have done here is buy two pairs of light and beautiful shoes that fit me so well. I was just going to throw away my rope-soled shoes, when the mission's typist took them from me. "They belong in the Revolution Museum, they are a relic. You wore these shoes when you spoke at numerous meetings, persuading us women to join the revolution and Bolshevism."

Today I was in the Cathedral Square. It took my breath away to see it so large and empty. In 1917, when we Bolsheviks held rallies there, standing on the cathedral steps, the square was filled with so dense a crowd of sailors in shirts, workers and soldiers, that they had to carry me out over the sea of our supporters. I ascended the familiar steps, and again, gave in to recollections...

In the square the Finnish Senate also brings back memories. The young Soviet government of Finland held a session there. In February 1918, I gave a report at the Finnish Council of People's Commissars on Lenin's instruction. The session was chaired by Sirola, and Kuusinen did the interpreting. Two months later the White Guards together with Germans drowned Soviet Finland in blood.

Well, I've gone on enough. This letter will be sent with diplomatic mail, so I write whatever I want to.

* Zoya Leonidovna Shabdurskaya, childhood friend.

** The Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet—Ed.

October 10 (diary)

The first impediment: the Swedes at their embassy here have not given me a visa and are contacting the Stockholm authorities for the instructions, though it is only a transit visa for Norway and I have a diplomatic passport. Comrades at our mission explained that that is the usual red tape, for we have not yet established formal diplomatic relations with Sweden, and the issuing of a visa may be delayed for a week or longer.

I feel at home with our people at the mission, and I like Helsingfors, but still I am eager to get to where I'll be working. I'm afraid that the Swedes are not giving me the visa because they remember that long ago, at the start of the World War in the autumn of 1914, I was deported from Sweden for campaigning and writing against the imperialist war, and then I caused an uproar by my agitation tour to the USA in 1915-1916 (on Lenin's assignment and for building up the Zimmerwald Left).

I sent a telegram to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow so that they would speed up the issuing of a transit visa through Sweden. That was my first coded message to Chicherin. At first they would not let me into the coding room, but I produced my diplomatic passport and was then allowed to send the message.

"Don't be surprised by our strict rules", the mission secretary apologised, "the coding room is the most sacred place in all our missions. One should be utmostly careful—enemies operate everywhere."

To fill the day, I went to see my favourite paintings in the Ateneum Art gallery. I stood a long time in front of Gallén's works of scenes from Kalevala. Then I admired the portrait of singer Ino-Akte—the great and tragic love of Albert Edelfeldt, the painter. Akte had competed with Zhenya Mravina* in Paris and London. Zhenya had more charm, musical talent and a fascinating voice. But Aino Akte was more original in interpreting her parts.

But I don't want to write about the past—the door to the future is open wide before me.

October 11

A visa from Sweden arrived, and my diplomatic passport was taken to the Swedish embassy for registration. In two hours I would leave Helsingfors, and take a Swedish steamer heading straight for Stockholm, and from there to Norway.

I parted warmly with the mission staff in the dining room, and I am grateful to the life-giving atmosphere of long-known Helsingfors. I spent my time getting a good rest and restored my strength for the new stage in my life.

ON BOARD THE SHIP**October 11. The Steamship Birger Jarl.**

The ship is heading for Stockholm. It is a brisk autumn day, and the sun is going in and out of the clouds. The ship is not rocking at all; it is like sailing on a lake. Rocking and tossing will start at night, after we pass the Aland Islands, but, so far, we are moving among skerries. The sharp granit edges of the rocky islands are polished off by the

* My sister, the prima donna at the Mariin Theatre in Petersburg Guest performances abroad—*Author*.

water's ebb and flow. But there are islets overgrown with alder and birch trees. On such an island is the inevitable little red house and a wooden pier with a boat tied up to it. It is a fisherman's house, or a summer collage not yet abandoned for the winter. Pines skirting the skerries are quaintly bent and crooked by the sea winds. Behind the yellow-leaved birch trees a small red house on an island attracts one by its serenity and seclusion from the whirlwinds of our daily life. I'd like to live there alone sometime and put in order what I have lived through and thought over in the years of the revolution.

It has not fully hit me that I will soon start diplomatic work—my appointment was so sudden. I am very glad to be sent to Norway. I am anxious to go to the country full of wonders of nature, with its working class that sympathises with us. I have already worked among them and with them, persuading them to back up Lenin's line during the war, and I have friends there. Nansen is also there. It is he and the Norwegians who came to the aid of Soviet Russia in the difficult year of 1921, when the country was hit by poor harvest and famine. The aid to the hungry Volga Area, extended by the Norwegians with Nansen at the head, was honest, friendly and humane*, in contrast to the US organisation with its famous ARA association, which was occupied more with intelligence and with material aid to the counter-revolutionaries and all kinds of organisations hostile to Soviet power, than with aid to the hungry.

Though it was sad to abandon my work among women, I'm glad it is Norway I'm going to and I am looking forward, with interest and even enthusiasm, to the diplomatic service, an entirely new job for me.

When the Comintern planned to send me to work with the International Women's Secretariat in Berlin in 1920, I flatly refused. We had so much work to do, and I couldn't leave our Soviet Republic, our toiling people making a social revolution which had a long way to go. I had dreamed about a social revolution from an early age. Now it was a fact, and to leave the country which was the first to accomplish it, when the victory was by far not ensured (the failure of the revolutions in Finland and Hungary)—no, I couldn't do that.

But now the situation is different. Now the worst and hardest days for the world's first republic of working people have past. We have won, the party has suppressed counter-revolution, routed the White generals, the kulaks, the armies of Denikin and Yudenich and their foreign capitalist accomplices, and has driven them all away from the Soviet land. The blockade failed. The people, the free Soviet people, have launched vigorously and eagerly the struggle against dislocation and are building their new life in a new fashion, laying the foundations of socialism.

So you see, you gentlemen capitalists and militarists, it is not so easy to defeat a nation carrying the banner of the Communist Party led by Lenin, marching with determination along a path leading the working people to a new and fair social system.

The Soviet Republic today, after five years of revolution, has taken its place as a powerful factor of international significance. The bourgeoisie, the imperialists hate us, but considering all that we have achieved over these five years, they are compelled, fearing us, to reckon with the Soviet state.

The Genoa Conference showed our enemies, the counter-revolutionaries and imperialists of the whole world, what we are and what our strength and significance is in international affairs. Soviet power is not what it was during the civil war and intervention. Our state can not only win

* It was for that aid that the congress of Soviets expressed gratitude to Nansen for his work in combating hunger in the areas hit by the horrible drought—*Author*.

in battles, but also at diplomatic round tables. In Genoa, the highly educated Jesuitical diplomats of the capitalist powers expected they would cleverly fool the "Russian barbarians", the Soviet representatives. But it was the other way round. The Rapallo Treaty cut the British and French down to size, showing them they would have to reckon with the Soviet Republic. In Genoa, we foiled their game and routed their hostile plans. The Soviet Republic will not be wiped off the face of the Earth, they will have to adapt themselves to it. To be sure, the capitalists will not be able to reconcile themselves to it, but they have to reckon with us. In the struggle against us they have to rack their brains. But the very clever diplomatic move in Genoa baffled them, showing them our might.

I continue. I'm in a small "ladies' cabin" where no smoking is allowed. The breakfast was wonderful. I remembered it from my previous sea travels on board Swedish ships. The table in the dining room, the length of the room, was laid with appetizers. Pyramids of diverse kinds tasty Finnish butter misted over with cold salty beads, heaps of knäckebröd (Swedish bread), variously seasoned herring, boiled potatoes covered with napkins to keep them hot, smoked venison, bright-red salt salmon, smoked ham and ham with green peas, thin slices of cold roast beef, panfuls of hot round rissoles emanating a pleasant heady odour, shrimp bigger than those available in Normandy, dishes of cold hazel hens, game pâté, and a long line of cheese varieties to suit any taste supplied with bisquits and balls of frozen butter on small glass trays. There are so many various dishes on this famous appetizer table. You don't have to pay more than the usual paid for breakfast, though you may eat as much as you wish. As soon as your dish is empty, it is refilled. This is the custom in Sweden.

The passengers serve themselves, fill their plates and take their seats at small tables. I also took what I liked, sat at a table and ordered half a bottle of light Finnish beer.

The passengers, though they are preoccupied with appetizers, cast glances at me and whisper among themselves. Instead of going with platefuls of appetizers straight to their tables, they pass near my table to cast a brief look at me, a strange passenger travelling from the Soviet Republic to take up a diplomatic job in Norway. "The first woman diplomat". It turned out that I'm a sensation, and the shipping company uses it as an advertisement for the *Birger Jarl*.

Somehow I hadn't realised that I'm the first woman in diplomatic service, and that it is, as it were, a practical result of the work done by our Women's Department and the party's call to promote women to important posts. But now that I realise all this, I want to write briefly about how it all happened, and why.

MY APPOINTMENT

Everything was decided unexpectedly rapidly earlier this summer. I came to see my husband who was on leave (he commands a corps) in Odessa. We lived in a smart villa that had belonged to a wealthy man who had fled with the White Guards. It was an oppressively hot southern night. The roses in the garden had a stifling sweet fragrance. Moonbeams gilded the dark waves of the Black Sea and scattered like small diamonds in the sparks of sea foam.

We had it out, again, and the painful conversation took place in the garden. I gave him my final decision: "I am leaving for Moscow on Wednesday". I am leaving him, my husband, for good. He briskly turned

his back on me and walked in silence to the house. A shot sounded clearly in the calm of the stifling night. I instinctively realised what that sound meant and, struck with horror, rushed to the house. There on the terrace he lay, my husband, a gun in his hand...

But that's not exactly what I was going to write about. As I cross the Baltic Sea, embarking on a new path of state service, I want to express the emotions that completely fill me now. The emotions are bright and joyful, and all the personal gloom and sorrow, all that went through this year which came to a head with the shot fired in Odessa, have dissolved in these feelings and disappeared.

The Party asked me to take an important job. The nightmare of what I suffered is in the past. It is not only personal joy, it is yet another achievement for women. The door to diplomatic service was until now hermetically sealed for them. The Soviet Republic has removed the taboo...

I hurried to the Metropol building at the corner, where the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs then was housed. In an instance I felt as if cold water had been poured over me. Board member Ganetsky repeated that an agrément for my appointment had been requested in the Foreign Office in London,* but they doubted very much in the commissariat that the government of the British Empire would give a positive reply. "It's unprecedented—a woman is given a diplomatic post. The Soviet Republic is not going to break all established traditions in diplomacy. Besides, your subversive agitation activities during the war are well known in the British Empire and in America."

"But I had been told at the Central Committee that the decision on sending me to Canada had already been adopted by the Political Bureau."

"Quite right, and this is because the commissariat has requested an agrément for your appointment. You know that our party can't lay down the law for London," Ganetsky added with a faint note of irritation. "Better talk it over with the People's Commissar".

Chicherin appeared to be even more pessimistic about the approval than Ganetsky. "How can the Central Committee undertake such a delicate affair without first discussing the matter with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs? A Bolshevik propagandist has made so much commotion all over the world, and all of a sudden she is Counsellor to a Soviet mission! It's an awkward situation. And it is especially impolite to impose you of all people on Britain! You are a most odious person for the British Empire. I just don't understand," he added with irritation, "why should we provoke a rejection of an agrément now when relations with London are already tense?"

I left the commissariat discouraged. Still, I decided to have a talk with Leonid Krasin. He is an old friend of mine and would never give me bad advice.

Krasin's response to my appointment was quite different.

"Don't pay attention to Georgy Vasilyevich's** grumbling. If our republic, progressive in all respects, appoints a woman like you to a diplomatic post and thus violates diplomatic traditions, this is only logical and correct. You see how Maria Fyodorovna (Andreyeva-Gorkaya) copes with my assignment in trade! No, you don't have to drop it because of the doubts at the People's Commissariat. You are going to be useful to our state. It is precisely now that we need educated people in foreign countries who are familiar with life abroad. If the British refuse to receive you, try and contact another state, say, Norway.~ It's a nice country, and we have many friends there. I saw this when I was in

* For appointment to the post of Counsellor to the mission in Canada—*Ed.*

** Chicherin—*Ed.*

Christiania* in transit. Write to your friends, members of parliament, ask them to intercede for you. The Communists together with left-wing Labourites are politically strong there. Besides, one shouldn't forget that we have a trade agreement, the first of its kind, with Norway. It is beneficial not only to us, but also to them. This is obliging."

I left Krasin reassured.

But days passed, and there was no reply from London. At last a telephone call came through from Board member Ganetsky: "London has refused to give an agreement as we warned you," he added.

What should I do now?

I decided to go to the Central Committee. Stalin received me.

"What are we going to do with you? No one wants you. Is there any country where you didn't raise so much commotion?"

I named Norway. Stalin wrote on a piece of paper lying on his desk.

"We'll try there, too" he said.

The reply from Norway came unexpectedly quickly: the agrément to my appointment was given.

I went to Chicherin. "What will be my job in Norway?"

"You will help establish normal diplomatic relations between the Soviet Socialist Republic and the Kingdom of Norway. We already signed quite a good trade agreement with Norway in 1921, but it is only a recognition of us *de facto*. There should be mutual recognition *de jure*. Since the agrément to your appointment came so quickly, you have opportunities for establishing goodneighbour relations with Norway. Leaving aside the fact that you are a woman, you have many advantages which our young Soviet diplomats sent abroad do not have. One of them is your perfect knowledge of five foreign languages. The rules of etiquette are known to you, and the situation in bourgeois countries is nothing new to you either. You will be able to make use of these advantages to carry out the assignments of the People's Commissar with your usual preciseness."

I didn't tell Chicherin that, following Krasin's advice, I had written to my friends in Norway and this is evidently why the favourable reply approving my appointment came so soon. But the fact of the quick reply to the request by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concerning my appointment as Counsellor in Norway reconciled Chicherin with my taking a diplomatic job. He informed me that Ambassador Surits was in Christiania and would explain my new duties to me, and suggested that I immediately agree with Ganetsky and the business manager of the People's Commissariat on making arrangements to quickly carry out the formalities of my departure.

Shaking my hand, he wished me as much success in my diplomatic work as in my work doing agitation while in emigration. He recalled also how at that time he had sent me to read lectures in the Russian communities with the aim of increasing the funds of aid to emigrants, the funds of which he had been in charge.

At that moment I again saw in the dry and inaccessible People's Commissar of the Soviet Republic, whose department I was joining, the Chicherin-Ornatsky that I had known in the years of emigration.

That is how I joined diplomatic service, and that is why I'm on my way to Norway.

STOCKHOLM

October 13. Continental Hotel

So I am in Stockholm. Comrades met me at the pier. The steamer was late and Permanent Representative Kerzhentsev had left to the mission. We shall meet later.

Now Oslo—Ed.

I was put up at the Continental Hotel, opposite the railway station. I had stayed there in 1917, when I came for the meeting of the left-wing Zimmerwald group as a Bolshevik delegate. At that time none of the German comrades could come from Germany. That was in July 1917, the war was still going on. The meeting was attended by Zeth Höglund and Frederik Ström (Swedes), Angelica Balabanova from Italy, Martynov from the Mensheviks, and the rest I don't remember. Meanwhile there were the "July days" in Petrograd. Lenin had to go into hiding. On my way back to Russia, in Tornio, on the border with Finland, I was arrested by the Russian authorities by order of the Provisional Government, and after the Continental Hotel I went straight to a Kerensky prison in Petrograd *. Five years have passed, and now I'm a diplomat of the Soviet Republic travelling to Norway via Stockholm. But even then, in 1917, I was so confident in our victory, the victory of the Bolsheviks, that when Vorovsky ** tried to persuade me to wait some time in Sweden, I refused. I had to borrow money from him for my journey back home, but I did go to Russia.

But enough of that.

I looked out of the window at Vasa-gatan. It is too early to go to Kerzhentsev. The weather is gloomy, I would rather not leave the hotel now. I'd rather record a funny incident that occurred on board *Birger Jarl* as I arrived in Stockholm.

When our ship sailed up to Stockholm, the Swedish authorities began, as usual, to check passports before the passengers went ashore. One of the police agents checking the passports looked familiar, but I couldn't place him. He looked intently at me, twidling my diplomatic passport in his hands. When his narrow, cunning eyes met mine, I recognised him: he was the sleuth who had arrested me in 1914 and then accompanied me to the prison castle in Malmö.

He evidently recognised me, too. He took another look at the photograph in the passport and bowed.

"Travelling to Norway, madam? How many days will you stay in Stockholm?"

I told him that persons carrying diplomatic passports did not need to state the time they are going to spend in Sweden. But my former sleuth was unimpressed by the diplomatic passport and put something down in his pad. Yet, handing back the passport, he bowed. During the World War I policemen got used to anything.

October 13. The Train to Christiania. At Night.

The day in Stockholm passed in confusion. It evoked in me feelings of pain and torment that seemed to have ceased. And now, as I reread my husband's letters, I wept a little and couldn't fall asleep. I had received Pavel's letter at the Mission in Stockholm - it had reached me with the diplomatic mail sent from Moscow. The letter was so tender, full of longing for me and of self-reproach... "Is it possible that a single mistake," he wrote, "an affair with a beautiful girl, while we lived separately (I was in Moscow and he in military campaigns) can ruin our profound friendship, our love".

I was in doubt: was I right to have broken with him? Yes, that was the right thing to do. Still, it's painful. The letter spoiled my day in Stockholm.

I didn't like the information provided by Kerzhentsev. He said there was no work for the ambassador in Sweden. There were difficulties with the authorities, the newspapers were hostile to our republic and published

* See my pamphlet *In a Kerensky Prison*.

** Vorovsky was our first ambassador to Sweden.

slander about it. Furthermore, the Comintern Executive Committee distrusted the Swedish Communist Party and is very much displeased with its line. Still I braced myself and made a fairly good report to mission's officials on the work and achievements of the women's departments in the Soviet Republic.

I was seen off on the train by all, and our women at the Mission were very pleased with me. Kerzhentsev did not arrive at the railway station to see me off.

But enough of recalling Stockholm and Pavel's letter. Tomorrow I will step down on Norwegian land and become a diplomatic counsellor. Will I and Surits be able to work in harmony together?

October 14. Morning

I was awoken by a knock on the door of my compartment. The conductor brought a vacuum bottle full of coffee, sandwiches, sugar, and a cup—all in a wicker basket. That was a sign we reached the border station in Sweden—Charlottenberg. Norway is across the border.

Hot coffee was refreshing and I looked out of the window with pleasure. The train was on the move again. I am in Norway at last. Bright autumn colours, small houses with big windows to let in more sunlight. Northern nature gives so little sunlight. Sturdy rosy-cheeked children are hurrying to school. There is no snow yet, of course, so there are no skis and no helke sleighs. But it is still Norway. Hello, the familiar land, the refuge of my emigration! Here I had not been imprisoned, had not been deported. In the hard days of the World War I, I was here, relating to the workers of Norway the great thoughts of Lenin's, showing them that the social revolution was near.

A border guard came into the car and asked: "You are Mrs. Kollontai, aren't you? Welcome in Norway." He bowed affably. He didn't even touch the passport that I handed to him.

A moment later a short customs official burst noisily in. He extended both hands to me in the doorway and exclaimed joyfully in Norwegian: "So you have come back to us, Comrade Kollontai! Congratulations—the Russian proletarians did accomplish a social revolution. Your Lenin is a fine fellow. I said this back then, during the war."

"Are you a Communist?" I asked him.

"I am what I was during the war. We anarchists do not recognise parties and all that. One should build a new life on principles of mutual assistance. Why are you staring at me? Don't you remember me? I'm Egil Mortensen, the very Mortensen who in those years secretly smuggled parcels from Lenin into Russia for you. Not a single package was lost. You thanked me so much.

"Is it true that in your Soviet Republic everyone is equal and the workers themselves are the masters? It's hard to believe this. Now you, too, are not just Comrade Kollontai but a diplomat and I have no right to examine your suitcases. A worker from Russia will have his belongings rummaged in, but it's forbidden to examine your luggage. And you call that equality?

"But your Lenin did a good thing by driving all the capitalists away from Russia and giving land to the peasants. Write to Lenin and tell him that Egil Mortensen sends his best regards, and that I believed him and helped him when many people didn't even know his name.

"Well, good luck, Comrade Kollontai. Help us here in Norway, too, to make a socialist revolution. The capitalists keep us down. I have several kids, was a transport worker, and now have to work as a customs official. I will get off here. Good-bye!"

And my noisy anarchist jumped off the train as it was slowing down.

(Continued on page 137)

DE GAULLE: FORESIGHT AND ILLUSIONS

Vladimir YERÔFEYEV

After the defeat of France, General Charles de Gaulle emigrated to Britain and was sentenced to death by the Vichy regime. With a small group of followers he started practically from scratch. From an early age he fanatically believed that he was destined to serve France and lead it to the summits of glory and grandeur. To attain this goal, de Gaulle, a modest and honest man, acted in the political arena as a sophisticated politician, at times resorting to intrigues and even blackmail whenever the situation, in his opinion, required that.

He was an energetic and realistic-minded statesman and military commander building the edifice of his policy, carefully selecting the raw material, rejecting what was redundant, manoeuvring and playing on contradictions. In doing so, he often made use of the political crises he himself created and of the easing of tensions he vigorously promoted.

From June 18, 1940, the day de Gaulle called on all Frenchmen and Frenchwomen to rally round him in the struggle to save France and restore its freedom and independence, he vigorously sought to be the country's sole military and political leader, both during the war and immediately after liberation. As the customs and morals of the former regime of the parties of the Fourth Republic began to be restored in 1944-1946, restricting his power, de Gaulle launched an uncompromising struggle against it. "The regime of the parties", he said in 1945, "is pernicious. It blocks the pursuance of a major foreign policy and upsets stability and internal tranquility." But, finding himself incapable of overcoming the unacceptable, from his point of view, order of things, de Gaulle in January 1946 left government activities to everybody's surprise.

He spent more than twelve years in his small estate Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, where he wrote military memoirs in an old-fashioned style and, absorbed in his thoughts, took walks in a shady park. The General's supporters called that period of his life "the crossing of a desert". During those years, as he recalled later, he walked a distance equalling that around the Earth. I didn't believe it, but the General offered simple proof: nine kilometres multiplied by the 4,500 days he spent in solitude add up to 40,000 kilometres, or the length of the equator.

In the first years of his self-imposed retirement, though, he made occasional attempts to rejoin political activity, in particular, with the help of the supra-party association the *Alliance for the Republic* (RPR), but those were hopeless steps, poorly suited to his main principles. In the

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meantime, de Gaulle closely watched developments, waiting for the moment when, as he put it, "a ray of hope would flash in the darkness".

He believed that his day would come. Nearly every week he paid secret visits to Paris where he kept a small flat which served him as his office, on quiet Solférino street in the administrative centre of the capital on the left bank of the Seine. It was there that I first met him early in February 1958.

Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov, who regularly visited de Gaulle back then, once took me along with him. At that time I was Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in France. De Gaulle and Vinogradov were on friendly terms. Vinogradov's disposition, sincerity and optimism, and the fact that he was well-informed about the current developments evidently appealed to the General. As a military man, he was also drawn to the Soviet Ambassador who was known as the best shot in the Paris diplomatic corps and was among the best in hunting, which was occasionally arranged for foreign diplomats. But most important, of course, was that the General, non-active at that time, valued the attention paid him by the Ambassador of the great power, a power to whom de Gaulle was profoundly grateful for unfailing support in the hard years of the war.

When I first saw de Gaulle, he seemed more bulky than he had appeared to be in photographs. He was nearly two metres (6'8") tall, and his figure, which looked awkward at first sight, was crowned with an unproportionately small head; he had massive features, a puffy face. He was an easy target for cartoonists of all styles, who readily exaggerated his large nose, broad ears and small eyes under bushy brows. When he was in good spirits, he was charming in his own way. He knew that and used it well.

When he spoke, people were greatly impressed by his temperamental and somewhat clumsy gestures, and by his voice which reached a high pitch during fits of anger, at times genuine, at times feigned in keeping with his own scenarios during public speeches or at press conferences. At such moments he in some ways resembled a fretful child. De Gaulle was an emotional man, but could restrain himself when he wanted to, and he could be inaccessible and stern. In a word, he was an excellent actor.

I remember my first meeting with him also because, the moment we entered his modest room, the General rose from behind a small desk in the corner and, having greeted us, said with a smile: "It's lucky you have come today—I just finished a chapter of my memoirs on my trip to Moscow in December 1944. If you have time, I'd like very much for you to read it and give your comments." He took a pile of typewritten pages, handed it over to Vinogradov and invited us to the sitting room next door. We spent about an hour and a half reading the text. It was in bold hand, because de Gaulle had poor eyesight; one eye was especially weak. He often had to memorise his long speeches.

When we came back to his office, the General was absorbed in his work. He removed his thick glasses, which he normally did not wear in public, and asked, "Well, any comments?" We had corrected a few inaccuracies in his description of Moscow, the Kremlin, etc. He accepted our remarks. After a short pause he said: "It's your business, of course, but, frankly, I don't understand why you have done all that to Stalin's name, why you belittle his merits and negate his role. In my opinion, he was an outstanding man and he did a great deal for our common victory, for enhancing Russia's prestige." Vinogradov replied that Stalin's role, especially in the war against Hitler Germany was not disputed by anyone, but that at home he had made mistakes that cost our people dearly. De Gaulle thought it over, and said: "Well, Mr. Ambassador, small men make small mistakes, while great men make enormous mistakes."

I think that utterance reflected the typical features of de Gaulle's character: his megalomania and disregard for the daily cares of the man in the street, and his idealisation of leaders with a firm hand and iron will, even if he felt the methods they used were unacceptable.

As he uttered that maxim, de Gaulle obviously meant himself in the first place, his own role in world history, thinking about how the coming generations would judge his deeds. In general, he liked to take a detached view of himself. In conversations he often spoke about himself in the third person: "General de Gaulle considered...", "General de Gaulle decided...", and so on. Quite often he did not hesitate to say, "There were difficult periods in France's history. But it always found a way out because at critical moments it had Jeanne d'Arc and Louis XIV, Clemenceau and Charles de Gaulle."

He evidently had the same attitude to Stalin whom he identified with "eternal Russia" and all the achievements and victories of the Soviet people. Naturally, he had only an outward impression of Stalin, and a very approximate one at that. He, as anybody else for that matter, was unaware not only of the scope of Stalin's crimes and the monstrosity of his arbitrary rule, but even of the very fact that these crimes were committed.

There were cases when de Gaulle was tough, but he was never cruel. Undaunted in attaining his goals, he never, even at critical moments, resorted to repressions and annihilation of either his numerous opponents or open enemies. When a group of terrorists submachine-gunned the car in which he rode with his wife, he called for the death sentence for only one person, the group's leader Colonel Bastien Thiry. De Gaulle, it was said, summoned him to announce that he had declined the Colonel's plea for mercy not because he had fired at him, but because, being an officer of the French army, he was a poor shot.

Whenever a conversation turned to attempts on his life—there had been fifteen of them—de Gaulle would say with a smile, "It's better to die from a gunshot, than to die of a heart attack in a lavatory." He was a courageous man, fearing no bullets, either in World War I, when he was heavily wounded near Verdun, or in World War II, or in the days of Liberation, when the motorcade he headed was machine-gunned from the rooftops in the centre of Paris, or when he alone faced a frenzied crowd of rebellious ultra-colonialists in Algeria.

De Gaulle resolutely smashed his internal enemies, but he did that not so much by power methods than by political means, setting them at loggerheads or neutralising them by threatening to expose their crimes and unseemly machinations. This was the way he coped, for instance, in late 1958 with the scandalous affair of rogue Lacase, in which many well-known politicians and military leaders were involved, who had capitalised on the illegal resale of lead and zinc mines in Morocco. Threatening to open proceedings against them, de Gaulle kept a group of his enemies, including Marshal Juin, right-wing leader G. Bidault and others, securely in check.

He was ostensibly secluded, reserved, shut off from the people. Frédéric Joliot-Curie, a world known physicist and chairman of the World Peace Council, told me once that when de Gaulle had appointed him to the post of the Supreme Commissar for Atomic Energy, he said, "I know, Joliot, that you are a Central Committee member of the French Communist Party but your political views do not concern me. The main thing is that you are the greatest scientist in this important sphere."

"Once a strike erupted in a national atomic centre, of which I was in charge," Joliot-Curie went on. "I found myself in a pretty delicate position. Indeed, a communist, a member of the party's leadership, should try to prevail upon the strike committee, the trade union and the workers

and insist on their resuming work. After long negotiations conducted in a comradely spirit and after friendly conversations with the personnel, it finally became possible to reach a mutually acceptable compromise, and the strike was called off. On the next day, de Gaulle summoned me and said: 'Joliot, I've heard you had a strike. It's good that it has ended. But here is my advice: do not be so close to people, keep them at a distance, and then they will respect you, obey you, and will not let go'."

Naturally, Joliot-Gurie took that advice with irony, but de Gaulle himself followed that rule which had become part of him. Describing the qualities required by strong leaders in his book *Au Fil de l'Épée* (On the Tip of the Sword) way back in 1932, he stressed, "prestige cannot be retained without mystery, for what is well known does not induce one to worship. Intentions, manners, and display of intelligence should have something in them that is incomprehensible to others. What rouses one's curiosity and excites one, keeps him in suspense. Such restraint of the soul is normally impossible without restraint in gestures and words. Perhaps this is only outward appearances, but it is on the basis of these appearances that many people form their opinions."

To maintain distance, de Gaulle preserved a "zone of estrangement" around himself and in fact remained all alone among people. Those years he did not sit behind a desk, but preferred to plunge into a sea of people, after which he felt "renewed", as he put it. But that was not mixing with the people, but his "presenting" himself to the public. De Gaulle travelled a lot and spoke to large audiences. In the first six years of his presidency he visited nearly all of the country's 90 departments, made 600 speeches, and appeared before 15 million French people.

It is sometimes alleged that de Gaulle loved France, but not the French people. This was hardly so, though his attitude to the people was peculiar. He saw in them above all the material for building up the greatness of France. He did despise bourgeois parties, their incessant squabble over narrow egoistic interests, their leaders, deputies, mayors, and journalists, regarding them as unprincipled, narrow-minded and corrupt. Among the politicians merely a few persons were an exception, in his view. He respected them and regarded them as entirely honest. Among these he named Maurice Thorez, General Secretary of the French Communist Party; and Pierre Mendès France, the leader of the party of radicals. De Gaulle also recognised the dynamism of the Communist Party of France, its services to the country, its strength and prestige.

"REPUBLICAN MONARCH"

Authoritarian administration appealed to the General. Having absolute power, he nonetheless acted within the limits of republican law, preserved democratic rights in the country and observed the constitution, which had been tailored to his standards, though approved at a national referendum. The people called him a "republican monarch" not for nothing.

Speaking about the future state system of France, de Gaulle said even during the war, in 1943. "it is necessary that the head of state perform the duties of the arbiter of the nation due to the system of his election, his rights and prerogatives". He worked persistently to establish his one-man rule and in fact staged, to that end, a coup and liquidated the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle did not see any other way of leading the country out of the impasse, where it had found itself in the late 1950s because the weak governments that succeeded one another proved unable to solve the Algerian problem and cope with the political, economic and financial crisis caused by the colonial war and by France's vassalage to the United States and NATO.

The split caused by the position of the then Socialist leadership (being in the Cabinet, they collaborated with reaction and supported the war in Algeria) made it impossible to solve the acute problems facing the country in a democratic way, through the joint efforts of the left. And that could not suit de Gaulle, a man of right-wing, conservative views. What is more, that would leave him no chance of becoming an authoritarian ruler.

De Gaulle's masterly political skill was seen in that he proved capable of focusing himself on the hopes and aspirations of different, in many cases conflicting, sections of the French people, and to present himself as the only possible savior of France from the misfortunes that befell the country. "I am a lonely man who is not mixed up with any party, any organisation," the General assured. "I am a man who belongs to nobody and who belongs to all".

He prepared his re-emergence on the national scene strictly in keeping with the rules of warfare, conducting the operations in the two main areas: in France and in Algeria, where the brass tops closely allied with the "ultras" were preparing a rebellion. In France, he was busy making contacts with representatives of various parties and groups. Early in 1957, the deputies of the Socialists, radicals, and the right-wing bourgeois MRP, "independent" Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and others paid a visit to President René Coty and suggested asking de Gaulle to take office. Coty said he was ready to step down, but he evaded meeting the General at that time.

Public opinion of de Gaulle was built up to the point that even Maurice Thorez told us early in February 1958 that the General, whom he characterised as a statesman understanding the national interests of France, could greatly help solve the Algerian issue. Naturally, Thorez meant that de Gaulle should act in the framework of a legitimate government.

Preparing the ground for his comeback, de Gaulle did not forget about the Soviet Union, too. At a breakfast in the house of a senator in March 1958, J. Grandval, former French Ambassador to Morocco who had resigned because of his disagreement with the government's policy in North Africa, was introduced to me. Grandval had been close to de Gaulle during the war, when he commanded a guerilla detachment in Lorraine. Making it understood that he acted on de Gaulle's instructions, he told us that the General had started practical preparations for coming to power. Grandval set forth the political programme to be pursued by de Gaulle as the ruler of France.

The programme envisaged, among other things, the solution of the Algerian problem through talks aimed at forming a federation, France's rupture with NATO and its lessening political and economic dependence on the USA, expansion of economic cooperation with the East, above all with the Soviet Union and China, cooperation with the left and giving the Communists broader access to state affairs, but not including them in the government at initial stage. According to incoming information de Gaulle was really seeking contacts with the leadership of the French Communist Party, but the communists were not responding.

As regarded the Algerian problem, the General was establishing ties with future rebels through his mediators. Though he evaded making promises to head a rebellion against the republican system, not wishing to be, as he put it, a "second Franco", the prospect of using a military coup as a ram attack smashing the foundations of the Fourth Republic looked tempting to him. He had sent his people to Algeria who established there a veritable headquarters called "Antenne", keeping the General constantly informed and maintaining permanent contacts with the organisers of the rebellion. A great deal was done to that end by his

long-time supporter J. Soustelle, former Algerian Governor General who had long since come to terms with the leaders of the "ultras".

The comeback operation clearly revealed de Gaulle's keen political intuition, his ability to wait for the right moment, and when the moment came, to act resolutely and promptly. As soon as the coup broke out on May 13, de Gaulle, availing himself of the confusion caused in the country by the surprise action of the military, emerged on the scene. Having created the impression among the leaders of the bourgeois parties and in the right-wing quarters that he alone could save France from a civil war, he persuaded them to agree to his forming a new Cabinet, and took power into his hands. He formalised his power in a constitutional way, after which he quelled the rebels, ignoring their shouts about betrayal, smashed their open and secret networks, and precluded any possibility of their new actions.

To be sure, that operation was successful because the people of France with their strong democratic traditions helped isolate and suppress the rebels. Under these conditions the quashing of the May rebellion in Algeria and the subsequent developments caused only a small number of casualties.

The establishment of the new regime and the General's preference for such methods of state administration were objectively justified to some extent due to the specific conditions in France at that time, to the alignment of political forces there, and to the magnitude of the challenge the country had to meet. Without all that de Gaulle could have hardly removed the obstacles put up by the right-wing parties, overcome the resistance offered by some factions of the French bourgeoisie, restructured the economy by giving preference to the development of its more advanced industries and introduced cardinal changes in French foreign policy.

ALGERIAN SYNDROME

Having come to power in June 1958, de Gaulle immediately set to solving the burning problems that France was facing after the collapse of its vast colonial empire. The problems were a heavy impediment to any efforts to normalise life in the country and elaborate a French foreign policy. The priority task was that of ending the war in Algeria and putting on a new basis the relations with that country, and also with other former French colonies in Africa. Trying to save everything that remained of France's former military, political and economic power in these countries, de Gaulle was building a so-called French community. In Algeria, he sought a settlement which would retain its close ties with France and France's access to the oil resources in Sahara and to other natural wealth.

The Algerian settlement operation, which lasted four years, revealed many important typical elements of the strategy and tactics used by de Gaulle. Among these, above all, was priority of the interests of the nation over other considerations. De Gaulle believed that, faced with most important tasks, the nation must be united, while classes, parties and economic clans are the elements splitting it, and their internecine struggle should not affect his sovereign decisions.

De Gaulle was of ancient aristocratic stock and came from a rather conservative bourgeois family, and so, his class instincts inevitably made themselves felt. His supporters, mainly big bankers and industrialists, too, adhered to clearly expressed class positions. But de Gaulle rated himself above them all. "I have never felt bound with the interests and aspirations of that class," he said about the bourgeoisie. He even allowed himself to condemn the "enslavement of people by capitalism".

He was never elected a deputy or a mayor and therefore was not connected with bourgeois parties and the political and economic circles behind them. Despising the self-interest of the bourgeoisie, he called it "foam on the surface of the sea". Moreover, he would stop short of nothing to engage in direct conflict with his class, to come out against its numerous groups, associations, parties, and patronage organisations, whenever this was required by the higher, in his view, interests of France. Meanwhile de Gaulle's activity in the area of home and foreign policy often coincided with the far-reaching interests and goals of the major groups of the big industrialists and financiers of France.

Another of his principles, that of enlisting the support for his goals of the majority of the French people—from the left to the right wing—was based on his view of the nation as a community of common traditions, mentality and sentiments. As a rule, he succeeded in getting that support. Thus, at the referendum held in September 1958 on the constitution, which in fact proved the principle of the president's absolute rule, which he motivated by the magnitude of the problems facing the country, an unusually large number of voters—79 per cent of all who took part in the referendum including communists and their supporters—voted for the constitution. Maurice Thorez privately admitted, in particular, that such referendum returns came as a surprise to the Communist Party, since it had underestimated the continuing confidence in de Gaulle among the people and his popularity, and also the yearning for "renewal", which was widespread in the country.

The General's capability for rallying the majority of the French population round his policy is explained by the fact that he could formulate practical tasks in a way that they were supported by various sections of the public. Even the French Communist Party, which fought most consistently against one-man rule, could not oppose measures undertaken by de Gaulle such as achievement of peace in Algeria, France's withdrawal from the NATO military wing, détente, rapprochement with the Soviet Union, denouncement of the US war in Vietnam, and others.

Maurice Thorez recalled that on his return from a leave in the autumn of 1959, he had to correct some comrades in the FCP leadership who had gone so far in criticising de Gaulle that they at first were opposed even to his September 16 statement on readiness to grant Algeria the right to self-determination. Meanwhile the statement had immediately evoked the positive response of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN).

At the same time de Gaulle's utterances were often ambiguous and so crafty that they misled those whom he intended to cheat. A good example of this is his speech before a frenzied crowd of French "ultras" in Algiers in the first days of his presidency, on June 4, 1958. The roaring crowd, ready to tear apart anyone showing the slightest disagreement with its slogans "Algeria is French!" and "Save Algeria!" expected an immediate answer from the General who appeared before them at the balcony of the local Forum. De Gaulle said: "I understood you". The crowd howled with joy, hearing in these words what in fact they did not mean. The use of ambiguous phrases was de Gaulle's favourite trick.

Acting in this way he misled for a long time both the Atlanticists, who believed he wanted to build up NATO, and the Europeanists who hoped for his support for the ideas of supra-national integration, and his other opponents. That method was part of the concept of a political leader portrayed by de Gaulle way back in the 1930s in his book *Au Fil de l'Épée* as a person who "makes use of all his craft to seduce the crowd, concealing his views until the right moment".

Persistently following his line and skillfully manoeuvring de Gaulle squeezed out of every stage the maximum that would be achieved. Some-

times, when he was convinced that a problem could not be solved in a way favoured by many, de Gaulle continued to follow that way for some time to demonstrate its hopelessness and create conditions for going over to a new line, which in his view was more feasible. Thus, in August 1958, more than half of the country's population (52 per cent) favoured the idea of making Algeria part of France. Since his coming to office de Gaulle never doubted that it was futile to try to solve the Algerian issue by military means and that the granting of independence to Algeria was inevitable.

"I realise that colonialism is outdated," he said in a talk with us. "Therefore I have granted independence to thirteen African countries which had been French colonies. I hope I will solve the Algerian issue, too, on the basis of self-determination principles." Carrying on the war, he was at the same time effecting political change. Hoping to find in Algeria a more acceptable partner in talks than the FLN, which was a firm spokesman of the fighting Algerian people, de Gaulle was going over from vague slogans about "Franco-Muslim fraternity" and "peace between the brave ones" to plans for Algeria's economic growth; from persuading Algerians to join the elections to the National Assembly to statements on an "Algerian Algeria" associated with France.

"I moved along by stages," de Gaulle said when he completed the Algerian operation by recognising the right of Algeria to self-determination and by signing in March 1962 in Evian the agreements on ceasefire, on terms of granting Algeria sovereignty, and on future relations between France and independent Algeria. "Politics is an art based on realities"—this was his comment on that event. The Evian agreements were approved by 91 per cent of the French voters at the national referendum held on April 8, 1962.

CLASHES WITH THE USA AND NATO

In the opinion of Jacques Fauvet, a well known analyst of French politics, and some other historians, the Fifth Republic's foreign policy started not in 1958, but in 1962-63, that is, after the Algerian war. De Gaulle began, perhaps not to the extent he wanted, but very vigorously, to implement his programme for restoring the independence and greatness of France since the first days after his comeback in June 1958.

Aware that at that time France was in no way comparable in military and political and economic terms to other major NATO states, de Gaulle hoped to regain for it the rank of a great world power by means of building a united Europe under its moral and political influence. To do that, France first had to put an end to its military, political and economic subordination to the USA and NATO and show its worth by pursuing an independent foreign policy.

He concentrated his efforts on four areas: the USA and NATO, the FRG and Britain, the Common Market and Little Europe, and the USSR and Big Europe. De Gaulle played his big political and diplomatic game, now building up pressure in one area and then shifting it to other places, now acting simultaneously in all or several areas.

The first thing to be done was to change the character of France's ties with the USA and NATO. De Gaulle's foreign minister Couve de Murville wrote in his book *Une Politique Etrangere, 1958-1969* (Foreign Policy, 1958-1969) that "from 1946 to 1958 the USA had dominated the foreign policy of France. We depended on them; financially it was the Marshall Plan and in the area of our security—NATO." That dependence was a serious threat to France which could be involved against its will in a USA-provoked armed conflict. De Gaulle pointed out to US President Dwight Eisenhower when he met him in 1959 in Paris that "in case

of a conflict in Europe France would for many geographic, political and strategic reasons be the first doomed".

During talks with us de Gaulle stressed the danger of the international situation at the time, in which France and the Soviet Union could be involved in a war against each other even without any conflict of their national interests. Even during our unofficial meetings on Solferino Street in early 1958 de Gaulle said, "France will not always be tied to the USA. The causes of this relationship will disappear with time, and then all the good that you do now to France will pay off."

As soon as he became head of the French government, de Gaulle got down to business. During talks with British Premier Harold Macmillan and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who arrived to Paris to get acquainted with de Gaulle, he directly stated that there was a need to reorganise the North Atlantic alliance and the entire system of Franco-American cooperation, so that France could play the role of a power charged with world responsibility. That was a bolt from the blue. The Americans and the British, who were tied to them by special relations, were sure that France had reconciled itself to the secondary role assigned to it in NATO.

The verbal move was followed by a written one. On September 24, 1958, he addressed to Eisenhower a memorandum suggesting the establishment of a trilateral directorate in NATO with the participation of the USA, Britain and France for discussing and adopting joint decisions on world problems and for developing a strategy. Couve de Murville, setting forth the meaning of the memorandum wrote: "Either France would be closely tied to the USA and Britain in security matters, beginning with the question of using strategic arms, or it would have to revise its positions in particular, concerning its participation in NATO which made it binding on it to follow America without real consultations and, possibly, even without its consent."

"Nobody had any illusions about the response the memorandum would cause in Washington", wrote the French minister, "but it clearly outlined the policy which in subsequent years and later, since there was no other way, had to remain a French policy with regard to NATO, taking into account the profound considerations for the vital national interests of France."

De Gaulle kept increasing his demands, showing that it was impossible to reach an understanding with the USA and Britain and, when these demands were not met, he made an abrupt turn removing France from the NATO military wing.

In March 1966 he informed US President Lyndon Johnson and the governments of 14 NATO countries of France's decision to end its participation in the integrated command and not to place its armed forces at NATO's disposal. The situation changed substantially since the time the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded, de Gaulle explained. NATO no longer suited the new conditions, Europe had ceased to be a centre of international crises, and the USA lost its atomic monopoly.

In a note issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs a timetable was fixed for the withdrawal of the NATO headquarters and US troops from the territory of France, and de Gaulle firmly insisted on keeping to the timetable, despite the repeated requests by the US side to delay the date of withdrawal. France's separation from NATO's military organisation was completed by the autumn of 1967. The main pillar of the NATO infrastructure in Europe collapsed.

De Gaulle accompanied the restoration of full control over all French armed forces by building national nuclear forces. Even back in October 1958 he declared: "When we become a nuclear power we will be able to make others see our activity in those areas which we regard as most

important and necessary." Simultaneously de Gaulle advanced a concept of national defence "in all directions". The concept was described in detail by General Ailleret, chief of the General Staff of the French armed forces, in the December 1967 issue of *Révue de Défense Nationale*.

The purpose of that move was to "build a defence system which would not be aimed against anyone, but which would be worldwide and applicable for all directions", that is, which would allow to thwart a threat on any side. That enabled France to avoid a major war and to determine its own fate.

Though de Gaulle left France in the general framework of the North Atlantic alliance and assured its members that it would be on their side in the event of an unjustified attack on them, the French concept of independent defence was definitely anti-American and anti-West German. This explains why Ailleret stressed in the above-mentioned article that "the Soviets have no intention of starting a war" and the "fear of Soviet aggression is ungrounded." Soon Ailleret was killed in an air accident: the plane in which he was flying crashed into the sea. There was probably someone who did not forgive him his stance. And later, when de Gaulle resigned, the concept of "defence in all directions" was buried.

Not content with delivering France from the trammels tying it to the USA and NATO and strengthening its military and political independence, de Gaulle began to publicly denounce dangerous American military actions, warning about the negative consequences of blindly following US policy. US correspondent David Schoenbrun, the author of the book *Les Trois Vies de Charles de Gaulle* (Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle), complains that de Gaulle "never passed up the chance to slap the Anglo-Saxons in the face". And since the USA gave him quite a few chances, he slapped them quite often.

De Gaulle was most stubborn in attacking the US Administration for the Vietnam war. In 1961 he tried to convince President John Kennedy to stay out of that war: no one would be able to extricate oneself from its quicks and the General warned. Later he denounced the "disgusting" US war in Vietnam in such strong words that this led to the serious aggravation of Franco-American relations. Speaking in Phnom Penh in September 1966, de Gaulle demanded that the bombing be stopped and US troops be withdrawn from Vietnam.

When on tour of Latin America in 1964, de Gaulle stigmatised US policy in all the sixteen countries he visited. The Americans were also piqued when he failed to visit the United States, though President Johnson expected a meeting with him. His visit to Quebec Province in Canada infuriated Washington. In Quebec, addressing a crowd of rejoicing French Canadians, he cried out: "Long live free Quebec!" That caused a tremendous scandal in Canada. In the USA, it was regarded as an intrusion into its domain. The moral and political damage to the United States by such escapades of the French President was enormous.

(To be continued)

DIPLOMATIC DIARY: A RECORD OF 23 YEARS

(Continued from page 127)

We are approaching Christiania. I can already see the outlines of the mountains of Holmenkollen and Asker. My heart is ponding with excitement. What awaits me in my new job?

(To be continued)

SPASO HOUSE—BACKDROP TO HISTORY

Rebecca B. MATLOCK

Assembled under the gold and crystal chandelier of Spaso House, the residence of the Ambassador of the United States to the Soviet Union, were more than five hundred Americans who had gathered to say good by to President and Mrs. Ronald Reagan at the end of their visit to the Soviet Union. The President said with a twinkle in his eye and a smile in his voice, "If I could have gathered a crowd this big in Hollywood, I'd still be there!" That entertaining remark is typical of the comments that make Ronald Reagan popular with ordinary folks as well as with world leaders.

It had been an historic visit, combining official meetings, the signing of various bilateral agreements, the exchange of instruments of ratification of the INF Treaty, as well as personal encounters with Soviet people. Through television, President and Mrs. Reagan became known to millions of Soviet citizens just as General Secretary Gorbachev and Mrs. Gorbachev had become familiar to Americans during their December, 1987, visit to Washington, D. C.

President and Mrs. Reagan stayed with Ambassador and Mrs. Matlock at Spaso House during their official visit to Moscow, as the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev had stayed with Ambassador and Mrs. Dubinin in Washington at their residence in Washington. The four-room Vice-Presidential Suite on the second floor was renamed the Presidential Suite in their honor, and Spaso House adapted itself to the needs of the President and Mrs. Reagan.

Spaso House, a mansion built in the classic revival style, was designed and built by Moscow architects Adamovich and Mayat for the Siberian merchant family of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Vtorov. It was completed in 1914.

The house takes its name from the pleasant square on which it is located and it is named for the small Russian Orthodox Church, the Church of the Saviour on the Sands, nearby. Spaso House is at Number 10, Spasopeskovskaya Ploshchadka. The church and the meadow then beside it, were painted at the end of the nineteenth century by Russian artist Vasili Dmitrievich Polenov. A small reproduction of this much-loved painting was used for invitations to the opening of an exhibition of Nineteenth Century Russian Art at the Renwick Gallery in Washington, D. C.

An extraordinary chandelier, the work of a master silversmith named Myshkov, dominates the domed reception room with white columns and white marble walls. It must have been a factor in the selection of Spaso House as an appropriate house for the residence of American Ambassador when diplomatic relations were established between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1933.

George Kennan, the young Foreign Service Officer who had the responsibility for negotiating the lease and preparing the residence for the Ambassador, kept a diary of his efforts during January and February of 1934. In it he describes the complications of drawing up the lease, of determining what rent would be acceptable, whether payment would be in gold roubles or in dollars, who would pay the insurance and how long the lease would run. Three years was considered too long because the Central Executive Committee of Narkomindel, now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had been using Spaso House as an entertainment center and rooming house for important officials, might want it back sooner.

Estimates for the cost of repairs and remodeling were difficult to get. Having been received, they had to be translated into English, transmitted to the State Department, and approved. The Embassy, after negotiation, agreed to pay for the removal of snow from the roof of Spaso House in order to determine the condition of the roof. New interior walls would be made of plaster, but the new bathrooms would be painted rather than tiled because all tile production was going into subway construction. When additional fireplaces were required they were removed from the Narkomindel building and installed in Spaso House. Although the State Department had budgeted \$5,000 for the cost of work in Spaso House, the actual cost was \$5,800.

Makeshift offices had to be set up at Spaso House because although the building near Red Square, next door to the National Hotel, which would become the American Embassy appeared ready for occupancy, the Embassy was not allowed to move in for more than six months. This, according to George Kennan, left Ambassador Bullitt steaming with fury. It was confessed later that the reason the Americans were not allowed to occupy the building was that the ground was shifting during subway construction and it was not absolutely certain the building would not collapse!

President Roosevelt, who was elected President of the United States in 1932, and remained President until his death in 1945, sent five Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, all personal friends, all political appointees, meanwhile reserving for himself the responsibility for dealing with Marshal Stalin personally concerning important matters.

During the first years, while William C. Bullitt was Ambassador, there were many contacts between Soviet citizens and Americans and memorable parties were held at Spaso House, attended not only by high-ranking Soviets and foreigners, but also by animals from the Durov Animal Museum who performed for them in expected, and sometimes unexpected ways.

A particularly active Ambassador, sympathetic to the Soviet Union, and a collector of Russian art, was Ambassador Joseph E. Davies. During his tenure in Moscow, the ballroom, also in neo-classical style, was added. His book, *Mission to Moscow*, which was supportive of Stalin's regime, was made into a popular American movie with the assistance of Soviet editors.

During the war, while Laurence Steinhardt was Ambassador, 1939-1941, maintenance at Spaso House was almost non-existent. The bombing of 1941 broke window panes and openings were covered with beaver-board. Wind blew around the edges of the windows and the large rooms were dark. Some rooms were usable only when the people inside were dressed in warm clothing. Kerosene stoves sitting in boxes of sand were used to supplement the heating system which was in bad repair.

Spaso House was described by Admiral Standley upon his arrival to become Ambassador in 1942 as being "an impressive looking mansion behind a facade of considerable shoddiness." He described how stucco

had peeled from the walls in irregular patches, and how the bannister railings and columns were plastered over with cheap cement, but exulted over the "magnificent chandelier."

Kathleen Harriman Mortimer, the daughter of Ambassador Averell Harriman, who was his hostess while he was Ambassador from 1943 until 1946, observed that when they arrived Spaso was incredibly dank and dark, but that it had one luxury she enjoyed—hot water. It took, she said, until the summer of 1944 to have the beaverboard replaced by glass so the sun could at last filter in. Kathleen was unhappy about the interior decoration of the "spacious but bleak rooms," and well she might have been. Since there was no money available from the State Department for furnishing the Ambassador's Residence, Admiral Standley had, at President Roosevelt's suggestion, had Spaso outfitted as a newly commissioned battleship.

President Roosevelt died just before the end of the war. Foreign Minister Molotov himself came to Spaso House to offer condolences.

When World War II ended on August 14, 1946, General Dwight D. Eisenhower who had been Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, was the guest of Averell Harriman at Spaso House. Attending a party for him when the news of the surrender of Japan came was Soviet Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov. Stalin invited General Eisenhower and Ambassador Harriman to stand with him and the Soviet leaders on top of Lenin's tomb to review a physical culture parade, the first time foreign representatives had been so honored.

President Harry S. Truman, sent General Walter Bedell Smith to Moscow to be American Ambassador later in 1946. Ambassador Smith described Spaso House as a two-story masonry and stucco structure with a good deal of wasted space. He said that he thought that the pre-revolutionary millionaire who built it was primarily interested in a large reception room, and that he put most of his money in the magnificent gold and crystal chandelier which must have weighed a ton, and then added on the living quarters as an afterthought.

He described large cracks on the outside walls, handsome cornices and frescoes which were mildewed and flaky, and silk and satin wall coverings which were dirty, split and hanging down in shreds, details which during wartime while the Embassy was evacuated to Kuibyshev and Spaso served as headquarters for the Lend Lease Mission, were ignored.

Mrs. Lydia Kirk, wife of Admiral Alan G. Kirk, who arrived in 1949 and remained until 1951, described Spaso as being an immense neoclassical palace which looked tidy and secure set back behind an untidy green space beside the ruins of an old church. Inside, she found the interior of the house far better than she feared, dignified, and not difficult to live with. The house had been freshly painted, and the furniture was American. Although out of scale for the huge rooms, she thought it unobjectionable.

George Kennan, sent by President Truman to become the first professional diplomat to become Ambassador to the Soviet Union, found Spaso House, upon his return after several years, "barnlike and empty and a little sad, despite the freshly painted rooms." Particularly objectionable he thought was being cut off completely from Soviet citizens by the fence that surrounded Spaso lit like a prison wall.

Charles Bohlen, also a Russian speaking professional diplomat, was sent to Moscow by President Eisenhower. He returned to Moscow in 1953 not having been there since 1945. He found many changes at Spaso, all for the best. The grounds had been spruced up, the rooms painted and refurbished, and the house, he thought more pleasant and comfortable than it had been since 1934 when he had lived there as one of the young

Russian specialists brought to Moscow by Ambassador Bullitt.

President Eisenhower replaced Charles Bohlen by Llewellyn E. Thompson who came to Moscow as American Ambassador in 1957. It was during his tenure that Jack Matlock was first sent to Moscow as a second secretary to work in the consular section of the Embassy.

Spaso House seemed grandiose to me when I saw it for the first time in 1961 when I went to pay an obligatory social call on Mrs. Jane Thompson, the wife of the Ambassador. I was met by a Chinese butler and ushered into the immense reception area where hung the largest chandelier I had ever seen.

Mrs. Thompson invited me to join her in the Blue Room, a room which was actually painted green. It was a much smaller, more comfortable room with high ceilings and impressive architectural details. It contained several bookcases. There was a fire in a fine marble fireplace. An Andrew Wyeth painting, "Christina's World," was hanging above a chest.

A few months later I was in the same room with Mrs. Kohler, whose husband, Foy Kohler, sent by President John F. Kennedy, became Ambassador in 1962. Ambassador Kohler had first met Nikita Khrushchev during his visit to the United States in 1959, and the two men developed a good relationship.

During the time of the "thaw" in United States-Soviet relations, Ambassador Kohler often invited Soviet writers to Spaso House. We met Alexander Tvardovsky, Kornei Chukovsky, Leonid Leonov, and during the visit of American poet Robert Frost, the extremely popular young poets, Yevgeny Yevtushenko and Andrei Voznesensky.

The General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev attended Fourth of July receptions at Spaso House. He attended the afternoon reception in 1962, and when he crossed the chandelier room on his way to the garden, he was followed by more than twenty persons. The Icelandic Ambassador, who was standing beside me, asked if these people would be his bodyguards. I looked closely and saw that the entire American press corps was following him, obviously trying to hear him say something they could quote in their dispatches.

After President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969) kept Ambassador Kohler in Moscow for several more years, replacing him after Leonid Brezhnev became General Secretary, with Ambassador Kohler's predecessor, Llewellyn E. Thompson, in 1967. During his two times as Ambassador, Thompson served longer than any other American Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Former American President, Richard Nixon and Mrs. Nixon, stayed at Spaso House in 1959 when he was Vice President. He recalls staying up one whole night preparing, with the help of the Ambassador, a speech which he gave to become the first American official to speak to the Soviet people on television.

Jacob D. Beam, President Richard M. Nixon's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was appointed in 1969. He was an experienced diplomat who had been Chargé d'Affaires when Stalin died. He was Ambassador when President Nixon came to the Soviet Union for the first summit meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev in 1972. President Nixon was the first American President to visit Moscow while in office, President Roosevelt having remained in Yalta during his wartime visit to the Soviet Union.

In 1973, the Ambassador resigned, and his Deputy Chief of Mission, Adolph Dubs, remained Chargé d'Affaires for more than a year, from January, 1973 until March, 1974. In June of that year President Nixon came to the Soviet Union to meet again with General Secretary Brezhnev. During both these visits official dinners were held at Spaso House, and it was at one of these that Richard Nixon quotes Leonid Brezhnev as

saying, upon being served Baked Alaska, "Look, the Americans really are miracle workers! They have found a way to set ice cream on fire!"

When Jack Matlock returned to Moscow in 1974, as Minister Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission, Walter Stoessel was Ambassador, having been appointed by President Gerald Ford in 1974. "Détente" was strengthened during this time by the meeting of President Ford with General Secretary Brezhnev in Vladivostok.

We found that Spaso House had been redecorated and looked like a delicate watercolor, a good set for a classical ballet, with pastel curtains and furniture coverings, with impressive examples of non-representational work by contemporary American artists floating on the white walls.

During the height of détente after the termination of American military activity in Vietnam, Spaso House came alive with receptions, dinners and movie parties attended by many hundreds of Soviet citizens.

Of historic interest was a gathering at Spaso House to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the meeting at the Elbe of Russian and American forces in 1945. Mr. Anastas Mikoyan, together with high-ranking members of the government and of the military forces attended the dinner held in honor of veterans of the meeting, and of former Ambassador Averell Harriman who had remained in Moscow while others were evacuated during the war, and other Britons and Americans who had cooperated in the herculean task of destroying Nazi power to bring to an end World War II. They had come as guests of the Soviet government invited to commemorate the event.

Mrs. Harriman remembers that because many more guests than were expected came to Spaso House, that dinner was not served until 10:00. She observed that everybody was extremely gay, and that the dinner at tables for ten was extremely pleasant. She recalls that the toasts given by Ambassador Stoessel and others saluting the Red Army, the Soviet people, the British armed forces and the American armed forces gave appropriate tribute to the heroism of the cooperative effort, and that the evening did not end until one o'clock in the morning.

The largest party ever held at Spaso House was on July 4, 1976 to commemorate the Bicentennial of the founding of the United States in 1776. Tang, the Chinese butler who had worked at Spaso House for more than forty years, greeted each guest personally and on his counter, in addition to Americans assembled earlier, recorded 3001 persons. Even though it rained, the chandelier room, the ballroom, the library, and the dining room managed to accommodate them all.

After his inauguration, President Jimmy Carter supported the interim appointment of professional diplomat Malcolm Toon as Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1977. Jack Matlock remained for two years longer as Deputy Chief of Mission.

As Chargé d'Affaires in the absence of the Ambassador, Minister Counselor Matlock and I hosted our first reception at Spaso House. It was to commemorate the success of the joint US-USSR mission in space. All American and Soviet astronauts and cosmonauts who had travelled in space attended as well as numerous other people. For the buffet we combined Russian specialties such as *pelmeni*, *pirozhki* and caviar *zakuski* with favorite American *hors d'œuvres* such as raw vegetables served with a dip, miniature ham sandwiches, and small pizzas. Since the Ambassador was not there to disappear with his wife when the party officially ended, several hundred guests stayed well beyond the appointed end to the party. It was the last large party at Spaso House as cooperation of the détente period began to wane.

Ambassador Toon was replaced in 1979 by Thomas J. Watson, Jr., the first non-professional to be sent to Moscow since 1952. His time was

difficult because of the coolness between the United States and the Soviet Union brought on by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which occurred two months after his arrival. When Ronald Reagan was elected President, Thomas Watson, a Democratic political appointee, submitted his resignation.

Jack Matlock returned at the request of President Reagan early in 1981 to be the *Chargé d'Affaires* following Ambassador Watson's departure. We found many changes in the house, particularly in the paneled State Dining Room where there was a new crystal chandelier, a bright red rug, two beautiful white and gold hand-painted screens, and handsome red and white curtains. The most spectacular change was that the large window had been replaced to duplicate the original blue and crystal fanlight. There was a bust of President Kennedy, a smaller version of the one that is in the Kennedy Center in Washington. Ambassador and Mrs. Watson had been very generous.

During 1981 while Jack Matlock was *Chargé d'Affaires*, gifts of an English case clock and mahogany secretary were made for the representational library together with furnishings for the Ambassador's library upstairs by Mr. and Mrs. Elton Hyder. They were supportive of our efforts to make Spaso House hospitable even when there was no art on loan from private lenders and museums.

Ambassador Arthur Hartman came to Moscow from Paris, where he had been Ambassador to France, in October, 1981, and Jack Matlock went to Czechoslovakia as Ambassador. During the years that Ambassador Hartman was in Moscow, from 1981 until 1987, there were important changes in the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union. There were summit meetings in Geneva and in Reykjavik and the possibility of summit meetings in Washington and in Moscow began to be discussed.

In April, 1987, President Reagan sent Jack Matlock, who for three and a half years had been his advisor for European and Soviet Union Affairs on the National Security Council, to Moscow as Ambassador.

When we returned to Spaso House in 1987 it had been transformed. The walls and ceilings had been painted in vibrant colors, and new rugs had been designed and woven to coordinate with the new decor. In the lobby were a very large American eagle, a figure of Columbia (another symbol of America) holding a sheaf of wheat in her hand, and a cigar store Indian. Throughout the representational rooms were paintings by important American artists from many periods, and additional three dimensional objects. This impressive collection of Americana had been assembled by Ambassador and Mrs. Arthur Hartman to commemorate fifty years of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Since this collection had been in Spaso for more than five years, and had been loaned to Ambassador Hartman personally, it was time for the individual pieces to be returned to their owners. Several artists donated works to the permanent Spaso House collection where they remain on display.

Through Art in Embassies of the Department of State we arranged to borrow art by well-known creative and innovative artists of mid-century America. We arranged also to show work by outstanding young contemporary artists. Corning Museum loaned eighteen pieces of studio glass from their permanent holdings. It took well over a year to assemble these collections, have them shipped to Moscow, and installed. They were in place before the Moscow summit of 1988, and a catalog listing the major works was published with the assistance of private supporters.

In the introduction to this catalog, Henry Hopkins, Director of the Frederick R. Weisman Collection, which loaned fifteen pieces for exhibition at Spaso House, observes, "We are all believers that the arts have

the capacity to provide communication among people of diverse background and heritage. What better opportunity could there be to put this belief into practice than at a time of markedly increased desire for communication and interaction between the people of our two great countries."

It was important, we felt, in addition to the formal representational areas of Spaso House, to have a comfortable and attractive place to receive our guests. In that context, I determined to try to reproduce the traditional library I remembered from my first visit to Spaso House in 1961. I searched the house for appropriate furniture and found four glassfronted book shelves, mahogany chests of Empire design, wing back chairs and oval coffee tables. Together with the grandfather's clock, the mahogany secretary and ornate gilt mirror which had been donated to Spaso House in 1981, we were able to create a room of warmth and comfort for private conversations and for small groups of guests.

The most important undertaking at Spaso House in preparation for the visit of President and Mrs. Reagan was the restoration of the Greek-revival ceiling in the vestibule. Master restorers worked on this curved space for several weeks carefully applying paint and gold leaf to recreate the classic designs which were originally there. The brick walk in the garden was relaid for the guests to follow when they came to the dinner which President and Mrs. Reagan gave for General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev.

For Spaso House, this dinner was the highlight of the visit. In preparation new white curtains were hung throughout the house, and masses of flowers were arranged in all the representational rooms. Pink peonies were used as centerpieces on the round tables in the ballroom where the dinner took place. Special platforms were built in the back of the room for press cameras and at the opposite end for Dave Brubeck and his jazz ensemble to entertain the President and Mrs. Reagan's guests after dinner.

President Reagan, in his toast at dinner concluded, "Spaso House has, as I said, seen quiet times—yet the animated conversation of this evening has already done much to make up for them. And so, I would like to raise a glass to the continued interchange between our two nations—and, if I may, to Spaso House itself, as a symbol of our relations. May this lovely home never lack for visitors, and shared meals, and the sounds of spirited conversation—and even the peal of hearty laughter. Thank you and God bless you."

General Secretary Gorbachev in his response described his vision of "a world more reliable and safer, a world that is needed by all people on Earth, their children and grandchildren, so that they can acquire and preserve the basic human rights—the right to life, to work, to freedom and to the pursuit of happiness." He ended by saying, "Let the coming years bring about an improvement in the international situation! Let life triumph!"

With these words, spoken by the leaders of the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, Spaso House, which for fifty-five years has furnished an elegant backdrop to history, experienced its finest hour.

ERRATUM

In the article by Thorvald Stoltenberg, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, "A View from Oslo" in *International Affairs* No 8 for 1988 the 7th line from the top on page 10 should read "naval bases and the use of the archipelago for warlike purposes."

CONFIDENCE AND THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS

Andrei KOZYREV

Over many years, especially those which we have notionally called the "era of stagnation", Eastern and Western diplomats were engaged in a never ending and fruitless dispute over what should come first—confidence, as they insisted, or arms reductions, as we asserted. Although quite fierce, the debate produced but one result—inaction. In the meantime, the flow of ever more sophisticated arms was growing as was the number of international problems. The desire to break this vicious circle has led to the understanding of one simple thing, namely that practical actions are needed concurrently both to enhance confidence and to terminate the arms race, to establish interaction on the entire gamut of international issues.

Now it seems to have become clear to everyone that war preparations are not only the most evident and condensed expression of mutual mistrust but also stimulate the latter since they are perceived by the opposing sides as material proof of aggressive intentions. It is equally wrong to ignore this "countereffect" the arms race has and to try and reduce the whole issue of confidence exclusively to the military area.

A peculiar feature of the problem of confidence, which accounts for the latter's delicate and even sensitive nature, is that it encompasses the entire spectrum of policies and practices of all nations. There will be no confidence as long as state politics pursues the goals of economic, ideological or cultural supremacy, which usually lead to military adventures. Nor can there be any trust in dictatorial, anti-popular regimes which are all but inevitably spreading methods of violence beyond their national borders as well. A case in point is Hitler's Germany; the very idea of confidence in that totalitarian state led to illusions, to the conscious or unconscious deceiving of its own public.

And why were our partners frightened by Stalinism? There are many reasons but one is perfectly clear, i. e. it is difficult to have confidence in a society which is mired in all-out suspicion, it is hard to trust a regime that has no faith in its own people. The interrelationship of domestic and external politics is an axiom of political sciences. It is therefore only natural, legitimate and simply necessary for the world community to pay close attention above all to the internal affairs of a given country.

In this particular sense the problem of confidence knows no state frontiers and accepts no references to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs. This is why the all but reflex

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reactions, which are still very much alive among us, to an outsider's analysis of our domestic ways (of the don't-you-dare-trespass-on-our-Soviet-garden-type) in no way support the thesis of an interdependent world. It is an essential rule of international intercourse, if the latter is based on trust and cooperation rather than on fears, arms and ideological self-sufficiency, both to be criticised and to criticise others for what worries you—in a proper manner, of course.

If we are to speak of confidence in earnest, obviously, we ought to have in mind not only, and not so much, gestures of goodwill or diplomatic propriety (their importance notwithstanding) but first and foremost the intentions and interests of the states as well as the ways they are understood and taken into account in politics. In Lenin's words "Our experience has left us with the firm conviction that only exclusive attention to the interests of various nations can remove grounds for conflicts, can remove mutual mistrust, can remove the fear of any intrigues and create that confidence, especially on the part of workers and peasants speaking different languages, without which there absolutely cannot be peaceful relations between peoples or anything like a successful development of everything that is of value in present-day civilisation"¹. The resurrection of this formula under present-day conditions will obviously be facilitated by the idea of a balance of interests of states as the only possible basis of confidence and universal security in international life.

A logical question is whether a balance of class interests in the international arena is possible at all. The answer to it has long appeared to be undoubtedly negative. This has been accounted for by a simplistic assertion that the class struggle between socialism and capitalism is essentially a "who wins" question; hence, the clearly irreconcilable nature of that struggle. This has certainly been accompanied by a reservation that such "class confrontation" should have the form of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Yet, this has not prevented the highly viable and dialectic Leninist concept of international confidence from transforming into an ossified black-and-white pattern of orthodox theory. In practical terms, this has degenerated into confrontation across the entire politico-geographic system of coordinates.

It is not surprising that following the "anti-imperialist struggle" logic we have, contrary to our national interests, let ourselves to get involved in the arms race and helped introduce the "enemy complexes", to erect technological and cultural barriers between the USSR and the USA, between the two systems. Hence, the embodiment of Kipling's East is East and West is West formula.

The issue is also complicated by "question of principle" which should be answered once and for all. For example, can there be any serious talk about trust in one's class enemy? Regrettably, more often than not we have tried to live "by the book" rather than to proceed from realities in answering that question. It is also alarming that now that the 27th CPSU Congress has deleted from the Party Programme the definition of peaceful coexistence as a "specific form of class struggle", attempts are being made to interpret this merely as an acknowledgement that there is now some limit to the class and ideological irreconcilability in relations between states belonging to the two systems, i. e. the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. Nothing more. But this cannot be the basis for creating a nuclear-weapons-free, let alone non-violent, world. Otherwise, it would seem that without such risk global class confrontation would again become a reality. Does this mean, then, that Mrs. Thatcher is quite right in saying that without "the bomb" mankind would have to return back to the era when wars

not only in the Third World but also throughout the planet could be regarded as a means of politics?

The same logical sequence also confuses the thesis concerning the priority of common human values, interpreting it merely in the sense that the USSR would not bring class confrontation to a catastrophe. By moving to the fore common human values which unite the world working class and the world bourgeoisie, it wishes to survive and to continue history. The same conclusion is drawn, i. e. should we eliminate nuclear weapons by the end of this century, and ensure environmental protection, universal class confrontation would once again come to the forefront in the twenty-first century.

The Party however, has something different in mind. New political thinking, as has been stressed by the 27th CPSU Congress, does not merely demand that confrontation not be brought to the last line but it requires ever more insistently that there should be *constructive and creative interaction between states and peoples on the scale of the entire world*, that is transformation of peaceful coexistence into a supreme universal norm of interstate relations. Herein lies the true class—hence, common human—interest of all nations, whether socialist, large and small capitalist, or developing.

That interest of various class forces can be put into practice only by establishing confidence and removing tensions among states in the international arena. State policy is known to be influenced by all strata of the population, reflecting a complex synthesis of class, ethnic, cultural and other aspirations in a modified form of the special national-state interest. Bearing this in mind, the conclusion can be made that peace certainly has its “sworn” enemies which are easy to recognise, namely rabid anti-communists, militarists and the military-industrial complex. The above are often perceived as inherent, immanent features of the capitalist world.

It should be recalled, however, that Dwight Eisenhower, who is usually quoted in such cases, spoke of the military-industrial complex as an “unlawful” force. It is unlawful precisely from the standpoint of the bourgeois state which is called upon first and foremost to serve as a steering committee for the entire capitalist class rather than any one of its groups. A careful analysis of the US monopolistic bourgeoisie as a whole would show that few, let alone the “backbone” of its groups are linked with militarism. Today, for example, there are no longer any grounds to speak about a military struggle for market outlets or commodity markets or for the division or recarving of the world. Business interests which embrace above all the sphere of economic ties can well be secured abroad with minimum reliance on military and armtwisting techniques, which is borne out by many an authoritative representative in the West. The same is true of capitalism “at home”, in which case it regards such techniques only as an undesirable last resort, preferring to dispense, and having in fact dispensed, with it for many years now. As to the dislike of socialism as a social system, the degree of its non-acceptance varies depending on numerous factors, including the willingness of socialist countries to take into account economic, political and ideological interests of “antipodean” states.

Today, those countries have absolutely no reason to regard confrontation with the “spectre of communism” as a life-or-death question. Whether it is good for us or not, the West can in this respect abstract itself from the existence of countries with a different social system. Furthermore, our country has no valid reason to remain in a state of class confrontation with the USA or any other country, provided certainly that we do not proceed from the absurd theory of permanent revolution. No single class or stratum of Soviet society, either separately or together,

is subjected to exploitation by foreign capital; what's more, it cannot resolve vital problems facing it through the "struggle against imperialism". There is only one road leading to it, i. e. internal revolutionary renewal of socialism, including its emancipation from the anachronistic vision of the world only as a boxing ring on which the "international class fight" is taking place.

It is all the more strange to speak of the irreconcilability of interests of states with different social systems now that even class conflicts within capitalist countries are being waged--and this is the purposeful policy of their communist parties--not in fierce confrontational forms but predominantly through compromises reached within the framework of mutually recognised legality. Hence, the solidarity of the Soviet working people with their class brothers and sisters in the West cannot justify the thesis of global class confrontation. Moreover, nothing can warrant the myth that the class interests of socialist and developing nations in their fiasco against imperialism are identical because, first, the majority of developing countries are already professing, or leaning to, the Western model of development and, second, they are suffering not so much from capitalism as from its shortage. They are interested not in confrontation with their former mother countries, but in cooperation in safeguarding their own and international stability, which should be the goal of our cooperation with the Third World.

As to a class alliance in the anti-imperialist struggle, a question that naturally arises is whether its theorists regard the risk of confrontation as an acceptable price to be paid by socialism and the "entire world proletariat" to see the nations of poorly developed capitalism reach its highest stage as soon as possible.

This is certainly not a question of disregarding the aggressive potential of our opponents, underestimating the aspirations of the reactionary and militaristic quarters, turning a blind eye to all their designs, or dropping our guard. These are realities which must be taken into consideration. But the crux of the matter is to rid ourselves and the world of the ideology of international confrontation foisted by those forces and thus to support the "party of peace" which is quite active in the West and which was mentioned by Lenin and is being referred to by the CPSU. In other words, this is a question of creating a global climate of confidence which is urgently needed to tackle democratic tasks in our own and other countries in order to get engaged in the world-wide ideological, cultural, economic and technological exchange, i. e. tackle the vital tasks facing our country.

The problem of confidence in its present form has been in existence as long as the two different social formations have been coexisting, with all their ups and downs. Does this mean that we are doomed to go on living in suspicion? No, there is no "iron-clad" need for it. As to the past, we need not stereotypes but facts, which are yet to be analysed. We are now quite close to grasping one of those reasons.

The Leninist course, born as it was out of the most acute ideological and political clash with left-wing adventurism, had as its fundamental basis the unconditional priority of the interests of the country's socio-economic development under conditions of stable interaction with the world around us. Subsequently that course was distorted by the administrative system that prevailed over the years of the personality cult and in the stagnation period. Rapallo and the period of recognition in the 1920s could be viewed, after a fashion, as a promising but short-lived period when Lenin's policy was being implemented. Soon after,

efforts to overcome enmity towards the new system in Russia by showing its democratic and peaceable nature were superseded by the exertions to cultivate mistrust of the other social system.

The natural need to defend the country against armed incursions from without and concern over internal stability turned into suspicion and dislike of everything foreign, into spy-mania, the psychosis of secrecy and ideological intolerance. International confidence was hardly promoted by the crimes committed by Stalin's regime, its attempts to justify mass repressions with references to the capitalist environment, and the theses of the exacerbation of class struggle both within the country and in the international arena, which, incidentally, actually scuttled the formation of a broad anti-fascist front.

Our participation in the post-1945 global anti-war and democratic upsurge was also truncated. It took a decade to arrive at the conclusion that a new world war was not inevitable and some 30 additional years to rise the question of moulding a new political thinking truly in line with today's realities.

The substitution of a technocratic approach to international problems for a political one developed and was even "scientifically" justified. Putting the blame, out of habit, for all world evils on the US military-industrial complex, the bureaucrats who were ready to place departmental interests above those of society not only followed but also brought the grist to the mill of the arms race logic imposed on us by the ideologists of attrition. Things went so far that during the stagnation peak our "counteraction" began to outpace their "action", which, in the final analysis, damaged our own interests. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the history of medium-range missiles in Europe and Asia without which, as has been demonstrated by the treaty eliminating all those missiles, we could have well managed, enhancing rather than undermining the security of the USSR and its allies as well as international security as a whole.

At the same time, we unconsciously nourished the atmosphere of suspicion with regard to our intentions in the zone of developing countries. The prestige and influence won by our support for the wave of national liberation that swept away the colonial system of imperialism in the late 1950s and early 1960s were later used to seek what appears to be poorly thought out and, what's most important, unrealistic goals. A primitive pattern that would occasionally work tended to draw a parallel between militancy and anti-imperialism, ultra-progressive phrasology of certain personalities and movements in developing countries and their socio-economic practices which did not amount to socialist as well as purely democratic transformations either in the economic or political areas.

In some cases, while rejecting in theory the concept of division into spheres of influence, we followed it in practice, backing the states which were viewed as our strongpoints in global confrontation with the other system. Meanwhile, profiting by foreign assistance and wielding "arch-leftist" anti-imperialist rhetoric, some regimes in those countries were in no rush to tackle the problems of hunger or backwardness, relying on the force of arms to pursue domestic or external policies, thus instilling no faith in the "progressive non-capitalist" path of development. Their attempts to run the economy by administrative system methods, reliance on military aid from abroad, and neglect for democratic freedoms necessarily resulted in the polarisation of political forces. Virtually all those regimes are involved in protracted and bloody conflicts with their opposition which, in turn, also relies on outside assistance. In this situation the imperialist quarters providing such support certainly never forget to refer to foreign and by the other

side or occasionally to direct presence of its troops in the territories of developing nations.

The failure to resolve crucial national problems in the group of "leftists" states is sharply in contrast with the trend, growing in Asia and Africa, to search for ways of stepping up economic development and participating in the international division of labour. Unfortunately, there are no data concerning the price paid by the Soviet Union for providing assistance to those countries. Estimates published in the West provoke most serious thoughts about its results and advisability. Furthermore, it is important to stress that aid itself is only the tip of the iceberg. Our direct or indirect entanglement in regional conflicts brings about enormous losses, exacerbating overall international tensions, justifying the arms race and hampering mutually beneficial economic ties with the West.

It would seem that we ought to give a thought to eliminating the loss-producing mechanism in the area of external political ties, as well. This is certainly not a question of turning our backs on the democratic forces in developing nations or progressively oriented states. On the contrary, genuine equality and non-interference in internal affairs individual decision-making responsibility, realism in evaluating the situation and potentialities, and the shift of accent to mutually advantageous trade and economic ties will but enhance the stable basis for cooperation with them. In a word, realism and responsibility are in our common interest.

For the time being we only begin to recognise what will be the response of other states, including those with a different social system, to the truly Leninist foreign policy. In any case, we must remember the words pronounced from the rostrum of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU to the effect that self-purification is impossible without tormenting efforts to overcome the past, pitiless self-analysis and sincere repentance. If the road to truth which is to be traversed by Soviet Communists themselves is uphill, it will be all the more steep for many observers abroad. This is something to be aware of in order to pursue a realistic policy and to react without excessive emotions to both criticism and praise addressed to us from abroad. Clichés like "the world is applauding Soviet initiatives" or "the enemy's lashing means that we are right" promote neither a sober analysis of world affairs nor our prestige nor international trust.

There are two questions that arise by themselves: do we have a good knowledge of the surrounding world and does it have objective information about us? Openness and truth about all aspects of the life of societies is a *sine qua non* condition for international trust. Only knowledge can lead to understanding and only understanding can lead to trust. It is not by happenstance that the Russian word *glasnost* together with the Greek word *demokratia*, is taking root as an international term and is associated everywhere with the hopes for a better world.

However, as regards confidence, we must at least have faith in ourselves. Coming forward at the United Nations with the initiative concerning a comprehensive system of international security, the Soviet Union stressed that an essential condition for building confidence is openness and democracy in the nation's domestic and foreign policies, in the mechanism of elaborating and adopting major decisions, especially in the military-political area. This is a genuine and very topical thesis.

At the same time, we cannot help acknowledging that voluminous reports issued and debated in great detail by the US legislature, and for that matter in other states as well, contain information about their economic and military-political ties with third countries and their cur-

rent and prospective military postures that is far in excess of anything found in our publications. What's more, even "their" data, to say nothing of our own comparative figures and facts, are classified in our country. It is a fact, however, that the absence of objective information is the breeding ground for myths of a Soviet threat. In Lenin's words "The people should be told the truth. Only then will their eyes be opened and they will *learn* to fight against untruth".² Are we going to heed, at long last, those words?

Evidently, decisions in the military domain which are of crucial significance for the fate of our country and all humankind call above all for an open and democratic discussion on the basis of full and objective information, with the exception of purely technical secrets which are not disclosed in the West, either. The examination of such problems should become a prerogative and an expression of the new role of the Supreme Soviet. This is also a means to ensure active involvement of the world public in the anti-war movement. Without credible knowledge of each other's military potentials, neither we nor the other side can act without regard to the "worst case" scenario or reach agreement on the level of minimum sufficiency. A true revolution in conscience and practice, overcoming the syndrome of closedness and total secrecy, is the order of the day.

Only a proper solution to that task will help us raise the question of credible information before other states as well. It is on record, for instance, that the US Department of Defense budget does not include figures reflecting R&D by arms-manufacturing companies or costs related to the development of nuclear weapons, which are placed on the Energy Department's accounts. But we have to talk to the West about these matters on an equal footing.

There is another thesis which has already become quite commonplace, namely that the pace of overhauling international and domestic journalism is clearly different. However, Soviet people are as capable as anyone of understanding the essence of historical processes transpiring in other countries. Yet, this cannot be done as long as they only receive positive information from the friendly states or those which we have simply termed as progressive nations while they get predominantly "exposing" information from Western countries. For example, did we have much knowledge of what was happening in Kampuchea under Pol Pot? Information about his crimes that saw light in the West did not reach us, and how could it—he was a "Khmer Rouge"... At present our readers possess more information from our own press about socialist countries, but can we really talk about drastic changes in how it is presented?

"International *glasnost*" is too important for the destinies of the world and the country to be muffled because of what has, alas, turned into quite habitual fears lest this frank discussion, which is occasionally not quite pleasant for us and for our partners, possibly bring about complications in our relations with them, lest we offend our allies or drive away our friends. On the contrary, there will be all the more confidence in our foreign policy if the world public can witness how it is worked out and how it absorbs various viewpoints and interests. A Nicaraguan journalist said very aptly that support for the revolution should above all be critical and truthful. Only such support is advisable and realistic.

The restoration of reasonable principles in our foreign policy makes it possible to identify a platform for searching a balance of interests of the USSR and other states with a view to shaping a

comprehensive system of confidence and security. What is needed are resolute actions, but certainly with a clear awareness of all the complexities of the task set. It is also very important not to lapse into new utopianism. The diversity and collision of interests will persist and states will continue for a long while to rely on military force as the only real guarantee of their security. A non-violent and demilitarised world is possible but only as a result of profound self-transformation of societies and interstate relations. What is urgently required, therefore, are both specific practical steps leading to a common goal and the latter's realistic analysis.

It seems to be necessary above all to clarify the notion of the balance of interests. This can hardly be viewed as tantamount to some quantitative or even qualitative equality. It would be a mistake to speak about the need of a state or a group of states, say, in such armaments and such political, economic and military ties that would be a mirror reflection of similar ties of the adversary states. The asymmetry of such needs just as of the means of meeting them, is an objective factor that should be fully taken into account.

It would appear, for example, that many more border troops would be needed to defend the extremely lengthy perimeter of Soviet frontiers than the mainland United States. At the same time, it is essential to take into account specific interests, for example, of the US or Japan in protecting sea lanes which link them with their major overseas economic and political partners. Despite the lesser oil factor, there is probably still a case for speaking about the vital interests of Japan and several other Western states in ensuring oil supplies from the Middle and Near East. Consequently, along with nuclear disarmament negotiations, we have to seek agreement on a balance of interests that would preserve the world without a risk of its destruction.

Let us recall unilateral measures which, if reasonably approached, will amount to an initiative-oriented rather than dilatory policy. What is important today (just as ever before) is that such measures can be of great help in dealing with our socio-economic issues. The road to this lies through bringing the building, structure and location of armed forces into conformity with the thesis of their reasonable and verifiable sufficiency for repelling an aggression but not for waging offensive operations. It is still a fact that the limits of disarmament continue to be determined by the attitudes and actions of the US and its bloc partners. At the same time, the present correlation of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty has a substantial margin of resilience, which allows us to make major convincing steps towards sufficiency and to removing asymmetries as a good example. Generally speaking, why should reasonableness of our actions be contingent on the other side's unreasonableness?

It would seem that the forces intended to be deployed far from our land and maritime frontiers should also be re-examined from the standpoint of sufficiency and efficiency. Our country has no interests which would justify any use of armed forces beyond the borders of the socialist community. At the same time, the presence of such forces, to say nothing of their buildup, serves as a pretext for mistrust and for appropriate campaigns. One of the postulates of new political thinking is the reaffirmation of the Leninist principle concerning the inadmissibility of the export of revolution in any form whatsoever. Consequently, the new thinking calls for restraint in choosing means, especially military means, to support regimes which declare themselves progressive but far from always boast a sufficient democratic basis in their countries. The revolution must know how to defend itself primarily by its own forces and above all by non-military means.

As to attempts to export counter-revolution to the developing world sphere, such violence should be barred by an international peace-keeping mechanism and, what is no less important, by the in-depth analysis in each case of both the essence of internal processes and the nature of external threat. Obviously, what is required here is namely allround information rather than proclamations by some local political forces or others.

Long outdated are the views according to which any clashes between advanced Western states and developing nations were looked at primarily through the prism of "suppressing national liberation aspirations". In reality, more often than not this is a question of intricate international conflicts which require solution with due regard for the interests of both sides coupled with their strict respect for international rules, which will constitute a criterion for judging the fairness of national positions. "Anti-imperialism" is a poor counsellor in matters related to improving the situation in the world as a whole and in some of its parts. Deideologising international relations calls for the primacy of law, which is the best constraint of aggressive designs.

Finally, there is a need to re-adjust stereotyped perceptions concerning the desire of the imperialist centres for all-out plundering of newly free nations. Lenin stressed that, unlike its undeveloped forms, advanced capitalism is not interested in deception but in "honest" profits from trade and economic transactions. Besides, developing countries ever more often have the highest stake in economic ties with the West and primarily in the export of raw materials. It is also necessary to impartially analyse the phenomenon of accelerated development of several developing countries which have embarked on the road of close interaction with the West and vigorous science-intensive exchanges.

There is no confidence if partners' interests which are totally non-existent on our side are neglected, let alone impinged upon. In other words, our interests in developing nations would be predicated above all on the actual possibilities for building mutually beneficial economic and technological cooperation. From this perspective, it is easy to see that such interests of Western countries are indubitably broader and deeper. Attempts to make up for this asymmetry with an enhanced potential of naval presence or with stronger strategic ties with some states that would "counterbalance the West's influence" would mean to deliberately doom ourselves to confrontation with those having objectively complementary interests and, what is no less important, to build relations with developing countries on a shaky, transient basis.

This is not a matter of concessions to imperialism or retreat to reserve positions in order to minimise losses or to muster forces. This is a matter of realism in assessing one's own interests, cleansing them of dogmas and stereotypes; this is a matter of true respect for other including non-aligned, countries. In a word, this is a question of return to the Leninist policy alien to which are any notions of great power chauvinism or rivalry in fighting for spheres of influence.

It is even easier to bring the community's interests into harmony on a positive basis because we are driven to it by the historical process itself. The need for such harmonisation is vividly seen against the backdrop of urgent global problems facing humanity. Apart from removal of the nuclear threat, they include prevention of an environmental disaster, efforts to combat underdevelopment, hunger, old and new diseases, e. g. AIDS, and so on. It appears to be only natural that Soviet literature raises the question of a crisis of civilisation and a need for new forms of international cooperation is overcoming it. The watershed here lies not so much between the systems and ideologies as between common sense and the sense of self-preservation of the human

species, on the one hand, and lack of responsibility, national egoism and prejudices, on the other. Apparently, this unity of "anti-crisis" forces contains an important prerequisite for lowering the level of military confrontation since an answer to the problems that arise both for us and for the other side lies in the sphere of socio-economic and scientific solutions rather than in the area of military power techniques.

A humanitarian basis of confidence is the identity of common human interests and values related to the longing of every individual for freedom, spiritual, cultural and social self-expression and happiness. Hence, the crucial significance of international cooperation in encouraging and protecting social and political human rights and fundamental freedoms as embodied in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants on Human Rights. As to a comprehensive system of international security, its humanitarian component can and should undoubtedly become a powerful and promising system-shaping factor. A defensive, conservative stand in this matter is a distinctive feature of the vestiges of Stalinism and stagnation. The growing process of democratisation should, after all, clear those logjams. This area needs a purely realistic rather than a sectarian assessment of the possibilities of international cooperation. Bourgeois democracy, apart from some elements of class domination which are stuck to by the ruling quarters, also possesses a tremendous potential that has already turned into something of a classic of political thinking and practice. In other words, this is the most valuable part of common human culture which, as Lenin said, we ought to study, appreciate and master.

The preservation and development of representative institutions, public control mechanisms and a maximum freedom of expression in all countries with which we coexist constitutes our national security interests. For this is an essential condition for uplifting democratic and progressive forces and for whittling down the sphere of influence of the military-industrial quarters. The banner of pluralism and of defence of human rights should be held by socialism. Only then will other peoples be able to see its true image and only then will it represent a credible historical alternative. The task is to show the direct link, i. e. the more socialism, the more trust.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1966, p. 386

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, 1964, p. 344.

SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL CONFERENCE AT THE USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE 19TH ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF THE CPSU: FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS continues the presentation of conference materials. Published below are speeches given at the conference by representatives of departments and organisations taking part in foreign political process.

In our October issue we started publication of the materials from the scientific and practical conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held on July 25-27 this year. That issue carried the report and the closing speech by Eduard Shevardnadze, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and speeches by the deputy ministers, who headed the sections in which the work of the conference proceeded.

The debate on the report delivered by Eduard Shevardnadze is published below.

IN THE SPIRIT OF RENEWAL

Guri MARCHUK,
President of the USSR Academy of Sciences

THE 19TH PARTY CONFERENCE, a major event in our country, was convened at a time when the concept of *perestroika* had actually taken root, but it was necessary to plan and deeply comprehend the practical measures through which we will give effect to *perestroika*. The report made by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Conference laid the groundwork for the resolutions adopted at that Conference. The report answers the questions that are of concern to us today.

I should like above all to express my profound satisfaction with the fact that the scientific and practical conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is being held. We listened attentively to the report by Eduard Shevardnadze, which is in line with the spirit of the Party Conference. In the report the practical and scientific aspects of diplomacy are linked together, and a political concept is set forth. This is exactly what we lacked. Many miscalculations in the international sphere and many problems for which we found ourselves unprepared came about, perhaps, because we lacked a comprehensive and profoundly scientific approach.

As we analyse the materials of the 19th Party Conference, we find in its resolutions what is most important to us from the point of view of activating science and developing international relations. But what are

we to begin with? What should we rely on, regarding the scientific and practical aspect of the matter?

As I see it, there are mainly four problems emerging which should be in the focus of our attention.

First. The problems of building a nuclear-free world and eliminating the war threat. Their solution should be based on concrete facts, and scientific substantiation, we should offer variants, and display a scientific, technological and economic approach, including variants which would help us to propose alternative solutions for the political leadership.

Second. The problem of global climatic and environmental changes. It was not by chance that during his Washington visit Mikhail Gorbachev described this problem as very serious. Global problems concern all people. And so they become central problems, just like nuclear disarmament. Undertaking extensive research in ecology, the biosphere, studying tsunamis, earthquakes, and the global hothouse effect in the atmosphere, we give people an opportunity to see what they will be faced with, if we fail to issue correct forecasts and to pool the efforts of science, technology, and engineering.

Third. Problems of economic, or in a broader context social, development of the Soviet Union in the period of *perestroika*, which is a major condition for stabilising the international community. These are not only political, but also social problems. And if we fulfil our plans—and we will certainly do that—our position will doubtless grow more attractive. This idea has been very clearly expressed at the Conference.

And, finally, fourth. The problem of fundamental science and creation of new technologies—the basis of the future development of the world community. A good deal of work lies ahead in this area, because science, especially fundamental research, has long been underestimated. Therefore I propose that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up an appropriate commission to consider scientific, and in the future, also technological and engineering, aspects of international relations. I believe our scientists can contribute a good deal here.

Science offers alternative solutions. We should prepare several views, so that the political leadership has a choice. In this way we will consolidate our democratism and the principles we have proclaimed. This will enable us to choose concrete ways.

Considering that the problem of international ties is becoming extremely important for our country, and relying on effective support from the Central Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we have decided to set up a special department of world economics and international relations at the USSR Academy of Sciences. I think this is a large step forward. The Institute of Europe has been established. Other research groups are in the making. So now we are going to have an entire system which should pool our scientific efforts. The problem of modelling international situations will be extensively worked on.

Diplomacy has always been a science. But today it demands an integration of social and natural sciences to arrive at optimum systems solutions. *Perestroika* has enabled us to formulate the concept of Soviet diplomacy on the basis of new thinking, taking into account the striving to perfect our society. This, too, has been well described in the report.

One of the main aspects of diplomacy is its economic expediency. We share this point of view completely. All this points to the need to combine national economic and defence actions into a single complex. So far, they have been proceeding along parallel lines: economic tasks on the one hand, and defence ones on the other. These lines very rarely crossed. Though definite efforts were made to coordinate them, there did not exist the concept we have now. World experience tells us that only the buildup

of the entire scientific, technological and economic potential of a country provides a reliable basis of security.

There was a time when the development of military industries stimulated the growth and improvement of the civilian ones. But the task now is to reverse the main direction.

Economic criteria should influence political decisions, and political decision-making should help develop international relations. Many of them could promote the progress of science and technology. I shall name but a few of them. In the first place, it is necessary to greatly expand our scientific ties with industrialised countries. A veritable organisational breakthrough should be made here. For instance, our economic potential today accounts for 60 per cent of the US potential. We should seek to achieve the same level in scientific ties in the near future. So far, we are only at about 10 per cent of that level.

There should be joint international projects. It gives me pleasure to inform you that travelling to socialist countries has been made much simpler. The same should be done with regard to the capitalist world. There are many other problems awaiting solution. I cannot help saying here that in the period of *perestroika* we note the constant attention to science by our embassies in various countries.

The personnel issue is the main one. I believe we could help in personnel training. And again we are faced with a host of difficulties. We are groping for ways which should be optimal or, at least, effective.

After the 19th Conference I visited six research centres of the USSR Academy of Sciences. I wanted to see the effect of the Party Conference on the minds of our scientists. Six large meetings of leading scientists were held. I told them about the Conference, and saw what plans these research centres had. I must tell you that the scientists are optimistic. So we have a good potential. But, of course, it has to be increased. The thoughts about the development of science expressed in the report by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Conference, plus the enthusiasm and theoretical potential of our science can contribute considerably to the cause of *perestroika*, including the development of international relations.

CARDINAL REFORM OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC TIES— THE CALL OF THE TIMES

Konstantin KATUSHEV,
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR

THE REPORT by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 19th Party Conference, the debate that followed and the decisions adopted gave us a critical analysis of the progress of *perestroika* in every sphere of Soviet life. The Conference adopted resolutions determining the chief tasks of our work. One task is to complete within the current five-year period the cardinal restructuring of the organisation and system for administering foreign economic activities, which is part and parcel of the radical economic reform now under way in the country, and to adopt the principles of cost-effectiveness—self-recoupment and self-financing—for our foreign economic activities.

About two years have elapsed since the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers passed the first decision which marked the start of the reform, the start of cardinal change in the organisation

of trade and economic relations with foreign countries, to make them duly dynamic and economically more effective.

The chief task of remodelling foreign economic relations is to bring producers of goods directly into the foreign market and steadily expand the limits and vary the forms of their work.

Since then considerable work has been done to provide the legally-organisational and economic preconditions required for the accomplishment of this task. Questions related to foreign economic ties are invariably present in all recent party and government documents. A separate section is devoted to them in the laws on state enterprise and cooperatives. They are also reflected in the detailed resolutions on planning, material and technical supply, finances, statistics, etc., issued after the June 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, and are a major component of the general concept of the country's economic and social development until the year 2005.

Today, economic organisations of 55 ministries and departments and close to 100 enterprises and firms that fall under them operate independently on the foreign market. Similar rights have been granted to the foreign economic associations under the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics and to the socialist enterprises under republican authority. Greater possibilities have been provided for border trade and cooperation with partners in the socialist countries. Over 1,000 enterprises have established direct ties with their foreign partners. The law allows cooperatives, too, to take part in the foreign economic activity.

New forms of economic interaction with foreign partners—joint ventures in the USSR: manufacturing enterprises, financial consortiums, business partners' associations, etc.—have been introduced in practice both legislatively and organisationally.

The Soviet share of posted capital in the 62 joint ventures which were registered by the middle of this year is estimated at 350 million rubles. Over 12,000 Soviet workers will be employed by them. More than 300 proposals on establishing joint ventures are being negotiated. Simultaneously, work is under way to improve juridical regulations on their organisation and functioning, on negotiating with foreign countries mutual guarantees of investment, and so on. Briefly speaking, conditions are being consistently provided to expand the foreign economic activities of Soviet producers.

The organisations with direct access to the foreign market and independent of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations had a 20 per cent share in our trade turnover at the start of this year. By the end of the year this share will rise to 30 per cent as a number of foreign economic associations and firms are being handed over to the production ministries. Meanwhile the share of foreign economic operations effected in a centralised way will be further decreased.

The current reform of foreign economic activities, and the large number of Soviet enterprises participating in them have made it imperative to develop a smoothly functioning system for ensuring the state monopoly in foreign trade, for observing state interests through effective coordination and interaction of all those involved in the foreign economic complex. It must be noted that in this undertaking the goals are clear to us, but we are just beginning the search for optimal ways of attaining them. Only the system of central foreign economic organs has been reorganised: the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the State Committee for Economic Relations have been eliminated and in their place the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MFER) was formed; new functions have been assigned to the Chamber of Industry and Commerce. However, on Western market our new participants in foreign economic relations, who are not sufficiently competent yet, are faced with

tough competition and hard business style of their experienced partners. So under real conditions, in order to achieve success, we need the closest, I should say organic, fusion of Soviet producers and traders, and efficient performance on the basis of active market research and thorough calculation of real economic effectiveness of an agreement or a contract.

Unfortunately, we do not have as much of this as we need. The MFER, our all-Union economic associations, trade missions and Soviet embassies bear much blame for this. Our common goal, one so important for us today, is to carry out a thorough economic study of the offers coming from foreign firms, their comparison with possible offers of their rivals and scrupulous counting the nation's money. Also, there must be more effective interaction of all participants in foreign economic activities on international markets and within the country.

The organisational formation of the central apparatus of the MFER has been practically completed. The main directions have been outlined along which departmental foreign economic associations are to be refashioned. These will be strengthened, while their staff will be cut by 25 per cent; they will number 25 in place of today's 45. The MFER's unified missions abroad are being formed. Their number is being cut substantially. Their staffs, too, are also being reduced, country-wise and by categories of workers; economic methods are devised to interest the personnel working abroad in the end result.

An important task is to provide employment according to profession for the workers of foreign economic associations and foreign missions who are laid off because of the reductions, and to ensure their social rights.

At the Ministry measures are taken to make up for the delay in forming the central apparatus, and a new mechanism is being established for our activities in all aspects in order to meet the interests of the whole state and ensure interaction among all the participants of foreign economic relations: planning systems, contractual relations, provision of material resources for export, including backing by state orders and wholesale trade in the means of production, and also systems of settling accounts, stimulation of export deliveries, and so on.

Many of these questions have been determined in the Statutes of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations approved by the State Foreign Economic Commission and submitted for approval to the USSR Council of Ministers. This should enable the MFER to start introducing in the practice of foreign economic ties measures of economic, and, when necessary, also organisational, regulation of activities, such as licencing, determining contingents and quotas, development of a new tariff system, etc.

Most important, naturally, is the use of economic methods. The chief object of both theoretical and practical work is to develop optimal methods for making industry economically interested in organising and increasing the output of competitive goods for exports, above all machines. What is being done in this area so far, has not brought about any major changes. The system for settling accounts with industry for export goods by using differentiated currency coefficients is complicated and imperfect. The system of paying a currency percentage to the producers of export goods and services is not satisfactory either. The regulators of foreign economic activities should be better tied in with the reform of the domestic economy.

For the time being, as industry is being switched over to the cost effectiveness system, some enterprises refuse to accept export orders and sign contracts if these deal with, for instance, deliveries on credit, without compensation, with accounts being settled in closed currencies, etc. Our regulators do not yet duly counteract the tendency of group

interests opposed to those of the state as a whole, which affects our ties with many socialist and developing countries, ties that for the most part are priority ones from the political point of view.

Strong organisational and economic methods for regulating and enhancing the responsibility of all Soviet participants in foreign economic relations are needed to enable the state to fulfil the obligations and agreements with partners abroad; in particular, the orders for the export of goods and services under commitments of the Soviet side should be placed within the category of state orders. The resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers on this question, which was passed recently, will help resolve this most important problem.

Of the tasks of our foreign economic reform, that of increasing efficiency is still the most urgent. The organisational and economic preconditions that have been provided have failed, so far, to bring about changes in the dynamics and structure of the country's trade.

In the first two years of the current five-year-plan period the foreign trade turnover has dropped in value by 9 per cent. In the first half of 1988 the decline ended: as compared with the same period of 1987, it was 5 per cent up and amounted to 66,500 million rubles. However, the price trends on the world market are still unfavourable to us.

The foreign economic complex has, and will have in the future, a significant role to play in the practical realisation of the task set by the 19th All-Union Party Conference—the task of making the Soviet economy more socially oriented. This implies economically effective purchases of equipment from Western firms for rebuilding and modernising the food and light industries and direct purchases of foodstuffs and consumer goods including deliveries in payments of credits, etc.

The large-scale task of increasing in 1991-2005 the volume of foreign trade by roughly 150 per cent is being formulated in practical terms, and in the more distant future the export share in the national income should be at least doubled to reach 12 to 15 per cent.

The most important task is to rapidly increase exports, improve the quality, and raise the technological level and competitiveness of export goods. It is known that today less than one-third of our industry's output of machines and equipment meets world standards. In our view, there is only one way out—radically switching over to production designed for exporting individual kinds of machines and equipment that are in demand on foreign markets, in the framework of the existing industries. To do this the efforts of designers must be intensified and the necessary technological equipment and skilled personnel must be provided. Appropriate economic norms encouraging the organisation of such kinds of production must be envisaged, such as higher labour-intensity, larger staffs, special bonuses in rubles and foreign currencies, etc.

Our experience in solving very difficult scientific and technological problems by national means, for instance, in defence and space exploration, through a purposeful approach and concentration of effort, resources and personnel in strategically important spheres is one more proof that the possibilities exist for making a "technological breakthrough" onto the foreign market.

One more point. I should like to draw your attention to the fact that we should establish joint ventures not to by-pass cooperation, trade on the basis of compensation, barter, etc., but parallel with these, remembering that for us joint enterprise is a higher and costlier form of economic cooperation. One should bear in mind that there are differences in joint ventures with capitalist, socialist or developing countries. In our partnership with capitalist countries we look for additional sources of financing, equipment and the latest technologies, and managerial experience. Establishment of joint ventures in developing countries can

be expedient when there exists a workforce of proper skill for this and when the given country can cover the expenditures of fixed capital and the current expenses, and reliably ensure deliveries of the output to the Soviet Union, including in repayment of other Soviet credits.

The competition on foreign markets and their monopolisation today have reached the extent when many economic and commercial mechanisms should be brought into play to develop a sector of the market of goods even with a high level of quality.

To that end, we should, in particular, be more active in giving practical trade and economic content to the political understandings reached between the CMEA and the EEC and in ensuring the USSR's participation in the Conference on Pacific Economic Cooperation and in other international and regional economic organisations.

Politicians and economists should conduct extensive work abroad to explain the goals of Soviet participation in GATT, disproving the cold-war arguments of our political adversaries. At the same time, large-scale restructuring should be effected within the country as well. Among the primary tasks here is the adoption of the new system of export and import codification and statistics used in world practice; the introduction of a new and effective customs tariff; measures of non-tariff regulation; our greater participation in multilateral commodity agreements, etc.

All these measures will help increase our economic interaction with the world economy.

The questions I have mentioned here show the entire complexity of the tasks confronting the MFER in the context of the reform of foreign economic relations. The main goals and directions in the development of foreign economic ties have been clearly formulated in the Party and Government decisions. As we carry out these decisions, we should proceed along non-traditional ways and look for new forms and methods in our work. And we should find concrete answers to all these questions, since this is what the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference require us to do.

TO RAISE THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

**Albert VLASOV,
First Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department,
CPSU Central Committee**

WE HAVE HEARD an interesting report. It examines honestly and with a forthrightness the matters of foreign policy and diplomacy, reflecting the diversity of our new political thinking and fresh theoretical and practical approaches to international problems. Unquestionably, the posing of the tasks set forth in the reports by Mikhail Gorbachev at the February 1988 Plenary Meeting and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on raising the quality of information on international issues and the intellectual level of foreign-policy propaganda and explanatory and analytical work on world affairs is impossible without drawing on theory and on the ideology of renewal.

It is a known fact that propaganda on the whole and international propaganda in particular belongs to the superstructural formations. Their link with the basis have a different degree of proximity—direct impact of economic successes, lag behind changes in the basis, relative independence and reverse influence—positive and negative—on basis relations. Lastly, the degree of the reflection of the individual's environment. Here any propagandist runs up against many complicated problems. What is most important is that the formation of the ideology of renewal takes place not in and of itself but according to a certain pattern, in the individual's practical activity. In other words, it is only through the human factor and by drawing on it that we can shape successful propaganda strategy and tactics. It must be admitted that the administrative-command methods of the past implanted in propaganda illusions and goals which in effect reduced the human factor to naught and spawned arrogance and illusory abstract slogans. These facts are making themselves felt to varying degrees inasmuch as they are linked with reshaping the consciousness of propagandists themselves and the development of a general culture of propaganda. It is not all that easy to renounce dogmatism, the legacy of bureaucracy and voluntarism.

The specificity of our international propaganda is that it reveals to millions of people abroad the world of our *perestroika* and our foreign policy. A world which many people abroad do not have an opportunity to observe independently. A world which is at times misrepresented deliberately, or out of ignorance or delusion. The question arises: Can these and other pitfalls be negotiated via the former methods of general phrases, adjurations and abstract appeals? Obviously, they cannot. Suffice it to examine the losses which our propaganda suffered in the international arena in the past. The restructuring drive has turned around not only foreign public opinion, but also old stereotypes about the Soviet Union. That the stereotype of the "Soviet threat" and the "enemy image" has been steadily on the wane since April 1985 is to the credit not only of staff members of foreign policy departments and foreign policy propagandists. It is the direct result of *perestroika* and revolutionary changes in Soviet domestic and foreign affairs. It is these changes that are rapidly winning this country sympathies abroad.

Lenin's works and letters of the last years of his life contain an appeal to politicians, ideologists and propagandists to refrain from "generalities", repeating which is harmful since they evoke nausea and boredom, and state that general phrases and untruths ultimately spawn and encourage bureaucracy. It is an open secret that today, too, some people are apprehensive of "excessive *glasnost*" in the belief that it can harm the international prestige of the Soviet Union. However, we have seen for ourselves the enormous advantages to be derived from an atmosphere of *glasnost*, honest criticism and candidness regarding our affairs. The proceedings of the 19th party conference are the most graphic illustration of this. Obviously, the times are gone when one could simply become intoxicated by the atmosphere of openness, when our democratic process "automatically" worked to destroy the enemy image and heighten the Soviet Union's international prestige. The new stage is linked with creative endeavour, with practical steps towards reform in all spheres.

The point at issue, of course, is not at all a return to propaganda done in rosy tones or some limitation of openness. No, what we are talking about is observance of the principles of *glasnost* and democracy, observance of a sense of measure, responsibility and at times simply common sense. Still another point is "blank spaces" in Soviet and world history and criticism of ourselves or of others. There are two choices here. One is criticism for the sake of creation and of repudiation of

everything that hampers socialism and socialist pluralism; the second is masochistic self-flagellation. The first option yields the greatest political and propaganda effect, while the second leads to a renunciation of both the past and the future. Our propaganda opens the door to the world of our *perestroika* for millions of people abroad.

Even sovietologists who several years ago rejected everything Soviet offhand are today turning out books and articles in favour of *perestroika* and new political thinking. An entire trend of Western political thought is taking shape which does not jibe with the old canons of Western sovietology.

While concurring fully with the tenets contained in Eduard Shevardnadze's report to the effect that we are not indifferent to the Soviet Union's image abroad, whether the point at issue is Afghanistan or human rights, I would like to talk about the "vindicating" tendency that appears at times in the propaganda sphere as well. In assessing the positive changes in public opinion in the West, we would obviously be making a mistake if we started introducing notes to the effect that we are not quite the same as you, in the West, but we will get better, we will be more and more like you. We are shaping our own way of life, one that is based on a different social system, on the 70-year experience of Soviet power, the national traditions of the peoples comprising our union. The Soviet political system can hardly be said to be a copy of the Western parliamentary model. We are paving our own, original, way of democratic administration of society, the way of genuine self-government of citizens. World practice is taken into account in it as well, of course. The main thing, however, is that it is a political system that has no analogues in the West and organically obtains from the socialist nature of our society and draws on the experience that has been amassed.

Priority of universal interests over class interests in the modern age is a foremost theoretical conclusion of our party and a vivid manifestation of new political thinking. However, for one thing, we know full well that we have a long hard struggle ahead if this stand is to be espoused in the West by forces which are doggedly grasping at their selfish interests. For another, the interests of peace and world civilisation and our commitment to universal values can in no way hamper us from promoting our ideological values and arguing the veracity of our chosen path. And here the apologetic, vindicative notes in our propaganda are clearly out of place. We should avoid, however, a slide into methods of psychological warfare. How is this to be avoided?

At the initiative of the Soviet side, complicated dialogue has been initiated with the American side; a search is underway for criteria which is making it possible to draw a dichotomy between international information and misinformation, and criteria for certain norms of mutual relations in the information sphere. This approach is in accord with the spirit of peaceful coexistence and confidence-building. The very raising of the issue presupposes a revitalisation of our propaganda in connection with the Soviet initiatives on disarmament, settlement of regional conflicts, the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, or other international issues.

No one is calling upon the Soviet media, as was the case in the past, to portray Western reality and the foreign policies of the USA and its allies in exclusively black tones. But if we are speaking candidly about what is bad in our country, we must show just as openly the many negative phenomena there, too. This does not mean that we should conceal from our public the good elements there. We have seen for ourselves that such propaganda is not believed, and given the diverse means of obtaining information today, both Soviet people and the foreign public

will simply choose alternative sources of information, and not ours. We simply fail to avoid extremes in our propaganda—now we hurl the fiercest epithets at the enemy, now after, say, the first signing of a serious agreement, we sink into an inexplicable euphoria. We can, after all, choose a reasonable path. Evidently, diplomats at the negotiating table should be using the language of diplomacy, and propagandists, the language of propaganda, that is more frank.

Obviously, the development of *glasnost* and democracy requires a new look at media coverage of international issues. Is regarding a pronouncement by each Soviet author as an expression of the official viewpoint justified? But what about the possibility of thus sounding out foreign public opinion on developments in a specific international matter? We have been pussyfooting here, looking back at one another, with censorship of sorts. Calm, well-argued polemics, without sensational attacks of criticism for the sake of criticism not only on questions of the past but also on current Soviet foreign policy and international relations is quite permissible.

The world of *perestroika* is totally overhauling the correlation between politics and propaganda and tearing down impediments whether in the form of elitist approaches and professional cliquishness or in the form of limited information on decision-making and ways of implementing decisions, which ultimately rules out involvement of the public and, consequently, the media, reducing the latter to a passive registrar of events. A merger of politics and propaganda obviously requires mutual efforts, boldness and a scuttling of old approaches.

One more point. All of us agree that our country exerts a decisive influence abroad through its successes on the economic front, and this in turn requires that in politics and propaganda we draw on the real endeavours of *perestroika*. In short, rectifying the situation in foreign policy propaganda and raising the level of information on international issues require a comprehensive approach and joint efforts by all our agencies—foreign-policy, propaganda, party and economic—and by cultural workers and the scientific community.

I believe that the 19th party conference has enriched all of us with reflections and experience which help accomplish the tasks set by the CPSU Central Committee.

THE DOCTRINE OF SECURITY AND PEACE

Vitali SHABANOV,
Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR

THE PROCLAMATION of a defence doctrine by the 27th CPSU Congress was a momentous event in the military policy of our state. The chief purpose of the doctrine is to prevent all war and build up our Armed Forces on a level sufficient for defence.

It is no easy task to put the doctrine into practice. This requires a combination of military, political and diplomatic efforts. But the most important thing is to materialise the doctrine. This is the most difficult part of our efforts.

To understand this, we must look back and touch on the reasons for the rise of the arms race, its main stages and the results which led humanity to a fatal boundary. Beyond this boundary there is no

alternative to arms limitation or reduction, for a global nuclear catastrophe cannot be regarded as an alternative.

After the war there occurred two events of decisive significance to the destiny of the world. One of them was the development of the atom bomb in 1945 in the United States, after which the hydrogen bomb was made. The other event was the development of ICBMs in the late 1950s. It was these two events that actually put the world in a peculiar situation where scientific and technological progress provided immense opportunities to improve humanity's standard of living but, on the other hand, humanity found itself gripped by fear. The two weapons combined to form a harmonious whole, so to speak, a virtually absolute weapon against which there is still no defence. By the late 1970s this deadly jinn had multiplied on an unprecedented scale.

It would be hard to imagine the fate of our country had we failed to make our own atom bomb and then the hydrogen bomb. Nevertheless, this was far from enough to effectively curb the aggressive intentions of the United States.

In the late 1940s we had a rather small number of long-range bombers, such as could hardly have reached the United States. They were succeeded by an improved aircraft but even that one lacked the necessary capability. It was not until the late 1950s that the development of the first Soviet ICBM under Sergei Korolev's direction ushered in Soviet nuclear weapons with an intercontinental range. After that, however, it took many years to build up a dependable nuclear missile capability giving our potential enemy no hope of launching aggression with impunity. And that was when we achieved the strategic parity we are now speaking about. From then on, the United States could have been hit in a matter of 25-30 minutes.

The intercontinental missiles certainly cost our country a lot of money but we had no choice.

Ever since the appearance of our strategic missile complexes, the Americans have been casting about for ways to suppress them with impunity by delivering a pre-emptive missile strike.

Only recently the conclusion was made that a disarming strike using powerful nuclear weapons would be suicidal. The disastrous ecological effects of the strike would kill the whole of humanity.

Even so, the doctrine of a disarming strike led to a rapid increase in the arsenal of strategic offensive weapons in both the United States and our country and to their mounting on diverse vehicles to provide for inevitable retaliation against a disarming enemy strike. Ballistic missiles were deployed on nuclear-powered submarines, and mobile ground complexes appeared.

Strategic air forces, too, made rapid progress and ultimately came to form a sizable part of the nuclear triad. However, they had a shortcoming which was not removed until the mid-1970s. The fact is that strategic bombers sent to bomb strategic targets had to enter the enemy's air defence zone.

The appearance of small-size, low-altitude subsonic cruise missiles with a range of over 2,600 km, developed in the early 1970s in the United States, reversed the situation. Each bomber could carry 20 missiles of this type weighing 1,200 kg, so that a mere 100 carrier aircraft made possible a massive strike with 2,000 cruise missiles.

It was a most serious spiral in the strategic offensive arms race.

The more than 25,000 nuclear warheads mounted on the strategic missiles alone developed during the arms race are capable of wiping out civilisation on our planet several times over. Besides, there are tens of thousands of land-, air- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons.

The nuclear strategic arms race led to a race in defensive strategic

arms. Originally both sides developed an air defence system against bombers, one equipped with the most diverse facilities for tracking and destroying aircraft. But while such systems were effective as a means of defence against strategic aircraft, they proved practically ineffective against a massive attack by small-size nuclear cruise missiles, to say nothing of ballistic missiles.

It is only natural that ever since the appearance of ballistic missiles, both our country and the United States have been trying to develop an ABM system. But 30 years on no solution has yet been found. The main reason for this situation is the immense overkill of the US and Soviet nuclear capabilities, which nullify the effectiveness of investigated ABM systems against a massive strike. The likelihood of developing ABM defences is understandably increasing with the reduction of the number of nuclear warheads. This is a very important circumstance.

We are therefore correct to make cuts in strategic offensive armaments conditional on compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. Both our initiatives and the Soviet-US agreements on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles enjoy unanimous support in practically all UN member countries, which we witnessed as we attended the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

In the area of strategic armaments, however, a new and mighty jinn, if not a nuclear one, is now coming out of nature's secret recesses. Non-nuclear weapons are becoming strategic weapons capable of hitting such targets of vital importance as factories, power stations, storehouses, oil and gas tanks. Take, for instance, the strategic sea-based cruise missiles of the Tomahawk type developed in the United States and equipped with nuclear and conventional warheads. They have a firing range of 2,600 km in the case of the nuclear version and from 1,300 to 1,500 km in that of the conventional version and hit targets with great accuracy.

With the rise of the homers capable of identifying the shape of a target, accuracy can be increased to mere metres. Work on this is in full swing now. Currently there are 60 US warships armed with a total of 540 Tomahawks. In 1995 the Americans expect to have 180 ships carrying over 2,000 missiles of this type. I might as well add that the United States is punctual in building ships and equipping them with the latest weapons.

It follows, I think, that we must seek cuts in both nuclear and non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons, primarily sea-based ones.

The United States has been doing much to increase the capability and combat readiness of general-purpose forces, with ground troops as their backbone.

These forces, such as armies and formations, are preparing to fulfil diverse tasks in wars varying in scale and duration and with or without the use of nuclear weapons.

This is the starting point of the US policy of developing and improving the armaments of these forces. The means of delivery and nuclear ammunition itself have undergone appreciable qualitative changes as a result of repeated modernisation, gaining in range, accuracy and effectiveness.

The atomic artillery of US troops has been modernised, too. At present all 155 mm and 203.2 mm guns are nuclear-capable. Their firing range has increased from 15 to 30 km.

The firing power of ground troops is also being built up by developing qualitatively new weapon systems and precision location field systems that can strike deep in our territory. One of the set tasks is to develop weapons equivalent to tactical nuclear weapons.

Space weapons hold a special place in the overall policy. For over

two and a half decades now, use has been made of satellite systems developed under military space programmes and providing for operations by armed forces at the global level.

However, major scientific and technological achievements of recent years in microelectronics, computer systems, composite materials, laser technology and other fields make it possible to develop advanced space techniques with fundamentally new combat capabilities. This circumstance has led to a reappraisal of the role of space in US strategy. US concepts of using space weapons regard space as a new theatre of military operations.

In line with the SDI programme, the Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories, which are among the largest in the United States, are doing research into the use of nuclear ammunition as a means of generating diverse kinds of directed energy and hitting targets both in space and on the Earth.

From what an analysis of five years of work on this programme has revealed, the Americans have not yet achieved results enabling them to adopt a decision on full-scale development of advanced weapons. Work is at the stage of exploring lines of research. Thus, there is still some time left for preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space.

What about our space facilities? We are using them in systems of early warning against missile attack, in communication, navigation, meteorology and control over compliance with international arms limitation treaties and agreements. In seeking to prevent the likely enemy from winning military technological superiority, we understandably found ourselves involved to a degree in the space arms race. We have worked out plans and measures against the US programme for militarising space. Their implementation, however, requires large financial and material resources and the diversion of a substantial part of our scientific, technological and economic potential, which could be used for our society's social advancement.

To end the race in space weapons means not only improving the military political situation but saving vast economic resources.

Thus the interests of world security today imperatively demand deep cuts in both nuclear and conventional armaments. This is particularly important to Europe because, seen from the standpoint of the threat to humanity's existence, using conventional armaments in the European theatre could have fatal consequences.

Who can warrant that the belligerents will never strike a blow against atomic power plants deliberately or accidentally, if only using conventional yet highly accurate weapons? As far as the governments of NATO countries are concerned, they persist by tradition in treating conventional arms as a lawful component of power politics. They want to "offset" the INF Treaty by continuing to develop conventional armaments.

The proposals made by the PCC of the WTO countries for cuts in armed forces and armaments in Europe are another important step towards a world without mass destruction weapons and without violence, a world based on the principles of reciprocal security.

These peace initiatives are appreciated and enjoy widespread support in the world, both among our friends and our adversaries.

It would be wrong, however, to consider that we can confidently look forward to far-reaching changes for the better in East-West relations.

The force of habit which for decades has kept Western policy on the well-trodden path of the arms race still makes itself felt.

We are reminded of this only too clearly by voices from Washington and NATO headquarters.

This is why the struggle for peace and for the reduction and elimina-

tion of armaments must be coupled with steps to assure our country reliable defence as specified by decisions of the 27th congress and 19th conference of our party.

The Ministry of Defence is working in close contact with the Foreign Ministry. We see eye-to-eye on both military technological matters (they are the material basis for reductions) and political problems. We are occasionally asked, especially by foreigners, whether there are contradictions between the military and the political leadership of our state. But this is asked by people who are misinformed. There are no contradictions. The military shares in every initiative of our party and our government aimed at limiting and reducing armaments.

SCIENCE IS A PARTY TO POLITICAL DECISIONS

Academician Roald SAGDEYEV,
Director, Space Research Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences

WE WOULD ALL LIKE to witness the early results of *perestroika*, as soon as possible. It is primarily in foreign policy that we can see these fruits. This is the sphere where new thinking was first formulated and the early concrete steps were taken, finding a broad international response and influencing the whole of *perestroika* in our country. This accounts for, among other things, the interest in the role of science shown by this audience, with the minister's introductory report as the starting point.

Indeed, there is a marked increase in the role of science in a fast-changing and interdependent world. The march of history is quickening and the problems we must grapple with are assuming a global character. Such is today's inescapable, objective reality. The interval between cause and effect is steadily growing shorter, be it the interval between a scientific discovery and its application and the socio-economic effects of it or the relationship between man and nature. Regrettably, the interval between decision-making by the human community and the actual adoption of measures to reduce harmful socio-economic or ecological effects is by no mean growing shorter. This is perhaps the main and most painful paradox of our epoch which tends to increase the price of error, something which Eduard Shevardnadze spoke of here in broader political terms. Nor is it accidental that Chernobyl has become the gauge of the error price.

We are unwittingly becoming sappers who are compelled to cross an increasingly dangerous minefield. Political decisions and their scientific evaluation and examination should be as inseparable as political decisions on major technological projects, be it the introduction of a new technology or weapon or a new plan for subduing nature.

It follows that science is becoming a partner in all decision-making along with politics, a party to it. Is science prepared for this?

For a long time a primitive stereotype was upheld and cultivated in our country. Those who did so expected scientists and engineers to merely produce new facilities; they could not see the wood for the trees and forgot that what was needed was something more than the signature of science sanctifying a further project for the transformation of nature, that science must stop being something you can put in your pocket.

We paid very dearly for the socio-political consequences. On top of all this, our scientists lost in social prestige. I suppose everybody remembers how readily delegates to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference applauded every quip made by Vladimir Kabaidze, whose speech was a real

success and who wanted to know what "hundreds of thousands of infant prodigies" were doing in Moscow.

Unfortunately, we had no chance to answer that question. I will do it briefly here and now. Moscow's 800,000 scientists are people engaged in R&D. I think at least half of them hold jobs of a sensitive character.

The Moscow institutions of the Academy of Sciences itself employ less than 100,000 people, who include only a few thousand research workers. And so I think we will yet have to do a lot to rid the image of researchers and scientists of all that has tended to tarnish it.

The minister said here that every diplomat should also be a publicist. This is also true of research workers. We, too, must become publicists so as to publicise new thinking as well, to publicise the role of science. We must respond to the new social assignment and try to look ahead, to model the likely socio-economic effects of new scientific discoveries, of the further surprises which interaction with nature may dish up. It is a question of models taking account of demographic and environmental problems, of the problem of the exhaustion of natural resources, of manpower resources, of North-South cooperation. After all, it is not accidental that this cooperation is now assuming an entirely new and seemingly unexpected character.

Indeed, faced with the prospect of a climatic disaster, scientists predict that roughly 50 years hence humanity will find itself in an entirely new climatic situation due to a rise in temperature. In a sense, we have reason to consider that we or our descendants will have to move to another planet as it were. New and unusual conditions will develop in each region.

Do we have a forecast? Do we have a real forecast of these phenomena? I am sorry to say, present-day science is fighting defensive battles, using isolated units that are hardly cooperating. Meanwhile "futurology", a systems concept, has long been considered derogatory. Now is the time to free it from blame and lend it real scientific substance.

Scientists owe humanity a debt in yet another area, the science of disarmament. I believe we all realise in equal measure that the problems of strategic balance, strategic stability and the limit of sufficient defence are no longer a monopoly of the professional military.

I would like to tell you a little story, an episode that happened to my teacher, Academician Victor Artsimovich, in the early fifties. He had a passion for strategic problems and often commented on developments in the close circle of his disciples and friends. "I say", he said one day, "what strategist conceived the plan for a rapid thrust into South Korea? Why, it makes the whole northern part vulnerable." Some time after that but before the thing really came out, the authorities concerned drew his attention to the impermissibility of such "strategic digressions". I think the episode shows that civic commitment, awareness of the need to shoulder their share of responsibility, has always marked real scientists.

Several years later Academician Artsimovich became one of the leaders of the Pugwash Movement. Looking back at those years—the years when agreement was reached on banning nuclear tests in three environments—I realise how big a role Soviet science played, in particular by proposing a whole number of technological innovations, such as the black box. It was not for nothing that those scientists were also publicists.

The achievements of our science and our new thinking now include participation in the devising of an asymmetric response to America's SDI project. It is not accidental that in the five-odd years which have passed since Reagan's well-known address, serious changes have occurred in this sphere. Inside the American scientific and technological community itself there have sprung up whole movements, authors' teams and working groups have demonstrated along with us the impossibility of a

full-scale SDI and, furthermore, the extremely dangerous implications of any sort of partial SDI.

Last fall we all welcomed with deep satisfaction the new compromise formula which I think will go down in history as the Shevardnadze-Shultz Formula. I would like to tell you in this connection an interesting joke I heard from the Italian Ambassador to Moscow. He said it was a magnificent formula reminding him of what had befallen Al Capone, the famous gangster, whom the American court, being unable to convict him of criminal offences, had jailed for failure to pay taxes.

I believe it is not accidental that the US military political machine is now coming close, if gradually and not quite obviously or conspicuously, to a reappraisal of SDI. We can cautiously predict even now that irrespective of the presidential elections in the USA, the next few years will see a switch from space-based technology to earth-based. This is unquestionably another dangerous scenario. Nevertheless, in a sense, space now has better chances of staying weaponfree.

The role of science is growing immensely now that the first real agreements have been signed, agreements whose implementation must be verified. And to verify compliance with agreements means using scientific ideas, including new scientific methods. I think this will become a very important professional activity of our whole scientific and technological community. I will cite none of our figures but you know that this year alone the United States is appropriating \$250 million for the establishment and functioning of a new agency in charge of on-site inspection.

In our country, too, there are signs that this science has won prestige. We are doing serious research. Specifically, we hope to be able to propose something concerning control over sea-launched cruise missiles.

One indication that this activity is winning prestige is the appearance in this sphere of bluffer scientists whose ideas unfortunately prove counterproductive during talks. We need real models, real physical ideas. And we need to draw on the potential of the whole of world science and all intellectuals, for the intellectuals are both a barometer indicating the attitude to use and an instrument of forming that attitude.

PRIORITY TO BE GIVEN TO OUR RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

Alexander KAPTO,
First Deputy Head of a Department, CPSU Central Committee

TO BEGIN WITH, I should like to express my profound belief that the 19th All-Union Party Conference demands of us not only a critical assessment of the state of affairs in the important area of relations with socialist countries, but also the elaboration of scientifically grounded forecasts in this sphere.

I understand that prognostication is risky, especially now that not only whole periods of our history, but also the present dynamic and dialectically contradictory reality have not been studied thoroughly and objectively enough. Nonetheless, we must take a realistic look at the future and determine the new tendencies that are gaining momentum. This pertains to our relations with the socialist countries, which, as it was most vividly stressed at the Party Conference, are of priority significance. It

would be appropriate, I think, to single out several major areas of activity where prognostication is most necessary.

First. Prognostication of *political relations* with the socialist countries. Most important here is the growing trend of a substantial renewal and further improvement of the mechanism of interaction between the fraternal countries.

I will remind you that the question of restructuring relations with the socialist countries was raised pointedly and in a principled way and then substantiated in detail in Mikhail Gorbachev's Memorandum to the Politburo of the Central Committee and in his speeches at the working meeting of the leaders of fraternal parties in November 1986, as well as during the meetings with the leaders of the socialist countries, including the recent one held in Warsaw.

The elements of "paternalistic" relations, in which we, as it were, played the role of patron are gone. The need for strictly observing the equality principle, which was advanced before, has been reaffirmed in the spirit of new thinking by the conclusion that no party has a monopoly on the truth of socialism, and only the strengthening of socialism in practice can serve as criteria of this truth. It is no longer viewed as harmful to the unity of socialist countries that there exist different ideas on how to build a new society and that individual socialist countries may have their specific national and state interests. In light of new thinking we have fully realised that the most reliable way to unity lies not in the mechanical unification of these countries, but in the persistent search for solutions based on a balance of their interests, and our common socialist foundation provides the most favourable conditions for this.

The fact that disputes over whose socialism is better and more "correct" have been entirely stopped has proved most beneficial for our cooperation. The results are obvious: changes for the better have clearly taken place in the relations among socialist countries in the last two or three years.

Noteworthy is the growing political activity of the socialist countries in the international arena. Their large-scale initiatives bear a convincing testimony to it: the Polish leadership proposed a set of steps for reducing armaments and building up confidence in Central Europe; the Hungarian comrades suggested that a zone of confidence, cooperation and good-neighbourly relations be established along the dividing line between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries, an idea to set up a 300 km-wide nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact of the WTO and NATO was put forward by the SUPG and CPCz jointly with German Social Democrats; Romania and Bulgaria have opted for a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans.

So we have good reason to say that there is an entirely new atmosphere in the interaction among the fraternal socialist countries. But this new atmosphere, for its part, demands a radical renovation of the forms and methods of work. One of the lessons of the stagnation period is that we must not tolerate a situation in which we follow in the wake of events—we should be ahead of them. Prognostication should not only help draw the general historical outlines of social processes, but also warn against undesirable zigzags in politics.

Prognostication is to help prepare scientifically-grounded recommendations on guiding the processes taking place in various spheres of international relations (political, economic, social, and others), and in specific regions and countries.

Viewed in a broader context, prognostication should help us renew our theoretical views concerning socialism's place in the world today and possible trends in the competition between the two social systems. It may be recalled how the ideas of the rapid development of the revolutionary

process on a global scale and of a near victory of a world socialist revolution were changing. Today it is entirely obvious that the solution of this question has been pushed by history beyond the limits of our present prevision. And the former view that the two systems were moving along parallel lines, so to speak, proved illusory. The interdependence of developments is such that these lines constantly cross each other. So what is our forecast on possible ways of interaction of socialism with the rest of the world, interaction in which socialism would take a most active part in the processes of world development, in the international division of labour, retaining at the same time its socialist nature? •

By ignoring prognostication harm is caused to the balance of the main development trends and national specifics in socialist countries. There was a time when recognition of national specifics was regarded as a virtual betrayal of socialism.

Quite understandable therefore is the popular response by the Yugoslav public and broad political and scientific quarters in other countries to Mikhail Gorbachev's statement during his visit to Yugoslavia that in diversity lies the richness of socialism. However, a legitimate question to ask here is: are we equipped with the results of scientific studies of possible variants of harmonising in the best way the interests of socialist countries, of solving contradictions between these interests, and finding a proper balance there? •

Or take the question of building a common European home. Prognostication would help us not only to more clearly grasp the conceptual approach to this problem, but to design specific projects for building the four walls of such a home—the political, military, economic, and humanitarian ones.

Second. Prognostication of the *economic ties* within the socialist community is of utmost importance. Meanwhile we must admit that the practice of promoting cooperation in the CMEA framework has always been ahead of theory, though it was not always developing smoothly as it has become especially clear to us now. Quite a few books and research papers on economic cooperation have been written, containing only positive assessments.

I should also mention here the idea proposed in the early 1960s, of planning the world socialist economy from a single centre, when the CMEA with its structure was turning in to a fragment of our State Planning Committee. There was also a concept of prices, according to which they had to be based on Soviet wholesale prices.

We also remember the theory of two world markets, socialist and capitalist, developing simultaneously, which, according to the authors of that concept, were to develop independently, on the basis of diametrically opposite principles. That concept was advanced at the time when international socialist division of labour was just taking shape, and later experience proved that concept wrong.

Or take this fact: for fifteen years now scientists have been writing about direct ties and joint ventures, but there is neither theoretical nor applied elaboration of the methods for studying, spreading and using the international experience of socialist construction. And another question arises: why are comparative studies practically absent, studies which would help us better understand the new developments in the fraternal countries? One could expect the following answer to that question: comparative studies are a very difficult undertaking requiring the use of special methods. All this is very well, but it makes it even more necessary to concentrate the best forces on this area.

More such problems could be listed here, and it would hardly be correct to explain them only by the factors of the stagnation period. What is the situation now? In August 1986 we adopted major, far-reaching de-

cisions on restructuring our foreign economic activities and, on that basis, we advanced progressive proposals on how to improve the mechanism of integration of the socialist countries. That difficult job, which lasted one year, was crowned with the adoption of a special decision at the 43rd extraordinary session of the CMEA.

However, as it has become clear today, we found ourselves unprepared for the major restructuring of economic cooperation and the building of a new integration mechanism. This is largely accounted for by the lack of prognostication which may have, perhaps, even several variants. The concept of restructuring socialist integration, outlined in a general policy-making way, needs to be developed and specified. And there are no scientifically verified approaches to shaping a new integrational mechanism as a whole and of its individual elements.

A difficult question also arises in connection with the adoption at the CMEA session of a decision on elaborating a concept of international socialist division of labour until the year 2005: what is the best way of determining the specialisation of individual countries and opening the door wide for scientific, technological and production cooperation? It is necessary to substantiate in this concept the most advisable extent of involving the socialist countries in world economic relations, for in this case we are faced with an extremely complex and dialectically contradictory problem. On the one hand, we need to open wide the socialist economy for the world market, and, on the other, to ensure our economic security.

Having signed agreements with the EEC recently, we should already prognosticate how the EEC's experience may help in organising the cooperation of our countries on three interrelated levels: interstate and sectoral levels and on the level of enterprises.

Now the question of establishing a socialist common market is being raised in practical terms. The first step here should be the development of an appropriate mechanism of prices and of currency and financial relations.

An effective theoretical and methodological solution of problems involved in the convertibility of the transferrable ruble and national currencies, their convertibility on a world scale, largely depends on the depth and scientific correctness of our forecasts and the development of several variants of these forecasts, which can be made only after discussions with our friends, repeated discussions, as one may expect. I should like to end my discourse on the role of science in improving economic cooperation by pointing out that a considerable part of R&D projects under the 1985 Comprehensive Scientific and Technological Programme do not bring us up to the world level, because a few hundred small projects offered as of now for the production sphere do not create a new quality. Besides, the questions of joint planning and stimulation of scientific and technological progress and of ensuring equivalent exchange associated with it are yet to be elaborated. This is one reason why the programme sometimes fails to produce a desired effect.

The above-said prompts a simple conclusion: the highest political considerations require radical changes in the solution of these difficult problems. To that end, we need significant impetuses, and it would be advisable to increase the coordination of the work of our departments for this purpose. Perhaps we should set up special, but, I should stress, not bureaucratised, inter-departmental working groups concerned with most complicated problems, in order to prepare thoroughly elaborated, and sometimes, perhaps, alternative, recommendations.

And, last but not least, the *third* question concerns the *relationship* between our *perestroika* and the processes of renewal in the socialist countries. This is an integral question and therefore I have placed it at

the end of the discourse on perfecting the mechanism of our cooperation. As is known, we started *perestroika* as our internal affair. But now we see that its international significance is growing. At first it was often said that *perestroika* was dictated only by the specific conditions in the Soviet Union, and that there was no need to effect it in other countries, whereas now the course of radical reforms has been officially proclaimed in Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam and Mongolia. The Chinese, who have always stressed that they had started the reforms before we did, now say that the CPSU is ahead of them in democratisation and in reforming the political system, and so its experience merits close attention. This, too, offers a good basis for the further development of our relations with China.

While upholding the course of rendering *perestroika* more profound, we must not allow impatience and attempts at speeding it up artificially. It is in our common interest that this process develop rapidly, but also as organically as possible, smoothly, taking into account the specific conditions in individual countries.

We would be making a big mistake if when comparing our *perestroika* to that of the other socialist countries, we confined ourselves to stressing the differences between us. First, this would be sinning against the truth, since our friends themselves say we have common goals and guidelines, while taking into account their specifics. And, second, it is time we begin together to study the experience in restructuring foreign-policy relations. It is appropriate to say here that, when planning our *perestroika*, we extensively drew on the experience of socialist countries. This experience was taken into account when the new economic mechanism was being designed, above all elements like the combining of strategic functions of the Centre with the wide independence of local units; ways of integrating science with production; normative methods of planning and managing the national economy; achievement of full cost effectiveness and form of developing democracy in production management; and the wide growth of forms of cooperatives in production and services.

In the sphere of superstructure we closely studied the experience of our friends in improving the election system and socialist democracy as a whole, their work with public organisations, and forms of the social activity of the population at the neighbourhood level.

The materials we received from the Soviet embassies in Budapest, Peking and Belgrade helped us generalise these problems. We should ask our diplomats to more closely follow the quest being made by our friends and timely inform us about the results, especially concerning the restructuring of the activities of the parties, improvement of the political system, effecting the idea of socialist pluralism, economic reforms, harmonising the economies, etc.

Of primary importance under these conditions is the radical improvement of ideological cooperation. The Declaration on Cooperation in Ideology, Science and Education signed between our Party and the Polish United Workers' Party, points to the great opportunities in this undertaking. It would be no exaggeration to say that this is an entirely new phenomenon in our practice. Now possibilities are studied together with other fraternal parties for signing such bilateral programmes of ideological cooperation.

In conclusion I should like to say that I wholeheartedly support the concrete proposals, formulated in the report by Eduard Shevardnadze, on deepening scientific research into problems of socialism, increasing the coordination of the work being done by theoreticians and practical workers in further improving the new political thinking concept.

VIEWING THE WORLD OBJECTIVELY

Vladimir KRYUCHKOV

Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR

THE RAPIDLY CHANGING world with its enormous diversity requires a profound scientific approach to assessing everything taking place around us. Only new political thinking and an objective, unbiased view of world development will enable us to keep from lagging behind and to keep pace with the times and attain weighty practical results. It is in this sense that the report by Eduard Shevardnadze contains much that is new and useful.

The revolutionary renewal has encompassed all facets of Soviet society and a highly important part of it—foreign policy. *Perestroika* and the energetic foreign policy line of the Soviet Union have yielded the first concrete results. It can be stated without exaggeration that disarmament, the attainment of a nuclear-free world and the elimination of the threat of major armed conflicts are not utopian but quite realistic.

Abroad, ordinary people, statesmen and public figures are reflecting today about the processes taking place in our country. The enemy image, the image of the Soviet state as a "totalitarian", "half-civilised" society, is being eroded. Our ideological and political foes are acknowledging the sweeping nature of our transformations and their favourable impact on foreign policy.

Reaction in the West has been ambivalent. There are forces in political, business and public circles which believe that it is easier to collaborate with the Soviet Union of today in tackling world problems. Adherents of this viewpoint acclaim the changes taking place in this country and view them with hope.

However, there are many people who do not conceal their concern over the prospect of the USSR's greater influence and prestige. In October 1987 CIA director William Webster stated in a *Newsweek* interview that one of the first things "Policymakers want to know, when they're looking at what's happening in Soviet Russia, is are these changes real?... Then having passed that threshold, the more difficult question is, well, if it is for real, do we want him [Gorbachev] to succeed?" Many influential persons in the USA are answering this question in the negative.

The inconsistency and contradictoriness regarding further disarmament steps have been revealing. On the one hand, the INF Treaty seems to have inaugurated the fundamental process of demilitarising Soviet-American relations. On the other, the ruling elite in the NATO countries are alarmed over the growing popularity and influence of the Soviet peace initiatives. They do not conceal their concern over the fact that this can lead to irreversible shifts in the public consciousness of the West in the USSR's favour. Hence the efforts to undermine trust in the Soviet disarmament proposals. It is being claimed that *perestroika* in the USSR is not leading to a change in its social nature and a repudiation of goals hostile to the West. Admittedly, analyses have shown that such propaganda is encountering ever greater difficulties because the Soviet peace initiatives and practical steps are winning over the international public at large and are becoming a real force.

Not too long ago the question arose as to whether it was worthwhile expending further efforts towards disarmament with the current American administration still in office. The times have borne out the veracity

of this line. There have been specific results; what is more, we have got the ball rolling, which can play a positive role under a new president. American society seems to be fed up with the high level of arms spending. A logical question: Has the conservative cycle in US politics started a decline? It is our belief that it has.

Assessing the situation soberly, we must not lose track of the attempts by the NATO countries to compensate for the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles being scrapped and the planned considerable reductions in strategic offensive weapons. We need to draw the attention of the world public to these plans and not allow the West to bypass us.

It is extremely important to see the world as it really is—truthfully and objectively, and to critically assess our own stands and conclusions and to strengthen international security on the basis of a strict balance of interests. A number of party documents and the materials of the 19th party conference have provided us with a new methodology for viewing the world and with new concepts for resolving the contradictions in world development.

In the past we frequently viewed the world in simplistic, general terms, engaging in a sort of foreign policy “levelling”. We poorly differentiated between social and political layers of modern capitalist society and numerous shades and trends in the alignment of political forces in a region or individual country. Our initiatives and practical steps were not pointed enough; they failed to take account of realities and nuances in the stands of our foreign partners.

Of course, it is simpler and, at first glance, more natural to draw our bearings on the view of the majority. It is much more complicated, however, to notice a promising minority in time. Let us take the main problem—the problem of war and peace. When we energetically set about disarmament, it initially seemed that almost all of America, with the exception of a few sober-minded people, would not support this movement. Today, however, it is obvious that those who allow the possibility of a conflict involving all manner of weaponry are in the minority. The majority, however, are people who have been confused by propaganda and do not think about war. We did not descry the potential of the anti-war movement right away. Nor did we immediately assess, say, the potential of the Greens, the influence of whose ideas has not bypassed us either.

We poorly study and know people; we pay too little attention to the development of contacts with foreign political and public figures, and we are too sluggish and inconsistent in fighting for their hearts and minds. It is evidently easier to create enemies than to win supporters.

Today maximum efforts have to be taken to make an objective study of the business community in the developed capitalist countries. We have become bogged down in clichés and stereotypes here, too. I think that all foreign policy and economic agencies should take an active part and pool their efforts in this area of vital importance to the Soviet state.

The processes of military integration in Western Europe reflect the striving for greater independence in tackling military-political matters. It is high time to give serious thought to the political consequences which the creation of a single internal market in Western Europe by 1992 can have, too. We must face up to the truth and say that this will certainly ensure still higher economic indices for the Western countries.

The modern world is woven of contradictions. On the one hand, there is a polarisation of political and economic forces and a formation of the main capitalist centres—the USA, Western Europe and Japan—in progress. On the other, their interdependence is leading to an interweaving of interests, spawning as it does unprecedented diversity, in which demarcation and integration alternate and combine. This is the dialectics. Ho-

wever, we have yet to descry the many shades and trends in this process.

The record is convincing us that success is possible only when realities and precise guidelines underlie national policy-making. The policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan proclaimed two years ago is enabling us to look to the future with hope. Light has appeared at the end of the long and gloomy tunnel, illumining the path to a settlement of the Afghan problem, a settlement that accords with the interests of the Afghan people.

Without an objective vision of the world, a vision of it without embellishments, cliches and stereotypes, all talk about the effectiveness of our foreign policy actions is mere phrase-mongering.

A factor of no small importance in the international situation is the activity of the enemy special services, above all the American intelligence community. They are fully keeping up their role as the strike detachment of the right-wing forces, the role of one of the foremost tools of the imperialist "braking mechanism" for hampering an improvement of the international situation. It is not fortuitous that spymania and crude provocations against Soviet missions abroad are still widespread in the West.

The tension surrounding Soviet missions and citizens continues to be maintained in a number of countries. Upwards of 900 provocative actions, including anti-Soviet demonstrations, shootings, explosions, etc., were perpetrated against them in the first half of the current year. There were six assassination attempts that left three persons dead and three injured.

The CIA and other intelligence services spearhead their entire potential above all at infiltrating key Soviet organisations, such as the Ministry of Defence, the State Security Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and so on. Over the past three years the security organs have exposed several dozen foreign intelligence agents who caused considerable damage to our state. Outright attempts to recruit Soviet citizens have increased of late. Such facts have been noted not only in the USA but in a number of other capitalist and in developing countries as well.

In connection with the restructuring effort under way in the USSR, American intelligence is oriented, alongside the traditional information-gathering assignments in foreign policy and military strategy, at obtaining intelligence on the processes taking place in the country. It is interested in public sentiment, attitudes to *perestroika*, the activity of unofficial organisations, especially youth groups, and so on. Relations among the nationalities are in the focus. According to major Western experts on the USSR, this is the sphere where the most formidable difficulties can arise for the Soviet state.

Generally speaking, the enemy is not letting up the pace. This means that we must continue to take practical measures to enhance the vigilance and sense of responsibility and civic duty of Soviet people. Democratisation and *glasnost* are the mainsprings of *perestroika*—we cannot do without them. At the same time, this requires order and discipline, and strict observance of the law. Today, when socialist pluralism of views is being encouraged in this country, Soviet people feel freer and more uninhibited abroad. Special services are finding it difficult to catch out individuals making critical, "dissident" statements about Soviet reality. For this reason they are out to find people who have moral flaws.

What is particularly important in Soviet missions abroad is an atmosphere of truthfulness and openness, in which their staff members are not afraid to speak openly about their mistakes and perhaps even serious faults. A great deal can be forgiven for the truth, even if an employee has made a serious mistake.

The changes taking place in the country today and their impact on the international situation have posed the issue of a revamping and further improvement of the performance of the security organs, specifically, the external service. Its range of tasks is being clarified and expanded. A deeper and more sober approach to assessing the work of the special services is being elaborated, and work forms and methods are being reviewed where necessary.

These are difficult problems. Many former tasks have not been removed from the agenda as well. The overriding one is not to miss a threat of a nuclear conflict being unleashed. It is extremely important not to miss an enemy breakthrough in the sphere of military technology, in the creation of fundamentally new types of weapons which would enable him to upset the strategic parity and attain supremacy over the USSR. For example, the USA is working on highly dangerous types of weapons—over and above the notorious SDI programme.

The Soviet security service is waging a stubborn and complicated struggle. We attach great importance to the human factor, to teaching staff members to think in new political categories. We are making a critical appraisal of and re-examining individual periods in the history of the security organs. Strict observance of legality, objective treatment of the past, and the truth and only the truth have been made the cornerstone of the training of the present and future generations of security officers.

I would like to underscore the point that we assess highly the efforts of the staff members and the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to implement the party's innovative course in foreign policy. Activism, initiative, purposefulness and consistency in attaining goals are characteristic of Soviet diplomacy. Allow me to wish the personnel of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs fresh success on this path.

COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE WITH POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS

Karen BRUTENTS,

Deputy Head of the International Department, CPSU CC

I WOULD LIKE to offer some comments on the problem of democratising international relations with due regard to that aspect of our work relating to ties in the social sphere. The theme of democratisation was prominent in Eduard Shevardnadze's report, which I consider very interesting; it is innovative and invites deep reflection. I wish to state right away that we are going to join in these reflections, in the effort to translate the ideas of the report into reality, along with people from the Foreign Ministry and other organisations.

And now for the topic of my remarks. Ever since Lenin's days, it has been a tradition of our foreign policy to rely on democratic social forces, to appeal to both governments and peoples, to carry on open diplomacy. However, this aspect of the matter is assuming unprecedented significance now. The very quality of the problems facing humanity has undergone a radical change. I mean problems affecting its very existence, problems which are global and therefore require global solutions. Hence a certain lowering of ideological barriers in approaching these problems. The impermissibility of directly applying a class approach to relations between

states is coming out more and more. We now realise better than ever that the policy of nations takes shape under the impact of a great variety of social interests and reflects this diversity to one extent or another. We now understand and apply better than before Lenin's idea of the need to pursue a peace-loving policy, helping the people turn their thirst for peace "from a vague and helpless waiting into a clear and definite political programme, into an effective struggle waged by millions".¹

One reason for the greatly increased importance of ties and contacts with the international public, which is vastly diversified, is our internal development at this stage. International response to *perestroika* is a notable factor for its success. At the same time it has an immense potential for influencing the sentiments of various social and political groups which looked on us with distrust or even hostility but a short time ago.

Lastly, a marked change must come about in the place and role of social organisations and public opinion in every sphere of our life, including international affairs, as part of the ongoing reform of our political system. I think we are only just awakening to this.

All this is introducing essential amendments into our work among the international public. It is safe to say that we are evolving a new concept of these ties. Whereas earlier we approached them chiefly from a class point of view, nowadays we must proceed from the fact that life is bringing universal interests to the fore.

Serious changes are taking place in the political content of our ties, with their scope qualitatively widening. Favourable conditions are shaping up for us to establish and promote contacts with the widest possible spectrum of working class, revolutionary democratic, left-wing, democratic and other parties, movements and organisations. This also applies to relations with the Social Democrats and to contacts with non-working class parties affiliated to the Liberal International, the Christian Democratic World Union or the International Democratic Union. Ties are developing between the CPSU and Latin American political parties as well as with their regional entities: the Coordinating Committee of Socialist Parties and their Standing Conference, which groups 32 parties, many ruling parties included. There are similar developments in regard to Arab countries.

The Moscow meeting of representatives of parties and movements, the forum For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity and other meetings showed that the most diverse political forces are interested in dialogue on key international issues.

How much attention the Central Committee devotes to these issues is seen in the fact that only in 1987 and 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev held major international meetings with public figures from many countries and received leaders of 25 communist and socialist parties; the CPSU CC received 70 party delegations. All these meetings were characterised by an approach based on real equality, mutual respect, readiness to calmly listen to contradicting opinions, the renunciation of any pretensions to a monopoly on the truth and the absence of any sign of a patronising, let alone an intolerant tone. All this also has a direct relation to the problem of democratisation.

Perestroika is seriously amending our work in the sphere of the communist movement. Winning new partners certainly does not detract from the significance of ties with communist parties. The 19th party conference stressed that the CPSU considers itself an inseparable part of the world communist movement. However, the new approaches and positions of the CPSU understandably have a tangible effect on our relations. The communist movement is now starting on a difficult search for paths lead-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1966, p. 56.

ing to a new stage in its development. By encouraging this search and taking an active part in it, the CPSU is helping build the future of the movement. As for *perestroika*, it objectively helps strengthen our influence and serves as at once an incentive and a reference point as this search goes on.

The meetings held at the CC and the response evoked by *perestroika* and now by the 19th party conference added to our knowledge of the atmosphere in the movement.

What conclusions have we drawn?

To begin with, the policy of *perestroika* and the new problems of world development raised by the CPSU are inducing communist parties to take a fresh look at the world about them and at themselves. The leaders of many fraternal parties consider that the movement as a whole is at the threshold of a historic transition. The majority of parties are faced with the task of renewing their strategic and tactical guidelines as well as the forms and methods of their work, most of which were evolved as far back as 30-60 years ago and are largely outdated.

Among the factors exerting a positive influence are the principles of relations between parties advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress, the ideas of unity in diversity, non-interference in internal affairs and non-dramatisation of differences. As a result, relations between the CPSU and fraternal parties, including so-called difficult parties, have improved appreciably. Furthermore, an atmosphere of openness, of public discussion of problems, is shaping up within the movement.

Needless to say, positive changes in the communist movement are only just beginning. Neither in scale nor depth are they comparable to the breakthroughs achieved in interstate relations.

Communist parties gave unanimous support to our foreign policy and took a correct view of the potentialities of new political thinking. Also, they were practically unanimous in backing *perestroika*, including the policy of democratisation resolutely upheld by the 19th party conference. They are well aware that *perestroika* is restoring socialism's appeal, thereby contributing in the final analysis to the prestige of fraternal parties.

This is not to say, however, that everything is clear and therefore no doubts or critical opinions are expressed concerning one or another aspect of *perestroika* and various theses put forward in our press. For instance, we are asked: Hasn't openness in our country gone too far? Is reliance on economic levers and cooperatives compatible with socialist economic principles? What is the relationship between material and moral incentives in our society today? Doesn't recognition of the priority of universal values run counter to class principles? Cannot emphasis on these values result in reducing support for revolutionary movements and solidarity with peoples engaged in struggle? Shouldn't critical analysis of our history be kept within definite bounds? Some people are concerned about press comments saying that it was wrong to sign the 1939 Soviet-German treaty.

Cause for doubts of this nature is given primarily by the objective difficulty of discarding notions and stereotypes prevailing for many years, whose renunciation has a painful effect on some parties, complicating the situation of their leaderships and occasionally that of the parties themselves, at least initially. Yet, many of these sore points can be removed by explaining things more competently and making an indepth theoretical analysis of the problems concerned. The primacy of universal values is often construed as opposing them to class principles, as pushing them into the background, which is certainly not the case. Besides, in publicising new political thinking, we often overlook or even ignore one of its decisive, inherent components, the right of every people to develop freely, to choose its own path. It is also only fair to say that the problems of

developing countries have yet to be worked out in accordance with the concept of new thinking.

The policy of extending cooperation fully applies to revolutionary democratic parties as well. A new but visibly developing line is the establishment of links with national progressive parties of the Third World, taking their political and ideological specifics into careful account. It seems that in view of the peculiarities of the present stage of relations with developing countries, party and other social ties with them are gaining in importance as a channel for bringing our influence to bear, building up Soviet prestige and dealing with questions that arise there.

The 19th party conference stressed the importance of new relations with other political parties, above all with the Socialists, Social Democrats and Labourites. The present-day concept of these relations could apparently include the major elements listed below.

First of all, approaching the working class movement as a multiform and contradictory but essentially and increasingly integral social phenomenon, with the social democratic movement as one of its components. The latter contributes in a measure to defending the interests and rights of labour in capitalist countries, including cases where the Social Democrats are in power. The political form—democratic or reactionary authoritarian—which capitalism takes on is by no means immaterial either to us or to the working people of these countries.

There is no doubt that ideological differences between Communists and Social Democrats, including differences over the essence of socialism and democracy, are still there and are bound to persist. But their actual impact on our mutual relations is diminishing. The Social Democrats, proceeding from their own positions, have arrived in many respects at conclusions similar to ours or coinciding with them as regards the dangers threatening the world today. We are aware of the Social Democrats' search for solutions to global problems, of their effort to help solve these problems in the interest of labour.

Social democratic leaders say they wish *perestroika* every success. They see in this a condition for solving their own inner and foreign political problems as they conceive them. The conversations which Mikhail Gorbachev had with Willy Brandt and Hans-Jochen Vogel furnished clear evidence of this.

To be sure, many social democratic leaders pin on Soviet economic and political reforms definite hopes for a peaceful evolution of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe on social democratic lines.

And there is another circumstance to be borne in mind. If the communist movement is now faced with difficult problems whose solution necessitates a renewal of strategy, a reappraisal of the world situation and, above all else, structural changes in the development of capitalism, the Social Democrats find themselves in a comparable situation. Many of them speak explicitly of the need to search for new paths.

The CPSU attaches some importance to the experience gained by the Social Democrats in consumers' and producers' cooperatives, local government, social policy and certain other spheres.

Understandably, cooperation with the social democratic movement is also very important from the point of view of our international affairs. The member parties of the Socialist International unite over 20 million people and represent upwards of 120 million voters. It is noteworthy that the Social Democrats' influence is expanding geographically as well and now encompasses much of Latin America and Africa as well as the Asia and Pacific region.

Evidently, more extensive relations with the Social Democrats could help us uphold our line in international economic organisations and in the sphere of cooperation in trade, science and technology, where the

Social Democrats have gained experience and have their own interests and connections.

There are currently over 30 socialist, social democratic and labour parties maintaining contacts with us in one form or another; they include the most influential ones. Working cooperation with some of them, such as the German Social Democrats, has become a noticeable independent factor in politics. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation operating under the aegis of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, is about to open a permanent mission in Moscow.

Thus there are growing prerequisites for both a more deep-going political dialogue with the Social Democrats and concrete cooperation with them on a wide range of world political problems.

Allow me to touch very briefly on the international ties of our social organisations. Substantial changes are occurring in this area as well. Formerly these organisations were mere commentators publicising our policy. While retaining and, indeed, extending this function, they now have a role to play in shaping our international policy. Eduard Shevardnadze spoke here of memorandums submitted by international physicians' organisations and the anti-nuclear movement of scientists as well as of proposals tabled at the UN Special Session Devoted to Disarmament. It is appropriate for social organisations to play a more active role by drawing our intellectuals and creative workers into international affairs, by giving Soviet people a stronger sense of really participating in the framing of our foreign policy. All this implies that social organisations themselves should become more democratic.

And there is one more point that should be made. The emergence of numerous so-called unofficial organisations and groups also has an international aspect. We occasionally come up both against those who want to make better use of their energies and against more complicated problems. For instance, there is a group set on founding a society of friendship with Israel. It applied for affiliation to the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. From what a conversation with its leaders revealed, they take an exclusively pro-Israeli stand. They were told that the union of friendship societies was about to found an association of Soviet-Israeli social and cultural relations with progressive Israeli organisations. Nevertheless, that informal association held its founding conference in a Moscow apartment on July 10, with 60 people attending.

As if to offset that, another group sent to the party conference and to leading party and government bodies an appeal on behalf of the Committee Against the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Israel, likewise formed, it seems, in a Moscow apartment.

We must remember that our partners in the anti-war, youth and other mass movements are tempted to interfere in the formation of socialist pluralism of public opinion and to speedily establish links with precisely those new associations and groups openly opposing the authorities and socialism. I think as far as associations like the one I mentioned first, the surest way to avoid political losses in this work now that conditions are favourable, if more complicated in a way than before is to solve old problems worth solving. Secondly, we should democratise our social organisations and make them more flexible and dynamic, so that they can operate on the principle of fast response and with professional competence.

Let me say in conclusion that we expect Soviet missions abroad, in particular our embassies, to take account of the changes that have occurred in our international relations or are coming, to give them proper attention and generously supply us with ideas and information.

PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC TIES

Ivan IVANOV,
Deputy Chairman, State Foreign Economic Commission, USSR
Council of Ministers

EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE and several other speakers have already given a summary of the state of affairs in Soviet foreign economic ties. There are reasons for this state of affairs and there are lessons to be drawn.

The aim of the development of foreign economic ties is simple. It is the enrichment of the country and the mobilisation of external resources for economic growth, technical transformation and social development to supplement Soviet ones. This task is not being accomplished in full measure in the USSR today. Quite the contrary, at times we lose our own national income through such ties.

Explaining why this happens, we customarily point to the unfavourable world market situation. Indeed, prices for Soviet exports are far from favourable now. But the market situation is not Lady Luck. The problems which we have encountered are inevitable in their own way.

During the stagnation period the Soviet economy lagged behind in the two key components which determine international competitiveness. One of them is technological progress, the low rate of which led to the deindustrialisation of Soviet exports, while external demand is increasingly rejecting its present-day energy-raw material structure. The second is the underdevelopment of commodity-money relations in the USSR, which is why foreign trade itself used to be perceived as something chancy and alien; there was a reluctance and consequently an inability to trade.

Hence the 17,000 million rubles lost through unfavourable proportions in the trade over the past three years, the tight balance of payments and a narrower base of economic interdependence on which we build our economic relations with other countries. Under the old model of exchange the socialist economic integration as well lost much of its dynamism what with raw materials being made the centrepiece of our trade and the overall nomenclature of Soviet trade being imposed from on high.

In order to accomplish the tasks facing us—both economic and political—we need an open economy built on the principles of competitiveness with the foreign market. There is no other way in this interdependent world, where fencing ourselves off would mean intensifying the lag. For this reason, the strategy elaborated for the future, for the development of the USSR's foreign economic ties provides for their much more rapid growth than that of the national income, along with consistent industrialisation of exports.

By the year 2000 the Soviet foreign trade turnover is to grow by between 120 and 140 per cent over the 1985 figure, the share of finished articles in our exports to rise to 50 per cent, that of machines to 40 per cent, and that of energy sources is to decline to 25 per cent. A course has been plotted for consistent supplementation of traditional trade with cooperation in production, and for the broadening of channels of cooperation, including the establishment of joint ventures in the USSR. Over the longer term the nation itself is to become a major international investor. In other words, the strategy is designed to turn the Soviet Union not only into a great industrial power but a great trading power as well.

To achieve this, we are essentially altering, in the context of our reforms, the procedure for implementing the foreign trade monopoly. It no longer fences the domestic economy off from the foreign, but is geared to their convergence and cooperation. Enterprises, and subsequently cooperatives have been given the broadest autonomy in emerging onto foreign markets. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations is being relieved to the utmost of day-to-day commerce functions, its activity now being confined to analysis, planning and protection of the nation's interests. Economic methods are being introduced into administration of the foreign economic complex.

Admittedly, for now there are few instruments for such administration. In order to bridge the gap between internal and external prices we are to re-calculate results of enterprises export and import operations at differentiated currency exchange rates. Exporters receive currency bonus for their sales (the higher the degree of an item's processing the greater the bonus). According to the figures for last year these bonuses stood at 1,300 million rubles in freely convertible currency and 2,500 million rubles in convertible rubles. These amounts remain at the disposal of enterprises and can be spent on their modernisation and on the social development of their personnel.

A uniform system of foreign economic information and market forecasts have been set going. Advanced training for personnel to be employed in foreign trade has been launched in this academic year.

Perestroika is compressing time. Even though reforms in foreign economic relations began only two years ago, we have every right to expect some results. This year we have halted the decline of foreign trade turnover. Exports of machines have grown somewhat, first time in the past few years. A number of enterprises have amassed certain experience in foreign markets, and headway is being made in CMEA. Talks with the European communities have been launched. We have tabled a proposal at them on concluding a package which would cover both the basic interests of Soviet industry and the full powers of the European communities.

Measures are being taken to improve the situation with repayment of our credits to foreign countries.

So far the results have been modest. Where are the stumbling blocks? Evidently we should begin with ourselves.

In the State Foreign Economic Commission we seem to have been too involved in current matters, paying too little attention to long-term, principled questions. We realise this and regard our main task to promote initiative in the foreign economic sphere from below, to create conditions for foreign market operations to truly become part and parcel of the general economic activity of enterprises and to be in accord with their interests. And for this it is not enough to remove the administrative barrier between the domestic and foreign market. The country's foreign economic and general economic mechanisms have to be dovetailed in a uniform regime.

There are three major problems here. First, in the foreign economic sphere enterprises' rights today are broader than in the domestic activities. The all-encompassing state order leaves them extremely little output for free disposal. For this reason they cannot react flexibly to foreign demand and, what is most important, do not have sufficient reserves to set going new forms of production cooperation. The solution is to develop domestic wholesaling, where the producer can become the owner of his own output. Without this we will fail to create a united market of socialist countries. It is only with a developed wholesale network that joint ventures, too, will be able to function normally in the USSR.

Second, pricing reforms are of key importance. For now, each enterprise operates within two cost-accounting systems with external and internal prices. What is more, the existing price structure hampers industrialisation of exports by making it unprofitable. Differentiated currency exchange rates are of little help here, too. There are too many of them, and they are subordinated to cost-to-object pricing. The solution is a reasonable convergence of proportions of foreign and domestic prices. This convergence will make it possible to unify the cost accounting, introduce effective customs tariffs, and make headway, on its basis, in talks with the EEC and GATT.

Third, a realistic, economically substantiated ruble conversion rate is needed. Geared to the comparative purchasing power of the ruble in the new prices, it will make it possible to juxtapose costs, effect and variants of domestic and foreign economic operations. Over the longer term this will open the path of the convertibility of Soviet currency as well.

The Commission for Foreign Economic Relations and other ministries and departments are working on these problems today. They are tackling them in conjunction with industry and its firms.

HISTORICAL SCIENCE, FOREIGN POLICY AND PERESTROIKA

Alexander CHUBARYAN,
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HISTORICAL SCIENCE has an important role to play in the difficult and demanding process of our society's renewal. On a sense, it has become an indicator of the differentiation of sentiments, positions, tastes and preferences. I think history holds an equally important place in the sphere of foreign policy.

We are in the presence of a paradox. Indeed, *perestroika* has begun in many respects with foreign policy, with the assertion of new thinking, with the advance to fundamentally new positions in international relations by the party and the state. But a critical reappraisal of many of our earlier foreign policy moves and steps is still at its early stage. And while we have ruthlessly and uninhibitedly, boldly and uncompromisingly laid bare the crimes of the personality cult years, a mere mention of the mistakes made in foreign policy in the 1930s and after the war immediately causes a painful reaction among many, who claim that it is injurious to our foreign policy interests. I believe this suggests that there are those who still look on foreign policy as exclusive area.

A word about theory. At this new historical stage we must look into the set of problems involved in the treatment of the principle of peaceful co-existence.

We must end our lag in studying theoretical problems of international relations. In doing so it is essential to take account of the vast diplomatic and foreign political experience gained in the past and to pool the historical experience of foreign policy and diplomacy.

Just as military strategists still remember battles of the past, even though we are living in the nuclear era, so it would be useful for diplomats to take into consideration the experience of Talleyrand, Bismarck, Gorchakov, Disraeli, to say nothing of Chicherin, Litvinov, Briand, John Foster Dulles.

Gaining in popularity in world historiography today is so-called imagistic research, or research into the system of the images and ideas formed by some countries and peoples in respect of others.

This is a matter of paramount importance for contemporary diplomacy. Over the centuries there have developed stereotypes and a subconscious psychology that are very hard to overcome and eliminate. Scholars must provide diplomats with a theoretical basis and supply them with specific evidence of how the Russians were and are viewed in, say, Italy, Britain, Finland, Afghanistan, Poland or Germany.

We have justly criticised geopolitics as the dominant or decisive aspect of international relations. But do we have a right to completely discount something like the traditions and logic of European balance?

When Margaret Thatcher, made uneasy by strengthening ties between the Soviet Union and the FRG or between the Soviet Union and France, takes to sending signals from London to Moscow, she may be said to repeat at a new stage in history the ideas of Castlereagh and Palmerstone, and proceeds in accordance with the British mentality acquired in the family or at aristocratic Eton or Cambridge. Kissinger considered his vision of Europe a product of assimilating Metternich's experience. Yet we often eliminate this experience from both historical studies and curriculums, including the curriculum of the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy.

The theme of the ideas of peace in history is receiving increasing attention. We historians owe diplomacy a great deal because we have failed to offer serious analyses of the concepts of Mahatma Gandhi, Leo Tolstoi and the Enlighteners of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, nor have we written a history of the peace congresses of the last century. We lag behind in studying the history and practice of pacifism.

A word about the crisis of contemporary civilisation, a problem widely discussed in the West. The crisis expresses itself in humanity being threatened with global military, economic and environmental catastrophes. The threat is reproduced again and again by the operation of military-political, economic and social mechanisms and structures which came into being at earlier stages of history.

There is a need for a wide-ranging and comprehensive plan to save and advance civilisation. The programme for a nuclear-free world and the concept of a European home are important parts of this plan.

A global plan must be worked out to save human civilisation, a plan comprising foreign policy, economic, intellectual, aesthetic, psychological and purely human factors. And it is our country that could take the initiative of posing the problem in the UN, UNESCO, and so on, and to call for mankind's entire humanist potential to be used for solving it.

International relations in the 20th century are compounded by a number of *painful problems* provoking impassioned debates and clashes of opinions and having a direct relation to foreign policy.

There is, first of all, the problem of the Versailles system. The tensions that for years have been building up between some small countries of Europe are closely connected with certain historical phenomena as well. I include also the relations between some socialist countries. The relations between some smaller nations are reflections of, among other things, the difficulties attending assessment of the Versailles treaties. As for us, we have for years assessed these treaties one-sidedly and occasionally even simplistically. It is clear that the Versailles system was what Lenin rightly described as an imperialist method of settlement giving rise to new contradictions and differences. But it is equally right to say that the Versailles treaties provided an international legal framework for the formation of a number of independent nations in Central and Southeastern Europe.

We should in general take a more balanced view of Versailles, including the founding of the League of Nations, whose performance (at least till 1934) our authors see as negative.

The pre-World War II history is one of the most acute problems. We have now started a series of discussions on the character of the early period of the war. Whatever the outcome of the discussions, we must point out explicitly even now that Poland's war was a just one from the outset. Also, we must fully realise the fundamental distinction between Germany, on the one hand, and Britain and France, on the other, with regard to the aims of the war.

The most heated debates revolve around the events of the summer of 1939. This means that we must take a new approach to the history of international relations, namely, to that of the idea of missed opportunities. Not long ago a book came out in France about the opportunities missed by that country on the eve of World War II. It would apparently be useful to make a similar analysis with regard to Britain.

But the time has come to ask how active Soviet diplomacy was and whether we did everything possible for the success of the Soviet-British-French talks in the summer of 1939. We must analyse the methods and tactics of our diplomatic service and form a clear idea of what we did successfully and what we did incorrectly or insufficiently. However, we can only analyse all this provided we have the necessary documents. Strange as it may seem, we have relevant German, French and British documents but few of Soviet ones.

The next set of problems has to do with developments after the signing of the treaty. We should condemn Stalin and Molotov outright for signing the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship (friendship?) and Frontiers of September 28, 1939, for their unlawful evaluations and statements concerning Poland which were justifying fascism and national socialism.

There is also an intense debate going on over the Soviet-Finnish war.

We need the documents to see clearly the whole course of events.

But speaking of the prehistory of World War II, I would like to pose the problem in broader terms and from a somewhat different angle directly linked with the present time.

It was a crucial stage in human history and the destiny of the 20th century. Looking back and well knowing that the war caused tens of millions deaths, crippled millions and wrought enormous destruction, you realise the true meaning of that extreme situation. Nor can you help asking: How did humanity comport itself? Did it fully realise its great responsibility? How should governments, diplomats, political parties and social organisations proceed in general during such periods of human history?

Using this criterion, we can really judge in the broadest sense the policies and actions of the political leaders of the time.

The meaning of current historical experience enables us to look at well-known facts and phenomena in a new way and to evaluate them accordingly. Besides, we ask of history not only to tell us of the course of events at the time, but of alternatives to it. These are questions asked today by people made wise by the experience of the subsequent 50 years.

The idea about unused or missed opportunities can also be used in covering the history of international relations between 1945 and 1950.

The USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History, which I represent here, plans to do research into a number of important problems of current interest.

We have appointed an ad hoc team to study the comparative history

of civilisations and their unity and to bring to light stage by stage the formation of the integrity and interdependence of today's world.

Another team is to study the ideas of peace in history, meaning also the history of pacifism and the peace congresses and conferences of the 19th and 20th centuries.

We are going to hold a broad discussion on the prewar crisis of 1938-1939 and are completing works on the subject.

We take a special interest in the origins of the cold war. We want to substantiate theoretically and with concrete historical facts the very idea of missed opportunities for the benefit of the theory and practice of international relations in the 20th century.

We plan to hold an international conference next year on "The Historical Prerequisites for the Formation and Realisation of the Concept of a European Home" with the participation of many historians from socialist and capitalist countries.

We are determined to use the potential of world history for solving present-day problems and for contributing our share to the development of the theory of Soviet diplomacy and to the work of our diplomats.

BUILDING A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL MECHANISM OF DECISION-TAKING

Vladimir KUDRYAVTSEV,
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NEW POLITICAL THINKING, which has arisen in our country in the period of *perestroika*, has achieved a breakthrough above all in the foreign policy. Yet, all that we are now witnessing in foreign policy, such as the transition from confrontation to mutual respect and cooperation, from power politics to agreement, from intolerance of dissenting views and positions to a pluralism of interests and opinions, has a bearing on society's inner life as well. It would seem that the outside world is more complex than the inner world, and yet the former has registered advances whereas the latter is making but slow headway. I wonder why. Unless we put the breakthrough in foreign policy on a lasting inner political and economic basis, the gains made by foreign policy will be merely temporary whereas we are seeking lasting, strategic gains.

Internal *perestroika* is aimed at democratising society and means openness and a struggle against bureaucratic practices; it means legality, a renewal of socialism's political system and of socialist society as a whole. I would like to dwell on the need to establish a legal state.

It is primarily an internal necessity. The chief task here is to do away with deformations in the legal sphere, to strengthen the legal foundations of *perestroika*, provide guarantees of irreversible democratic development, and inspire people with confidence in the present and future as regards their social standing and their mutual relations, both personal and social.

But the problem has an equally important foreign political aspect, namely, the need to assert universal values. And a legal state is one of these; it is neither a bourgeois nor a feudal concept or value but a uni-

versal one because the point at issue is the domination of law in society, the supremacy of law.

Establishing a legal state will add to the prestige of our state, for what we call legal thinking is common in the West. Seeing that we look with disdain on the presumption of innocence, on the judiciary and the Bar, on all the institutions which we used to treat as bourgeois, what can the image of socialism be like in the West, what reputation or confidence can socialism enjoy there, what is the world to think of socialism? Nor do I mean the man in the street alone but primarily intellectuals, the educated people.

We will have to overcome many difficulties and stereotypes. The introduction of humanist principles into our legislation is going on with great difficulty. Take, for example, an element of the legal state such as the supremacy of law. Why, we cannot get rid of departmental instructions, try as we may. This seemingly simple problem is still there. You know very well that covenants on human rights admit of definite restrictions on individual rights provided these restrictions are envisaged by the law and meet the interests of a democratic system. I call your attention to what would appear to be a trifling formula: "restrictions envisaged by the law". But we have no law imposing restrictions on travel abroad. They are envisaged by instructions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Why not propose that the Supreme Soviet should pass a law replacing those instructions? This would require no economic expenditures, yet it is an element of prestige and legality, an element of the legal state.

These are no trifling matters but components of the problem of legality, of law and order in society.

The report justly stressed the need to raise the role of international law. That is correct but who is to do the raising since we do not have a single institute of research in international law whereas the United States and every West European country, each have several.

A most important principle of the legal state is the supremacy of the interests of the individual, the priority of the interests of the individual, of the citizen, and the responsibility of citizen and state to each other. The constitution sets out these things, individual rights, in appreciable detail but our mechanisms, that is, regulations and constitutional legislation, have yet to be worked out. I consider that the idea of appointing Foreign Ministry commissions of experts when drafting internal legislation is correct. The need for it in the light of our commitments vis-a-vis the international community is perfectly obvious.

A word about the mutual responsibility of the state and the individual. What should the state be responsible for? Obviously, it is responsible for foreign policy decisions as well as for economic, military and inner political ones. Has anybody in our country ever assumed such responsibility? I don't remember.

And now for an example concerning the legal sphere, the activity of the Bar. In our country, lawyers are in fact kept out of preliminary investigation. One day I delivered a lecture in a Central Asian republic. The audience included preliminary investigators, prosecutors and militia officers. A young man asked me in writing when we were going to completely abolish the Bar as a bourgeois institution. I see nothing funny in that. I asked why the Bar should be abolished. The answer was that the bourgeois state needed it to defend working people against exploiters but what good was it in our country where we have Soviet preliminary investigators and they never made a mistake? I refrained from reminding the young man of the fact that his formula used regrettably to be uttered in 1930s.

We must create a Soviet socialist society civilised in every respect,

We need to put things in order in our big home. This is difficult enough, nor is it welcomed in many places. But there are international legal standards, and our country should respect them for its part. They have been approved by international congresses and various international forums, including the UN General Assembly. We should work together in this sphere, should seek a common conception of these and other problems, including problems relating to environment protection, information, space exploration, the Antarctic Region and all other spheres where legal questions arise. Such cooperation is relevant and perfectly feasible.

SCIENCE FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

**Academician Yevgeni VELIKHOV,
Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences**

THE DISCUSSION at the conference was long-awaited and very interesting to me as one who deals with natural sciences.

During the arms race the scientific communities of the USSR and the USA were active both in developing new arms and in attempting to curb the arms race or, at least, to prevent its going to the extreme. Sometimes this was done independently and sometimes with a degree of interaction, direct or indirect, between the two communities. As arms were being built up, the real or imaginary successes of one side provoked the other side and were often used as the main arguments in favour of some or other solutions, sometimes for want of better arguments. But the dialogue between the scientists who tried to grasp the situation and stop the slide down to a catastrophe has never ceased. Naturally, in the years when the political process was atrophied, it could only be hoped that this dialogue would see better days, and during the last few years of acceleration it has had great difficulty in catching up with political developments. At the same time it has a considerable impact on public opinion, providing it with a scientific basis and proved most useful in the worst years of the cold war.

One should do credit to Soviet science and scientists who in the tough competition with the most powerful rival, in scientific and technological terms, that was an active motive force of the arms race, nonetheless provided a scientific basis for the rapid elimination of the monopoly that was fatally dangerous to us, and, later, for reaching strategic parity with the USA, thus paving the way for a policy of nuclear disarmament.

The question now is: what can science do to make the world nuclear-free by the start of the second millennium (to which there are merely 12 years to go) especially under conditions when the idea of disarmament comes up against powerful opposition.

Let us recall the history of involvement in the arms race. The anti-missile defence issue is now being spiritedly debated. Even at the early stage of the debate in the late 1960s, the idea emerged of using lasers and charged particle beams for hitting warheads as they approach their targets. It was obvious from the outset that the undertaking was almost certainly hopeless because the warhead, specially designed for entering dense layers of the atmosphere at space velocity, compact and fast-moving, was hard to hit. Meanwhile the sending of beams of required power through the atmosphere is in itself a great problem. The beam method is thus inferior to the methods of hitting the target by a missile, the latter one having been tested experimentally. The main opposition to

starting work on a beam project came from Academician Lev Artsimovich. But the work was started. And then the abovementioned difficulties proved insurmountable. Due to the insistent influence of Academician Yuli Khariton a document with an absolutely honest and principled analysis of the situation was handed over to the government. A decision was passed then to stop the work. The only reminder of it today is the empty structures on the testing ground near Lake Balkhash (so-called Sary shagan), about which Americans often inquire; and also the amendment to the 1972 treaty on limiting anti-missile defence systems allowing the on-ground testing of anti-missile systems based on new physical principles, which was an obstacle in our talks on the reading of the treaty. The US side agreed to that amendment also because of the corresponding work that was under way in the United States. Later that work was stopped in the USA for similar reasons.

In the early 1970s the euphoria in the area of space technology gave rise to the Star Wars concept. In the USSR this idea was first proposed by Academician Gersh Budker. But it was defeated by the criticism of Lev Artsimovich and Academician Boris Konstantinov. The debate of vaccinated Soviet scientific opinion against the "star war disease" and prepared for the discussion that followed Reagan's speech. The idea of Star Wars was given a fresh impetus after the proposals by Academician V. N. Chalomey. He suggested the creation of a space echelon of anti-missile defence based on the use of interceptor missiles, similar to the US "rapid deployment" project. He had reported his version to Leonid Brezhnev, and therefore the discussion proceeded in a very tense atmosphere on a high level. An appropriate commission was set up under the chairmanship of Vitali Shabanov, Deputy Minister of Defence. Owing to the principled stand held by a number of scientists and military experts, the heated debate resulted in the adoption of a correct decision, and the proposal was turned down. Just imagine what would have happened had we agreed to begin work on the system. Apart from fantastic expenditures, which would have given us no greater security, we would have given an excellent trump card to the Regan administration and the US right-wingers and would most certainly have a host of costly but potentially dangerous weapons up in space, which would be senseless from the point of view of greater mutual security. Their subsequent removal would be very difficult.

The second "vaccination" enabled us very rapidly and energetically to respond to Reagan's speech. In the middle of April we held a discussion of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), as it was later called, at the USSR Academy of Sciences with all the members of the Academy. The discussion was not easy—we could not express all the arguments under the restrictions of secrecy, and the official position was not yet formulated, but the resulting document was good, and I would subscribe to it even today. It was used by the opponents of SDI among US scientists during a debate in the US Congress.

We were prepared to look for meeting the US challenge in a non-traditional way. The country's leadership, using to some extent the recommendations provided by Soviet scientists and the opinion of the world scientific community, formulated the concept of an asymmetrical effective response to possible US actions. That was a fairly sobering decision and, I am sure, it influenced US public opinion and the Congress decisions on limiting the SDI budget and leaving the 1972 ABM Treaty unchanged. It broke the action-reaction chain with its positive feedback, which sends the arms-race spiralling up.

In 1983, before Reagan made his speech, we discussed with our US colleagues the advisability of signing an agreement on non-deployment of weapons in outer space. Later we discussed these ideas, as well as

the advisability of a unilateral Soviet moratorium on the testing and deployment of weapons in space, and anti-satellite weapons with Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. The draft of such a treaty was proposed by the USSR and in August the Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium on arms testing in space. The USSR observes this moratorium to this day. As for the United States, though the treaty and the moratorium became unacceptable to the government after the adoption of SDI, during the past five years the US Congress has legislatively held the Administration back from testing anti-satellite weapons. As a result, the Administration stopped financing the anti-satellite system ASAT which earlier was to be deployed on F-14 aircraft.

In the spring of 1983, we also discussed with a commission of the US National Academy of Sciences the advisability of signing a treaty on completely banning nuclear explosions. The main argument of the treaty's enemies against ending the testing was the alleged difficulty of verification. The Administration insists on the CORTEX method, which is in principle unsuitable for verifying the complete end of testing. We began discussing this problem with US scientists at a time when the Soviet Union had declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, which played a decisive role in the change of the attitude of US and world public opinion to the sincerity of the Soviet proposals on nuclear disarmament. In May 1986, we discussed the plan of experiments on the Soviet nuclear testing ground in Semipalatinsk and the US testing ground in Nevada. In June we signed an agreement and requested our governments to allow the required work. We were so sure about the Soviet government's decision that the US scientists were admitted to the Semipalatinsk area a week before a permission was issued, and the first oscillogram was received in July. The work was organised at an unprecedented speed, possibly because it was financed from private funds and the usual red tape was reduced to the minimum. It took the US Administration two years to allow such work in Nevada. This occurred only after I personally addressed the president, and after Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle resigned and the talks on ending the tests resumed. It has been experimentally proven that the signal from a 10-ton explosion is reliably measured against the background of seismic noise in the USSR at a distance exceeding 600 kilometres, and at a distance of 300 km in the USA. Keep in mind that that is the measurement of an explosion of dozens of tons, not kilotons.

So two years of work have shown that at present seismic science has a reliable method of verifying the observance of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear tests, down to very low yields. Therefore the US House of Representatives has been for several years now, passing bills on ending the financing of tests with charge yields exceeding one kiloton. The Soviet government, it will be recalled, has declared that if such a limitation is adopted, it will observe it, too. Regretfully, the US Senate did not agree to this proposal.

The administration, as is known, has come up with a number of other arguments against the complete cessation of tests and speaks of the need to check the reliability of nuclear arms. But their reliability can be tested without initiating an actual nuclear blast. This has been officially stated by the Soviet government and a number of Soviet and American scientists, among them leading scientists of the Livermore Laboratory.

Among the more serious reasons for this resistance is the desire to go ahead with developing new types of weapons, above all the so-called third generation weapons and new warheads to perfect weapons systems. This destabilises the strategic balance, and it is precisely this we are struggling against. Considering the abovesaid, I must note that among

the Soviet and American scientists working for the complete cessation of testing, the Soviet-American statement caused bewilderment which was somewhat dispelled only after our support of a complete ban on testing was confirmed at a UN session.

Another area of our mutual activities is the joint work of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Threat of Nuclear War and the Federation of American Sciences to study problems involved in verification of future agreements. In the first place, this is the problem of verifying the presence of nuclear arms in spaceships, sea-going vessels and submarines. Reliable verification requires a combination of various methods with the use of technical means and on-site inspection. Scientists are developing methods of long-distance detection of the presence of nuclear warheads by their neutron and gamma radiation. Besides, principles developed for astrophysics and for the search of radioactive ore are also used. Naturally, inspection of space means is far simpler on launching sites than when they already are out in space.

The USSR has officially proposed to the US government that such work, including experiments at the launching sites and on board ships, be conducted jointly. So far, the US official response has been negative. Evidently the US military are not yet prepared for such cardinal measures, despite the repeated propaganda statements that the West is especially interested in verification and in lowering the level of secrecy. The Soviet initiatives in this sphere have caught US politicians unawares. Therefore we conduct them on a non-governmental basis in the hope that governmental organisations will join us when an appropriate political situation is ripe, and we are moving gradually towards that. An important step in this direction is the signing of the treaty on scrapping medium- and shorter-range missiles and on measures of its verification.

The negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms have imparted urgency to the question of destroying nuclear warheads and of a verifiable use of the nuclear material thus released. We are carrying on corresponding work in the framework of the above-mentioned cooperation. Now a "window of opportunities" is being opened for reaching an understanding on ending the production of fissionable material.

The further elaboration of the concept of going over to a nuclear-free world is associated with the study of a stability of such a transition in the context of crisis situations and a return to the arms race, as well as stability of possible intermediate states. Thus, a possible transition to an intermediate state in which both sides would possess 5 per cent of the weapons currently involved in nuclear confrontation is discussed in the report issued by the Committee of Soviet Scientists, and it shows that there are conditions required for making such a state stable. I must note that, in order to effect this changeover, it would be necessary, unfortunately, to develop a new type of a light monoblock missile of the Midgetman class. This problem should be discussed with the Americans now, since discussion of military plans largely increases mutual trust.

We are just embarking on the way from a mad world which is criminally irresponsible with regard to the past and future generations, to a world based on reason and mutual security. The political process has started, and scientists must mobilise themselves to provide the necessary scientific and technological backing for it.

THE PERSONNEL POLICY TO SERVE PERESTROIKA

Stepan CHERVONENKO,
Head of Department, CPSU CC

I

THE 19TH ALL-UNION CONFERENCE of our party is an event inseparable from the revolutionary *perestroika* begun in the Soviet Union in April 1985 and carried forward by the 27th CPSU Congress; it was also a factor accelerating this process.

The Conference set wide-ranging foreign policy tasks calling for a further consolidation of its scientific foundations. This scientific and practical conference is bound to constitute an important advance in the overall intellectualisation of approaches to pressing problems of international relations.

Eduard Shevardnadze's detailed, in-depth report and the debate at the plenary sittings and in the eight sections of the conference followed a conceptual and prognosticative line and bore on key aspects of Soviet foreign policy. They will undoubtedly serve the search for more effective ways of pursuing it and help take new initiatives and choose political alternatives.

By combining diplomacy with science, maintaining extensive ties between our embassies and other Soviet missions abroad and research institutions and by comparing points of view and assessments, we are certain to avoid mistakes. All this will safeguard us in a measure against subjectivism and voluntarism, which on the past occasions caused us both moral and material damage in international affairs that was hard to undo.

It is important to make an objective, honest and responsible analysis of the strong and weak points of our foreign policy potential. We must probe more deeply into the causes, external or internal, of the delay in the realisation of some of our foreign policy initiatives, and ascertain which of these initiatives are in need of renewal or additional incentives, which of them and why we should amend with due regard to the changing situation in the world or in a particular region.

As experience has shown, and as the conference stressed, we must be more selective in defining not only political but economic priorities, including those with reference to a given region. The time has come as well to bring our country's commitments into greater harmony with our potential and main foreign policy aims on the world scene.

II

THE 19TH PARTY CONFERENCE held in-depth discussion concerning the pursuit of the right personnel policy as a decisive condition for the progress and irreversibility of *perestroika*. This fully applies to foreign relations.

No foreign policy initiatives, however brilliant, can be developed when there is an inadequate number of people to translate them in a highly professional way, into everyday diplomatic action.

No opportunities for publicity, however favourable, can be used unless our diplomats, journalists and foreign economy experts are thoroughly versed in the essence of the party's policy and can spell it out with professional competence.

Economic resources involved in international turnover cannot produce proper results unless specialists in charge of them know all about international economic cooperation and competition on the world market.

The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs has done much since April 1985 to prevent departures from the Leninist principles of personnel policy such as occurred in the past and to generally improve work among personnel. This effort is bearing fruit, as has been said here.

Life abounds in instances of high professionalism and of initiative which yield concrete results. Judge for yourselves.

A group of young officials of the Foreign Ministry's Department of the USA and Canada (the highest-ranking of them is a first secretary) took the initiative of modelling likely trends in the evolution of US strategic programmes and calculate on that basis the likely line of the US side's behaviour at the talks on nuclear and space weapons. The result proved interesting and benefited practice.

The staffs of our missions in Afghanistan, which have to operate in a most complicated military-political situation, literally under fire, are doing their job in an organised fashion, efficiently and imaginatively. They solve fundamentally new political and organisational problems and propose further moves on our part in fulfilment of the Geneva accords.

I could cite many examples of this kind. But let us admit that not all our foreign missions have switched to new methods—far from it. There are quite a few instances of passive work marked by low efficiency, of ill-advised proposals and occasionally even of unjustified moves.

Progress in overcoming the departmental approach is slow, and the functioning of Soviet missions abroad is not as coordinated as it should be. Ministries and departments must amend their instructions and brief those they send abroad, insisting that they proceed primarily from the interests of the state as a whole, breaking down departmental barriers and putting an end to departmental ambitions, that outdated junk that has no more right to exist. The task is to restore everywhere truly socialist standards, real party norms of relations between Soviet officials, above all between the heads of our missions abroad, needless to say.

In surmounting difficulties in coordination of the functioning of Soviet missions abroad, it is first of all the ambassador as the chief representative of our party and state in the given country that must play his part. So must, of course, the social organisations of the mission concerned. Moscow will aid them whenever their efforts turn out to be inadequate.

I do not want to portray here the ideal Soviet diplomat of the era of *perestroika* and new political thinking. Experience has revealed the futility of evolving ideal patterns in the hope of translating them into reality through persuasion and admonition. Our new approach to personnel policy implies a change in its real mechanism, the provision of conditions permitting a more accurate assessment of talent and mediocrity, of competence and incompetence, initiative and passivity.

How are we to make such a mechanism work? This is not a simple question.

Obviously, a major component of this mechanism is scientifically sound long-range planning. Without such planning it is difficult to ensure the judicious use of personnel, provide optimum conditions for professional advancement of every staff member and promotion of gifted young people. Planning does not consist simply of a schedule for the dispatch of employees to our foreign missions and their return to the Ministry. It necessarily involves further training to improve qualifications, study visits, the vertical and horizontal rotation of staff, the setting up of a reserve, and so on. Greater attention should be devoted to selecting representatives of our Union republics for service abroad and in Moscow.

Rotation should extend to employees of the republics' foreign ministries.

It is necessary to find without delay a solution guaranteeing a qualitative change in planning, in the provision of qualified personnel for our foreign relations. Although there are specialised educational institutions of different levels and types, such as the Moscow State Institute of International Relations or the Diplomatic Academy, the Ministry and, above all, our foreign missions come up, nonetheless, against serious difficulties in reinforcing staffs with competent people. After all, there is no denying that the growing dynamism of Soviet foreign policy and of the work of most of the Foreign Ministry's territorial and functional entities is plainly ahead of the pace of *perestroika* in the Ministry's educational institutions. Yet life itself imperatively demands the reverse. It demands that they lead the way, teaching "diplomatic technology of a new generation", forecasting requirements for specialists and reorganising themselves in response to new needs.

Can this be done? We believe so, provided the problem is tackled realistically and responsibly, which means working out a well-considered concept of training and advanced training, a concept taking account of both the present and the future.

However, it would be wrong to put the whole burden of responsibility for training on the Institute of International Relations, the Diplomatic Academy and the Academy of Foreign Trade.

Each Soviet mission abroad and each staff will have to concern itself with improving the qualifications of its diplomats and other staff members on a permanent and sound basis, using diverse forms, such as lectures, seminars of "situational" games covering the more urgent international problems. With these forms, familiarisation with the process of *perestroika* going on in our country should be a standing task. It is important to entrust this work both to experienced people serving in the country concerned and to specialists, scholars and senior delegation members arriving there. Each Soviet mission abroad should work out its own system for improving qualifications according to its possibilities and closely coordinate it with the corresponding system used by central ministries and departments maintaining relations with foreign countries.

Of course, much will depend on the degree of competence of those in charge of seminars and other forms of training. We are asking ambassadors and party committees to give this some thought. Little will change in this respect without the cooperation of ambassadors, trade representatives and other senior officials.

It would be advisable to convene members of our staffs abroad on a more regular basis by type of activity, region and group, as is done in other countries. To assume that people serving in our foreign missions can improve their qualifications only in Moscow is to agree to their merely catching up with developments whereas they must keep ahead of them so as to respond promptly to any event, doing it competently and convincingly.

We daily make increasing demands on our foreign staffs. We must admit, however, that these staffs do not get enough help in spite of the measures adopted. I have in mind more information to come from central ministries and departments, as well as the conferences or seminars held in Moscow once a year though these are generally attended by leading staff. This is why training in our missions abroad, as well as making greater demands on every staff member, will allow it to draw more on the potentialities of every staff for greatly improving its performance. The passivity shown by many members of Soviet missions abroad with regard to analytical work, information and publicity betrays an inadequate knowledge of developments and problems. This accounts to a considerable extent for the fact that they avoid appearing before large audiences and

dread the press, television, round tables discussions and sharp debates.

We think certification would help make more efficient use of creative potential of the staffs of our missions abroad and, indeed, of our central departments, help draw staffs into analytical work and inspire them with a keener sense of responsibility. Regrettably, certification has yet to become a powerful instrument for objective and principled appraisal of their work and what I would describe as an unfailing incentive to greatly improving their performance.

The time has come to streamline pay in the case of staffs and specialists serving abroad. The pay rates now applied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be extended to other Soviet missions abroad. This system of remuneration should be improved and carried forward.

These measures call for special examination by the ministries and departments concerned.

In view of a marked extension of the Soviet Union's ties with foreign countries, important decisions have been adopted of late to more promptly settle questions relating to Soviet people going abroad on business, privately or as tourists and to reduce both correspondence between government departments on these questions and time limits of settlement. The emphasis is being shifted to preparing business trips abroad more efficiently, to making them more fruitful and establishing more regular ties between central departments, organisations and enterprises and our foreign missions.

Our embassies, trade missions and other bodies abroad call attention to serious shortcomings which central departments are guilty of in this respect. The criticisms that have come in are now being summed up, and proposals are being drafted to put things in order.

There are some other matters under consideration, including humanitarian questions, and directive bodies will take action on them before long.

A question raised recurrently in correspondence of embassies and other Soviet missions abroad with central departments is that of feedback. We must say that notwithstanding relevant decisions of recent date, no real improvement has so far been achieved. We expect the Ministry and the State Commission for Foreign Economic Relations as coordinating agencies to exercise stricter control over implementation of these decisions and to see to it that they are fully carried out. Additional measures are also needed to tighten executive discipline in ministries and departments. As for our embassies, trade missions and other bodies, they should more carefully study questions before taking them up to central bodies, and should raise them solely on the basis of well-established facts.

III

PERESTROIKA AND THE RENEWAL of every aspect of the life of our society were begun on the party's initiative. By embarking on them, the CPSU consciously and deliberately exposed itself to public criticism in order to be able to make as a result of this criticism a more deep-going analysis of the processes under way in both society and the party itself and to unite the people in support of its ideas. The party is purifying itself, gaining in prestige and increasing its leading role in society as revolutionary changes come about in the country.

The 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th Party Conference stressed the special role of the party cells as the chief, decisive factor in the implementation of *perestroika*. How are these cells coping with this task? We can state explicitly that much has changed in their work in the post-April period.

This came out during the party meetings and conferences that discussed the progress of *perestroika*, and especially during the discussion

of the Theses of the CPSU CC for the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Communists showed unprecedented activity on those occasions. It is gratifying that they were highly vocal and that every Communist saw the party's concern over the destiny of *perestroika* as his own problem. Proposals made by the staffs of our missions abroad were used in drafting decisions of the 19th Party Conference.

At the same time, discussion on the Theses revealed our own shortcomings, primarily in ideological and political work and the education of our foreign staffs, particularly those of their members who had been far from their country for a long time. Evidence of these shortcomings was the fact that certain proposals had nothing to do with reality and that attempts were made to mechanically apply the experience of bourgeois parliamentary government to our country.

Generally speaking, *perestroika* in Soviet missions abroad is following an uneven course, and there are many places where the requisite change has yet to come. It is our common task to bring about a decisive change in this state of affairs.

The 19th Party Conference equipped us with a clear understanding of our goals and the means of attaining them. We now need practical deeds, and much will depend in this matter on how ambassadors and heads of other entities cooperate with social organisations. *Perestroika* works where these forces join efforts. We have many instances where the initiative, energy and competence of ambassadors, being coupled with the dynamism of social organisations efficiently using modern forms and methods of socio-political work, made it possible to greatly change the collective mood, the staffs' attitude to their duties, the organisation of work and produced tangible results in raising the level of relations with the countries concerned.

Some recommendations were made here with a view to ensuring more fruitful use of the potentialities of the social organisations of Soviet missions abroad.

The 19th Party Conference took a stand against certain negative phenomena in the work of many of our foreign staffs, phenomena which seemed all but fatal for a long time. I am referring to the supercilious and authoritarian manner of a number of senior officials who misinterpreted the principle of undivided authority, and to its reverse side, which expresses itself in servility, bootlicking and informing, in a lack of initiative and the habit of doing nothing without explicit orders, in complacency and selfishness.

Democracy and openness are a powerful instrument for enhancing everyone's sense of responsibility for his job, the adherence of Soviet people serving abroad to sound moral and ethical standards and principles. It is not easy to use this instrument in the peculiar atmosphere of a foreign country. There are those who ask whether openness is applicable at all abroad. Our answer to that should leave no room for doubt: abroad as at home, openness is not only possible but indispensable. The main safeguard against openness being used to the detriment of our interests and security of our people is a new level—I would call it a *perestroika* level—of political maturity, vigilance, discipline and responsibility ruling out all naiveté, day-dreaming and political infantilism.

It is important to carry *perestroika* and hence the democratisation process deeper, use the powerful instrument of *glasnost* as a means of removing all shortcomings and doing away with every form or method of blocking *perestroika*, to carry on a steadfast and uncompromising struggle against passivity (which often amounts to a parasitic attitude), against indolence and inactivity. It is necessary to build up in staffs the prestige of conscientious work, to encourage talented people, to foster the finest qualities of every employee, to promote the finest traditions, to

create a healthy moral climate, one of comradeship and friendly relations between all staff members of Soviet missions abroad.

Enlarging on this subject, we wish to stress that in the context of *perestroika*, democratisation and *glasnost*, the standard of leadership must go up and not down. Ambassadors, trade representatives, delegates to international organisations are all responsible for the implementation of the policy of our party and state in the sectors entrusted to them. This implies unflinching fulfilment of official duties and the assignments of superiors by every member of staff. Of course, a superior's exacting attitude to his subordinates is really effective only where it is coupled with competence and principle. His ability to lean on the support of social organisations, of the work collective he heads, is a major indicator of his place, role and prestige as leader. Hence the importance of his seeking and being able to use all democratic forms of work. One cannot make increased demands on one's subordinates without showing them respect and helping them solve their problems. Exchanges of opinion and consideration of staff members' proposals and views should lead to collective reason and will, to help formulate tasks and instructions and compile reports and cables to be sent to Moscow.

Comrades, this scientific and practical conference is an important component of the *perestroika* that has been going on at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a businesslike manner since April 1985, the 27th Party Congress and Mikhail Gorbachev's programme speech to the conference of personnel involved in foreign affairs held at the Ministry. A good deal has already been done but there are even bigger tasks to carry out.

I wish for the whole tremendous potential of the thousands-strong body of Soviet diplomats and other people active in the sphere of foreign relations to fully join in the accomplishment of the tasks set by the 19th Party Conference. This purpose will undoubtedly be served by the present conference, which is coming to a close today. It is important that the ideas, proposals and opinions expressed here be not only examined further but be translated into concrete deeds.

THE GROWING ROLE OF THE PUBLIC IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Valentina TERESHKOVA,
Chairwoman of the Presidium, Union of the Soviet Societies
for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries

THE VERY FACT that spokesmen for public organisations were invited to the Foreign Ministry scientific and practical conference is evidence of a new attitude of our professional diplomacy to people-to-people diplomacy. Mikhail Gorbachev's report to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference pointed out the increased role of the people in world affairs. It stressed that objective world processes should become a subject of constant scientific and public discussions involving the general public and its organisations. People-to-people diplomacy is a reality in today's world. Policy can no longer be shaped without regard to the activity of mass anti-war, anti-nuclear, environmental, youth, women's, friendship movements in all countries.

The very existence of friendship societies with socialism's pioneer country is a noteworthy feature of our times, one of the first manifestations of people's diplomacy. Lenin noted that without confidence there can be neither peaceful relations between nations nor reasonably suc-

cessful advancement of all that is valuable in contemporary civilisation. This view is expressive of the meaning of the friendship movement and the activity of the union of Soviet friendship societies. Eighty-five Soviet friendship societies and associations are working on a permanent basis to promote international contacts. The Union of the Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries makes increasing use of direct informal contacts between people, exchanges of youth and schoolchildren's groups, professional meetings and international forums at which noted statesmen meet representatives of the public, answer their questions and join in debates. Ample opportunities for active participation by the public in international affairs are provided by the movement of twin-cities. Soviet cities and regions today maintain friendly ties with over 400 partners abroad.

The recent period has seen the emergence of new interesting forms: twinning of the Soviet republics with the US States, West German Lands, Japanese prefectures, and so on. But generally speaking, we are not satisfied with the results and efficiency of our work. We must say outright that we are moving too slowly in reorganising our activity and occasionally lag behind the dynamic, imaginative foreign policy of our party and state.

We are directing all our efforts towards applying new political thinking, which expects nations to know the truth about each other, discard mutual prejudice, renounce the enemy image and extend informal ties. Growing links are characterised by a rediscovery of the Soviet Union on the part of the foreign public and, furthermore, by the possibility for Soviet people to know and understand the peoples of other countries better, to benefit from ideas generated by other cultures and intellectual traditions.

In every sphere of our work, we are cooperating actively with the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the foreign ministries of the union republics. The Foreign Ministry makes a fruitful contribution to such international public events as the Soviet-American forums held by the union of friendship societies in collaboration with the Chautauqua institute, mass meetings with the French, Japanese and Finnish public. We are now thinking of extending these forms of social intercourse to other countries and regions, of drawing as many representatives of the Soviet public, parliamentarians, scholars, cultural workers and artists as possible into them.

In helping new political thinking take root in practice, we seek opportunities for dialogue on a broader political basis than before and strive to promote contacts and cooperation with all who stand for preserving human civilisation, for a nuclear-free and non-violent world. The fact that for a long time we were confined within a narrow milieu, that is, mainly within the environment of like-minded people abroad, could not but affect the content and style of the work of the union and, indeed, its foreign counterparts. This robbed us to a considerable degree of flexibility, which is so necessary for expanding contacts with movements and organisations of a different ideological orientation.

The union of friendship societies is now working to extend effective cooperation with its traditional partners—societies of friendship with the Soviet Union—and at the same time to establish and develop relations with forces which earlier were generally beyond the scope of our activity.

Meetings with noted foreign statesmen who arrive in our country could help friendship societies greatly in winning higher prestige and in contributing more tangibly to the development of international contacts. Such meetings would be a natural response to the other side. After all, Soviet statesmen and party leaders generally and regularly meet during their stay abroad with members of friendship societies with the Soviet Union.

These societies themselves could come forward as generators of ideas formulated on the basis of the proposals of a broad and dynamic friendship movement. The presidents of friendship societies and members of the Presidium of the union could attend meetings of the Foreign Ministry Collegium to present the opinion of the general public on problems of cooperation with this or that country and on other international problems. Interest in our country has grown of late but this is not to say that so has, automatically, confidence in us. We must work for that. It is something we will have to win.

The chief reserve in our information work is, now as in the past, to considerably improve coordination and combine the efforts of diverse Soviet government and public organisations, unions of creative workers included, primarily in sponsoring socio-political and cultural events: Soviet Union Days, festivals, months dedicated to the Soviet Union. Soviet cultural centres, which are the basis of our information activity abroad, have an important role to play in this. I wish to emphasise this with reference to both the union of friendship societies and other Soviet bodies, such as ministries, central departments and unions of creative workers. We would like them to be Soviet centres in the full sense of the term, not just foreign departments of the union of friendship societies.

Lastly, there is something else that we consider very important. In the light of the decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, we believe the attempt being made by some central departments to put all cultural exchanges under state control is unjustified and out of keeping with the spirit of our times. Specifically, I mean exchanges between by public organisations under plans and agreements with their foreign partners as well as the activity of Soviet cultural centres abroad. The tendency to place cultural exchanges on a state footing is likely to handicap the extension of international cultural relations and shackle the initiative of public organisations, both at home and abroad.

The Foreign Ministry's assistance and that of its scientific coordinating centre would be highly welcome in working out recommendations would help us define more precisely the long-range tasks of the friendship movement, its place and role in the political system of Soviet society, and seek new forms of extending international public relations. Effective cooperation between the UFS and the Foreign Ministry at this stage is particularly relevant as a means of raising the efficiency of work both at home and abroad, of increasing the contribution of the general public to international security, mutual understanding and confidence between nations.

ON THE ROLE OF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE DIPLOMACY

Genrikh BOROVIK,
Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee

THE SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE has been undergoing its own *perestroika* over the past two years and a half or so. I think that the fact that a delegation from the Soviet Peace Committee was invited, for the first time ever, to a Democratic Convention in the United States shows that our Committee's image is changing for the better. It is now considered a real force, and this applies not only to us but to other Soviet public organisations as well. The same can be said of the importance which the United Nations attaches to contact with our public forces. The 3rd Special Session on Disarmament reaffirmed this.

In his report Eduard Shevardnadze assessed highly the practical role of people-to-people diplomacy. Today we are facing the task of exploring a mechanism of cooperation between people-to-people diplomacy and official diplomacy. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs understands the importance of people-to-people diplomacy and is searching for contacts and forms of work with it. The public ought to know what is taking place in the world and influence foreign policy. And it can offer good advice.

For example, the Peace Committee had a hand in the initiative to announce a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. Other ideas can be named which were proposed by Soviet participants in people-to-people diplomacy and by our foreign partners.

People-to-people diplomacy has another important role to play as well. It is the destruction of the "enemy image". Much is being done in this respect. It is the peace march by 220 Americans from Leningrad to Moscow. It is the concert at a stadium in Moscow last year which was attended by 35,000 people. (Incidentally, some people in charge of maintaining order at the stadium wanted to use Alsatian dogs for the purpose. It took us no small effort to prove that a friendship concert and Alsatis are not very compatible things. The reason I am saying this is that here, too, there are specific problems.)

Won't the meeting planned between American and Soviet soldiers, 20-year-old lads, be useful? They are to spend five days in Moscow and five in Washington; they'll talk about their concerns, their girlfriends, their mothers, and about averting war. Let them realise they were born not to look at each other through gun-sights, but to make life on the planet better. I am certain that this encounter will draw the attention of the world press.

We are also thinking about producing a Soviet-American modern musical based on the anti-war comedy by Aristophanes in which, as you remember, women fought against war in a very unique manner.

I have mentioned only several of the projects which came up this past February at a Soviet-American conference in the USA. This was a totally new type of conference. Not the kind where the sides exchange blows. It was a conference at which 500 Americans and 100 Soviet people gathered to spend four days working out practical proposals and to think about what we could do to improve trust in each other, how to make the process which began last December 8 with the signing of the INF Treaty hold together with "grassroots" the way hillsides that can crumble down are held in place. Work of this kind is geared to the future. It is a model of how people-to-people diplomacy can influence foreign policy.

One more point. When Soviet schoolchildren gather signatures on Moscow streets in support of fighters for disarmament, this is also education of internationalists. Among such children there will be less chance in future of finding people who would fall for the bait of nationalism.

The public and the organisations representing it can be probes for and developers of new ideas.

We have many difficult problems to contend with. A bureaucratic image of the Soviet Peace Committee has been created over many years. The Peace Committee itself, with its inflexibility and lack of resourcefulness is at fault, too. And, of course, the image created by Western propaganda. Today a great deal is changing. Our multifaceted ties have been augmented tenfold. This is no exaggeration. Relations are developing with a very broad range of organisations, and not only with our friends, whom we are accustomed to dealing with. The motto "Those who are not with us are against us" is not suited for a dialogue on how save the world by joint effort. We want the World Peace Council, too, to become a more pluralistic organisation.

SPIRITUAL VALUES AND DIPLOMACY

Vladimir KARPOV,
First Secretary of the USSR Writers' Union Board

THERE IS A GREAT DEAL in our country that is being accomplished for the first time in history. It seems to me, as a man of letters, that what is taking place here, at this conference, is also taking place for the first time in history. Never before has there been such active involvement on the part of writers in international affairs and such close cooperation between literature and diplomacy.

We could enumerate many major actions of this kind—literary and political—which diplomats and authors have carried out together. I am referring to forums, round-table discussions, debates, symposiums

This is only natural, as never before has such large-scale tasks faced either diplomacy or literature. The Writer's Union has a Foreign Commission—our own "Foreign Ministry", as we jokingly refer to it. Our union maintains direct contacts with over 120 countries, and diplomats are a great help to us here. This is also very important and necessary work. I look into this audience and I see very, many familiar faces—ambassadors and Ministry staff members. Writers have been to all the countries where you are stationed. We are working closely with you.

Everywhere they go, writers are very grateful to diplomats for the great help you render them, your hectic schedules notwithstanding.

Today is not the time for lavishing praises alone. It is the time for criticism, pinpointing shortcomings and restructuring. So please excuse me if I say something that you may not find very pleasant, but it is only to enable us to work even better together. It seems to me that the possibilities offered by writers are not always utilised in full. Sometimes foreign trips turn into tourist visits. We should be used more intensively for establishing contacts and creating positive impression of our country.

Writers themselves sometimes prepare poorly and hastily for their trips. Sometimes there are people who are not interested in the country they go to and have a vague notion of it. Of course, little benefit will be derived from such a visitor. Another thing. We need to prepare in advance articles and addresses on television and radio. World-wide interest in our country is enormous today. Speaking impromptu is all well and good, but not everyone is capable of this.

The Writers' Union has enormous possibilities, with over 100 magazines and 15 *Literary Gazettes*. Mainly the central one is famous, but each republic has its own *Literary Gazette* as well. One can set the needed tone for a forthcoming great endeavour or for any action. In this regard we need to cooperate more closely in the preparatory period. Sometimes the embassy does not accord our delegation enough attention.

Writers travel a great deal, but our output with regard to joint work is not all that great. Spiritual values are of enormous importance in diplomacy and in world politics.

We write little about the work of diplomats. Accept this self-criticism. There is plenty to write about. What is the usual notion of diplomatic work? Some people think that all your work is confined to the high life, and that's where it ends. But I have on many occasions seen for myself how dangerous your work is. During the Great Patriotic War I was an intelligence officer. I know of situations when a diplomat's work is no less dangerous and not in the sense of saying the wrong word. No, dangerous in the real sense. I can remember one time when we were invited

in Tunis to visit a mosque built by the barber of the prophet Mohammed. No sooner had we walked up two steps than an Arab ran towards us shouting that these infidels were about to defile the shrine. A crowd gathered and passions rose to the boiling point. In our delegation there was a writer from Uzbekistan, Khamid Gulyam. He said: "I am a Moslem, too. Where is your hospitality?" Silence reigned. Someone from the crowd shouted: "If you are a Moslem, recite from the Koran." He recited from the Koran. Then they told me: "You, recite from the Koran." Once, when I was a child in Tashkent, I had studied several chapters from the Koran, but over 40 years had passed since then and I had never recalled them, but now I immediately remembered them. I recited a chapter from the Koran! Whereupon we were invited with a bow to view the sacred mosque.

When we make mistakes this has a baneful effect on work. Today I am writing a book about Marshal Zhukov. Zhukov used to say that many of our misfortunes and failures were the fault not only of Stalin but also of the military, who often did not display proper persistence.

So diplomats, writers and the public should display persistence, too. If we had, perhaps the Afghanistan misfortune would never have happened.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the report by Eduard Shevardnadze is attractive in that it combines sweeping generalisations with personal impressions and assessments. Interesting and bold tasks are posed in it. We—both diplomats and writers—will have to tackle them together.

AGENDA FOR THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

(Continued from page 85)

³ For a good critique of the Reagan Administration's neglect of internationalism see Thomas Hughes, "The Twilight of Internationalism," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1985-86, pp. 25-48.

⁴ See Michael Gordon, "Split is Reported over ABM Accord," *New York Times*, July 15, 1988. The opposition of the joint chiefs to a suspension of parts of the ABM treaty underscores the dangers of automatically assuming that the military are the main obstacles to arms control.

A VIEW FROM PRAGUE

Bohuslav CHNOUPEK

If we look at the contemporary world and especially at the new trends in the development of the socialist countries in the light of the discussions and results of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU the conclusion is clear: our ideas about the character of the present times, the economic and political factors, the outlook and eventual goals of the struggle for social liberation and the qualitatively new state of the socialist system are becoming more profound and are being enriched with new and genuinely scientific approaches and assessments. They provide a sound basis in the search for new ways to enable mankind to enter the next millennium under conditions of peace, progress and human happiness. In Czechoslovakia, too, there is steadily growing support from Communists and non-Party members for the fundamental principles so convincingly enunciated at that historic forum. It is particularly important that in relations among the socialist countries we have started, in a comradely way and by common efforts, to break the barriers of formalism and pomposity and are trying to consistently combine the principles of independence and non-interference with the objective reality, namely the diversity of national forms of socialist society, to build international relations on the basis of mutual benefit and common responsibility for the destiny and prestige of socialism, and its world influence.

Socialism can only fulfil its important mission if it renews itself and develops successfully in the socialist community as a whole, and in each individual country. Undoubtedly, as the processes of renewal develop, relations among the socialist countries will logically enter a new stage. This is the only way in which our fraternal community will acquire a new dimension. There is therefore an objective and urgent need, to restructure our relations on the basis of time-tested principles. The principles of equality, respect for national independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and socialist internationalism, assistance and the granting of mutual benefits must go hand in hand with *glasnost* in internal and external policies, democratization of interstate relations and contacts at every level, exchange of experience and comradely discussion, joint search for ways to solve the

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existing problems and the problems that arise in the current process of dialectical development. This is the only way to overcome contradictions, to strengthen unity at a new and higher level.

Experience shows, however, that the essence of socialism in domestic and international affairs is not ensured against distortions even after the victory of the socialist revolution. This may happen due to departure from the time-tested internationalist principles. Lenin, in the course of the discussions on the self-determination of nations pointed out that the working class is not ensured against errors and miscalculations after the socialist revolution and that revolution and wars against the socialist state are possible.

This prompts a number of questions. For example, what has been our record of *glasnost* in the relations among the socialist countries? Did we raise before and do we now openly raise existing problems? Has there been a comradely discussion in our midst? Frankly, this has not always been the case. The reason, in our opinion, lay mainly in the prevalence of a false notion that socialism develops without conflicts, going from success to success. If development was understood in this way in individual socialist countries, this was naturally reflected in the views on the development of their international relations. If problems did arise we tried, out of a misguided sense of tolerance, to ignore or obscure these problems for fear that they would be used to damage socialism.

Thus the relations among the socialist countries too bore an imprint of dogmatism and subjectivism. There was no openness and no democratic atmosphere. This naturally prevented the full use of the advantages of socialism in mutual cooperation and the achievement of a balance between the international and the national, the general and the specific.

Perestroika is undoubtedly international in character, and it has universal relevance within the world socialist system. It is our profound conviction that for all the specific features and peculiarities of building socialism—and that includes its renewal—there is more need than before to study the experience of the partners, especially in such an important area as the use of new technology and in the social sphere. One talks of the new methods and forms, which, if creatively used, will help to improve the work of the state and public bodies and organisations and revitalise the living organism of society. The experience of fraternal countries is indispensable in this matter. Therefore, concrete, prompt and all-round exchange of such experience is at the core of interaction. Czechoslovak foreign policy regards the study of the experience of our friends as a top priority, a programmatic area of its activity.

How helpful the experience of our friends, especially of the Soviet Union, is to Czechoslovakia can be seen from the preparation and the decisions of the December 1987 and April 1988 Plenary meetings of the CC CPC, which reaffirmed, in our national conditions, the need for restructuring in the following main directions: profound economic reform, all-round democratisation of society and change in social consciousness. As General Secretary of the CC CPC Miloš Jakeš said in his report to the April 1988 Plenum of the CC CPC, "We draw inspiration from the experience and the Leninist course on which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has embarked, and which it is following in the spirit of the Great October Socialist Revolution."

Today we must self-critically acknowledge that in the course of our interaction we did not have enough courage to resolve burning problems in a comradely atmosphere and to respect our partners' opinion through constructive dialogue and discussion. It often happened that the slightest critical remark addressed to us provoked a nervous reaction and

left us guessing anxiously what the implications might be. This approach, alien to socialist ethics and sanctified by a declared lack of disputed problems, was not conducive to stronger unity, and in the final count created a backlog of unresolved issues driving untreated diseases deeper into the organism of the relations between the socialist countries. *Perestroika* requires that in this area too we should learn to work and to talk to each other and to live according to democratic norms.

The 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU, which reviewed the experience of *perestroika* in Soviet society, the theoretical guidelines and scientific forecasts it has provided for the further development of the USSR and the solution of global world problems not only open up new horizons for the process of *perestroika*, and for our tangible contribution to the restructuring of international relations in the spirit of peace, but also and most importantly, inspire us with historical optimism and the conviction that our efforts follow the logical direction in the development of the world.

We in Czechoslovakia have always been aware that the nucleus of the world socialist system which bears the main burden of the struggle for peace, disarmament and the restructuring of international relations is the Soviet Union, our most loyal friend and reliable assistant in speeding our social and economic development. The democratisation of relations among the socialist countries, the growing responsibility of each of them for the future of socialism and the development of human civilisation do not change our view of the Soviet Union's role. That is why Czechoslovak foreign policy sees the USSR as top priority.

Against this background one can see how futile are the attempts of some people, the so-called organisers of the "Prague spring" of 1968, to claim that everything taking place in the USSR and other socialist countries was already contained in their programmes twenty years ago. How one can compare the course towards eroding the socialist way of life and undermining the leading role of the Communist Party with restructuring our society? Is it possible to compare direct threats, physical violence and the attempts of the rightist forces in general to eliminate socialism with the main principle of *perestroika* and renewal: "more socialism, more democracy"? One can hardly imagine a more hypocritical approach than the attempts of the people who seek to erode the foundations of socialism to pose as the Messiahs of socialism's revival. On this subject our Communist Party has provided well-argued and definitive statements, notably the document called "Lessons" issued by the 14 Congress of the CPC which analyses the events prior to January 1968, the decisions of the January 1968 Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC and the destructive character of the period that followed.

As time goes on the dialectics of the above-mentioned three stages of that period stands out more clearly. Barring the tendentious claims of the avowed anti-socialist forces there are no fundamental differences in the assessment of the "pre-January" development. In the period preceding the crisis the opinion that the building of socialism was a conflict-free process prevailed. There was no scientific approach taken to the contradictions accumulated over the previous period which were coming to a head. All this was due in large measure to the gross neglect of the development of revolutionary theory, departure from the dialectical methodology in the study of social development in the specific conditions when the foundations of socialism had been built and the productive forces, living standards and culture of the people had reached a comparatively high level, but when, on the other hand, problems were building up in every area of social life and these problems were evolving towards a crisis situation. Growing economic strains, lack of perception in dealing with national problems led to mounting discontent in the midst of the

intelligentsia and young people and deterioration of morale in the country. Under these conditions mistrust for the Party and government leadership of the period became widespread. It became increasingly clear that the leadership could not cope with the backlog of problems, and that the gap between its words and deeds was widening. Even so, there is no doubt that in 1967-68 the balance of forces in Czechoslovakia was in favour of socialism.

Our working people and Communists sincerely welcomed the decisions of the January 1968 Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC regarding them as a step towards rectifying errors and opening new possibilities for constructive solution of the existing contradictions to ensure the dynamic development of our society. Therefore January 1968 was an objective necessity. This assessment still stands. But a red line must be drawn between the developments before and after January 1968. We must draw the line between what the Communists and the working people had expected from the January Plenum and what the real outcome was. We must draw attention to the behaviour of various parasitic elements, including people who formerly belonged to the exploitative classes.

The January Plenum did not provide for the necessary changes in the power echelons, policy and planning to ensure the kind of development that the Communists and the broad public sincerely wanted. On the contrary, top Party posts were gradually filled by people who under the slogan of "regenerating socialism" were destroying its very foundations, and opposed the fundamental principle of the Party's vanguard role. The Communists who were staunch supporters of socialism and internationalism failed to promote to the Party and state leadership people who had a profound grasp of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and were capable of implementing it creatively and finding answers to the problems confronting the country and people. In this situation elitist, aggressively anti-socialist groups promptly united. They were joined by card-carrying Party members with frustrated personal ambitions. They embarked on a primitive and simplistic course of destroying the socialist structure. This played the crucial role in the subsequent tragic development of events in Czechoslovakia.

Even a cursory review of the first seven and a half months of 1968 reveals that it was not just "isolated phenomena" or "spontaneous extremist trends", but a conscious action against the socialist order, against our political system, in particular against the leading role of the Communist Party which they wanted to exclude from the structure of the socialist state and the power apparatus.

Besides, the anti-socialist forces chose the tactic of making an absolute of specific Czechoslovak conditions and they went as far as to oppose Marx to Lenin, to deny the relevance of Lenin's doctrine to our country, and to claim that Leninism was only applicable in the Russian conditions. They denied the fundamental scientific truth that Marxism-Leninism is the only complete theory which knows no borders and that the component parts of that teaching—philosophy, political economy and scientific Communism—are not restricted to any particular country, and that all of them are effective weapons in the hands of the proletariat in the course of revolutionary change of the world.

Behind the proclaimed desire to give Czechoslovakia's foreign policy "its own face" were attempts to sever allied ties without any regard for our own security. The anti-socialist forces became so bold as to demand that Czechoslovakia withdraw from the Warsaw Treaty, the CMEA and become a neutral state. Even within the CC CPC there were suggestions that envisaged a break with the Soviet Union.

Now, two decades later, our people and the broad world public again ask themselves: did Czechoslovakia have sufficient strength to resolve the

crisis by itself. Undoubtedly they could. But the Party and government leadership should have given the Communists and the broad public truthful information about the real state of affairs, the extent of the threat to socialism, and show the way out of the situation and take resolute measures towards that end. This was not what happened in practice. After the publication of the pamphlet "2000 Words", which directly called for counter-revolutionary actions, and with anti-social organisations, such as "The Club of 231", "The Club of Engaged Non-Party Members" active on the political scene, Alexander Dubček spoke on television on June 28, 1968 on the eve of the series of regional Party conferences. The Presidium of the CC CPC had instructed him to condemn the above-mentioned counter-revolutionary pamphlet, and this was what the whole Party and the broad public expected him to do. But he did not even mention it. In this way he brought confusion into the Party ranks, and into the minds of the delegates to the regional conferences, which was immediately reflected in their position and their decisions. Such behaviour was not only an instance of a cowardly politician's irresponsibility and opportunism, but a stab in the back of the Party.

Yet even in this hysterical atmosphere there were factors that could have effectively opposed counter-revolution. There was above all the pro-socialist position of the majority of the working class, the peasantry and part of the intelligentsia, a resolute and committed stand of the people's militia at enterprises, armed forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and, not least, of our people's army. All this goes to show that if these capable people dedicated to socialism and their nation had full information about the situation in society and specific instructions from a firm leadership, Czechoslovakia, like Poland later could have rescued the ship of state from the rough seas and steered it along a constructive course of further socialist development by its own efforts, and thus prevented the events that followed.

The CPC has always been an internationalist and patriotic force. Its respect of dialectics, the general and the specific, the combination of the international and the national, the interests of classes and of the whole people have always brought positive results. At the same time we have had to pay a dear price whenever these laws of dialectics were ignored or turned into an absolute. The situation was compounded by the fact that the right-wing anti-socialist forces, aware that the people of our country had linked their destiny with the basic values of socialism, did not, at that period, openly come under anti-socialist banners. It was only later, when many of them had emigrated, that they revealed the true colour of their banners.

The weakening of the CPC as the vanguard political force and its partial paralysis in all spheres of social life, underrating of the working class and the popular masses, the pre-eminence of the so-called elitist forces (which sought to take revenge for February 1948) posed a serious threat to the revolutionary gains of the people, the foundations of socialism, our foreign policy and the security of the state.

What, then, does the "Prague spring" have in common with Soviet *perestroika*, with the acceleration, with the fresh upsurge and with the new thinking? What happened in our country twenty years ago prompts the basic and still relevant conclusion: the Party should always preside over the changes in socialist society because it has a clear revolutionary programme of socialist renewal which meets the interests of the people and has popular appeal. The result of this programme should be the strengthening of socialism and democratisation of all areas of social life. That is why we have welcomed the restructuring in the USSR begun after the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CC CPSU, the process which is now spreading to the other socialist countries.

There is no doubt that at the stage of restructuring and renewal of socialism there is a great need for revolutionary theory, without which there can be no revolutionary practice. If we are to cope with the qualitatively new problems in the building of socialism and in international relations we must master the revolutionary dialectical method and make full use of and elaborate the theoretical heritage of the founders of scientific socialism.

Otherwise, as past experience attests, we will be doomed to stagnation and will not be able to meet the challenge of the scientific and technological revolution. The need for a bold concept of the further improvement of socialism is prompted by the fact that we are almost daily aware of the lack of valid scientific answers to a number of key questions. This happened because in many aspects our Marxist-Leninist methodology had unfortunately remained largely at the level of the thirties and forties. To free our common thinking of dogmatism and creatively analyse the new phenomena it is necessary to check every practical step against theory and to enrich theory by practice.

As for our foreign policy we believe it necessary that the social studies in our country dealing with problems of restructuring international relations be linked more closely with the corresponding studies in the socialist countries. It would be particularly useful to create joint research teams to study the experience of integration processes and new aspects in the relations among the socialist countries and to take up questions that arise in the evolution of the present world. Although much has been done to develop the Marxist-Leninist theory in the last three years we should remember that we have yet to arrive at a profound understanding of the laws by which society develops at the end of the 20th century. The socialist countries must pool their efforts to prognosticate the development of socialism, the relations between socialist states and to carry out studies that would result in a scientific assessment of what is happening in the capitalist and developing world.

The transition of the scientific technological revolution from the industrial to the technological stage makes it important to train skilled personnel capable of deciding how to produce and not only what to produce. It would be justified to combine our efforts in a scientific study to develop a scientific programme for personnel training and to pursue our cooperation and mutual assistance on that basis. The requirement of lifelong education, and frequent retraining of sections of the working class, technicians and other employees, further underscores the need for such cooperation.

We believe that the Comprehensive Programme of Scientific and Technological Progress of the CMEA Countries until the Year 2000 is to be welcomed. Its five priority areas fully meet the requirements of our country's economic development and its commitment to structural change. In spite of all the difficulties the Comprehensive Programme encounters it obviously marks a transition to fundamentally new technologies, to up-to-date equipment and machinery in the economies of the socialist community. Without consistent cooperation in the spirit of the Comprehensive Programme among the socialist countries, we would lag behind the rapid scientific and technological progress in the world. Czechoslovakia is especially concerned with maintaining its rate of progress. We manufacture 70 per cent of all the kinds of industrial goods produced in the world. Our body of researchers numbers 200,000, which accounts for about 1.5 per cent of the world's scientific potential. This is a considerable force, but it is often stretched too widely. On average we have 2.5 researchers working on each research task.

It must be frankly admitted that integration of scientific and technological cooperation among the socialist countries is not proceeding

satisfactorily. One gets the impression that the inertia of existing administrative methods is gaining the upper hand over the modern spirit of the Comprehensive Programme. A study of the economic, scientific and technological cooperation between the socialist countries shows that in the international division of labour we lag far behind the advanced capitalist countries, and that for a long period we had adopted an isolationist attitude. As a result, with some countries our cooperation in development and manufacture is nil. Today we cannot afford to waste time in this important area of economic, scientific and technological integration. Unfortunately, it still sometimes happens that, say, a leading worker of a major research institute in Czechoslovakia trying to apply the results of his research at home or at enterprises in the fraternal socialist countries, runs into obstacles, long-drawn-out negotiations and red tape or meets with fear of novelty. Meanwhile a West European partner approached with the same offer can make the decision within an hour.

The harbingers of change for the better are joint Soviet-Czechoslovak teams: the biotechnological laboratory in Nitra, a coloristic laboratory in Pardubice and the soon-to-be-opened Czechoslovak branches of the intersectoral complexes headed by Professors Fyodorov and Ilizarov.

The international research and production association Robot headquartered in Prešov is entering its second year of dynamic development. Its story is instructive. Bureaucratic delays, departmentalism, outdated attitudes, lack of economic pressures proved stronger than decisions taken by the highest Party and state bodies. For this reason it took almost two years to form the management and create the necessary conditions for the association to start its work. In retrospect it can be said that all this could be accomplished within two or three months at the utmost.

The working meeting of the leaders of the fraternal parties of the CMEA countries held in Moscow in November 1986, was a milestone and a catalyst in introducing new approaches into the relations between the socialist countries. The meeting made a realistic in-depth analysis of the situation in the world of socialism and triggered some changes in the relations between the socialist countries. This was again proof of Marx's idea that the best programme for revolutionary transformation and dynamic development is critical analysis of the past and the present.

We note with satisfaction that some valuable suggestions emerged from this meeting on the development of cooperation among the socialist countries in the most important areas of economy, science and technology. The philosophical value of these suggestions, in our opinion, lies in the fact that they stressed the need to master the qualitative factors that are crucial for competition with the advanced capitalist countries, and for achieving a breakthrough in introducing new technologies in the priority areas within a historically brief space of time. We are gratified that important decisions have recently been made to restructure the whole mechanism of the CMEA and to enable the enterprises and associations of its member countries to have direct relationships without the unnecessary mediation of the central bodies.

The early results of the above-mentioned meeting in Moscow have lent a new character to the cooperation among the CMEA member countries. A new spirit of cooperation is in the making, one based on economic instruments geared first of all to the development of cooperation within sectors of the economy. Greater importance attaches to coordinating the economic policies of the member countries based on the collective concept of international socialist division of labour for the period from 1991 to 2005. We believe its approval is of key importance. We feel that this conception would enable our economy to concentrate on several key areas of scientific and technological progress.

New trends in mutual cooperation suggest that it will be impossible to proceed only by quantitatively expanding exports and imports, and the volumes of contracts and agreements. One can welcome steps which show a gradual shift of emphasis from the simple increase in the volume of foreign trade to cooperation aimed at introducing scientific and technological achievements, and bringing profound structural change to our relations. Our country's economy, being a very open one (Czechoslovakia relies on international economic ties for more than one-third of its national income) is more and more aware of competition as regards quality, technological level and the meeting of market demand. There are also early signs that our machine-building industry is becoming less effective in providing payment resources in our relations with the Soviet Union, which weakens our positions in the CMEA market. We should therefore promote such export and cooperation relations which would help us to preserve and increase the volume of import of Soviet fuel and energy so that we can be more closely involved in developing advanced industries in the Soviet Union and the CMEA countries.

It is an unchallengeable fact that our economic, scientific and technological cooperation with the socialist countries, including the sphere of foreign trade, was in the past marked by insincere permissiveness and too much tolerance. One revealing example: Czechoslovakia produces 120 million pairs of shoes, of which more than 50 million pairs are exported to the socialist countries. The fact that for a long time we enjoyed a competition-free long-term market (experience shows that competition is a natural corrective instrument in the production of any kind of goods) and faced with the low demand for quality among our trade partners in the socialist countries have allowed our traditionally progressive shoe-making industry to become complacent. This gradually led to stagnation. The same happened in some other areas of industry which were traditionally highly developed in Czechoslovakia. This highlights the need for Czechoslovakia to restructure its trade relations with the socialist countries. The time of tolerance and leniency in economic, scientific and technological cooperation is gone forever. Instead we must now have economic relations based on mutual benefit and an exacting attitude.

Czechoslovakia's position on the acceleration of *perestroika* within the CMEA and early introduction of economic mechanisms for deepening international socialist division of labour and promoting cooperation with the advanced capitalist and developing countries, is well known.

Let us hope that the declaration on the establishment of official relations between the CMEA and the EEC will be crowned with positive results. Both sides have travelled a long way to sign this document which was made possible by new political thinking. The declaration opens broad vistas for economic, scientific and technological cooperation between East and West.

We are pleased that the conference of the Secretaries of the Central Committees of fraternal Parties on economic issues held in Budapest last June came out for bolder moves to restructure the mechanism of integration and implement major programmes and bring the price mechanism in line with world market prices. The idea of creating large joint international firms capable of large-scale production and effective operation is enjoying growing support. Ensuring the convertibility of the CMEA countries' currencies is necessary and logical because the stringent territorial and material constraints on the flow of goods existing today has already become a major barrier and a brake on the development of cooperation. We proceed from the assumption that if money is to perform its function as means of payment and ensure regular commodity-money relations, it should be internationalised. In our opinion this can only be effected by an early switch from the transferrable ruble

to the convertible ruble with which the socialist countries could buy goods, services and licences in any part of the world. How can this be achieved in the near future? The answer is to produce convertible goods and not the kind of goods that meet with no demand.

Every CMEA country, of course, approaches mutual cooperation in the context of its own experience, its needs and interests. History has shown that we were not and still are not prepared for some forms of cooperation. Therefore, any project should involve only those who are interested in it and stand to gain from it. This should be taken for granted in the course of restructuring relations between the socialist countries. If a CMEA country is not interested in a particular economic project or undertaking, this need not prevent the other countries from taking part in it.

Of late the question has been asked from the highest rostrums whether the level and forms of cooperation among our countries match the new challenges facing us today, whether all the resources for the interaction among the fraternal countries to speed our development and make us invulnerable to the capitalist market have been utilised? The answer is undoubtedly that we have not tapped our potential or used the advantages of socialist relations to the full and it is in our common interest to rectify the situation. The main answer suggested is wide-scale development of direct links between scientific organisations, enterprises and associations and the creation of joint firms for which purpose a number of legal financial and organisational problems will have to be solved. There is greater support for the need to experiment more boldly, to overcome bureaucratic and departmental barriers, to renounce outdated stereotypes and not to underestimate the importance of cooperation, something one can observe among some economic managers.

Together with our partners from the socialist countries, we regard multilateral cooperation within the CMEA as the top priority. This is our strategic goal. Its component is the time-tested truth that the Soviet Union is the mainstay of our successful economic, scientific and technical development.* At the same time the USSR is our main partner in modern forms of cooperation: in specialisation, collaboration, direct ties between producers and joint ventures. This potential could be increased many times over if the tenacious extensive tendencies (i. e., concern with growth rather than improvement) are rooted out. Our foreign policy, therefore, attaches exceptional importance to realising the agreements between comrades Jakeš and Gorbachev and Štrougal and Ryzhkov (1987-1988) most notably those dealing with higher forms of economic, scientific and technological cooperation, eliminating obstacles to specialisation and collaboration, direct links between producers and the activity of joint enterprises.

The intensification of cooperation and integration between the socialist countries presents Czechoslovak foreign policy with new challenges. Information and coordination activity must be upgraded, particularly the monitoring of the execution of long-term programmes and other agreements and suggestions on how to solve new problems that arise. Those of us who work in foreign policy must always bear in mind that the socialist countries can and must influence world developments, including

* The USSR supplies almost 100 per cent of Czechoslovakia's oil and gas consumption and 86 per cent of iron ore. It is the biggest, most reliable and stable consumer of Czechoslovak machines and consumer goods. Between 1981 and 1985 bilateral trade increased by more than 80 per cent and a further 19 per cent growth is expected during the current five-year plan period. The Soviet Union's share in our foreign trade is 45 per cent and Czechoslovakia's share in the Soviet foreign trade is 8 per cent. We are the Soviet Union's second biggest trade partner. One should bear in mind that the structure of trade has not been entirely balanced. In the past 25 years the share of fuel, raw and other materials in Soviet exports increased from 50 to 73 per cent, and the share of machines and equipment dropped from 25 to 19 per cent.

social progress, only through their success in the economy, science, technology and culture. This is the basic premise of Lenin's conception of the vanguard role of the socialist states in the world community. Integration and mutual cross-pollination therefore fully apply to such spheres of the social superstructure as culture, arts and education, etc. Although agreements on cultural cooperation for the current five-year plan period say that a number of our cultural and educational institutions, publishing houses and magazines will have direct links with their partners in the socialist countries, this is not yet the case. In this area we have failed to react to pressing needs adequately. In this area there is still a great deal of indecision and not enough is being done to look for new and higher forms of cooperation. It would be useful to have a joint multilateral bulletin of the foreign affairs ministries of the socialist countries for those interested. It could cover the experience of restructuring in the socialist countries and in international relations as a whole. The name of the bulletin could be "Perestroika and New Thinking" or something similar.

That cooperation in the sphere of social relations needs to be reviewed is proved by the fact that this sphere involves ever broader cross-sections of people. There is a clear trend towards greater democratisation of this area. By the same token relations among socialist countries are increasingly becoming the concern of all the people. One can truly talk of "people-to-people" diplomacy.

Tourism and other forms of exchanges increasingly lead to more and more people becoming personally acquainted and educated in the spirit of socialist internationalism. We also favour new forms such as the exchange of families between enterprises which maintain direct links, and united regions, whose number is increasing. We welcome moves which help promote broader social interests and not just derive commercial benefits. We must think of creating joint tourist societies, of building joint hotels and inexpensive camping sites for young people.

In our opinion restructuring in this field is held back by a lot of outdated practices. Our people have every reason to ask why is it that forty years after the revolution there were still bureaucratic barriers which prevent free travel of citizens between fraternal countries? Why is travel much freer in the West? Perhaps they trust their people more there. Why does a citizen of a socialist country have to run the bureaucratic gauntlet if he wants to go on a private trip to visit friends or as a tourist? Is it not high time we prove that socialist society is more modern and efficient, and that everything in it, including travel and tourism, serves man?

We should not only admit, but draw conclusions from the criticism of serious shortcomings in the material, technical and political aspects of tourism between Czechoslovakia and the USSR and the other socialist countries expressed lately in letters to the press. People today cannot tolerate the fact that tourists from socialist countries get poorer accommodation and service than tourists from capitalist countries. Tourist organisations and local government bodies should see what they can do to enable tourists to live in families, to improve the services and to offer material compensation to those who render these services.

Broader cooperation in the field of physical fitness and sports, more sporting events, competitions and tournaments would definitely help cement friendship between the socialist countries. An interesting suggestion was made by athletes who say that in some sports (such as ice hockey and, perhaps, soccer) international competitions should be held in which not only the socialist countries, but teams from other countries could take part.

Competition between athletes of socialist countries need not prevent them from exchanging experience and sharing all the "secrets" of train-

ing top-level athletes. Socialism would thus prove that in this field too it is guided by the highest ethical values.

New positive elements are appearing in cooperation in the mass media. Forms of *glasnost* like TV bridges, radio bridges and round table discussions between specialists are popular. They appeal to the public because they are marked by openness, and a friendly atmosphere conducive to discussion on the widest range of issues. There are fewer and fewer areas of life and people immune to criticism. More and more often the principle underlying these discussions is that criticism should be conducted from a socialist standpoint and should benefit socialism. This means that we should preserve everything that helps socialist development and creative activities. This means that we should not allow anything that is against socialism and against the people. We should be open to ideas and we should put all positive things in the world in the service of socialism. We are convinced that this is the only way if we want people in the fraternal countries and in the whole world to get a truthful idea of the life and work of the people building a new social system, to learn about its successes and appreciate them while being aware of the difficulties and problems.

If we look at the number of exchanges of people between the socialist countries, especially in the field of politics, economics, culture and science, we see that the most frequent travellers come from the "higher rungs" of the social ladder in our countries. Many visits have been made by heads of departments, fewer visits by leaders of regions, still fewer by leaders of districts, and very few by people from the grassroots. We should promote fraternal ties on a broader basis, similar to those existing between the agricultural complex of Slušovice and the farmers near Gottwald in the Ukraine, or between the workers of the Škoda concern in Plzeň and the Uralmash plant in Sverdlovsk. While promoting direct links in science, industry and culture, we should not neglect contacts between communists, the leaders of the youth, the trade unions, and other public organisations.

The programme of Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation in the sphere of culture and the agreement on creating an intergovernmental Czechoslovak-Soviet commission to this end will boost cooperation in all these fields. Perhaps the same kind of cooperation can be introduced with other socialist countries.

Democratisation of mutual relations among the socialist countries is one of the key ways to promote higher forms of cooperation and introduce a coordinated approach in resolving the main contradictions of the contemporary world. We are gratified to see a new positive element in relations among the Warsaw Treaty countries emphasising the links between mutual trust, mutual understanding, respect for one another's experience and interests, and unity, cohesion and true interaction. What is needed is equality and at the same time greater responsibility, mutual benefit and assistance, the initiative of each member of the Warsaw Treaty and adherence to the agreed line in international affairs as a whole.

The peace-making, that is, political function of the Warsaw Treaty, is coming to the fore. A whole range of well-thought-out and realistic proposals aimed at lessening international tensions, promoting disarmament, especially in the nuclear field, and advances towards a world without weapons have been the results of this tendency.

We support the idea voiced by Mikhail Gorbachev at the meeting with the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries in Berlin in December 1987

that the Washington agreement between the USSR and the USA on eliminating two classes of nuclear missiles, and the agreement to work towards a 50 per cent cut in strategic armaments were the fruit of the closely coordinated peaceful offensive of the socialist countries. The results of the Soviet-American summit in Moscow provided fresh proof of that, as they meet the interests of peace.

All this of course is a historic victory of the socialist world, of the forces of democracy and progress, and of realistically minded people in the West. By common efforts the key has been found that will open the first "iron doors" in the wall of age-old prejudice. However, we are realists and we understand that titanic efforts, a solid basis, strong will and boldness will be needed to rid the world of mass destruction weapons.

A truthful and critical analysis of our activity shows that in the past our relations with the West have been more aimed at creating the "enemy image", often at any cost, and that we did not actively search for common ground which would help us see the West as a partner and even an ally in solving many problems. Today we must provide truthful and objective information about the achievements and problems in the real life of the peoples both in the socialist countries and those with other social systems.

The recent meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee, foreign and defence committees, in addition to specific peace proposals, also made important decisions to streamline the structure and the whole mechanism of the Warsaw Treaty. We put a high premium on frank assessment of our position and approaches, their impact on the international situation and on laying down guidelines for further joint efforts.

A major factor for promoting the initiative of every socialist country and the Warsaw Treaty as a whole is the system of prompt information on talks with the USA and other Western partners which we have been getting regularly from our Soviet comrades in recent years. Prior collective discussion of important international initiatives has become standard practice. All this enhances mutual contacts among the socialist countries and contributes to their interaction.

Within the framework of our defence community useful work is being done by the multilateral group of current mutual information and special commissions of representatives of foreign and defence ministries on disarmament. We believe they meet the objective need to improve the mechanism for coordinating the foreign policies of the Warsaw Treaty.

We are highly appreciative of the fact that the spirit of *perestroika* is being asserted in the Warsaw Treaty organisation, that the activity of our alliance at all structural levels is permeated with the comradely atmosphere of mutual trust and frankness. At the recent meetings and conferences a number of recommendations were made on various international issues of concern to all the states (the building of a common European home and promoting the security and cooperation in Europe, elimination of dangerous seats of tension in the world, the establishment of a new international economic order, consequences of the arms race for the environment and other aspects of ecological security). We note with satisfaction that the Prague meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers held in October 1987 welcomed Czechoslovakia's proposals on closer interconnection between the Soviet-American negotiations and the Geneva disarmament conference, on a meeting of representatives of countries on the border of the two military-political blocs, on promoting a dialogue with the Arab League, on greater ecological security, on improving tourist exchanges among the Warsaw Treaty countries.

As part of the peace offensive of the socialist countries and the assertion of the philosophy of the new political thinking in international

affairs the General Secretary of the CC CPC Miloš Jakeš proposed the creation of a zone of peace, cooperation and goodneighbourly relations along the dividing line between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. The proposal was made on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the February Victory of the Czechoslovak people. The great attention to this initiative and the support it has enjoyed in political circles both in and outside Europe testify that its goals and thrust reflect universal human interests, since it meets the interests both of our allies and the NATO countries and the N+N group of countries. It does not damage anyone, but on the contrary, benefits everyone.

The initiative consists basically in the following:

in the military field: gradual cuts of troops and some highly destructive weapons systems would bring them down to the level of reasonable sufficiency while observing the principle of the balance of forces and equal security of the states and their coalitions. Verification activities would be an inseparable part of the above-mentioned measures. The establishment of personal contacts between the military representatives at various levels, coordination of actions to prevent undesirable incidents and prompt explanation of the causes of state border violations on the part of the military, etc., would go a long way towards deepening trust. Military measures would, of course, cover not only the neighbouring states, but the troops of the allies in the zone.

In the political field a mechanism can be created for maintaining dialogue, exchanging views and experience and solving urgent problems and realising interests on a bilateral and multilateral basis for the purpose of strengthening the treaty basis of our relations.

In the economic and ecological sphere a much wider range of possibilities for mutual cooperation would open up, some of which would go beyond the framework of existing or projected forms or measures. For example, support could be given to production cooperation, the creation of duty-free zones, cooperation in Third World markets, joint ventures in trade, services and tourism, in transport infrastructure, in energy, in nuclear power safety, in preventing and eliminating the consequences of ecologically dangerous accidents.

A similar positive perspective can be outlined for the *humanitarian, cultural, scientific, educational and health fields* with a view to developing contacts on human rights and resolving humanitarian issues, providing better conditions for international tourism, cooperation in the struggle against international terrorism and drug trafficking, the development of friendly working contacts between areas, regions and cities on both sides of the line of contact and direct links between schools, cultural, scientific and other institutions.

This Czechoslovak initiative contains proposals which have already been put forward by the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Hungary and other socialist countries, and by the "N+N" group of countries at the Vienna meeting and proposals by some NATO countries. As a result, all the socialist countries and a broad front of progressive, democratic forces of the West identified themselves with the Czechoslovak initiative.

This also presupposes that our proposals or those of the allies are open to reasonable alternatives wherever they may come from—a neutral, non-aligned country or a country belonging to a military-political alliance. All the members of the international community, large or small, whether or not they belong to an alliance or coalition, must be active in contributing to the new political thinking and promoting it in international affairs. This approach reflects the dialectics of the unity and diversity of the modern world.

The socialist countries—together and individually—have entered a new stage in development. The congresses of their Communist and Workers' Parties have creatively worked out long-term programmes for accelerating their social and economic development until the end of the century. They are aimed at reaching an advanced level in key areas. We are thus entering a crucial stage in the peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism. It is in the interests of the whole socialist community that each of its member countries develop as speedily and efficiently as possible for the good of its people and of world socialism, for progress and peace.

In our view, this sets exceedingly important tasks before the foreign policy establishments in the socialist countries. Much of the responsibility for solving the problems in all the areas of common interest rests with the foreign policy departments. This was what guided us in drawing up and signing the protocol on cooperation between the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia and the USSR Foreign Ministry, and in drawing up a list of priorities in Czechoslovak-Soviet cooperation and the plan for its implementation. The main aim of the protocol signed is to determine the key issues for the two ministries and their departments, including their embassies, for the period of *perestroika*.

All this is geared to speeding integration in the economy, science and technology, in the spheres of culture, education, and so on. Annual review of the protocol and specification of its tasks will help towards the achievement of these strategic goals in Czechoslovak-Soviet cooperation and joint tackling of the problems that arise. We intend to use the experience gained in the relations with the Soviet friends in our cooperation with all interested socialist countries.

Such an approach is prompted by the nature of the present stage in the development of the socialist world, the acceleration of social and economic development through restructuring and all-round democratisation. The work for these momentous goals will undoubtedly spell a richer, fuller, more diverse and happy life for man and will raise socialist internationalism to a qualitatively new stage.

This alone can help socialism become more attractive for the broadest masses of the people on all the continents. Only in this way can socialism fulfil its historic mission.

AGENDA FOR THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Stephen LARRABEE

U. S.-Soviet relations are currently in a period of transition. After years of antagonism and mutual recrimination, relations have begun to improve. It is not clear, however, whether this is part of a more fundamental process of reconciliation or simply a temporary lull before a new period of deterioration. There have been several hopeful periods of detente before. All have proven to be short-lived, in large part because the interests of the two powers proved to be fundamentally at odds with one another.

Nevertheless, while caution is in order, there are reasons to believe that both superpowers may be at a critical crossroads and that relations can be put on a firmer and more durable footing. This will only happen, however, if both sides are clear about the reasons for the failure of the past efforts at reconciliation and if they can learn from past experience.

THE FAIL OF DETENTE IN THE 1970S

There were three main reasons why the period of detente in the early 1970s failed: first, the detente was too narrowly based. It was centered almost exclusively around arms control. Hence when arms negotiations stalled, the bilateral relationship suffered, and there was little else to sustain it.

Second, both sides had exaggerated and unrealistic expectations. Many Americans naively expected that the signing of a few agreements in the warm afterglow of a summit could eradicate the fundamental political and ideological differences between the two societies. When this did not happen, disappointment set in. The Soviet side had no such illusions, but it clearly expected that the new more cordial atmosphere would bring substantial political and economic benefits.

Yet the Brezhnev leadership failed to see the incompatibility between an aggressive expansion of Soviet power in the Third World and the commitment in the U.S. Declaration of Principles signed by both powers in 1972 to refrain from seeking unilateral political advantage of instability in other areas. All this had two consequences. First, it had a negative impact on U.S. public opinion and led to a strongly anti-Soviet climate in the U.S., which made the conduct of a rational policy toward the Soviet Union difficult. Second, it led to a squandering of scarce resources which could have been better applied to economic restructuring at home,

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since many of the countries were neither politically or economically in a position to use these resources efficiently.

Third, detente was used by Brezhnev as a substitute for reform. Rather than undertaking a fundamental overhaul of the outdated system inherited from Stalin which was increasingly becoming a brake on Soviet economic, political and social development, Brezhnev curtailed the reforms begun in 1965 under Prime Minister Kosygin and sought instead to overcome growing economic difficulties through importing technology from the West. The Soviet Union, however, lacked the infrastructure to use this technology effectively. At the same time the military sector was given a disproportionate share of resources and qualified personnel. The result was increased economic stagnation and the situation when Soviet economy and foreign policy generally were often at odds with Soviet long-term political interests.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan severely damaged the image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of U.S. public opinion and forced President Carter to shelve the SALT II Treaty. Carter's actions were severely criticized in the Soviet press at the time—wrongly in my view. Given the hostile mood in Congress in the aftermath of the invasion, Carter had little choice but to withdraw the treaty from consideration for ratification. Had he sent it forward in such an emotionally charged political atmosphere, it would certainly have been rejected^{*}—which he knew and desperately wanted to avoid. He continued to hope well into the summer of 1980 that an improvement in the political atmosphere would make it possible for him to send the treaty forward for ratification. However, relations remained strained, and the treaty continued in abeyance throughout the rest of his term. Upon succeeding Carter, President Reagan made clear that he regarded the treaty as "fatally flawed." As a result, he never sent it forward for ratification, and it eventually became a dead letter, although both sides tacitly observed its provisions for a while.

The fate of the SALT II treaty highlights the close interaction between arms control and other issues in U.S.-Soviet relations. While there was not an explicit linkage between the two, the reality is that there is an *implicit* linkage, which needs to be understood if future misunderstandings are to be avoided. Public perceptions play an important role in Western democracies. These perceptions are often influenced by political developments not directly related to the intrinsic merits of arms agreements. This was particularly true in the case of the SALT II agreement. The debate on the SALT II accord in 1978-79 was less a debate about the merits of the treaty itself than about Soviet behavior. Soviet actions in the Third World, above all in Afghanistan, colored public perceptions and weakened support for the treaty.

To its credit, the new Soviet leadership under General Secretary Gorbachev has drawn the proper conclusion from the Afghanistan affair and has begun withdrawing its troops from that country. This decision—which clearly was not easy—has removed an important obstacle to an improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations and has done much to convince U.S. and world opinion that the new Soviet leadership is truly interested in a relaxation of international tension. It has also created an improved climate for resolving other regional differences.

A second major contributing factor to the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations was the deployment of the SS-20. The deployment of the SS-20 created a severe crisis with the west and a serious political problem for the Carter Administration with its European allies, who were the main targets of the system and who wished to see it constrained, preferably

* The author tells the half-truth: the USA decided against the ratification before the Soviet troops were moved to Afghanistan in December 1979. — Ed.

by arms control discussions. When the deployment continued despite warnings by both West European and American leaders,¹ the Carter Administration reluctantly concluded that some action was necessary to allay West European concerns. This led to NATO's famous "dual track" decision in December 1979, which combined an offer to conduct arms negotiations over these systems with a threat to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles which could hit Soviet territory if the negotiations failed.

Here is not the place to rehash the INF issue. The Western observer cannot avoid the impression, however, that the political implications of the decision to deploy the SS-20 were not carefully thought through by the Soviet leadership at the time. Military-technical considerations appear to have been given priority over the USSR's long-term political interests. The result was a politically costly miscalculation. Rather than enhancing Soviet security the deployment exacerbated relations with the West and resulted in a shift in the military strategic situation to the detriment of the Soviet Union.

Again to its credit, the current Soviet leadership has adopted a different approach, one which recognizes that in the nuclear age security must be mutual and cannot be achieved at the expense of the other side. The adoption of this new approach paved the way for the signing of the INF agreement in Washington in December 1987—the first real arms reduction agreement signed between the two countries in the postwar period. While the agreement only eliminates a small fraction of the warheads possessed by the two sides, it is an important step toward ensuring security at lower levels of armaments. Besides eliminating a whole class of weapons, the treaty accepts the principle of asymmetrical reductions and contains far-reaching provisions for verification, including on-site inspection. Both these aspects set important precedents for future negotiations, especially on conventional arms.

REAGAN'S LEGACY

The advent of the Reagan Administration witnessed a sharp deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations. President Reagan entered office convinced that U.S.-Soviet detente had been a sham and determined to arrest what he believed was a precipitous decline in American power, which had encouraged the Soviet Union to take advantage of U.S. "weakness." His initial policy was guided less by a consistent long-term strategy than a set of loosely-linked ideological beliefs, which rested on several highly questionable premises.

The first was to see U.S. security—and U.S.-Soviet relations—primarily in military terms. Arms control was regarded as a dirty word, part of the problem, not the solution. In short, Reagan's policy tended to mirror Brezhnev's: a defense buildup was given priority over arms control, and initially little serious effort was made to engage the Soviet Union in meaningful arms control negotiations.

The second weakness was the Administration's tendency to see all problems in the Third World through the prism of the East-West conflict. The Reagan Administration regarded the Soviet Union as the major cause of all turmoil in the Third World, downplaying or ignoring the indigenous and domestic sources of this instability. This led to an overly ambitious and politically questionable effort by the Administration to support anti-communist insurgents in a number of countries, which inhibited the search for political solutions to regional problems and undercut support for the U.S. among many countries in the Third World.

Third, the Reagan policy overestimated the capacity of the United States to effect changes in Soviet foreign policy and underestimated the domestic sources of change. To be sure, important changes have occurred

in Soviet foreign policy over the last four years. But these have primarily been prompted by domestic developments—above all a change of leadership at the top and a willingness on the part of the new Soviet leadership to take a new approach to many key international issues. U.S. policy played a role, but a secondary one. The main factors were clearly domestic.

Finally, the Reagan Administration's approach—at least initially—lacked a carefully calibrated balance between incentives and disincentives. In Reagan's first term there were basically only sticks, no carrots. Hence there was little positive inducement for the Soviet Union to change its policy. Not surprisingly, therefore, U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated significantly and little progress was made in resolving bilateral issues from arms control to regional problems.

Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union, however, has gradually evolved over time. It can be roughly divided into two distinct phases. The first phase lasted from 1980-1984. During this period Reagan showed little real interest in serious negotiations with the Soviet Union. He concentrated instead on building up America's military strength, which he saw as a prerequisite for any future negotiations.

The second phase began in early 1984 and has continued more or less uninterrupted since then. This second period ("Reagan II") has been marked by greater pragmatism and flexibility. A number of factors, some subjective, others objective, contributed to the shift in policy.

The first was Reagan's perception that American strength had improved sufficiently to allow him to negotiate seriously. To what extent this perception was due to objective factors and to what extent it was due to subjective factors is a matter of considerable dispute (many of the main features of the Reagan military buildup—the MX, the Midgetman, the Trident D-5, the Stealth bomber and the Rapid Deployment Force—were begun either by President Ford or Carter). However, perceptions often create their own reality, and this was the case with Reagan.

A second factor was Reagan's need for some visible success before he left office. For all his boasting about improving America's standing in the world, Reagan has very few concrete achievements to show for his tough talk. He would genuinely like to go down in history as a peacemaker, and an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union would help him to achieve that goal. A foreign policy success would also deflect attention from the Administration's growing internal difficulties, from Irangate to the controversy surrounding his close friend and confidant, Edwin Meese, who resigned as Attorney General in July after charges of unethical conduct had been raised.

A third factor which contributed to the shift in policy was the departure of many of the ideologues from the Administration over the last year and a half. This has shifted the political balance within the Administration in favor of the "pragmatists," headed by Secretary of State George Shultz. With the departure of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and his chief aide Richard Perle as well as other key conservatives such as Kenneth Adelman and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Shultz has been able to assert greater control over U.S.-Soviet policy. The appointment of Frank Carlucci to succeed Caspar Weinberger as Secretary of Defense has added another important voice of moderation and pragmatism within the inner circle.

The fourth and perhaps most important factor has been the shift in Soviet policy since the assumption of power by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The new approach taken by the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, highlighted by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the signing of the INF treaty, has opened up new prospects for im-

proving U.S.-Soviet relations. The series of summits, moreover, has convinced Reagan that "Gorbachev is different" and that there is now a realistic possibility to do serious business with the Soviet Union.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Given the short time remaining until the U.S. elections (November 8), many of the key issues, especially the conclusion of a START agreement, will have to be addressed by Reagan's successor. It may be useful therefore to examine the views of the two presidential candidates on key foreign policy issues.

Of the two candidates Vice President Bush has the greatest experience in foreign policy, having served as vice president, a member of Congress, U.S. Representative to China, head of the CIA and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Bush's political roots are in the moderate wing of the Republican party. While politically conservative, he is not as ideological as President Reagan, and if elected, his administration would probably be populated by moderate Republicans rather than the ideologues that dominated the Reagan Administration in its early days.

In the campaign so far Bush has taken a decidedly tougher and more skeptical tone toward recent changes in the Soviet Union than his opponent, Governor Michael Dukakis, or even Reagan himself. In his speech before the World Affairs Council of Northern California, for instance, he argued that "the Cold War is not over" and warned that while the U.S. "must be bold enough to seize the opportunity of change," it must at the same time be prepared for "protracted conflict."

One should not put too much stock in campaign rhetoric, however. Once in office it is likely that Bush would continue the basic outlines of the policy pursued by Reagan in the latter half of his second term, giving priority to completing the remaining elements of a START agreement. Moreover, unlike President Reagan, Bush does not have the same strong personal stake in SDI. Thus he might be more inclined to accept some restrictions on the program in order to achieve a START agreement. Economic pressures, particularly the need to reduce the budget deficit, are likely to push him in this direction as well.

The Democratic candidate, Michael Dukakis, has yet to spell out his foreign policy views in great detail. In his speeches to date he has gone out of his way to portray himself as a centrist. Nevertheless, on a number of key issues there are important differences between the policies he proposes and those espoused by Bush and the Reagan Administration.

For instance, Dukakis generally has taken a more positive view toward the prospects for change in the USSR and for improving U.S.-Soviet relations than Bush, who has emphasized the need for caution, arguing that it is too early to tell how significant the changes are. His emphasis on "evolutionary change" rather than revolutionary change in Eastern Europe is also very much in keeping with traditional U.S. policy goals.

The most clear-cut differences are in the area of defense policy. Dukakis opposes SDI whereas Bush supports it. If elected, Dukakis would probably continue some research on defensive technologies—but within the framework of the ABM treaty and reorient the program to focus on long-term deployment options.

Dukakis also opposes the deployment of the MX and Midgetman, two systems Bush strongly favors. It would be wrong, however, to see Dukakis as "anti-nuclear," as some West Europeans tend to do. His opposition to MX and Midgetman appears motivated more by considerations of cost effectiveness than a strong aversion to nuclear weapons *per se*. Recently,

moreover, he has softened his position, stating that he has "not ruled out" a new land-based ballistic missile.

Instead of building up nuclear forces Dukakis favors strengthening NATO's conventional forces and has called for a "conventional defense initiative."² Like Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia and other leading Democratic defense experts, he appears to favor trying to offset current Soviet quantitative advantages in manpower and tanks by exploiting Western qualitative advantages in technology. At the same time he can be expected to give conventional arms control high priority, focusing in particular on ways to reduce current asymmetries in the force posture of each side.

Another important difference lies in the attitude of the two candidates to multilateral institutions and international law. Dukakis is a strong believer in international law and "internationalism" generally. If elected, he can be expected to put greater reliance on strengthening the machinery of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions than the Reagan Administration, which has preferred to rely on unilateral instruments of power and diplomacy and made no secret of its low regard for the United Nations.³

Dukakis has taken a strong stand in favor of sanctions against South Africa, and openly attacked South Africa's "racist" policy. His views on South Africa are strongly at odds with the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement", which Dukakis claims has failed. If elected, Dukakis would probably pursue a much more "activist" policy designed to pressure South Africa to move more rapidly toward majority rule—a policy which could bring him in conflict with some of his West European allies, especially Margaret Thatcher.

Finally, on Central and Latin America Dukakis' approach significantly differs from that of Bush and the Reagan Administration. Dukakis has been a strong critic of the Administration's support for the Contras and its "unilateralist" approach to Central America in general. If elected, he would put more emphasis on political and diplomatic means to resolve the conflict with Nicaragua, and give greater weight to the views of the Latin American countries in the region, particularly those involved in the Contadora process.

It is important to recognize, however, that election campaigns and party platforms are relatively poor guides to a president's performance once in office. Richard Nixon, for instance, entered office with a reputation as a hard-line anti-communist, but once in office moved quickly to initiate a period of detente. Jimmy Carter, on the other hand, began by condemning America's "inordinate fear of communism" but ended up imposing a grain embargo on the Soviet Union and withdrawing from the Moscow Olympics. In other words, once confronted with the realities and responsibilities of power, candidates often modify their views and move toward the center—as Ronald Reagan's (belated) evolution underscores.

FUTURE PRIORITIES AND PROSPECTS

Regardless of who is elected President, the United States and the Soviet Union need to build on the progress made in the last several years and both deepen and expand it. The agenda is large. However, several issues deserve immediate attention.

1. Regulation of the Strategic Competition

Both sides need to follow up the INF agreement with an agreement on strategic arms. The goal of any agreement should be to enhance both strategic stability as well as crisis stability at drastically reduced levels of armaments. Several issues in particular need to be addressed.

The first is the question of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The major problem is verification. SLCMs are small and easy to hide, which makes verification difficult. Moreover, it is almost impossible to differentiate between nuclear- and conventional-tipped missiles.

One possible solution would be to ban all nuclear-armed SLCMs entirely. This is opposed by many in the U. S. government, who see the force as an important auxiliary to America's ballistic missile force and are reluctant to limit the U.S. lead. The U.S. lead, however, is likely to be temporary. At the same time the geographical asymmetries favor the USSR. Key American cities and military installations are near the coasts, and thus easy targets for Soviet SLCMs, while comparable Soviet targets are deep inland and protected by heavy air defense. These factors may eventually induce a new administration to compromise.

The second key issue is SDI. President Reagan remains committed to developing, testing and deploying such a system, despite large doubts about its feasibility and utility on the part of the majority of the country's top scientists and arms control specialists.

However, opposition to breaking the ABM treaty is strong in Congress—and among a number of government agencies, including the joint chiefs of staff.⁴ Moreover, budgetary pressures are likely to lead to some revision of SDI. Finally, President Reagan's successor will not have the same vested stake in the program that President Reagan has. Thus the prospects for a START accord, based on acceptance of the ABM treaty as signed and ratified by the U.S. Senate, should improve once Reagan leaves office.

An important step toward an accord would be resolution of the dispute over the Krasnoyarsk radar, which the Reagan Administration—as well as many of its critics—claim is a violation of the ABM treaty. From the military point of view the radar is not particularly important. However, it has enormous political significance, particularly within the Congress, and is likely to be a major stumbling bloc to the conclusion of a START accord. Dismantlement of the radar—perhaps in return for a clear commitment by the United States to adhere to the ABM treaty—would be an important demonstration of the Soviet Union's commitment to arms control and would do much to build support for a START agreement within the U.S. Congress.

A final issue that needs to be resolved is related to mobile missiles. Traditionally the U.S. has regarded mobility as a stabilizing factor. The Reagan Administration, however, reversed this position and sought a ban on mobile missiles in the START talks, largely because of the Pentagon's concern about verification. This position needs to be revised. Allowing both sides to deploy a limited number of mobile missiles would enhance stability. While the verification problems are real they are not insurmountable. In short, the gains in stability outweigh the problems posed by verification.

2. Conventional Arms Control

Both sides need to give greater attention to conventional arms control in the next few years. This problem has been made all the more acute from the Western point of view by the INF treaty, which has accentuated the current asymmetries at the conventional level, particularly the Soviet Union's preponderance in tanks and forward deployed armor. It is this conventional preponderance more than anything else that animates West European concerns about the Soviet "threat." Thus until this issue is squarely addressed, Europe is likely to remain a seat of tension and potential instability.

Recently the Soviet Union has shown a greater recognition of the basic problem and a willingness to address Western concerns more forth-

rightly. The communique issued at the end of the Berlin meeting of the WTO in May 1987 calls on both alliances to eliminate the capacity for offensive action and constrain the capability for surprise attack. In addition, General Secretary Gorbachev has acknowledged the existence of "asymmetries" and called upon the side which has the advantage in a particular category to make reductions in order to eliminate this advantage.

These elements of "new thinking" represent important steps forward and are to be applauded. For the first time East and West appear to agree conceptually on what the basic goal of the negotiations should be (though they still differ on how to achieve it). The task now is to translate these conceptual principles into concrete actions.

The goal, however, should not simply be a reduction of forces on both sides but a *restructuring* of the forces to eliminate the capacity for large-scale offensive action and surprise attack. The initial focus therefore should be on those weapons which enhance the capability for such actions, in particular battle tanks and forward deployed armor. The talks should also seek to reduce other capabilities that enhance the capacity for offensive action such as forward-deployed stockpiles of material and bridge-building equipment.

3. Regional Issues

Both sides also need to find ways of reducing and regulating their competition in the Third World. This is particularly important because it was precisely differences in this area that brought about the collapse of the previous period of detente.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the recent progress toward a settlement of Angola and Namibia have significantly improved prospects for bilateral talks on regional issues. The task now is to build upon recent developments to impart new momentum to the bilateral discussions and to transplant the same degree of cooperation to other areas.

One area of potential cooperation in the future could be in the Persian Gulf. Here the two superpowers share a common interest in seeing an end to the war between Iran and Iraq. The war has not only caused a tragic and senseless loss of life, but carries with it the seeds of potential escalation, which could drag in the superpowers. Hence both powers have a common interest in cooperating to help end the war.

One possibility would be a joint peacekeeping force in the Persian Gulf undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations. The force could involve several other powers as well, including neutral countries like Sweden. Such an initiative would be consistent with the espoused Soviet desire, articulated in General Secretary Gorbachev's important article in *Pravda* on September 17, 1987, to see a strengthening of the UN peacekeeping activities and could set an important precedent for future cooperative endeavors in other areas. While such an idea has been regarded with some suspicion by the Reagan Administration, it might find a more receptive response from a new Administration not wedded to the policies of the past.

At the same time the U.S. should reconsider its attitude toward an international peace conference the Middle East. An international conference under the auspices of the Security Council—or one modeled after the 1973 Geneva Conference, in which Moscow and Washington both played important roles—could help revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace process. Here again the advent of a new Administration more resolutely committed to resolving the current conflict could provide new opportunities for more fruitful bilateral cooperation.

4. Global Issues

Both superpowers need to give greater attention to "global issues." The more forthcoming Soviet approach to such issues and the recognition of the trend toward greater international interdependence recently is a welcome development and creates new prospects for greater bilateral cooperation in this regard. One area where the two countries could cooperate fruitfully is in protecting the environment. Joint research on the problem of "global warming," for instance, could yield positive results.

The two countries could also work more closely to help solve the international debt crisis, which is a major threat to international stability. The West European countries in the European Community have agreed to write off the debts of the least developed countries in the "Fourth World." The Soviet Union, which holds 25 % of the debt of these countries, could do the same. This would be a concrete and tangible demonstration of the Soviet Union's commitment to resolving the problems of the poorer developing countries. The U.S. should take a similar step. However, in the case of the U.S. the problem is more complicated, because a large percentage of the debt of many of these countries is held by commercial banks rather than the government.

5. Human Rights and Exchanges

The dialogue on human rights needs to be deepened and expanded. There still remains a large degree of misperception and misunderstanding about each other's society and political system on both sides. One important contribution would be to increase and expand the level of exchange programs. For instance, there are currently some 10,000 Chinese graduate students in the US. The USSR and the U.S., however, officially exchange only about forty graduate students each year (although the number is larger if all students, graduate and non graduate, are included). Why should there be such a gross disproportion between the number of students from China studying in the U.S. and those from the Soviet Union? This discrepancy is clearly not justified in light of the importance which each side attaches to relations with the other. The decision at the Moscow summit to expand the number of exchanges between high school students in each country was a step in the right direction. It should be complemented, however, by a significant expansion of the number of graduate students permitted to study in each country. This would contribute to a better informed educated elite in both countries and could help to reduce misperceptions and mistrust over the long term.

The above list by no means exhausts the bilateral agenda. But it does highlight the major priorities. To what extent they will be adequately addressed remains to be seen. However, as noted earlier, there are grounds for cautious optimism. After several false starts, the two sides now have an unparalleled opportunity to put their relations on a firmer footing and reduce some of the most pressing sources of tension. It is in their mutual interest—as well as that of their allies—to seize this opportunity. This will require New Thinking—and new approaches—on both sides.

¹ The concerns about the SS-20 were raised in particular by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his discussions with Brezhnev. His protests, however, were ignored. See his *Menschen und Mächte* (Siedler Verlag) p. 99-124.

² In a speech to the Atlantic Council on June 14, 1988.

ECOLOGY AND DIPLOMACY

Renat PERELET

There are at least two global problems now that have assumed the character of a threat to entire humanity. One of them is the war danger aggravated by an almost uncontrolled arms race and the other, the outdated, ecologically destructive nature of contemporary world industrial development.

It is certainly arguable which of these problems is worse or how far they are subordinated to each other, but their interconnection is obvious. First of all, the capability of weapons of mass destruction—be they nuclear, biological, chemical or geophysical weapons or weapons called “environmental” as if in mockery—is formidable. What their use can lead to is just as clear.

Secondly, the arms race is swallowing the limited natural, material, manpower and financial resources which are so necessary for “repairing” and restoring the environment and will be needed more and more for these ends as the years go by (that is, if we can still measure the extent of degradation of the biosphere in years). In this case as in others, figures speak for themselves. Current military spending, which, incidentally, nearly equals the total debt of the developing countries, exceeds one trillion dollars. Is it very much or is it not? In any case, the sum is five times as large as is needed for environmental protection and twice as large as the amount needed for the “mere” restoration of the natural resources potential of the Earth’s biosphere damaged by man.

And here is another fact. To fulfil the action plan for the conservation of tropical forests, it is necessary to spend an annual 1.3 billion dollars over five years; to combat desertification of the planet, an annual 4.5 billion dollars for twenty years (however, more than this will have to be spent unless immediate action is taken); and to press forward with the measures envisaged within the framework of the UN International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, 30 billion dollars. We may ask again whether or not this is very much. The sums listed above are spent by our civilisation for military purposes every one to ten days. It follows that two doors are held hospitably open to death, since we are producing suicidal weapons and, having run out of money as a result, are putting off the compensation we owe to nature for the damage caused by our purely peaceful activities. And by failing to rethink these activities, we are actually courting environmental disaster.

The inference seems clear. Assuming that the aim of politics is to protect people’s interests, all deliberate or unintentional counterposing ecology and politics, or separating them is completely unjustified. The problem will apparently be solved all the more speedily, the sooner we realise that environmental protection, the protection of man from products and results of his activity and hence from himself, is not so much environmental, technological, economic, and so on, as primarily *political*. Therefore what is called for is an adequate approach and reasonable efforts in both home and foreign policy, for comprehensive, active and fruitful international cooperation. Joint efforts in this sphere are all the more necessary because the time for organising such cooperation is up.

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Indeed, there are too many facts indicating that the environmental danger is coming to play a decisive role in the development of civilisation and international relations, especially because man's economic activity is becoming perfectly comparable to global natural processes as to proportions and, above all, effects.

Every year industrial plants, particularly thermal power stations, emit about 190 million tons of sulphur dioxide. Similar emissions of natural origin (volcanoes, etc.) are considerably smaller in volume. Industry and automotive transport "enrich" the air with more than 50 million tons of nitroxides, which makes up from one-third to a half of the quantity coming from natural sources (microbiological soil processes, lightning, forest fires, etc.). We must note that sulphur and nitroxides are the main causes of acid rain, which leads to degradation of forests and acidification of water reservoirs, ultimately killing their fish populations, hastens the erosion of metal structures, dams and historical monuments and saps people's health.

Man-made desertification affects over 30 per cent, or 45 million square kilometres, of the Earth's surface. Deserts are advancing at a speed of six million hectares per year. This is because tropical forests are being felled too fast. Yet they now take up 20 per cent of the dry land area of the globe (three billion hectares) and account for over 50 per cent of all plant and animal species. Thus the biosphere is losing in biological diversity, which means that the Earth is growing poorer.

Global action is made imperative both by the logic of solving any environmental problem and of seriously attempting to grasp the whole set of relations between civilisation and nature.

For instance, toxic chemicals or even chemicals not tested for safety admittedly present a hazard, which is growing as the production of chemicals of the latter type doubles once in seven or eight years. In use today are about 70,000 of the most diverse chemicals of which only a few hundred have been put to a reasonably exhaustive ecological test. But is one country equal to carrying out such a test? Of course not, if only because of the high cost.

This explains why an international data bank (or register) of potentially toxic chemicals is being set up within the framework of UNEP (UN Environment Programme)—an indication that joint efforts by the scientists of all countries are now *a sine qua non*.

This is one condition for accomplishing this particular task. But it is certainly not enough because such efforts, while absolutely necessary in themselves, are an attempt to cure the illness rather than prevent it. The practice of "patching" or trying to ecologically "defuse" products known to be environmentally hazardous holds no promise of success, for it means applying again and again a pattern harmful to man and nature: a disastrous decision followed by billions spent on a rescue operation.

I wish to repeat a proposition of paramount importance today: humanity is already crossing the boundary beyond which all further build-up of resource-intensive, high-waste production, such as has been the rule so far, is injurious to the environment and people's health and has become a dangerous anachronism. As a consequence, economic growth is entering into conflict with the task of achieving social objectives.

By developing virtually for its own sake, production is creating a new global problem, that of ensuring technological safety, of protecting the technosphere created by man. Can this problem be solved on the old basis, by "protecting the environment" and cleaning up after the use of technologies? The answer to this given by the international scientific community is a categorical no.

At present a special, environmental threat comes from accidents or faults in key echelons of the technosphere, that is, primarily thermal, atomic and hydraulic power stations (especially their dams and reservoirs), metallurgical, chemical and biotechnological plants, oil and gas pipelines, storage facilities, means of transport carrying toxic and hazardous substances, and so on. The increased proportion of industrial and power plant accidents in recent years demands a revision of the established methods for ensuring their safety. It is now obvious that the use of the most effective industrial safety measures, of up-to-date methods for controlling technological processes and managing industrial production generally does not and in principle cannot guarantee absolute safety of production processes and major engineering structures. The risk of accidents, no matter how improbable, is always there. Besides, the consequences of accidents are tending to spread more and more often beyond the boundaries of the country concerned.

Quests by scientists of various countries and a global assessment of the problem of man's survival have led to a change in environmental priorities. As late as the 1970s, all international and national efforts were directed primarily towards ascertaining and eliminating the damage to the environment done by economic activity, towards introducing ecological norms and standards, in short, towards "cleaning up", but now the aim is cleanness itself. In the early 1980s, the transformation of isolated environmental problems into a universal environmental menace gave rise to the concept of environmentally sound and then stable development. The task set now is to go over to a global development formula ruling out contradictions between economic growth, nature management and the conservation of ecosystems' integrity, a formula under which the present generation would not destroy the future's environmental basis.

The idea of ecodevelopment, or the eco-evolution of man and nature, are ideas whose time has come. But it would be naive to imagine that they will take root in the life of our civilisation by themselves, by virtue of this statement. There is a need for efforts coordinated at the global level, for a revision of the very concept of security, which must be seen as protection both of society and state and of man, without any counterposing of the former to the latter.

What is needed may probably be called "international environmental security". Its concept, which has yet to be worked out in depth, would be a first step towards an environmentally clean civilisation.

To say that international environmental security is necessary is not enough, for this kind of security is even overdue, all the more so since the regional and transboundary environmental danger has long existed as a major factor in international relations and not a "thing in itself" as earlier.

In Europe, for instance, many countries receive considerable amounts of pollutants, which cross frontiers, coming sometimes from countries hundreds or even thousands of kilometres away. Denmark is hit by 65 per cent of the acid rain coming from abroad, Poland by 52 per cent and Hungary and Belgium, by 50 per cent. There are controversies over air pollution between the United States and Canada, Britain and France, the Netherlands and Belgium, the EEC and Scandinavian countries.

International differences over the use of rivers for industrial and agricultural purposes have assumed an acute character. Conflicts have broken out over this in North America (Rio Grande), South America (Amazon and Parana), Africa (Nile), Southern Asia (Ganges, Indus, Brahmaputra), Europe (Rhine), and above all the Middle East (Jordan,

Litany, Orontes and Euphrates). Nearly half the population of the world now lives in the basins of international rivers. There are 214 international river basins in the world, 12 of them situated on the territory of five or more countries. Great importance attaches therefore to international multilateral and bilateral conventions regulating water management on the part of countries supported by one and the same river basin. Incidentally, much has already been done in this respect. Cited as fruitful effort is the work of the Danube Commission and the Canada-US Commission for the Great Lakes. In spite of shortcomings in the functioning of the Rhine Commission, the mechanism for settling international disputes devised by it deserves attention.

Growing desertification and soil erosion in a number of African countries are a source of tension at home and abroad. The threat of death from starvation has given rise to large migrations of people, so that there are "environmental refugees" now. In 1984-1985, these refugees came to nearly 10 million. Many of them settled in cities, adding to social tensions. A notable number of inhabitants of the countries hit by desertification migrated to Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire, with increased friction between countries as a result.

International economic relations are another channel of the spreading environmental menace. For instance, expanding international trade in hazardous chemical products such as pesticides, fertilisers, certain plastics and food ingredients has polluted the environment and caused disease in the importing countries. A cause of deep concern is "pollution export" by industrial firms, especially transnationals. This refers to the sale, burial and processing of hazardous waste or the construction of environmentally harmful production facilities in developing countries.

All this has led to the elaboration of international recommendations to notify importing countries of the degree of toxicity of the products concerned and to adopt an international code regulating the spread and application of pesticides. International banks are urged increasingly to help set up environmentally safe technologies. Of course, these are but the first steps towards putting international economic relations on an environmentally secure basis.

The international and interdisciplinary character of environmental problems on whose solution the survival of humanity hinges has given rise to new urgent problems bearing on international relations. First among them are those of working out principles of international management and global monitoring of the environment, the use of space facilities included; studying questions of environmental security and its role in easing international tensions and ending conflicts as well as in safeguarding national, regional and global security; rethinking national sovereignty in the light of the need to provide international environmental security; taking account of the impact of diverse environmental hazards on international relations; environmental diplomacy and international environmental law. The need has arisen to evolve effective international procedures and mechanisms based on equality and ensuring judicious utilisation of the planet's resources as the common heritage of mankind.

Such are the main tasks facing the world community and hence every country.

What is the Soviet Union's position on environmental protection? How sound is it in the context of international cooperation? How far do our proposals go in this sphere of relations?

One could have expected a very great deal here. Indeed, is the survival of humanity, respect for human life and the provision of every oppor-

tunity for it (which is the very foundation of the environmental movement) not the chief goal of all our foreign policy moves? Cannot this platform be also used for drawing up an impressive and streamlined programme for international environmental security as a full-fledged component of the proposed comprehensive international security system? These questions sound rhetorical, all the more since our foreign policy activity has won universal recognition, with new political thinking and *perestroika* yielding the most tangible results in precisely this area. Nevertheless, there is reason for asking these questions.

Life has shown very clearly that the connection between home and foreign policy is a grim reality which makes itself felt even where it runs counter to someone's interests. And one axiom invites another: *without a strong ecological policy at home there can be no effective foreign policy, nor there can be a reliable international environmental security.* We must admit, therefore, that the lack of appreciable progress—to put it mildly—in the matter of protecting our country's natural surroundings has had the most adverse effect on consideration of the environmental factor in foreign policy.

What is more, decisions and resolutions on the environment adopted at the international level have played practically no role in improving the ecological situation in the country. We have favoured, taken an active part in and even initiated "progressive" declarations and resolutions in various international organisations but actually the ecological situation in some areas of our country has greatly deteriorated. There is, for instance, the oft-mentioned resolution of the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly on "The Historic Responsibility of States for the Preservation of Nature for Living and Future Generations". For many countries, including ours, this is still nothing but a commendable call for action.

Our participation in multilateral environmental cooperation over the past 20 years may be described as uneven and often inconsistent. On the one hand, we actively backed the adoption of UNEP and allocated funds for environmental protection - eight million Soviet rubles for every three years. (The figure is strange because it does not divide by three, and we either underpay or overpay our dues, having made a reservation to this effect.) In the mid-1970s our contribution was the second largest after that of the United States (10 million dollars per year) but now Japan is ahead of us while the United States has reduced its contribution. On the other hand, for some years past this money was not spent. This can only be done on Soviet territory because the rubles allocated for UNEP have been deposited in Moscow's Bank for Foreign Trade and are not freely convertible.

In the early 1980s, a Centre for International Projects was set up under the State Committee on Science and Technology and the USSR Commission for UNEP to organise UNEP-sponsored events and programmes in the Soviet Union. It did and continue to do very important work which has won international recognition. It carries out activities costing three million rubles a year on the Soviet territory, including the teaching of diverse courses for developing countries, such as on the problem of desertification under the Institute of Deserts (Academy of Sciences of the Turkmen Republic), participation by entities of the Ministry of Health in the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals or the organisation of research by Soviet scientists for UNEP. However, the status of the centre and funding problems have not yet been settled definitively by the Finance Ministry and the State Committee on Labour. It is to be hoped that with the transfer of the centre to the State Committee on Nature this will be done at long last.

It was with great difficulties, due to resistance from Western countries which accused us of "politicising" UNEP, that Soviet delegations

to UNEP Governing Council meetings persuaded other countries of the need for UNEP to have "the arms race and the environment" among the main lines of its effort. UNEP set aside modest funds for this. But not a single Soviet organisation undertook to join in work on the problem. What was proposed at best was to study it on the basis of data from Western sources but UNEP turned that down. Fortunately, enough, the funds secured with such difficulty were used after all by SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) for UNEP. It is revealing that in a neighbouring entity, the USSR Academy of Sciences, our scientists took part in preparing a report on "nuclear winter" by SCOPE (Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment) of the International Council of Scientific Unions. But (another "but") the report never went beyond that non-governmental organisation; it was never submitted to either UNEP or other UN agencies. The reason must have been, as so many times before, our notorious lack of interdepartmental coordination.

Environmental problems are now discussed in many organisations in and outside the UN. Speaking of the departmental approach to our foreign environmental policy, I must point out that in our country as in other developed countries, national participation in the work of these entities is organised by the ministries and central departments so empowered by the government. Formerly the State Committee on Science and Technology and now the State Committee on Nature is responsible for Soviet cooperation with UNEP; the Health Ministry, with WHO (World Health Organisation); the State Committee on Hydrometeorology, with the World Meteorological Organisation; the Foreign Ministry, for participation in sessions of the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council), and so on. Needless to say, the ministries and departments concerned send their delegations (nominally representing our state) to meetings of the leading bodies of diverse international agencies. However, one and the same state occasionally turns out to be adhering to different positions in different international organisations!

Lack of coordination is also due to the practice of sending different experts to meetings on environmental problems: the State Committee on Science and Technology sends them to meetings of the UNEP Governing Council; the Foreign Ministry, to sessions of ECOSOC (in the event of its delegation including a staff member of the SCST, he turns out not to be the one who attended the relevant UNEP meeting); nor does it normally send to a UN General Assembly Session the expert who participated shortly before in the discussion of environmental problems at an ECOSOC session. And so our experts at an ECOSOC session occasionally do their best to "improve" a resolution passed by UNEP as a result of great efforts by our representatives, almost defeating it.

With a serious process of reconstruction under way in our foreign policy, we must analyse and take account of all negative phenomena which have limited participation by Soviet organisations and experts in international environmental cooperation and, on the other hand, resulted in our country lacking not only a common but even a coordinated position on environmental problems in diverse organisations. The formation of new structures in the Foreign Ministry and the State Committee on Nature (I believe the Academy of Sciences, too, needs a similar one of its own), makes it truly possible to shape an integral foreign environmental policy.

Now that enterprises are being put on a self-supporting (*khozraschet*) basis, they ought to be offered opportunities to join in environmental cooperation, specifically in the development of low-waste and non-waste, nature-sparing and resource-saving technologies as well as in international conferences abroad by drawing on hard currency earnings from

their foreign trade. As regards international conferences in the Soviet Union, they could be called by drawing on the ruble funds of several of our sponsors. This approach, without necessitating any new budget appropriations for international environmental cooperation, would make it possible to extend Soviet participation in it at the expense of enterprises, international funds of the general public and the scientific and business communities. Assistance to developing countries could probably be rendered on a similar, mutually acceptable basis.

It is very important that our position at international environmental conferences should rest on a sound economic basis. Has anyone calculated the economic cost for us of a 30 per cent reduction by 1993 as against 1980 in emissions of sulphur dioxide or in its flux across our western frontier? This reduction is provided for by a convention which we have signed with the ECE. And what about a cut in the production of freons to deal with "ozone holes"? Yes, we do have technologies making both possible but enterprises and ministries still lack incentives to adopt them and extend their use. Problems of taking account of environmental factors and requirements in foreign economic relations have yet to be worked out.

In the nearly twenty years that have passed since the UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm), we have failed to offer the world community any new concepts or paths of environmentally sound world development. Yet all over the world research is going on into "non-destructive development", "ecodevelopment" or "sustainable development". In our case, however, there are serious discrepancies between declared principles of interaction between nature and socialist society, on the one hand, and economic practice, on the other, which first created acute environmental problems and then, belatedly, brought their seriousness home to us (although it was this that our experts in international economics held against the West). In the final analysis there is a discrepancy between words and deeds that lies at the root of many problems: the ecological ignorance of the population, the purely technocratic character of many ambitious projects, the uncontrolled functioning of ministries and central departments, the low efficiency of their nature-conserving activity and their inadequate participation (often due to a disinclination to participate) in international environmental cooperation.

None but a realistic approach, which the CPSU calls for, can help in putting into practice an international security system for all participating states. An important condition for this is to include the environmental component of this system in the environmental protection programmes of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and in the international programmes of the CMEA, CMEA-EEC, regional commissions of the UN, and so on. In line with this task, it is necessary in drafting a long-term national environmental programme to establish quantitative target indicators consonant with the European environmental strategy up to the year 2000 and for the subsequent period adopted by the UN ECE with our participation and on our initiative.

In preparing for international environmental cooperation, it emerged that no one at the Academy of Sciences, the Foreign Ministry or our universities was seriously engaged either in analysing it or in evolving our concept and strategy of participation. Now that it is planned in conformity with a relevant decision of the CPSU CC and the Council of Ministers "to introduce into all secondary and higher educational institutions a special course in environmental protection and in rational utilisation of natural resources", provisions should be made for setting up at, say, Moscow University, the Moscow Institute of International Relations, the Diplomatic Academy and the Academy of National Economy courses

on international environmental cooperation and environmental diplomacy. If we do not do this, what justification will there be for our inaction?

Cooperation between socialist countries in solving environmental problems is a necessary and highly important component of relevant world efforts. This is undeniable if only because environmental problems in socialist countries, such as pollution due to routine economic activity and accidents, stand out more and more. As for the "contribution" of these countries to global and especially regional, European pollution, the sad situation in our own country is assuming an international dimension and, inevitably, a political character. It is easy enough to imagine the effects of this politisation, all the more so since they make themselves felt even now.

Our environmental cooperation with socialist countries is less than harmonious. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and its allies have taken a whole number of impressive international initiatives. The most important of these was the convocation of the All-European Conference on the Environment in 1979, and worthy of attention in recent years has been our participation in the working out of a European environmental strategy up to the year 2000 and for the subsequent period. In July 1988, the Political Consultative Committee of the WTO countries adopted a document calling on the world community to join efforts with a view to ensure environmental security. In short, our readiness to cooperate actively with all countries who are interested in a clean planet is a fact.

On the other hand, we must regretfully put it on record that it was not our country that took the initiative of proposing and effecting a 30 per cent reduction in emissions of sulphur dioxide, a cut in emissions of nitrous oxides, switching to lead-free gasoline, and other measures. Indeed, our role with regard to these initiatives was that of a country having to catch up with others.

The reason for poor coordination of environmental action is unquestionably the same as for what we consider unsatisfactory economic cooperation. For much too long, both suffered from an overall, excessively broad approach that often made us lose sight of the very essence of the problem and the object of cooperation. This explains why cooperation proved unable either to solve effectively some environmental problems of individual countries or to accomplish environmental tasks at the international level with the participation of Western and developing countries. Due to our insufficient involvement in joint action against environmental crisis and the regrettable inadequacy of our approach, global cooperation itself, while remaining nominally global, may lose its universal trend and become an instrument of meeting the interests of one country or rather one group of countries.

For the time being, this seems to be the case, more or less. The United States, for one, is plainly bent on putting environmental cooperation on a bilateral basis by cutting the dues it pays to international organisations and, on the other hand, by using their leverage for the solution of problems facing its national environmental and economic strategy. This is exemplified by its choice of global priorities: prognostication of the state of tropical forests, the collection of data on the natural resources of the planet (on their quantity and quality) and on the impact of the environmental situation in one region, such as Europe, on the economies of countries of other regions, the creation of prerequisites for business to actively infiltrate the economies of developing countries, the transfer of environmentally harmful industries to these countries, and so forth.

Now whatever our opinion of the aims of this strategy, we must admit that the US tactics of environmental diplomacy and mechanism of international cooperation, deserve serious attention. The United States first discusses its environmental priorities within the framework of the OECD

(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), which groups 24 of the most developed capitalist countries. An important merit of the OECD is that this forum specifies both the priority lines of cooperation and the concrete time limits of fulfilling the tasks set by it.

Then, in conjunction with other capitalist countries, the United States submits its proposals to the UN ECE and then these problems are submitted to UNEP, GAP, IUCN and other international organisations. In the end an OECD programme, if approved by these organisations as well as by ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly, is understandably implemented with international funds.

True, very often proposals of the OECD members are perfectly justified and meet the interests of other countries but, even so, the environmental initiatives should be reserved to the international community. And it is essential to ensure that the voice of socialist countries is heard clearly in the international chorus.

The socialist community members are now faced with important tasks in the area of environmental cooperation: safeguarding the environmental security, setting up a system of international environmental security as a component of a comprehensive international security system, and solving their own environmental problems. The very trend of development demands that we evolve both an environmental strategy for the socialist community and an elaborate concept of the community's environmental development. This is long overdue. All underestimation of the need to establish harmony between man and nature, to restore their community, is likely to have the direct consequences. Environmental protection today is a criterion of the efficiency of a state, of the humanism of society, of the judgement of scientists and the sense of duty of the authority.

Developments suggest that in 1992 or, possibly, earlier, the UN will hold its second world conference on the human environment (the first took place in Stockholm in 1972). At the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly (1987), Sweden offered to host the projected conference. Preparations for it should start now. The subject of environmental security and stable development could top the conference agenda.

I hope we will attend that important forum fully prepared, having both sound proposals for the solution of the problem of the environment at the global level and, most important of all, a valid, truly up-to-date programme.

The problem of protecting civilisation from itself is gaining fast in complexity. It calls for prompt and well-thought-out measures resulting from the joint efforts of politicians, diplomats, scientists, economists, managers and a fully informed public.

THE 43RD MEETING ON THE EAST RIVER

The 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly, which opened on September 20, is taking place under favourable international conditions unprecedented for decades. The first step to a nuclear-free world has been taken. The Soviet-US Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which substantively backs the positive evolution of the dialogue between the two countries as the objective pivot of international relations, is a spur to the fruitful processes gaining momentum in every sphere of those relations. An intensive bilateral search is on for solutions to problems of the nuclear complex, in particular for a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons with the preservation of the ABM Treaty and cuts in nuclear tests. Interest in multilateral disarmament is being revived. This was more obvious than ever at the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament last summer. The session notably contributed to the collective pool of ideas whose purpose is to seek security through disarmament. The effort to settle regional conflicts, until recently a seemingly chronic disease of the second half of the 20th century, has reached a turning point. Ever more, the international community realises the interdependence and integrity of today's world and the need for a comprehensive approach to the problems facing it, for simultaneous and parallel efforts in every field.

Characteristically, the change in the climate of international relations has led to stepped-up UN activity. UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar says that the meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev set the world community an example of voluntary dialogue. Governments had unexpectedly discovered that the UN is a perfectly suitable place for talks and the settlement of problems, he concludes. Indeed, interdependence expressed itself in the fact that the very first but resolute steps in the dialogue between the two leading powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, opened the door, as it were, to multilateral actions by the entire world community. The UN, brought into existence through cooperation and hence capable of functioning normally and fruitfully only in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding among nations, benefits again from invigorating international cooperation.

The renaissance of the UN is not a spontaneous process but the result of its member states' increased sense of responsibility, of their growing perception of cooperation and interaction as an imperative of today. The renewal of the UN began on the initiative of the socialist countries, which advanced the concept of a comprehensive international security system in line with the Organisation's aims and principles. It is safe to say that the lively international democratic dialogue which unfolded in response to that wide-ranging initiative produced a conceptual breakthrough at the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly. The session was unexampled in terms of the number of ideas and opinions expressed with a view to enhancing the efficiency of the Organisation. Setting in now is the next stage, at which the renaissance of the UN must be consolidated and made irreversible.

The concept of the UN as a centre coordinating international efforts in a democratically organised world was set out by Mikhail Gorbachev on

September 17, 1987 in his article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World". As a matter of fact, the ideas of the article constitute the quintessence of the Soviet approach to the UN. Moscow has actively joined in the renewal and rejuvenation of the Organisation and contributes new, increasingly specific and detailed ideas to the dialogue in progress on the East River.

The Soviet delegation to the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly is equipped with a constructive programme. Our proposals are now directed towards raising the efficiency of the UN, building up its potential for preventive diplomacy and crisis prophylaxis and asserting the primacy of law in state-to-state relations.

First of all, the Soviet Union considers that the permanent members of the Security Council should seek ever closer cooperation on a wide range of problems, including that of settling conflicts. It is felt that there are no objective hurdles to exploring the possibilities of applying measures, procedures and reciprocal obligations in the spirit of restraint, self-limitation and respect for the peoples' freedom of choice such as would preclude the outbreak of conflicts, to say nothing of their globalisation. The UN has serious reserves enabling it to use the mechanism of consultations between the five permanent members of the Council and to invite the Secretary General and, if necessary, representatives of the countries directly concerned to take part. In some cases the Security Council could also hold formal closed-door meetings to concentrate on extending the area of agreement and undertake an in-depth analysis of problems on which agreement is emerging without the adoption of final documents as an absolute necessity. The Soviet Union has reaffirmed its opinion about the usefulness of the Security Council meeting periodically at the level of foreign ministers, during or on the eve of General Assembly sessions, as well as about the possibility of holding special meetings in areas of friction and tension.

It would apparently be worth thinking about creating under the aegis of the UN a system of the "early detection" of danger spots in international socio-economic and military political relations to call world public attention to them and search beforehand for ways to eliminate them by political means.

The Soviet Union takes an increasingly constructive stand on the General Assembly as a major component of the collective security system enshrined in the UN Charter. For the Assembly is, in effect, a general consultation which nations hold at regular intervals to draw conclusions from the state of world affairs, express their anxieties and set out their views on likely approaches to various problems. It is also a forum helping ascertain areas of agreement with full regard to all interests, coordinate specific ways of solving problems and choose the mechanisms to be entrusted with carrying out agreed decisions. The Assembly could move on to real action by putting stronger emphasis on the search for consensus. What we mean is not nominal but real consensus expressive of an actual narrowing of the gap between approaches and holding the promise of joint efforts by countries.

Concentrating on preventive diplomacy implies greater use of UN peace-keeping activities. These operations could be carried out both where conflicts have already broken out and where preventive measures are needed to give material support to relevant Security Council decisions. This is why the Soviet Union has proposed that the 43rd Session should discuss in a broader context and more carefully than before possible steps to intensify the UN's peace-making effort in this important sector.

Coming to the fore is the task of using UN observers and armed forces to carry out fact-finding missions in international disputes and conflicts, monitoring the military situation in conflict areas and trouble spots of the

planet, collecting the requisite information and promptly making it available to the UN to contribute to the process of political settlement.

More than ever before, all nations recognise the need for law and order. To ensure the primacy of law is to provide effective guarantees of non-circumvention of international legal obligations and shape a regime making it certain that all countries will honour them without fail.

International law and order means both using existing instruments and devising additional ones for the peaceful settlement of disputes, such as allow any state-to-state differences to be smoothed out on a fair basis. The main instrument existing today is talks. But apart from talks, it is essential to bring in the mechanisms of international justice. The Soviet Union has therefore appealed to all countries, primarily the other permanent members of the Security Council, to recognise the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as binding—on mutually agreed terms.

Subsequently the international community could concentrate on drawing up a broad, long-term international law programme designed to work out consensus documents specifying and carrying forward provisions of the UN Charter that have to do with the principles of international law and setting out in international legal terms such categories of new political thinking as the interdependence and integrity of the contemporary world, the priority of universal values, mutual respect for interests, confidence, openness, the search for agreed solutions.

Confidence between countries and harmony within the international community can be built both through joint efforts and by getting to know each other better, through an increased flow of information. A particularly pressing requirement today is a global information programme whose paramount object should be to efface the enemy image and foster a durable partnership mentality. This would show that security is indivisible and all-embracing.

The priority of a multilateral approach, the renaissance of the UN and the assertion of full confidence are components of the philosophy of new internationalism, which presupposes a creative search for a balance of interests free from old patterns and stereotypes. It is on this philosophical basis that the Soviet Union proposes working out a common platform for the international community to advance to a safe and non-violent world. Such a platform means desisting from attempts to aggravate ideological confrontation, curbing controversy and propaganda, refusing to be spellbound by military power, opting without qualification for a constructive approach and setting up a ramified infrastructure reliably linking all nations together by common goals and bonds of cooperation.

The Soviet Union does not merely generate ideas but demonstrates in practice its commitment to bringing about genuine internationalism and strengthening the UN. Soviet officials are cooperating successfully with the UN observers in Afghanistan. Moscow has signified its readiness to help take Blue Helmets to the Iran-Iraq frontline and agreed to include its representatives in the observer team in Namibia. Our country assists the UN financially as well. Last year it fully paid the sum in arrears to the regular budget, and now it is gradually paying the debt it owes for the maintenance of UN armed forces. After all, the normal functioning of the UN and the growing significance of its influence are inseparable from its administrative and financial health.

The 43rd Session carefully examines all the ideas submitted to it and ascertains the prospects for their development. The delegates assembled in New York realise how very much they can accomplish provided they proceed from common interests, heed each other's anxieties and raise their sights to long-term tasks.

THE UNITED NATIONS HAS ITS PROBLEMS

James JONAH

It may come as a surprise to many to learn that the United Nations enjoyed universal support and acceptance for only a very brief period in its history, that is, in the months following its creation in 1945. The horrors of the Second World War and the human degradation it produced led to the determination of world leaders to establish a new foundation for global security and peace. That determination, coupled with the eternal yearning of the peoples of the world for peace and security contributed to the initial enthusiasm for and endorsement of the Organization.

Even that initial acceptance, however, was mixed. Those who had formulated what became known as the Dumbarton-Oaks Proposals * were not of one mind as to whether they wanted a universal organization for peace and security or an international system secured by regional security arrangements. The resolution was that a universal organization was accepted grudgingly, while the principle of collective security was endorsed in the Charter. Scholars have argued that this principle was immediately rendered inoperative when the right of veto was given to the five permanent members of the Security Council. The principal Powers could not even agree on how the Organization should function. Within the first five years of the Organization's existence, doubts were already being expressed about its capacity to fulfil the hopes and aims of the Charter. Criticisms about the inherent weaknesses of the Organization that are voiced so frequently today were current at that time. Crises of confidence and disenchantments of Governments and peoples over the performance of the Organization are, therefore, not new. It is also true that the United Nations has somehow been able to stumble, persevere and survive. What has been an alarming tendency recently is the determination by certain circles, such as the Heritage Foundation seriously to undermine the Organization while at the same time paying lip service to its original concept. The strategy these circles have adopted is to raise questions about the legitimacy of the Organization.

There are Governments that still wish the United Nations well, but are dissatisfied with developments within it. They call for significant changes and lament that the United Nations, instead of harmonizing the interests of governments in favour of peace and security, is deliberately exacerbating crises by the tone of its discussions in its deliberative organs and its voting patterns.

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* The Dumbarton-Oaks Conference (USA, August 21-October 7, 1944) worked out basic propositions for the UN Charter.—Ed.

WHAT AILS THE UNITED NATIONS?

The foregoing retrospective is essential in order to put the current state of the United Nations in perspective. It is not difficult to ensure total endorsement of the Organization by all and sundry. Why then should we be concerned about the current difficulties of the Organization? To be able to suggest an answer, it is necessary to make a diagnosis of the present crisis.

So much has been said of the present financial crisis that we have almost been persuaded that the problem is essentially financial. In fact the financial crisis is a reflection or expression of a deeper political problem in the Organization.

No attempt is being made here to minimize budgetary growth and what some consider an uneven distribution of financial contributions to the Organization. It is now widely recognized that too few Member States carry an overwhelming share of the budget while those Member States that enjoy the majority vote in the General Assembly contribute a small fraction. Furthermore, the United Nations cannot insulate itself from the financial discipline many governments observe in the conduct of their national affairs.

The United States and those of its allies that originally fervently supported the Organization are now disenchanted with its overall performance. Their earlier majority in the General Assembly has been reduced to minority status and they now protest against what they call "the tyranny of the majority". Their erstwhile understanding that collective security is the central goal of the Charter now often clashes with the third world's special focus on three themes: decolonization; development; and an end to racial discrimination and *apartheid*. Unwilling to consider that a minority status may have resulted, to some extent, from their policy positions on the current agenda of the Organization, many of the Western States have levelled criticism against the third world countries for being "irresponsible" and for allowing themselves to be inordinately influenced by the Soviet Union and its allies.

Attempts by the United States, in particular, to change this unfavourable position have taken many forms. At one time, former United Nations Permanent Representative to the United Nations (now Senator) Daniel Patrick Moynihan advocated a policy of "talking back" to third world representatives. That approach produced a lot of heat and controversy but did not change things very much. On the contrary, it made the situation much worse and during his watch in 1975 the General Assembly adopted a resolution linking Zionism with racism—a resolution that remains an anathema to Israel, the U. S. and many of its allies.

Another approach that was put forward by former Permanent Representative Dr. Jeanne Kirkpatrick was to make Member States pay heavily for their allegedly anti-U. S. voting pattern. At the request of the U. S. Congress, an analysis of the voting pattern of Member States is presented to Congress each year. This was supposed to influence how U. S. economic military assistance would be allocated to countries of the third world. This approach did not bear much fruit either, since Member States could hardly change their fundamental policy positions on issues such as *apartheid*, support for Palestinian self-determination, opposition to the occupation of territories and allocation of resources for development.

It is often assumed that many third world countries determine their votes in the General Assembly on the basis of the financial or military assistance given to them. Suggestions have even been made that some third world countries have been bribed to vote in a particular way. For example, the votes of African States in support of the Arab States in a number of resolutions relating to the Middle East have been said to have been in-

fluenced by "oil money" as well as to ensure Arab support on issues relating to southern Africa. There may be some truth in these allegations but it is too simple to suppose that all votes could be so influenced.

In the circumstances, the power of the purse, which has worked miracles in previous historical periods, is now being put to the test. One example is the withholding by certain major financial Powers of assessed contributions to the U. N. budget until an acceptable formula for decision on financial matters is reached. These Powers hope they can gain leverage to determine the programmes of the Organization. Third World countries, which well understand the intent of this tactic, are wary that the principle of consensus should become a way of reaching decisions on financial matters. They have seen Global Negotiations reach a virtual dead-end by virtue of the consensus principle. As is well known, the U. S., the U. K. and the FRG would not join in a consensus on Global Negotiations.

There is, of course, an ongoing good faith effort to determine whether the reform measures that have been adopted by the General Assembly can ameliorate, if not end, the financial/political crisis. Unfortunately, however, the situation has worsened instead of improving. In light of the reform measures, the U. S. Government has expressed its partial satisfaction and willingness to make good its financial contributions. However, the U. S. Congress has not yet agreed to the Administration's change of heart. Consequently, it does not seem likely that the United States will be in a position to pay all its dues to the Organization and the financial difficulties of the Organization may well continue.

It may be useful to observe that assessed financial contributions to the U. N. budget have some significant benefits. One, in particular, is the manner in which large financial contributions are reflected in the ranges or quota of staff of the U. N. Secretariat. Of the three factors—membership, geography and contribution—the latter has the highest weight of fifty-five per cent. Consequently, if the contribution rate of a Member State is reduced, there is a corresponding reduction in the number of staff in the range or quota of that Member State.

All along, however, the financial crisis has been taken by the Secretary-General and the General Assembly as a "window of opportunity" to promote necessary administrative changes in the Organization. This consideration warranted the establishment of the Group of 18, and influenced its deliberations and recommendations. The recommendations and their partial implementation thus far have received mixed responses. While the Secretary-General's actions have been applauded, others have pointed out that structural changes and the reduction of staff do not provide the real answer. There is, they claim, a need to give equal consideration to the quality of staff and the underlying factors that provoked the financial crisis.

SOVIET UNION SHOWS NEW INTEREST IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The disenchantment of the United States with the present state of the United Nations should be contrasted with the renewed interest of the Soviet Union in strengthening the Organization. The change in the Soviet position is significant in light of its earlier ambivalent attitude towards the Organization. In the shadow of Western majority status in the United Nations during its first decade and the corresponding minority status of the socialist countries, the Soviet Union gave rather luke-warm support to the Organization. It seemed to many at the time that the Soviet Union was opposed to the United Nations as a dynamic instrument of Government especially in its attempts to restrict or to confine the authority of the Secretary-General to article 98 of the Charter, which defines his or her function as the Chief Administrative Officer of the Organization. Since the

1970s, the Soviet Union has increasingly found itself in the company of the third world majority in both the General Assembly and the Security Council. One marked result has been the decreasing use of its veto in the Security Council, while at the same time we have witnessed an increasing use of the veto by the U. S. and the U. K.

As the U. S. appears to retreat from multilateralism, the Soviet Union shows a strong indication of embracing that concept. As the U. S. withholds its financial support to the Organization, the Soviet Union eagerly pays its full assessed contribution, makes voluntary contributions to assist the Secretary-General in coping with the financial crisis and made the surprising announcement that it would pay for past peace-keeping assessments it had previously denounced and refused to pay.

It is necessary to commend also the remarkable efforts of many West European countries that have assisted the Secretary-General in his efforts to obtain financial stability. While they share U. S. concern about developments in the United Nations, they have refrained from withholding their assessed contributions. Credit should go to Japan, another major contributor that has honoured its financial obligations and much more.

Many who support the re-invigoration of the Organization were pleasantly surprised by the views expressed by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in an article entitled "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World" which was published in the Soviet press on 17 September 1987. The views were addressed essentially to the delegates of the forty-second session of the U. N. General Assembly and represent further elaboration of the Soviet Union's notion or concept of a Comprehensive System of international security. Admittedly, this concept has not been warmly received by many Western countries and it is therefore of some interest to review the content of the article.

They were re-assured when General Secretary Gorbachev asserted that Comprehensive System of security called for "...continuity and compatibility with existing institution for keeping the peace" and that the system could operate on the basis of the United Nations Charter and within the framework of the United Nations.

Significantly, the views in the article about the functions of the United Nations were departures from the past known Soviet position. General Secretary Gorbachev argued for a more dynamic and robust United Nations, particularly in efforts to tackle regional disputes. He expressed strong support for U. N. Peace-keeping and called upon all Member States to extend to the Secretary-General "their fullest support and assist him in the discharge of his responsible mission". He added that the world community must encourage the Secretary-General "in his missions of good offices, mediation or conciliation".

Regrettably, owing perhaps to the distrust and cynicism that had characterized the period of the cold war, and which even persisted during brief periods of detente, there remain doubts among a number of Member States about the new Soviet position on the United Nations. This scepticism was more pronounced when the General Assembly examined at its forty-second session the proposal for a "Comprehensive system of international peace and security". The controversy over the draft resolution was intense. Nevertheless, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/93 on a "Comprehensive System of international peace and security".

THIRD WORLD DISENCHANTMENT

It is important to take note of the present third world attitude towards the Organization. It is widely assumed that third world countries are content with the United Nations, owing perhaps, to the majority status they

hold in the General Assembly, and the blocking majority they also enjoy in the Security Council. However, third world countries have an ambivalent attitude towards the United Nations. The Organization is of vital importance to them because their membership in it gives legitimacy to their sovereign equality with other Member States. They acknowledge that without the Organization it would have been considerably more difficult to have brought about such a rapid and fundamental decolonization process. They have also been able to utilize the forum of the United Nations to hold the major Powers accountable for their international conduct and behaviour.

Despite these obvious advantages, however, third world countries are also disenchanted with the Organization. They continue to lament the inability of the Security Council to promote peace in the Middle East, to end occupation of the Arab territories, and to take effective measures to abolish *apartheid* by imposing comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. The use of the veto in the Security Council to block the unimpeded implementation of resolution 435, on bringing independence to Namibia, has been condemned by the third world countries in general and by the African states in particular. The failure to bring about Global Negotiations remains of deep regret to third world countries. Nor are they fully convinced of the nature of the goal of the current reform measures. No one should, however, seriously doubt the determination of third world countries to strengthen the Organization. They see it as in their best interest that the Organization should be strong and vital.

POSSIBLE AREAS OF CO-OPERATION

Recent developments, particularly the United Nations brokered agreement on Afghanistan, may augur well for the Organization. Even though there were other contributing factors, the patience and perseverance shown by Under-Secretary-General Cordovez, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, provided, at the very least, the framework and motivation that made the agreement possible. The use of UN personnel to ensure compliance with the agreement, and the large scale humanitarian assistance programme headed by Prince Sadrudin Aga Khan may strengthen the new co-operation between the major powers and the Organization in tackling regional disputes.

While Member States understand that profound disagreement between the super Powers may reduce the chance of getting effective United Nations action in managing international disputes, they are equally ambivalent when there is close co-operation between the super Powers. What is a hopeful sign for the Organization following the Afghanistan case is that the two super Powers co-operated with the United Nations through the Secretary-General's Personal Representative to produce a settlement. Should the Afghanistan settlement live up to expectations then it might provide a model for similar co-operation in tackling other regional disputes.

There is, of course, a serious problem that should be confronted when considering the capacities of the United Nations as a peace-maker. States in dispute, together with their clients, and supporters, are able to determine to which fora they should go for mediation of their conflicts. Increasingly, many States are shying away from the United Nations machinery provided in the Charter. To take just one example, there is a growing belief that the United Nations is ill-suited for peace-making in the Middle East. Yet, those who take that position tend to ignore the enormous achievements of the United Nations in containing if not resolving the conflict in the area and allowing peace negotiations to proceed.

Sovereign States will, nevertheless, continue to resort to those fora where they believe they can obtain the greatest support possible so that when a party to a conflict believes it has minimum support for its position in the United Nations it will definitely use every device possible to avoid resorting to the U. N. forum. This phenomenon may well explain why it has been difficult to fashion a meaningful role for the United Nations in its current efforts to find a just and lasting settlement to the conflict in the Middle East.

As we look forward to the possibility of co-operation between the super Powers and the United Nations in tackling regional problems, we should, however, be mindful that such co-operation will not be possible if the machinery of the Organization is weakened. The fact is that sooner or later even the super Powers find it in their interest to utilize the Organization in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. If continuous lack of support for the Organization weakens its capacity to act, however, then the Organization will not be able to perform effectively when there is a willingness for it to take on major responsibilities. It is, therefore, essential that the major Powers, along with all Member States, reaffirm their support for an effective Organization.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

The central focus of the foregoing analysis has been essentially political, although references have been made to related economic and environmental issues. It may be helpful, perhaps to add a brief survey of the involvement of the Organization in economic and social matters. The economic and social activity of the United Nations is threefold: research and deliberation on global economic and social issues, negotiation of international agreements; and "operational activities" (essentially technical, food and emergency assistance).

While a great deal of United Nations research on such critical issues as population, trade, environment, statistics and social problems goes relatively unnoticed, that research has the merit of being universal in scope and has a long-term perspective. Furthermore, its interdisciplinary nature makes it relatively unique. In recent years this important work has suffered due to lack of sufficient resources and sufficiently qualified staff.

It is in the negotiation of hardcore economic issues—essentially North-South issues—that there has been relatively little progress in the United Nations except at a general political level. Thus, for example, a successful session of UNCTAD VII last year agreed on many important policy orientations in trade, money and finance. The General Assembly has also been seized of the critical external debt issue, as well as the economic crisis in Africa. The food emergency in Africa in 1984-1986, and now the development crisis have evoked positive political responses on the part of the international community in the General Assembly. However, when the overall economic balance sheet is examined the situation in most parts of Africa and Latin America, as well as in some parts of Asia, remains critical. Per capita income levels in a large number of countries are actually declining, social and environmental problems are mounting, and the future is filled with a great deal of uncertainty.

In particular, the external debt problem continues to mount, causing a negative transfer of resources. Real interest rates are high and currency rates are unstable. Many commodity prices are extremely low, and protectionism in the industrial countries keeps many developing countries' markets essentially closed or limited. The debt problem and its inter-related aspects call for urgent solution.

Of course, developing countries need to continue improving their own economic policies as part of their development struggle. They have accepted that, and many have taken courageous steps in that direction, often at great pain to their people. Even so, the external environment constitutes a stumbling block to a genuine improvement and resumption of economic development.

It is in this context that the United Nations and sister agencies continue their technical assistance programmes in developing countries. Despite some setbacks with some major donors, resources for United Nations operational activities have continued to be channeled to developing countries at a growing pace. Much attention has recently focused on assisting developing countries with their adjustment efforts. The United Nations system has also been in the forefront in critical food aid and natural disaster projects.

THE SECRETARIAT IN CRISIS

It is unfortunate that, as support builds for an effective role for the Secretary-General, there is so much disquiet in the Secretariat. Much of this disquiet results from uncertainties among the staff about the full implications of the staff-cuts recommended by the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts, commonly referred to as the Group of 18, and approved by the General Assembly at its forty-first session. Even though the Secretary-General has stressed that he would implement staff-cuts without major adverse effects on the staff, and the General Assembly called for flexibility in implementing the cuts, staff members are worried. At the same time, there is increasing recognition that a contented staff is a vital asset of the Secretariat.

The granting of fixed-term contracts on the basis of secondment of staff has become a litmus test. Those countries adhering to the practice of secondment as the preferred way to assign staff to the Secretariat continue to criticize the granting of permanent contracts on the grounds that it complicates personnel management. In contrast, those States that oppose the granting of fixed-term contracts on a secondment basis argue that such a practice is detrimental to the independence of staff members.

The Secretary-General has made considerable efforts to foster a convergence of positions on this matter. He has drawn the attention of the Soviet Union to the approval by the General Assembly of the Group of 18's recommendation on arrangements for permanent contracts. As a result, the Soviet Union has recently announced its willingness to accept permanent contracts for some of its nationals in the Secretariat. The Secretary-General has welcomed this "qualitatively new element" in the approach of the Soviet Union. However, it has not abandoned its view that a wider use of fixed term appointments based on secondment "would ensure an efficient co-ordination of Member States and international organization administration in the implementation of the Charter principle of staffing the Secretariat with personnel of exemplary efficiency, competence and integrity."

WHAT'S TO BE DONE?

The Secretary-General has given a number of suggestions as to how best the Organization can get through the current crisis. Many Governments have also declared their readiness to overcome the present difficulties and help to build a strong foundation for the Organization. With respect to the financial/political crisis, the Secretary-General has appealed to all Governments to honour their financial obligations and

to pay their assessed contributions as early in the year as possible. He has endeavoured to make crucial reforms in the Secretariat in order to win the confidence of the Member States. But, as has been observed previously, the underlying problems facing the Organization are mainly political in nature.

In his annual report of 1982, the Secretary-General said that the Security Council, the primary organ of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, all too often found itself unable to take decisive action to resolve international conflicts and that its resolutions were increasingly defied or ignored by those that felt themselves strong enough to do so. Too frequently the Council seemed powerless to generate the support and influence necessary to ensure that its decisions were respected, even when they were taken unanimously. "We are perilously near to a new international anarchy", he added.

The Secretary-General proposed a number of measures to reconstruct the Charter's concept of collective action for peace and security, and to provide a workable system of collective security in which Governments could have real confidence. One such measure was more systematic, less last-minute use of the Council. If the Council were to keep an active watch on dangerous situations and, if necessary, initiate discussions with the parties before a crisis was reached, it might often be possible to defuse them before they degenerated into violence, he said.

Ideas were advanced on ways and means of improving procedures to enable the Council to contribute more effectively to the prevention of international conflicts and to the peaceful settlement of disputes. It was felt that a collegial approach was desirable to facilitate concerted action by the Council as the main instrument for international peace. Members also explored the role of fact-finding missions undertaken by the Council, and suggested modalities for their utilization. Members of the Council found the exchange of views valuable and are determined to continue the exercise.

CONCLUSION

In analyzing the causes of the United Nations current difficulties, less emphasis has been placed on explanations associated with isolationism and opposition to multilateralism. It does not seem convincing that the tradition of isolationism, which indeed influenced the U.S. Senate's rejection of the League of Nations covenant at the end of the First World War, could adequately explain the current U.S. posture towards the United Nations. Instead of examining ideological isolationism as a main explanation, we have presented an analytical framework that may enable policy-makers, publicists and commentators to understand the varying attitudes which governments adopt, over time, towards the United Nations.

There is hardly any government today that will deny that we live in an interdependent world and that therefore a global approach to tackling common problems is required. Yet, many governments do operate outside the framework of the Organization—although not necessarily beyond the bounds of the Charter's principles. Depending on their judgement, and perceptions of whether or not they can mobilize support within the Organization, they reach decisions on whether, or not, they should use the machinery provided for in the Charter. Accordingly, the history of the United Nations has clearly demonstrated that the major Powers, in particular, have adopted differing attitudes, at times positive and at times negative, towards the Organization. In the light of this record, it is con-

ceivable that changing circumstances may yet enable the Organization to emerge from its present crisis.

During the recently concluded Summit Meeting in Moscow between President Ronald Reagan of the United States and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR, there was an hopeful sign when, in an exchange of toasts, General Secretary Gorbachev specifically mentioned the important role that the United Nations could play in tackling international problems, particularly regional conflicts. In the past few months, the permanent members of the Security Council have shown a growing inclination to coordinate their action in dealing with issues such as the Iran/Iraq conflict. It appears that there is more willingness among the members of the Council to harmonize, if not merge their actions with a view to the maintenance of international peace and security. These trends give rise to wide-spread hope that the United Nations may, yet again, be able to surmount its present difficulties and to emerge as a strong and viable organization.

This will require that all member states redouble their efforts to accommodate one another with a view to removing the causes of disenchantment among member states and the public at large. It is often said that the United Nations needs one major success to revive confidence in the Organization. The Organization has played a crucial role in assisting governments to reach an accommodation in Afghanistan. There is an urgent need for an agreement among the Council members to expedite the independence of Namibia by implementing Security Council resolution 435 fully and to promote conditions that will advance efforts for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

ALEXANDER SVECHIN. ON WAR AND POLITICS

(Continued from page 126)

¹⁰ Против реакционных теорий на военно-научном фронте Критика стратегических и военно-исторических взглядов проф. Свечина. Moscow, 1931, p. 73.

¹¹ А. Свечин. Эволюция военного искусства, Vol 2, p. 227.

¹² А. Свечин. Эволюция стратегических теорий — В кн.: Война и военное искусство в свете исторического материализма. A Collection of Articles, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p. 74.

¹³ А. Свечин. Стратегия, p. 247.

¹⁴ А. Свечин. Опасные иллюзии. — Военная мысль и революция. Book 2, March 1924, p. 49.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

HAS AN ERA OF NEOCOLONIALISM MATERIALISED?

Nikolai VOLKOV,

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The two or three decades that have passed since most former colonies gained political independence, leading to the disintegration of the colonial system, witnessed profound, and one can say, dramatic changes in relations between the centre and the periphery of the world capitalist economy.

The 1970s were marked by the energy and commodity crises, high prices for energy carriers and other raw materials. Developing countries were swept by a wave of nationalisation of TNC-owned companies, while higher earnings from the exports of raw materials, petroleum first of all, as well as sizable credits granted by the West at that period allowed a number of the Third World countries to carry out many major economic projects and accelerate their economic progress. A group of new industrialised countries (NICs) emerged whose rapid economic growth stemmed from the exports of ready-made garments, textiles, unsophisticated electronics, cars, ships and other traditional engineering products to Western countries. There was a widespread movement for the restructuring of international economic relations and the establishment of a new international economic order. It seemed that at long last the world community had embarked on the road to solving a key global problem, that of overcoming the backwardness of the developing countries where more than 50 per cent of the world population live.

However, the 1980s brought with them certain dissatisfaction. Lower export earnings due to the falling world prices of energy carriers and an acute debt crisis leading to the reduction of capital inflow from the West have seriously damaged the economies of the developing countries and substantially undermined their positions in their struggle for the restructuring of international economic relations.

On the other hand, political instability has plagued the developing countries as much as ever. Military expenditures of the Third World countries were mounting their share in the world military expenditures rising from 7 per cent in 1970 to 18 per cent by the mid-1980s which severely curtailed their opportunities for economic growth limited as they were. The scale of regional conflicts has expanded: in losses and damage the Iran-Iraq conflict has surpassed all armed conflicts since the Second World War. The use of nuclear weapons in some regional conflicts became a tangible threat. The growth of fundamentalist movements and continued terrorist methods resorted to by some groups in the developing countries are now yet another destabilising factor in the international situation.

It is obvious that these processes and developments do not easily fit into our former concepts regarding relations between the West and

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the developing world and require a certain reappraisal of some theoretical assumptions.

For a long time Soviet literature thrived on the scheme of neocolonialism and neocolonialist exploitation which served as a theoretical foundation for analysing West-South relations. According to that scheme the interaction between the centre and the periphery of the world capitalist economy was strongly influenced, on the one hand, by the striving of the Western monopolies to seize control of the raw materials sources and markets in the developing countries via international organisations or through "imperialist aid" and, on the other, by the national liberation forces fighting against imperialist dictate, for economic independence. This rather primitive perception has never been ideal and today this scheme is totally divorced from reality.

It seems that the relatively short postcolonial period of the world capitalist economy gives no ground to ask whether the epoch of neocolonialism has ever materialised. We shall try to show that it has failed as a system of unrestrained economic exploitation of the developing countries.

Of course, neocolonialism as a period of transition from colonialism to new economic relations with politically independent Asian, African and Latin American nations is a real phenomenon. However, we believe that it was determined by preservation of colonialist elements in the changing pattern of economic relations between the former metropolies and the newly-free states. But as the centre and the periphery of the world capitalist economy were establishing relations based on economic coercion, i. e. a specific division of labour depending on the strength of capital and the existence of comparative advantages, the vestiges of colonialism gradually eroded. By the early 1980s there were practically no traces of colonialism left in the world capitalist economic relations. Consequently, there also vanished the real foundation to which one could add the prefix "neo".

To correctly understand the real motives and interests underlying the West's policy towards the developing nations it is of cardinal importance to answer the question of whether the capitalist system (industrialised countries) can develop by itself, without resorting to outside stimulants. This question has a long history: representatives of various economic trends and schools have answered it in both the negative and the affirmative.

Without going into detail we shall state that in Soviet economic literature, particularly on political economy, it was frequently asserted that capitalist production on its own basis and without the pillage of the world economic periphery cannot develop normally. Soviet science and journalism have thrived on tendentious propositions to the effect that under capitalism the narrow effectual demand sets a limit to extended production and that the West cannot do without a system of neocolonialist exploitation, while the latter is the main, the basic impediment to the developing countries' progress.

It should also be noted that in their analysis of neocolonialism Soviet authors for a long time adhered to the concept of non-equivalent exchange which postulated that the industrialised nations of the West constantly and systematically appropriated a part of the value created in the developing countries just because labour productivity in the former is several times higher than in the latter and that via international trade greater labour inputs in the Third World countries were exchanged for lesser labour inputs of the West.

However, of late the concept of non-equivalent exchange was put to serious criticism not only in the Soviet Union but elsewhere, too. It is pointed out, in particular, that the value of the products is formed on the basis of socially-needed, mostly medium, inputs, that world trade prices are based on international value, and that one can speak about exploitation only when we come across an unpaid transfer (appropriation) of value. Since, as Marx noted, a more productive labour, as a more complex labour, generates more value in a specified period of time, lower labour productivity in the developing countries indicates only that they produce less value per time unit and not that a part of the value produced by them is appropriated by somebody else without any recompense.

It is also pointed out that since a considerable part of commodities and semimanufactures produced in the developing countries is exported by Western TNCs, no statistics on scissors of prices can be considered as proof of non-equivalent exchange.

Nevertheless, the concepts of non-equivalent exchange, quite primitive by international standards, still feature prominently in Soviet literature on the subject. In addition, there is a current view in the Soviet Union whereby "under the present conditions the neocolonialist exploitation of the developing countries by the centres of capitalism is of no less, if not greater, importance for the functioning of the entire system of capitalist production than the colonial policy pursued by the bourgeoisie in the period of the primitive accumulation of capital".¹ Some authors go as far as to qualify the developing countries as the last reserve of world capitalism. They believe that the retention of the developing countries within the world capitalist system is a vital condition for capitalism's survival. They even predict an exact time for the automatic collapse of capitalism, namely, "somewhere in the first half of the 21st century or even earlier if the developing countries withdraw from the world capitalist economy".²

Actually, the present-day system of economic relations between the imperialist and developing countries, which is customarily referred to as "neocolonialism" in Soviet writings, follows the basic laws of capitalist reproduction. In the purely economic relations maintained by the developed and developing segments of the world capitalist economy today the major role is obviously played by the commercial profitability of the deals. This required of the West to expedite the creation of conditions favourable for an efficient, that is, profitable operation of capital in the developing countries, while of the latter—establishment of a mechanism which would allow to turn these conditions to solution of their socio-economic problems. And although in many aspects the West and the Third World nations pursue different economic and political goals the intensification of their economic ties engenders a greater interdependence based on some common and coordinated "rules of the game", or the business principles adopted in the world capitalist economy.

Let us begin with the examination of world trade only, leaving aside for a while all international financial settlements. In our view, it should be recognised that there is no non-equivalent exchange as a systematic and constant factor. Even if we assume that a change in trade terms and conditions is an indicator of equivalence or its absence in commercial exchange, which is not quite correct as was shown above, it is still impossible to identify any consistent and constant trend. The fact, indeed, is that relative prices of primary goods are fluctuating because in their production and consumption we observe peculiar long-term cyclic

risers and falls which approximately correspond to half-century "long curves" in the development of the capitalist economy. The reason is that production of many minerals requiring substantial investments is rather sluggish: it cannot quickly pick up or slow down. That is why the periods of relatively steady growth in the market economy usually end with acute shortages of primary resources and higher commodity prices which entails higher production costs, reduced profit rates and retarded economic growth. Periods of slow growth, on the contrary, are accompanied, as a rule, by a drop in the relative demand for raw materials and are crowned with a surplus of raw materials on the world markets and falling commodity prices which, in its turn, allows the manufacturers to reduce production costs and serves as an impetus for an accelerated economic growth.

For instance, the 1950s and 1960s were an era of "cheap commodities". In that period prices for manufactured goods grew 50 per cent, while the price index for raw materials stood unchanged at all and there were high economic growth rates. However, eventually this created shortages of raw materials which caused a rise in relative prices of primary goods. By the 1970-s early 1980s commodity prices grew more than 7-fold, while prices of manufactured products increased less than 3 times. Of course, this gap was mostly due to sharp growth of prices of energy resources during the two energy crises in 1974 and 1979. However, similar trends can be traced even if fuel is excluded from the list of commodities: relative (compared to manufactured goods) prices of raw materials, fuel excluded, were (1950=100 per cent) 58 in 1970 and 75 in 1980.

The 1970s and the early 1980s were a period of a relatively slow growth in the capitalist economy, and this trend impeded a higher demand for raw materials. Besides, high prices of energy resources, as well as special energy-saving measures taken by governments and steps to develop alternative energy sources have led to the wide-spread use of energy-saving technologies, the reduction of the "petroleum component" in the GNP of Western countries by 25 per cent and the reduction of net petroleum imports by almost 50 per cent. All this resulted in the "land-slide" of petroleum prices in early 1986 to \$8-10 a barrel compared to more than \$30 at the beginning of the 1980s. Later on prices picked up somewhat but still remain twice below the unprecedented high level recorded in the early 1980s.

Compared to manufactured goods, today raw materials are on the whole somewhat more expensive than in the late 1960s. However, it seems that the days of excessively high prices are over and it is expected that in the foreseeable future, until the end of the century, the terms of trade in primary goods will deteriorate, while those for manufactured articles will improve. Incidentally, this is borne out by the fact that over the past five years the decline in prices affected not only energy carriers but also a wide range of agricultural products and mineral primary materials: grain, textile fibres, wool, natural rubber, tin, zinc, lead and other commodities. Experts predict that market prices for oil will hardly be above \$20 a barrel in 1990 and \$25 by 1995 signifying a further relative reduction of petroleum prices compared to those of manufactures. All this makes us believe that the 1990s will be a period of cheap primary goods.

Thus, today's deterioration of commercial terms for the developing countries follows a period (the 1970s) which was rather favourable for raw-material exporters and, as previous experience shows, will apparently be superseded in the next century by a period of relatively higher prices of raw materials.

With the long-term equivalence in the commercial exchange between Western and newly-free countries (with periodic deviations from the equivalence in one direction or the other) the periphery is exploited by

the industrialised centre mainly *through pumping out interest and dividends* on the credits granted to the formed and direct investments in the developing countries. In the 1980s the outflow of financial resources from the developing countries in the form of interest and dividends on capital investments amounts to \$40-70 billion annually. This is "net exploitation" or a transfer to the West of value created in the periphery.

This outflow of financial resources is fully or partially offset by *the inflow of "aid", i.e. new direct investment and credits* (private and through state channels) from the West. In the 1970s, for instance, the net inflow of external financial resources (which is the difference between the aggregate inflow of capital and the outflow of money in the form of the interest on loans and dividends on direct investments) amounted on the average to 2.7 per cent of the GNP of the petroleum-importing developing countries, or 10 per cent of their gross accumulation. Since 1983 the net inflow of external resources was superseded by capital outflow and today the developing countries' payments of debt servicing and dividends on foreign direct investments are more than they receive from abroad as credits, direct investment of official aid. In the 1983-1986 period this net loss averaged about \$17 billion per annum.³

What goals does the West pursue by investing in the economies of the developing nations? Private capital, of course, is attracted to the periphery by pure profit considerations. However, the role of such investments is limited and constantly declining. For instance, the developing countries' share in the aggregate US private direct investments abroad has dropped from almost 50 per cent in 1950 to almost 25 per cent presently; credits granted to the developing countries account for only seven to eight per cent of the assets of Western commercial banks. There is no doubt that with some temporary setbacks and difficulties the West would be able to eventually weather out the loss of its direct investments and credits in the developing countries as it already survived the nationalisation of the TNC property in the petroleum-extraction industry in the 1970s and the discontinuation of debt servicing by a number of the developing countries in the early 1980s. Indeed, on the free markets their debts are traded well below the nominal (at 20 to 70 per cent of their nominal value). That is, there is practically no hope of recovering the entire debt. However, the Western creditors are still afloat.

In fact, the West is truly worried over the socio-economic and political consequences of the situation for the developing countries themselves. It is self-evident today that the stable and steady development of industrialised nations is impossible while poverty and backwardness persist in the developing world where half of mankind lives. Today everyone realises that under conditions of global interdependence any regional conflict can go out of hand and lead to catastrophic consequences. That is why any steps taken by the West in the sphere of economic ties with the periphery, steps which may aggravate social tensions and engender dangerous situations and regional conflicts, are regarded by influential quarters in the developed countries as a direct and tangible threat to prosperity and security of "the free world".

The early 1980s more or less clearly revealed two concepts in the West's approach to the "aid for development". One of the concepts (the Commission of Willy Brandt, Francois Mitterand, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *et al.*) proclaimed the need to maintain and increase official (governmental) aid to the Third World countries. Its goals were precisely set forth by former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau who once said that it was better to guide forthcoming changes in the developing countries into the channel suitable for the developed nations than become their victims.

Another concept associated with Reaganism was based on the idea of market self-adjustment as the best safety valve in economic relations in general and between the centre and the periphery of the world capitalist economy in particular. Here the stress is laid on the need for the developing countries to "help themselves" by drawing private capital from the West, through the reduction of the official "aid for development", particularly of grants and subsidies, and by pursuing a tough line in re-financing the indebtedness of the developing countries.

Judging by the practical policy the Reagan concept has gained the upper hand: in recent years Western official aid for development showed practically no growth and is even declining in real terms; there has been adopted the American formula for debt re-schedulings which are to be entered in with every debtor individually. However, one cannot ignore the fact that even the Reagan Administration, which is particularly zealous in advocating the free-market philosophy, does not reject the very principle of official aid on easy terms to the developing countries and regards this aid as a payment which has to be made in order to maintain stability and keep the newly-free states within the confines of the world capitalist economy.

For instance, when in August 1982 Mexico and, later on, some other countries suspended their debt payments the US Administration was the first to decide not to tempt destiny and opted for interference in the free interplay of market forces. Urgent new loans and the revamping of repayment terms on almost a half of all previous loans to the developing countries which were undertaken by the governments of Western countries jointly with the IMF and the IBRD staved off the imminent bankruptcy of the debtor-countries.

Thus, on the whole, today even the advocates of Reagan's tough line towards the developing countries do not question the basic principle under which the capital outflow from the Third World countries in the form of interest and dividends on the West investments ("net exploitation") must be offset, more or less, by an inflow of new Western credits. And when the private sector refuses to grant credits this should be done by the state—Western governments and international organisations. In other words, the uncompensated transfusion of resources to the West is regarded there as a socially dangerous factor. In this case purely commercial gains of several billion dollars per annum are uncomparable with the political costs which would be involved in a potential growth of tensions, emergence of explosive situations and unpredictable changes in the developing world.

The official "aid for development", of course, is often granted in the form which implies purely commercial benefits as well: it is accompanied by a number of stipulations requiring, for instance, preferential purchases in the donor-country, etc. However, its main purpose is rather different. First and foremost, it is called upon to safeguard the West's political interests and forestall unfavourable developments in the Third World countries. To this end the West, to put it bluntly, finds it profitable to constantly compensate the damage inflicted on the developing countries, mainly through the extraction of interest and dividends on the invested capital, and systematically pays "something extra" to the Third World with the view of maintaining its stability.

The approach displayed by the West to the problems afflicting the developing world is prompted not so much by selfish interests of some TNCs making profits in Asia, Africa and Latin America and even not so much by the desire to tether the newly-free states to the world capitalist economy, although such motives do exist, as, first and foremost, by the desire to neutralise or at least mitigate the threat emanating from this part of the world to Western civilisation itself and to mankind as a

whole. Purely commercial gains and profits were dominating factors in the era of the primitive accumulation of capital and, later on, in the colonial period. At present, they are pushed into the background by strategic considerations of global political and economic security.

In the post-colonial period the accelerated integration of the developing countries into the world capitalist economy allowed them to become partners with the West. Despite the underdog position of the Third World in that partnership the developing countries managed on the whole to use the commercialisation of new economic relations with the imperialist centres to develop their own economies.

Moreover, processes of internationalisation of the world capitalist economy, so active in the last decades, are eroding to naught the bi-polar "centre-periphery" economic ties of capitalism, and open up wide vistas for the West governments and monopolies in setting up a world-wide sphere of production and marketing of commodities and services. Developing nations, too, are interested in the formation of such a sphere because internationalisation of the capitalist production, besides adding to the efficiency of their economic ties with the West, makes possible a rise in the level of their partnership with the leading centres of the world capitalist economy.

In the 1980s the most significant changes in the system of economic relations between the developed capitalist and newly-free states were introduced by the restructuring of the Western economy. The transition of the United States, Western Europe and Japan from the conveyor automated to conveyor technological method of production eroded the forms of interdependence of the two parts of the world capitalist economy which dominated in the 1960-1970s. On the one hand, the introduction of a new technological method of production in the developed capitalist states shapes, for the Western capital, new demands on the organisation of the Third World's production apparatus and market and the search for efficient ways of raising its economic potential. This demand stems from the fact that the centres of the world capitalist economy hold leading positions in the foreign trade of the developing states and cover their basic needs in modern technologies, 80 per cent of their imports of machinery and equipment and almost 60 per cent of food imports. Radical changes in the system and methods of production of these goods and qualitative changes in the financial sphere make it imperative for the West to contribute to the technological modernisation of the developing economies. In modern conditions a wider technological gap between the centre and the periphery of the world capitalist economy is extremely unprofitable for the West since it reduces external markets for the Western countries and raises the marketing costs.

The other aspect of the changed nature of the interdependence between the West and the newly-free countries is connected with the formation of new social requirements for the means of production and consumer goods in the economies of developed capitalist countries. In these countries demand for machinery, technologies and product quality is much higher today than in the 1970s. Correspondingly, there was a shift in the West's interest in the supply of traditional raw materials and semi-manufactures, as well as manufactured goods from the developing world. Against the background of a noticeable reduction of energy and material consumption per unit of production in the centres of capitalism, a vigorous implementation of cost-saving programmes by their corporations and a substantial diversification of production with emphasis on the quality of production systems, i. e. the factors of production rather than only

goods, as was before, the newly-free states are objectively drawn by the West through economic venues into the new world technological order. They face the alternative of either being incorporated into the technological model created by the developed capitalist countries or continuing their search for their own ways of development which would take into account national, economic, political, social and cultural specifics of each developing state.

By and large, neither alternative runs counter to the West's attempting to stabilise the world capitalist economy. The incorporation of developing countries into the new technological order substantially reinforces the trend towards the integration of capitals and complementation of markets and interests of the leading centres of capitalism and the most developed Third World states. Here this interdependence assumes the form of a partnership between the West and the developing countries in elaboration of a new system of international economy which they structure on the basis of modern technology. This process actually divides the modern world capitalist economy into two parts. The first comprises the countries of the West and a certain group of the developing countries which have established a long-term industrially-diversified partnership. The interdependence of the partners is determined by the degree to which they are useful for each other, that is, their ability to conduct business, the efficiency of capital investments, flexible control of the market, responsiveness, and not by only the size of investment and the monopoly on a particular technology. Sometimes developing countries, and this is especially true of new industrial states, play the first fiddle in this partnership.

The other half of the world capitalist economy is represented by the developing countries whose economic potential is represented basically by the extraction and primary processing of raw materials. Of course, the "raw material" option in the development of these states provides them with a very restricted choice of alternatives for the participation in the world capitalist division of labour. At the same time this also serves as a basis for a specific form of partnership with the West. The nature of this partnership directly depends on the usefulness of primary materials for the reproduction process in the centres of capitalism, while for the developing countries the efficiency of this partnership is measured by the availability of investment resources and capital and consumer goods which are indispensable for their economic progress. Relying on this partnership the Third World countries possessing primary resources of most value to the West, petroleum-producers in particular, can use this partnership to solve some major socio-economic problems in a relatively short period of time. Today they have tangible prerequisites for creating a diversified industrial structure and making use of some advanced technologies in their economies.

At the same time within the existing economic structure quite a few developing nations have practically no chance of exerting any noticeable economic influence on the world capitalist economy because they have no important strategic raw materials which are of interest to the West and a very low solvency and, correspondingly, an unpromising home market for the goods from the centres of capitalism. Since they are neither producers of any technology useful for foreign consumers nor its active buyers from the West these countries are integrated into the world capitalist economy only in periods of high demand for a particular commodity. Their relations with the West are mostly limited to the aid they obtain from the industrially-developed capitalist states.

True, in recent years we saw that Western capital was more inclined to partnership with these states in the field of production of some components for the processing industries to be found in the centres of capitalism

and new industrial countries. Here the industrialisation of production in the world capitalist economy pursues the goal of substantially raising efficiency in the field of consumer goods production. Nowadays on the transnational technological conveyor the most backward of the Third World countries are allocated "parcels" which may subsequently become relatively large specialised enclaves producing sophisticated goods. For instance, in El Salvador and Haiti American TNCs already produce a number of electronic components for their maternal enterprises. West European and Japanese capital regards a number of African countries as potential manufacturers of semi-finished articles for their main production facilities. And here this capital does not attempt to thrust alien economic interests of the West upon the Third World. On the contrary, the West attempts to achieve a reasonable compromise beneficial for both sides. The principle "we have money, you have labour" becomes the mainstay of the economic partnership of the two components comprising the world capitalist economy.

The modern realities reflecting the interdependence of the West and the Third World are best visible in relations between the USA, Western Europe and Japan with the new industrial nations. Actually, the model of interdependence existing in relations between these states determines to a considerable extent the future system of economic relations between the centre and the periphery of the world capitalist economy.

The rapid industrial development of the new industrial nations is attributable first of all to the radical overhaul of their economies within the framework of capitalism. To this end the NICs of Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia) widely resorted to the use of foreign capital. And the flexible state-capitalist economic policy channelled the activities of foreign capital to the establishment of rational (for their economies) cooperation of the state and the local business with Western companies. The export orientation of their economies allowed these countries to fill in the gap in meeting the unsatisfied demand for consumer goods in the West which was formed when monopolies dropped those sectors which ran up costs substantially above the average world level. With their orientation towards the Western markets this group of states has rechannelled towards their production capacities some of the consumer and industrial demand of the capitalist centres. Accordingly, the interdependence of these states and the countries of the West has assumed the form of intertwining capitals and markets which is rapidly moving towards the establishment of mutually complementary open economic amalgamations of the West and the most developed Third World countries.

It is particularly urgent for the West to form such amalgamations with large new industrial Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) and India. Besides consumer goods, including those with medium science intensity such as household electronics and cars (for instance, in a couple of years Autolatina, whose controlling interests belong to Ford and Volkswagen, will produce 1.5 million cars in Brazil), these countries produce and export ships, planes, tanks, military missiles, precision machinetools, platforms for underwater drilling, telecommunications means and other modern hardware. These nations have a rather diversified network of financial institutions allowing the local and foreign capital to substantially reduce running costs in financing major projects. Abundant natural resources, a modern transportation network, capacious home market of consumer and investment goods and ambitions of the rising national, particularly monopoly, capital and an obvious democratisa-

tion of political structures allow the bigger new industrial countries to conduct, on the one hand, a sovereign economic policy and, on the other, actively use financial, scientific and technical resources of the West on a partnership basis for accelerated integration into the top echelon of the world capitalist economy.

Naturally, this is no easy process for the NICs. Under modern capitalism the integration of economic complexes is accompanied by a sharper competition on the world capitalist market. Now one of the major aspects of this struggle is the rivalry among the Western countries for the markets and economic potentials of the new industrial countries: it seems that any centre of capitalism which is able to establish the most solid economic ties with the new industrial countries will thus substantially consolidate its economic positions.

Apparently, this is why in the 1980s the West has noticeably liberalised its economic policy towards the new industrial countries. For instance, with the dollar's exchange rate decline since early 1985 the United States made efforts to keep the currencies of these countries at a lowered level. As a result, in 1988 the US trade deficit only with that group of Southeast Asian countries may reach \$53 billion, or will be roughly the same as the deficit the USA is running with Japan.⁴ Although at the beginning of 1988 the USA ruled to deprive the new industrial states of their MFN status and managed to make South Korea and Taiwan reduce their import dues for 300 and 3,036 items correspondingly this should not be regarded as a resuscitation of the neocolonialist system of relations between the USA and the new industrial states.⁵ Actually, a major event took place in their relations. These countries of Southeast Asia were elevated to the status enjoyed by the US West European and Japanese partners. Moreover, by its actions the USA urged the new industrial countries to penetrate the market of Japan which is the arch rival of American corporations. Incidentally, this invasion is facilitated by the low rate of exchange of the NICs' currencies vis-a-vis the US dollar against the background of the rapidly climbing rate of exchange of the yen vis-a-vis the basic capitalist currency. Thus, last March due to the favourable rate of exchange the new industrial states of Southeast Asia sold their merchandise on the Japanese market at prices considerably lower than those of Japanese goods: 20"-screen TV sets cost 1.6 times less, refrigerators 1.2 times, video recorders 1.3 times, radio sets with in-built mikes 2.25 times, wireless telephones 2.4 times, movie cameras (35 mm) 3.2 times, sports gear 2.5 times.⁶ This indicates that the new industrial countries rub shoulders with the cream of the world capitalist economy where in economic relations the leading role is played by capitalist partnership based on the principles and the system of capitalist competition rather than on imperialist exploitation.

The above-said is an attempt to answer one of the major questions of our time posed in Mikhail Gorbachev's report "October and Perestroika: the Revolution Continues" made in connection with the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution: can the capitalist system do without neocolonialism and can this system function without the inequitable trade with the Third World? It seems that we can answer "yes" to both parts of the question.

Life provides fresh proof that a new model of relations between the Third World countries and the West are emerging which are based both on partnership and rivalry. This pattern objectively facilitates the solution of the acute problem of backwardness. The fact is that the world economy has no more efficient alternative to tackling that problem. Today

for the West the partnership in development has become a major instrument for creating favourable conditions for profitable investments in the developing world and maintaining political stability in it. This provides the newly-free states with an opportunity, albeit a limited one for many of them, to create an economic structure which can break the vicious circle of their backwardness.

In this connection it should be noted that the Soviet Union, too, should contribute to the efforts to solve the problem of backwardness. *Perestroika* in the economy and foreign policy requires new approaches to cooperation with the Third World. Obviously, the internationalisation of the socialist economy should not be confined to the expansion of economic ties with the West. The Soviet Union can also efficiently use material and financial resources, as well as the pool of skilled labour of the developing world for its economic development and the establishment of new mutually-beneficial relations with the Third World. Here we should take into account the useful experience accumulated by the West, and not regard this experience exclusively as a tool of neocolonialist exploitation.

Forms of the West partnership with the developing countries include joint ventures, the use of Western financial institutions to provide financial support to TNC branches in Asia, Africa and Latin America, participation in the construction of processing enterprises with the subsequent export of their products, the setting-up of research laboratories at the branches of corporations in the host developing countries and investment in enterprises operating in the export enclaves of the Third World. The financing of the export programmes by petty businesses in the newly-free states is fully in line with the principles of economic partnership between the socialist and developing countries. A promising form of assistance in the development of the Third World could be joint financing of major projects in the developing countries by the Soviet Union and other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Soviet Union and Western countries, the Soviet Union and new industrial countries, the CMEA and the EEC, etc. Economic assistance which needs a thorough overhaul in order to improve it is expected to play an important role in raising the Soviet Union's prestige in the Third World. The mechanism for granting this aid must be decentralised so that Soviet enterprises and banks themselves can come to terms with the firms of the developing countries as regards specific areas and forms of cooperation.

Concerted efforts by the Soviet Union and the West to eliminate the economic backwardness of the Third World will only expedite the establishment of a worldwide mechanism of economic security and socio-economic progress

¹ *Мировая экономика и международные отношения* 1983, No 7, pp. 77, 78

² See М. М. Голанский *Мировое капиталистическое хозяйство и освободившиеся страны*, Moscow, 1986, pp. 172, 173

³ *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*, 1987, No 2, p. 30, 1988, No 7, p. 136

⁴ See *Newswatch*, Jan 25, 1988, p. 40

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Wall Street Journal*, March 18-19, 1988, p. 1.

In memoriam

ALEXANDER SVECHIN: ON WAR AND POLITICS

Andrei KOKOSHIN

The return of forgotten or half-forgotten names and names simply taboo until recently is a sign of the times. This is something more than a tribute to justice, for it meets a natural requirement of our present intellectual life, which seeks to absorb both today's ideas and ideas ignored for one reason or another in the past.

Of particular interest are the writings of our military theorists active in the 1920s and early 1930s. They form a unique part of our cultural heritage. Without studying and updating these works, we can hardly carry on a deep or exhaustive discussion on major military political problems. This discussion concerns the relationship between war and politics, arms limitation and disarmament, the building up of strategic stability, the role of military power in international relations, and so on. Certain forecasts, analogies, parallels and conclusions are most unexpected yet relevant.

Many authors have long since gone down in the history of Soviet military thought irrespective of how their fate shaped up in those remote years. These include Mikhail Frunze, Sergei Kamenev, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Avgust Kork, Yakov Alksnis, Vladimir Triandafilov, Ieronim Uborevich and other eminent figures. One of these was Alexander Svechin,

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the works of Professor Alexander Svechin of the WPRA (Workers' and Peasants' Red Army) Military Academy gave rise to sharp controversies over military political and strategic problems. By then Svechin had won high prestige in the Red Army. He had disciples and followers, and his concepts were shared by others.

The very nature of those controversies was indicative of both their topics and the participants. Deadening dogmatism and sermonising were only just in the offing, and in the meantime discussion went deep and was uninhibited and free from the complex of uniform thinking. Those who joined in it differed in assessing the experience of the civil war and World War I as well as in forecasting the character of future war. They discussed the military doctrine, military strategy, operational skill and tactics of the Red Army.

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By the late 1920s, however, the controversy had begun to degenerate into forcible imposition of an only school of thought, one fully rejecting even what was rational in other schools.

Indeed, that practice went a considerable way towards creating the political and psychological climate in which Stalin destroyed most of the high- and medium-ranking army and naval officers as well as defence industry executives and specialists, with the result that our military power was substantially reduced shortly before the life-and-death struggle with nazism.

The outcome of the discussion was tragic for Svechin as for others. He fell victim of repression in the early 1930s, being charged with all sorts of heinous crimes up to and including high treason, and died in detention in 1938. One of the many paradoxes of those years was that among those who attacked the disgraced theorist was Mikhail Tukhachevsky, himself a victim of subsequent repression under Stalin.

But to turn to the records. In 1966 the monthly *Voyenno-istoricheskyy zhurnal* carried a testimonial on Svechin signed in May 1924 by Roman Muklevich, a noted party leader and statesman who at the time was Commissar and Assistant Chief of the WPRA Military Academy. The testimonial reads as follows:

"Svechin, Alexander Andreyevich. Major General. Academy graduate. He served in the old army as Division Commander, and Chief of Staff of an Army. In the Red Army he was Division Commander, Chief of the All-Russia General Staff, lecturer at the Military Academy. This academic year he heads the Chair of History of the Art of War and is virtually in charge of the Chair of Strategy...

"A well-educated military specialist, Svechin has vast experience (of the Russo-Japanese war and the First World War), having held the most diverse posts ranging from service at General Headquarters to the duties of Regimental Commander. A very talented and witty man, he is a most valuable professor at the Military Academy. This academic year his lectures on strategy have been—thanks to their originality and invariably simple and ingenious presentation—one of the major achievements in teaching senior students (an applied course on strategy is a corps commander's test work).

"...Paradoxical by nature and full of venom in everyday life, he never misses the chance to have a dig at someone on any pretext.

"He is working most fruitfully, however.

"Of course, he is a monarchist by convictions but, being sober-minded politically, he has taken the situation into account and adapted to it. However, he did not do so as clumsily as Zayonchkovsky (who is a "sympathiser" of the Communist Party) or as fulsomely as Verkhovsky; he did it with dignity, taking a critical stand on political questions and expressing his own opinion about each of them. He is particularly valuable as a man combating slavish adherence to routine and conservatism among fellow-officers who served in the old army (and are now lecturers at the Academy) and whose weak points he knows better than anyone else.

"Svechin is the most prominent professor at the Academy."¹ There was only one inaccuracy in the testimonial: Svechin's political views were not those of a monarchist.

Svechin's chief work is *Strategia* (Strategy), published twice in 1926 and 1927. Its merit lies in examining every problem of strategy in close connection with politics and the economic aspect of war and with due regard to the social and cultural development of society. An outstanding authority on history, Svechin showed that wars are no longer fought by armed forces alone but involve all of the belligerents' political and economic forces.

This writer ventures to affirm that hardly any of our military theorists of the time—not even Tukhachevsky—could match Svechin in capacity for so multidimensional an analysis of strategic problems. While Svechin was no Marxist, his writings invariably stressed the importance of the dialectical method and generally formulated fundamental materialist concepts and applied them more consistently than some of his critics ritually pledging allegiance to Marxism.

Svechin did not regard dialectics as simply a handy term. Nor was it accidental that this theorist held Lenin in great esteem admiring his ability to combine an inflexible will in advancing socialism's fundamental goals with flexibility and a gift for political manoeuvre according to the exigencies of a changing situation.² He described such qualities as also being absolutely necessary to strategists proper, to the military leadership. "An inflexible will does not express itself in keeping to the chosen course but in not losing sight of the ultimate goal for a single moment."³

I hardly need underscore the relevance of this idea. Its timeless character is not accidental. As Svechin saw it, works on political and military history, strategy and campaign tactics should primarily encourage independent thinking by political and military leaders and help streamline it rather than offer rules and recommendations ready for use in any contingency. This is why Svechin's reflections and opinions, which are particularly valuable from precisely the methodological point of view, can and should help us in soberly analysing the military political problems we face today.

POLITICS AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Widely current in the 1920s were the views of certain well-known foreign military leaders and theorists on the interaction of politics and military strategy. Applying Clausewitz' well-known formula in their own way and even dismissing it as outdated due to the dimensions of modern war, these authorities called for allowing strategy a considerable degree of independence from politics. Many Red Army commanders, for their part, differed over these concepts. Svechin, defending Clausewitz' formula, made a detailed analysis of the views of Field Marshals von Moltke, Ludendorff and Hindenburg, the French military theorist Leval and other opponents of the "tyranny of politics".

Svechin did not merely refute the arguments of those who sought to examine war in isolation from politics; he also stated the reason why these theorists tried to make politics a "menial of strategy". "The affirmation that politics dominates strategy is in our opinion world-historical. It leaves no room for doubt where policy is made by a youthful class which is advancing to a promising future and whose historical health also takes the form of the healthy policy this class is pursuing. But it always breeds doubts about states representative of the organisational domination of an already obsolete class who is historically on the defensive, a class whose regime has begun to decay and which is compelled to carry on an unhealthy policy, sacrificing the interests of all to preserve its domination. In that case an unhealthy policy is inevitably continued in the form of an unhealthy strategy. It is easy enough, therefore, to understand the protests of bourgeois military authors, especially French authors, who were under the disastrous influence of the decayed policy of the Second Empire on strategy. Naturally, strategy seeks to emancipate itself from bad politics but it cannot exist without politics, in a vacuum; it is doomed to pay for every sin of politics."⁴

Delving into the relationship between politics and strategy, Svechin drew attention to the special role of general staffs, which in the imperialist epoch tend, as he saw it, to look on all life in the world "from a

particular angle, that of war plans". And where "the balance between the General Staff and the political leadership is upset, peace finds itself in danger. The General Staff, proceeding from its special point of view, will always favour the idea of preventive war ... of declaring war when we have the maximum advantages in preparations over the state competing with us, advantages which may come to nothing in a few years as a result of vigorous effort on its part or even be reversed (rearmament, military reform, etc.)".⁵

At the same time Svechin pointed out on more than one occasion that all political decisions should be made with due regard to strategy and the military potential, that a politician should pay the most careful heed to the opinions of professional military men and know how the war machine works, what the state's military mobilisation mechanism is like, and so on. His views proved correct only too obviously both during the war with Finland (1939-1940) and in the early period of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945).

Nowadays, at a time when the idea is taking root that war can no longer serve as a rational means of politics (at least not in Soviet-American relations nor in relations between the WTO and NATO), the need for the top state and political leadership to know the fundamentals of military strategy, operational plans, the functioning of the military mechanism of carrying out decisions, and so on, has by no means been eliminated. On the contrary, it is increasing. This is because decisions made at the boundary between politics and strategy may have fatal and irreversible consequences.

The general public, too, should have a knowledge of the main military strategic questions, which means that openness is needed in this particular sphere as well, if only on the same scale as we had in the 1920s. This is one of the main conditions for policy to exercise real and not nominal control over military strategy, so that there can be complete correspondence between the political and military technical components of the state's military doctrine.

ANALYSIS VS ILLUSIONS

In appraising Svechin's views on the nature of future war, we cannot but pay attention to his concrete military political forecasts. These undoubtedly include the idea (which he expressed as far back as 1926) that in a future war in Europe, the first victim of German aggression would be Poland. He came to this conclusion after analysing both the system of international relations brought into being by World War I and deep-going trends of history. He regarded the whole post-Versailles system of international relations in Europe after 1918 as highly unstable.

Svechin held that this accorded primarily with the designs of France, a country having ample experience and a tradition of modelling precisely those kinds of uncertain formations benefiting it. "For centuries, ever since Richelieu, French foreign policy thinking has been educated by creating in Europe such conditions of scattering, 'strip holding' and incapacity for defence. As a result of the French policy, whose ideas took the shape of the Versailles 'peace' treaty, the whole of Middle Europe—Germany, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and other countries—finds itself in a situation ruling out defence and trench warfare. The vassals of France have artfully been reduced to the plight of a 'caged squirrel' having to turn the wheel of militarism. The French art of politics consists in deliberately creating uncertain situations. Hence the fact that its 'creations' are always shortlived.

"...Poland will yet have an opportunity to think of how it should thank France for presenting it with the Danzig Corridor, which assures Poland priority in regard to a German attack."⁶

It should be noted that Svechin's forecasts concerning the character of future war took shape and were made public chiefly in 1925 and 1926, or when the world had travelled less than half the road to World War II and the outlines of that war were still very dim. As for some other, very categorical opinions about its likely character that were expressed often enough at the time, those were subsequently disproved in the most brutal manner.

A thesis popular with Soviet authors in those years was that all the wars to be fought by the Soviet Union would be revolutionary. The inference was that in the event of a war between our country and a coalition of capitalist states the Red Army should use none but an offensive strategy. This mood was also prompted by other circumstances. The Red Army leadership of the time included an influential group of commanders who overestimated the experience of the Civil War, especially that of its offensive operations, and therefore visualised the war to come from the point of view of these operations. True, this was at the time a general trend to forget that victorious Red Army offensives had not been the only events of the Civil War.

What played a role was, furthermore, the ideologisation of military theory common at the time, with primitivist propaganda slogans substituting scrupulous military political analysis. Many insisted that the Soviet Union as a state of the most advanced revolutionary class could only use an offensive "crushing strategy". A section of the Red Army leadership and certain civilian theorists upheld the idea that the rear of capitalist countries would be as insecure as that of White Guard governments in the Civil War years. The conclusion drawn from this was, again, that the Red Army would invariably pursue a victorious offensive.

Without fully ruling out the likelihood of future wars assuming a revolutionary character, Svechin maintained in his writings, nonetheless, that it was dangerous to base policy and military strategy exclusively on such calculations, on ideological guidelines, and that "historical experience is not very reassuring" in this respect. The result could be both incorrect political guidelines and an overestimation of the possibilities for strategic offensive operations, and ultimately disaster for the attacker.

Proceeding from an analysis of historical regularities and taking account of the belligerents' industrial and economic potentialities, Svechin constantly emphasised that the future war would put the Soviet Union to a rugged test, assume a protracted character and require a phased mobilisation of immense resources and strenuous effort by the whole population. He warned against looking forward to early successes, to realisation of the idea of a "crushing strategy" that would allegedly enable the Soviet Union to decide the outcome of the war against its main capitalist enemies through a brilliant series of offensive operations and in a short time. Svechin countered this approach by advocating what he called the "strategy of attrition", thereby stating that the coming conflict would last long and necessitate the mobilisation of all of the country's resources. It is worthy of note that in this case he came out as a direct supporter of Mikhail Frunze, who put forward the concept of a "strategy of exhaustion" very similar to Svechin's.

Svechin's military political and strategic conclusions about the nature of future war dovetailed with his economico-geographic reflections. He repeatedly called attention to the need to bear in mind the possibility of the enemy seizing a part of Soviet territory and insisted on a

judicious policy towards building new industrial projects in the western areas of the country. "...The construction of mighty sources of electric power—Dnieprostroi, Svirstroi—which are destined to industrialise whole regions in the future, necessitates advanced technological and economic as well as competent strategic research."⁷ In this connection Svechin justly mentioned the Urals as an area of concentration of industries that would be least vulnerable in the war to come.

What gave Svechin particular cause for concern was the destiny of Leningrad, which he called "the Sevastopol of future war", alluding to the role played by Sevastopol in the last century. He warned in point of fact against any further concentration of industry and population in Leningrad, noting that "the disadvantages of Leningrad's strategic situation are aggravated by its remoteness from fuel, grain and raw material sources".⁸

All of Svechin's main writings urged statesmen and politicians as well as military leaders (strategists) to take careful account of economic factors, of the country's industrial and economic resources. They stressed the importance of an optimum distribution of the always limited resources among the armed forces.

Svechin questioned the advisability for the Soviet Union to build a large surface fleet. He proceeded in so doing from the experience of tsarist Russia. "Our army," he wrote as he pondered on the state of Russia's armed forces before World War I, "could have matched Germany's in technical equipment only if we had refused to build a line-of-battle fleet; due to the exceedingly unfavourable situation of Russian ports deep in the operational backyards of seas, this fleet, which lacked proper bases, was doomed to inaction. After Tsushima and the first revolution, however, we again set out to build ships, which diverted a large part of the sums appropriated for defence and an even more substantial part of our still weak industry."⁹ Mikhail Tukhachevsky expressed similar ideas in his writings.

Svechin's views on this matter fully coincided with those of Frunze who, while calling for the restoration of the navy, stressed that the scale of construction must be established in strict terms. He said that "however favourable the budget situation may be, we will confine ourselves to a programme for the construction of small ships of a defensive type". This naval construction policy only lasted until the late 1930s.

ATTACK OR DEFENCE?

Svechin's reflections and conclusions regarding the relationship between attack and defence on a strategic scale flowed from his views on future war, on the material potentialities and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. I have noted earlier that by far most of his contemporaries among Soviet authors hardly concerned themselves with problems of strategic defence in their writings, concentrating almost exclusively on offensive operations. This approach was highly obvious in the comments of those who joined in destroying Svechin's school of thought. A certain I. Duplitsky, for one, wrote that "in the event of war we will certainly proceed according to the instructions of the leader of the Red Army, who has said that we must bring about a situation enabling us to fight on foreign soil and not on ours".¹⁰

Svechin stressed the need to study the problem of strategic defence. "In strategy," he wrote, in *Evolyutsia voyennogo iskusstva* (The Evolution of the Art of War), "defence can use the lines and depth of the theatre, which makes the attacker waste his forces on tightening his hold on territory and on passing through it; and every gain in time is

a new advantage for defence. The side defending itself reaps even what it has not sown... because an offensive is often discontinued due to false reconnaissance data, unwarranted fears and inertness." ¹¹

Svechin pointed out that Clausewitz considered defence the strongest form of warfare to which the materially weaker side must resort. He invariably treated defence and attack in their dialectical unity. Although he was accused of pinning his hopes on defence alone, he saw it as a means of providing conditions for an effective counter-attack. "...More often than not, the reality of a strategic counter-attack greatly surpasses in scope the original strike of the attacker. The whole course of the world war fully confirmed the correctness of these views of Clausewitz, did it not? Fauche's strategic counter-attack in July 1918 and the Poles' counter-attack in August 1920 showed his idea to be entirely justified, did they not?" ¹²

Well knowing that the idea of strategic defence was unpopular, Svechin tried to see clear in the reason for its unpopularity. He turned to such lasting categories of the art of war as activity and initiative, which justly receive much attention, now as in the past. The conclusions he drew from analysis were instructive.

"Very often mistakes made in setting a goal at variance with the available means of achieving it," he wrote in *Strategia*, "are due to partly false ideas about activity. Defence has been given the unflattering epithet of 'ignoble'. Before the war (World War I.—A. K.), all academic courses extolled in unison the merits of attack, of activity, of capturing the initiative. Yet real activity consists primarily in taking sober stock of the conditions for struggle; one should see everything as it really is and not make illusory plans. Initiative may be interpreted as a narrow concept determined solely by time: forestalling the enemy and capturing the initiative of action... However, retaining the initiative may also be interpreted more deeply, as the art of imposing one's will in fighting the enemy." ¹³

Referring to the experience of World War I, Svechin showed how prominent military leaders made serious mistakes in the name of activity, of capturing and retaining the initiative, mistakes which ultimately led to reverses. His writings on military history and military strategy contain a whole number of cases where strategic defence was the only correct means of defeating the enemy yet was rejected by the political and military leadership as well as by the public.

In respect to ensuring strategic defence, Svechin did not rely at all on the vast area of our country, the lack of roads and a rigorous climate contrary to what his critics accused him of. He saw strategic defence primarily as the totality of appropriate operations comprising counter-strikes, major operations and battles on positions prepared beforehand. What he warned against was namely reliance on the opportunities offered us by territory and climate. He first did this in "Dangerous Illusions", an essay brilliant in both form and content (1924). "Soviet power," he wrote, "has received from the old regime a complex heritage, including a feather-bed in the form of the ideas of the immensity of Russian territory supposed to allow wide scope for retreat, of the invulnerability of the political centre to the external enemy, and of the Russian winter, said to be able to stop any invasion." ¹⁴ Telegraphy, radio, aircraft, automobiles, all modern technical facilities, the essay stressed, are "great devourers of space".

We know from history, Svechin noted, that the strategic importance of capitals directly depends "on the intensity of political passions". Speaking of future war, Svechin therefore insisted on seeing above all else to the defence of Moscow as the political centre of Soviet Russia, for "it is here that the decisive game will have to be played". ¹⁵ While

the invasion mounted by Nazi Germany turned out to be much larger in scale than Svechin could have foreseen in 1924 (the Wehrmacht launched offensive operations in three strategic sectors simultaneously), the main attack was nevertheless directed at Moscow.

One result of the discrediting of Svechin and a number of like-minded theorists was that Soviet military theory failed before the Great Patriotic War to properly evolve ways and means of holding the strategic defence line. This told understandably on the preparedness of both our troops and, in general, theatres of operations deep in our territory.

It is well known that a strategic offensive by a superior enemy force cannot be repulsed in passing, as if this were an intermediate task. To do this, it is necessary to carry out a whole series of prolonged and bitter defensive operations. Had plans for them been laid, they would have made it possible to deploy forces in the districts concerned in an entirely different manner, namely, with due regard to defence tasks, and to differently organise the control of operations and the in-depth distribution of materials and other mobilisation resources. Our forces, being orientated to an immediate counter-offensive developing into a general offensive and unprotected in proper measure by defences distributed in depth, turned out to be highly vulnerable to powerful surprise attacks from the aggressor.

Mistakes of a military political, strategic and operational character led to heavy setbacks for the Red Army, many millions of deaths and the loss of a substantial part of our territory plus huge material values, including a considerable part of our industrial potential strenuously brought into being by the people and the Party under the prewar five-year plans.

Until recently, our postwar literature on the strategy and campaign tactics of the Great Patriotic War concerned itself mainly with the conduct of successful strategic offensive operations in the second half of the 1943-1945 period. Many authors failed to note that these operations were only made possible after a series of strategic defensive operations. Psychologically, this disregard of the early period of the Great Patriotic War is quite understandable. But seen from the standpoint of our present-day policy and strategy, it is as harmful as was our failure in the 1920s and 1930s to take proper account of the Red Army's reverses and defensive operations during the Civil War.

This orientation to primarily offensive operations told on the development of Soviet military thought not only in the 1940s and 1950s but in later decades. It is only recently, particularly since the Berlin meeting of the WTO Political Consultative Committee announced the organisation's military doctrine (May 1987), that the situation has been changing. Since the summer of 1987, a number of important innovations have occurred in the Soviet military doctrine as well. One of the major changes in its military technical part (and accordingly in its strategy and campaign tactics) both throughout the postwar period and, in general, since the late 1920s is the proposition that the principal mode of action by the Armed Forces of the USSR in resisting aggression will be defence and counter-offensive and not offensive.

There is reason to feel concerned about a certain absolutising of the experience of the Great Patriotic War (for all its unquestionable value) to the detriment of full consideration of all the new political, economic, scientific, technological and strategic factors which are now thoroughly changing the entire "strategic landscape", to use Svechin's expression.

In assessing the military political situation in the world today, we are often influenced by the syndrome of June 22, 1941. It is quite under-

standable and in many ways justified. At the same time we do not really take full account of the fact that the bourgeois democratic regimes existing in the leading Western countries today, even where power is in the hands of conservative governments, differ greatly from Hitler's or Mussolini's dictatorships. Nevertheless, some of our authors still virtually fail, when estimating the likelihood of war, to take account of these qualitative differences or the deep imprint left by the results of World War II on the social consciousness of the majority of developed capitalist countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. Still, bearing all this in mind, we must continue to carefully watch the activity of and the influence exerted on the people and the government by various extreme right-wing alignments and organisations capable of reversing the political and hence the military political situation. All the more so as the West has created and is building up its technical and organisational prerequisites in a number of fields for an attack.

Besides, in view of the increased interdependence of countries, a change has come about in the very character of the struggle of capitalist countries for markets and raw material sources in comparison with what was the case between the two world wars and in the early postwar decades. Most indicative in this respect is the policy of Japan, which virtually lacks many raw materials (beginning with energy resources) and is quite behind other capitalist countries in military power.

We should also remember that the period of struggle for the national liberation of colonial and dependent countries in its traditional understanding is essentially over. At present more and more conflicts in this zone occur between newly-free countries themselves at the present stage when they are shaping their national and multinational (multi-tribal) statehood. This obviously calls for a different answer to the question of just and unjust wars.

We have come a longer way from the defeat of US aggression in Vietnam and the 1967 and 1973 wars in the Middle East than the participants of the discussions in the late 1920s and early 1930s had from the Soviet-Polish war. Yet the degree to which these recent wars, the mechanism of decision-making and the role of our advisers and armaments in it have been studied is far below that characterising Svechin's days although we were infinitely weaker, more vulnerable and poorer in specialists than today.

Nor have we done proper research into the armed conflicts that occurred in the postwar decades between socialist countries: the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, PRC and Vietnam. And we have yet to fully formulate conclusions that could help in completely ruling out all such clashes in the future.

Of course, there are many other military political problems calling for painstaking research. In fulfilling this task, we will undoubtedly find Svechin's writings helpful. He was an original and principled thinker, a staunch and intellectually upright scholar, a true member of the military profession.

¹ *Военно-исторический журнал*, No. 9, 1966, pp. 117-118.

² А. Свечин. *Стратегия*. Moscow, 1927, p. 40.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵ А. Свечин, *История военного искусства. Классический мир и средние века*, Moscow, 1922, p. 112.

⁶ А. Свечин. *Стратегия*. p. 184.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁹ А. Свечин. *Эволюция военного искусства*. Vol. 2, Moscow, 1927, pp. 534-535.

DIPLOMATIC DIARY: A RECORD OF 23 YEARS

Alexandra KOLLONTAI

Notebook One. Norway, 1922-1923

OUR MISSION IN CHRISTIANIA

Christiania, October 14, 1922

Ambassador's pleasant, roomy office is fitted out with solid furniture. Its large windows look onto the Norwegian capital's busy Drammensveien.

Ambassador, Yakov Zakharovich Surits, is not back yet from his business trip to Berlin. Secretary of the mission Oshmyansky asked me at once to seat myself behind the mammoth desk in Ambassador's office. He told me that as Counsellor to the mission I automatically substituted for Ambassador in his absence, taking charge of the mission. Incidentally, the designation of our mission as diplomatic representation has not found acceptance in Norway. Both officially and in common speech, it is called the Trade Delegation of the Soviet Socialist Republic or simply the Russian Trade Delegation.

Until such time as Soviet Russia is recognised *de jure*, ours will not be a diplomatic mission nor will it enjoy all diplomatic privileges, from what Oshmyansky told me, not without a touch of vexation. "Our situation will change as soon as we become a diplomatic mission recognised *de jure*."

He offered to take me around the premises. The building is new and commodious. It is three storeys high but is stretched upwards in the English manner, so that a sizable part of it is taken up by the main staircase. The walls on both sides of the staircase are hung all over with oil paintings depicting battle scenes. A painting in the middle shows a battlefield and the death of King Gustaf Adolf of Sweden at Lützen.

"Why do all these unsuitable paintings hang here?" I asked Oshmyansky.

He said the building was not owned by the Soviet state. We merely rented it from the artist Bruno, who had stipulated for his paintings to be left where they are. It was not very easy to find a suitable mansion in Christiania whereas this building was situated in the city centre and had an imposing appearance, as I could see for myself.

There are no living quarters in the mission's building but only offices. The only people living here are the cipher clerk and the guard. Ambassador Surits lives in a country villa at Lia Station. [...]

I interrupted... Oshmyansky to ask some necessary questions about the daily routine. He did not like this because he was in the mood for gossip.

"Yakov Zakharovich will tell you everything when he's back," he said dryly. "We've got no particular work to do, except corresponding with Moscow about deserters from Miller's Northern Army. They keep running away and pestering us with applications for help in getting back to Russia."

"Do you mean privates or officers?"

"Mostly privates but we also get applications from officers. It's quite a headache. The head of the consular service has gone to Moscow, and so I'm responsible for everything now. Moscow takes its time over granting permission and insists on our checking up on things for our part. But what checking can we do here?"

"You can do it with help from Communists."

"Besides, no funds have been allocated for their repatriation."

He is a typical bureaucrat, this Oshmyansky. I do not like him.

There is a trade branch on the top floor. I do not think old Kovalevsky knows anything about trade but his assistant, Dyakonov, a former bank clerk, seems competent. They are assisted by two Norwegian business experts, and there are also a bookkeeper, and the Ambassador's wife, Yelizaveta Nikolayevna, a typist.

One of the Norwegian experts, Kolbjørnsen, is a Communist. He is busy compiling for Moscow a survey of Norway's industrial resources. He is a conceited young man but appears to know his job. The other, a member of the Labour Party, has been entrusted with purchasing herring. He said it was wrong of us to drag our feet instead of starting talks on purchasing herring from the spring catch while prices were low.

"He's right," said the Second Secretary. "The man knows the situation on the market. We could do good business in this country but the mission is very slow on the uptake."

He was vigorously backed by the expert in herring. Both the expert and the Second Secretary supplied me with plenty of information on the opportunities for developing trade between the Soviet Republic and Norway. But the watchman came to announce that there were journalists waiting for me.

"Those interviewers will now keep pestering you," Oshmyansky put in. "Yakov Zakharovich turns them away. Please let them know that you are busy."

"On the contrary, I'll receive them by all means. Especially the interviewer from the liberal *Verdens Gang*."

I went to the Ambassador's office to receive the journalists.

The woman journalist from *Verdens Gang* remembered me from my years in exile and quoted an item published in 1917. It said that at the latest rally in Christiania, held just before I left, I had affirmed that the February Revolution was merely the "prologue" and that the real revolution would be accomplished by the Russian people with the Bolsheviks and Lenin at their head.

After the journalist from *Verdens Gang* I gave an interview for the Communist press. I listed all the economic benefits which Norway could derive from closer relations with the Soviet Republic (fishing trade, freightage, and so on).

The interviewer wanted my statement to include a comment on the recent Moscow Congress of the Comintern but I found that unnecessary. Not a word about the Comintern.

The journalists left. My next visitor, who came tripping in, was lighthearted, optimistic Erika Rutheim, a faithful Norwegian friend I first met during my years in exile. She is as pretty and vivacious and laughs as infectiously as ever. Her big blue eyes were shining, and she had a huge muff in her hands. It was an agreeable meeting, she invited me for lunch. But first I had to decide where was I going to live.

Oshmyansky said he had reserved a hotel room for me. But on hearing the name of the hotel—Cosmopolitan—Erika shook her head.

"That's a second-rate hotel," she said, "while Kollontai as a Soviet diplomat must keep her prestige high. Please reserve a room for her at the Bristol or Grande Hotel."

But I solved the problem in my own way by telephoning to reserve a room at a sanatorium hotel on Holmenkollen, a hill overlooking the city. It takes a mere half-hour to get to the city from there by electric train.

Holmenkollen, October 14, evening

Here I am again on Holmenkollen, a place familiar to me, after five years of absence. I breathe wonderful mountain air here, and below I can once again see the bright lights of Christiania. And there is a lot of starlit sky. Good evening, Christiania! Good evening, Universe!

But five years ago I lived in a little red house, at a cheap hotel a bit farther below the splendid and expensive sanatorium. This time, however, I have been put up in a comfortable sanatorium hotel room to maintain the prestige of our Soviet Republic.

I changed into a quiet black woollen frock and went to the big hall to dine.

Everybody at the hotel had heard the news about the arrival of the "first woman diplomat".

The elderly Norwegian woman who runs the hotel rose from her table to meet me and led me to a secluded table by the window. "We often have diplomats staying here," she hastened to tell me.

After dinner I went back to my room and am now recording my first day in Christiania.

MY FIRST DAY OF DIPLOMATIC WORK

October 15, 10 p. m.

I am still at the mission. There were no incidents on my first day as chief, and I believe it was useful.

Both papers carried the interviews without distortions or cuts. That is very well. Marcel Yakovlevich, the Second Secretary, is very glad. [..]

The Second Secretary feels optimistic but Oshmyansky drew my attention to a mistake I made. The point is that, being a Counsellor, I did not have the authority to give the press an interview without first asking Ambassador's permission.

"But Comrade Surits isn't here, and to refuse those interviews would have been to our own disadvantage. Yakov Zakharovich and I were fellow-exiles for a long time. He will understand, and I'm sure he won't hold it against me."

I said that to reassure Oshmyansky but I am not certain that Surits will get me right. Fellow-exiles are one thing and Ambassador and Counsellor another.

I set to work on looking over incoming and outgoing papers, which Oshmyansky turned over to me with particular pleasure. It is awfully boring, current correspondence, without anything important in it. There is a notification from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs saying that I have been appointed Counsellor to the mission in Christiania, and a special letter to the bookkeeper about my salary, settling up with me, and so on:

The most interesting paper is a letter about the purchase of herring. Semb, a fish merchant, wants us to pay the remainder of the money which he says we owe him for herring delivered as far back as last fall. I will have to look into this. [...]

It is the Second Secretary that has supplied me with the most valuable information about the state of affairs in Norway. He is French but took sides with us in 1917. I remember him from 1919 in Kiev, where I was a member of the Ukrainian Soviet Government while he worked in the Comintern. Marcel has the mind of a politician with a Comintern background. I remember him working in the French Section with Inessa Armand, who praised him in speaking to me. [...]

Marcel is very unhappy because the mission is not doing any work. He thinks we should take advantage of the Mowinckel Cabinet's friendly attitude to us to get our commercial affairs going right away. He considers it important to purchase herring precisely now, not only because prices are lower, which is what our trade experts want, but from the political point of view. [...]

Our conversation was broken off by Semb, the fish merchant. He was asked to go up to the third floor but he insisted on seeing me. It emerged that we still owe him money for herring delivered last year through Centrosoyuz.

Kovalevsky's assistant, Dyakonov, and the bookkeeper brought the papers and books. We established by joint efforts that we are not really quits with Semb as yet. The consignment had turned out to include several barrels of inferior herring which we rejected. This had led off correspondence about that part of the consignment (actually a small part), and final payment had been left hanging in the air.

I promised Semb to clear the matter up. I sent telegrams to Centrosoyuz and Vneshtorg.

Dyakonov left my office rubbing his hands with satisfaction.

As for me, I smiled ironically as I wondered what the reaction at the International Women's Secretariat would have been had it got word of the zeal I showed in tackling the problem of herring on my very first day at the mission.

AMBASSADOR IS BACK

October 17

Surits is back. There is hustle and bustle at the mission. Oshmyansky rushes upstairs and downstairs, carrying folders, and stands at attention in front of the closed door of Ambassador's office. I have been told that he is a former frontier guard, and as for how he came to be here, that is a long story that I am going to write about specially.

Kovalevsky wipes his spectacles every second, as if he fears he might not see his chief clearly enough. Only Marcel sits at his writing-table, compiling a note in French and pushing the sheets filled with text to his wife, a French typist. His pointer Pedro lies under the table, greeting all who come in by wagging its tail.

Ambassador locked himself up in his office to look through the mail. Finally he invited me to his office. He is no longer the Yakov Zakharovich of the years of exile but a well-dressed diplomat with a beard à la Napoleon III. We hardly ever met during the war.

I immediately assumed a businesslike tone.

"What problems are there between our country and Norway?"

Surits listened in silence, smoking.

He: "Didn't they tell you even that at the People's Commissariat? What have you been sent to this country for as Counsellor? Our staff is

small, as you see, and the amount of work is even smaller. Chicherin's letter doesn't explain anything. However, this may be because they are going to transfer me to a post in another country, one more important to us. Did they tell you anything about that?"

I: "No."

Surits: "Be that as it may, I'm not going to stay here for long. The idea is apparently to have you gain some knowledge of diplomatic work while I'm still around. You've never held a diplomatic job before, have you?"

I laughed. "Why, where could I have held one? I'm active in women's committees and a propagandist, that's all. But tell me, Yakov Zakharovich, what problems do we have here?"

Surits was silent again, smoking thoughtfully.

He: "There are no big problems. This is neither Turkey nor Persia, you see. But there are some unsolved problems. First, the problem of sea zone. The Norwegians insist on our recognising a three-mile zone but we have a stake in establishing a 12-mile zone. This is due in part to sealing and fishing in the White Sea but we also need it for purely strategic reasons.

"The other problem, which is more important, is that of sovereignty over Spitsbergen. Are you familiar with the problem? Give it your attention, study it. The press writes a lot about it, especially that swindler of an assistant professor, Hul."

I: "Swindler? I thought he was an expert in polar exploration. His name is known in our country."

Surits: "He's a swindler because he tampers with the facts, trying to prove that Norway has priority with regard to sovereignty over Spitsbergen. But Russia has staked out claims to coalmines there. You should make a thorough study of this matter too.

"Lastly, the integrity of Norway itself, recognition of its frontiers. In discussing the question of recognising the RSFSR *de jure*, we can corner the Norwegians over the issue of frontiers. That's not pressing, however."

I: "What about our trade links with Norway? How do we meet our obligations under the trade treaty?"

Surits, looking annoyed: "Trade with Norway? There is virtually none. What do you expect of them? All they can sell is herring. They still owe us part of the consignment ordered last year."

I tried to correct him by mentioning the money we still owe to Semb but he broke me off impatiently, telling me to see Kovalevsky about it.

Surits: "Those are all passing trifles. If you're interested in herring trade, go to the third floor. I have more important business to attend to."

I got up. Before we parted, he invited me to his Lia villa.

Surits: "There we will talk about important things. Our friendship with the Middle East is vastly important to Soviet diplomacy. I will tell you something interesting. Mustafa Kemal Pasha is entirely on our side, and London is furious. We have wrested Afghanistan, Turkey and Iran from them. Do you realise what that means to Great Britain? Especially young Turkey (which is entirely under the aegis of Moscow). There is real scope for diplomacy there but what do we have here? Herring plus seals. A dull country. Even their liberals are spineless, and as for their conservatives, they're trailing along behind England. Nansen? He has begun to put on airs, he's crazy about the League of Nations. I'm sure you, too, will soon be bored to death here. See you in the evening, all right?"

GETTING READY FOR WORK

Lillehammer, October 22

Vneshtorg has ordered immediate settlement with Semb, the fish merchant. This is my first success. Dyakonov and Marcel congratulated me. We can now start talks on placing new orders in Norway.

Lillehammer is a nice little town on the slopes of Gudbrandsdalen, with famous snow-capped Dovrefjellen in the north. Lake Mezen below is icebound already, and world figure skating champion Sonja Henie trains there every morning.

The local paper writes that Lillehammer has become a world centre where three of the world's most famous women are now. They are the writer Undset, who was recently awarded a Nobel prize for her historical novel; Sonja Henie, the idol of all figure skaters; and Mrs Kollontai, the world's first woman diplomat. [...]

I am staying at a modest boarding-house on the edge of a pine forest park. The outlook is admirable. At night you have the impression of looking into outer space, not at the sky as usual. There are other planets somewhere there, other suns and whatever else space is full of. Astronomy still has a great, unexplored future....

I have already set out in earnest to study Norwegian statistical and commercial reference books. Before the war Russia ranked first as an exporter of rye to Norway, Norwegian fish exports to Russia were considerable, and it was Germany that imported more herring than other countries while Latins purchased more dried fish than others (Catholics eat it when fasting). As regards trade with the Soviet Republic, there are no data at all. I will have to look into this as soon as I get back to Christiania. Let Surits appoint me head of the trade department in place of Kovalevsky. But I must stay here for a while because I gasp for breath when climbing a mountain, something which never happened before, and besides, I sleep restlessly, thinking for hours... It would be unwise to leave without completing my course of treatment. I need a reasonable reserve of energy to start work.

"I don't train when I'm in low spirits or feel weak," says Sonja Henie. A charming figure skater, she is nimbler and more graceful than Goltser. And she is still in her teens.

Lillehammer, October 25

When reading our press back home, in Moscow, I had a feeling that the Soviet state had become a powerful factor in international politics. Our successes at Genoa, the Rapallo Treaty and recognition by Germany... The People's Commissariat assigned a palatial mansion to German Ambassador Brockdorff-Rantzau and decorated it. Our trade delegation in Berlin is very active. Krasin sent my Misha (Kollontai's son.—*Ed.*) there, preventing him from engaging in research at a technological institute as assistant professor.

Friendship with Middle East countries, trade agreements with England and neighbour countries—how many gains in two years! The blockade imposed on the Soviet Republic is history now. It simply does not exist any more. This does credit to the Union and is an indication of its power.

But for all our achievements on the diplomatic scene, I sensed even when I was in Helsingfors how precarious peace is and how very busy our enemies are. We are virtually isolated. [...]

It is certainly no easy career I am starting on. Even so, I want to get to work as early as possible. But in Christiania nothing is being done to promote trade.

The air here is fine but I am longing to return to Christiania. I am going to leave in two days, no matter what my doctor says. I feel all right and am full of stamina. I have fought for women, against Kerensky and for Lenin's line. I have won. I am equal to overcoming herring, too.

Lillehammer, November 4, evening

I am going back to Christiania tomorrow. And I am at once glad and unhappy. What will my performance be like? I still have a poor knowledge of Norway, most of it dates from my years in exile, and everything here is alien to me. It is politics and not construction as in the Socialist Republic. [...]

The mountains are aglow with colours reminiscent of Vrubel's as look at them out of the window towards evening. The beauty of nature is majestic here. I have kept myself very busy these past days and have sent 18 letters to Moscow. People over there are preparing for a congress of the Comintern and the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution. How are we in Christiania going to celebrate our great holiday?...

Now why am I moping? I had better take a walk around Lillehammer and say good-bye. I wish to thank it for the wonderful air, for the stillness of solitude and the fact that I hardly think of Pavel. My head is full of thoughts about the problem of trade with Norway.

BACK TO CHRISTIANIA

November 5

Surits greeted me with a question "Why are you back so early?" he asked. "You could have stayed there for another week or so. I won't be going to Moscow before December."

"But we are on the eve of our holiday, the fifth anniversary of the revolution, aren't we? We must prepare, mustn't we?"

"There will be no reception," Surits snapped. "Nobody would turn up, anyway. But I'll put an ad in the papers saying that the Political and Trade Representative Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR will receive visitors in the building of the Trade Delegation on the occasion of the national holiday, November 7. That will compel the ministry to send good wishes."

I: "But you'll give the staff a talk, won't you, Yakov Zakharovich? Besides, we must organise an amateur concert. Is there anybody here who can sing or recite poetry?"

Surits: "Talk that over with Oshmyansky. I'm busy."

But it was Marcel and his wife and not Oshmyansky who set about preparing enthusiastically for a social I promised to tell about what it was like in 1917 and what Lenin had done and said on the occasion.

November 6

Cde. Kobetsky dropped in yesterday. He is in Norway on an ECCI (Executive Committee of the Comintern) mission. I was awfully glad to see him. He brought news from Moscow and the ECCI. But things in the Labour Party here are in a bad way, and he is worried. Discord between Tranmael and Schefflo is fuelling differences. The pretext is the 21 Points of the Comintern. Moreover, reaction is on the rise.

Kobetsky advised me to read without delay the Norwegian daily press for recent months. He said it would give me an idea of the policy of the Cabinet and the struggle between parties. The Norwegian government's policy showed an unpleasant trend pointing to the right. To help

the Labour Party and strengthen the Communists' hand against opportunists, we must be clear about the situation and the influence exerted on Norway from without.

My conversation with Kobetsky helped me a lot. I will bear everything in mind, both the trend and the differences

Yesterday I dropped in at Folkets Hus (People's House). It is taken up by the Bureau of Trade Unions, the Labour Party itself, the editorial offices of its newspaper, a conference hall, and so on. How familiar that house is!

Folkets Hus has a café at the corner, on the first floor. It was there that during my years in exile I handled the dispatch of Lenin's pamphlets and literature of the Zimmerwald Left. Also, it was the starting point of letters sent illegally to secret addresses in tsarist Russia. I felt deep emotion at seeing the place again, after all the experiences of those five eventful years. Folkets Hus is a modest building but the café helped us prepare for the October Revolution. Norwegian workers understood Lenin's ideas at the time. But what is the matter with them now? Why is the Right gaining ground?

At Folkets Hus I met many friends I know from my years in exile. One of them is Peter Andersen himself, Chairman of the Union of Transport Workers, but how old he has grown, or is he ill? It was he who sent literature from Zurich and Bern, that is, from Lenin, to England and America.

"You and I did quite a few things at the time—dangerous things—and took risks, both of us," he said, shaking hands with me. "But now there is the result, the Socialist Soviet Republic in place of tsarist Russia. It's a beacon for us workers of all countries. I would be happy to go to your country with a delegation but I'm in poor health.... Would you, Comrade Alexandra, admit me to the Socialist Republic? After all, it's up to you now to grant me a visa, because you're a diplomat."

We chatted on, cracking jokes.

I saw many people yesterday but, of course, I did not recognise many of them, hence an absurd incident that occurred last night.

I was going to a pharmacy at about nine p. m. I was in a hurry. Near restaurant Casino a stranger barred the way, taking off his hat. I thought he might be one of those I had met at Folkets Hus earlier in the day. I certainly could not remember everybody, so I pretended to recognise the man.

I: "Good evening, comrade. So our destinies have brought us together again." I held out my hand but he looked astonished.

Stranger: "Why, do you remember me?"

I: "I never forget comrades I have known."

Stranger: "May I escort you?"

I: "Certainly, if you wish, but it isn't worth while, I'm going to that pharmacy over there."

Stranger: "Pharmacy?" And suddenly he added in a brash tone: "Hadn't we better drop over at that little restaurant first?"

It was only then that I realised why the "comrade" had stopped me. The next moment I took to my heels, leaving the so-called comrade from Folkets Hus standing there in openmouthed amazement.

"You must put the blame on your new hat," said my Norwegian friend Erika, laughing at my expense. "Your overcoat is the worse for wear and old-fashioned while your hat is the latest thing out. So he said to himself that he knew about those smart women who went out at night without enough money to buy a coat. Called him 'comrade'? The form of address after a drink."

We laughed a lot.

Soviet Mission, November 7

We are marking our holiday. Soviet power is celebrating its fifth anniversary today. We did not know then...how long we would be able to hold out. Would the Russian people follow us? Would we succeed in crushing the Hydra of Counter-revolution? Smolny, too, was in a state of anxiety. But the atmosphere in Lenin's office was always one of self-discipline, order and confidence in our victory.

In the room where the Military Revolutionary Committee was in continuous session, everybody was working hard, what with reports from troops and city districts, orders and assignments. In those early days it was there that the will and heart of the revolution were [...]

There was gunfire somewhere... Columns of workers with rifles slung over their shoulders—our Red Guards—marched out of the Smolny courtyard one after another. A detachment of Bolshevik combatants was followed by several women workers in white kerchiefs, with red stripes on their sleeves. They were nurses of the revolutionary army.

As for us people's commissars newly assigned to government duties, we were in a hurry to write into the book of history—through decrees, orders and decisions—what Soviet power planned to accomplish.

All that has been put into practice, and our orders and decisions are in the archives. Life and its transformation and construction have far outpaced the ideas and aspirations of the early weeks of Soviet rule. But that day five years ago, no anxiety for the future cast a gloom over our minds. Smolny was rejoicing because Lenin had come to the Congress [of Soviets] and was among us.

The hour had struck for the Bolsheviks to take the offensive against the old world. We will hold what we have won. There was elan, a youthful mood of jubilation. Our revolution was on.

Those events took place before. And now Moscow is the venue of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern. The Norwegian delegation to the Congress has sent me a congratulatory message. Not a code telegram. It was not clever of them to do that even though I was pleased with the message. Isolation from Moscow on a day like this is particularly agonising.

I am uneasy about how the Norwegians will comport themselves at the Congress. Schefflo left for Moscow in a most aggressive mood. He wants to expose the "Tranmaelites". But his own line is far from correct. How will it all end? A split in the Labour Party would by no means benefit the Soviet Republic.

But enough of this soliloquy. I had better go and help our people put up posters and portraits.

November 10

Our holiday is over. In my heart and mind, I was not here but in the Kremlin. Some comrades came to see us, then came some members of the Tranmael group, who held a rally at Folkets Hus, but we did not attend it.

Surits received visiting cards from German Envoy Romberg, the Norwegian Consul in Petrograd and some others. Not a single merchant, nobody from parliament. I resent this.

Conversations with my Norwegian consultants have shown that the hitch in trade is due to herring. We must go at once into talks on the spring catch of herring. This is what all importers do. And then, it would be better for us this way because prices are lower now and it is they that usually serve as the starting point.

Communists here consider that the issue of our purchasing herring is the main problem with regard to Norway. The population of northern Norway is hopeful that the Soviet state will expand its trade. Fishermen say they want to sell their catch to us and not to Germany. They are full of friendly sentiments towards new, socialist Russia. Fishermen are the mainstay of Norway's Communists. Contracts for herring must be made before it is caught, perhaps as early as January, but Yakov Zakharovich says that it is all an attempt to put "pressure on us" and that there is still time. We have so far had no meetings with fish merchants or the trade department. Yet, reference books of earlier years actually indicate that even old Russia, which purchased quite a lot of herring in Norway, made contracts almost one year in advance. Our trade expert is plaguing me with complaints, while I have no relevant powers from either Moscow or the Ambassador.

I have written to Krasin to ask him for instructions.

A student society has asked me to give a talk on "new Russia". But Chicherin has told me that public appearances must wait. And so I must hang around, doing nothing while there are things to do, as life itself shows.

I recall another piece of parting advice from Chicherin's. "To be a good diplomat," he told me, "one must not only perfectly speak the language of the country where one is accredited but have a thorough knowledge of the psychology of its people. Read fiction and talk to the common people. It helps greatly." Yet we are isolated by living in a kind of seclusion. Like exiles or something

To be continued

De Gaulle—Foresight and Illusions

Vladimir YEROFEEV

MAJOR MANOEUVRES IN EUROPE

During his confrontation with the United States over NATO De Gaulle styled himself a spokesman of Western Europe or, to be more precise, of the Common Market "six". Meanwhile France had no real leadership in Western Europe. In fact, it could not achieve it, unless Britain was pushed aside and France established close cooperation with West Germany. De Gaulle believed that only if Britain, the USA's Trojan Horse was isolated from the Common Market and from European political development, could France hope for becoming a leader. Only half as strong as the FRG economically, it had a political advantage over it, being a victor state and, possessing nuclear weapons of its own, it had a military advantage as well.

In September 1958 De Gaulle did not hesitate to invite West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer for talks in Colombey. At the talks De Gaulle's main issue was a joint policy in Europe, in particular, coordinated actions to devise plans for uniting Europe. Adenauer was just as interested in cooperation with France, hoping in this way to gradually restore not only the military but also West Germany's political positions in Europe and to somewhat exonerate his country in the eyes of the European public.

Besides, he wanted France's support for the FRG's claims in the German and Berlin issues. But as for leadership in Western Europe, the FRG was not averse to measuring swords with France, but that would be in the future. For the time being, Adenauer was willing to make friends with De Gaulle. By the time they completed their first meeting they had already come to terms.

Within less than four years De Gaulle and Adenauer met 15 times and spent together over one hundred hours talking. Adenauer fell so much under the spell of De Gaulle's personality that he even promised in Bad Kreuznach in November 1958 to assist him in restructuring NATO. Later, too, he stood behind him on many occasions, when the French President proposed plans for building a "smaller Europe", insisted on recognising the agricultural interests of France in the Common Market, and repelled Britain's persistent attempts to join the EEC. In the summer of 1959, he went so far as to declare: "Those Britons should realise at last that they can no longer occupy a leading position in Europe. From now on France and Germany will lead the continent."

But De Gaulle had to pay a heavy price for Adenauer's backing: the loosening of arms restrictions imposed on West Germany under the Paris Agreement, the granting of French territory for Bundeswehr's depots and training bases, and so on. To please Adenauer, De Gaulle was most intractable on the Berlin and German issues for four years beginning in 1958, and in 1962 on disarmament problems.

De Gaulle staged big ceremonies devoted to rapprochement between the two countries, gave grand receptions in honour of his "friend" Adenauer, extolling him in his bombastic speeches, embracing him, and awarding medals to him. In the autumn of 1962, De Gaulle made a tour of West Germany, where he made speeches in German, a language he did not like, before large crowds, eulogising friendship and blood kinship between Gauls and Teutons.

But only someone who did not know the General at all could take those assurances and pompous ceremonies at their face value. His sober mind contemplated the main action which crowned French-West German rapprochement—the Treaty on Cooperation signed at the Elysée on January 22, 1963. The agreement envisaged regular consultations between the governments of both countries on all major issues of foreign policy, coordination of actions on military strategy and tactics, and so on.

Everything considered, De Gaulle did realise that he was playing a diplomatic game that was far from harmless. Being a nationalist-minded French general, he had no trust in, not to mention sympathy for, German militarism. He had fought against German invaders in both world wars, and in 1944-1945 he had insisted on dismembering Germany. So it hardly pleased him to back up the military-political and economic claims of the FRG. Besides, he was constantly worried by the reaction to that of the Soviet Union which he never let out of his sight.

In almost every talk with us De Gaulle would make a point of justifying his line of promoting ties with the FRG, explaining his relations with that country mainly by economic motives, in particular, by the evolution of the EEC. He did not deny that revanchist forces existed in the FRG, but asserted that they were insignificant. He always emphasised that he was against the revival of Germany as a military force dangerous to the cause of peace, saying he was categorically against building up German militarism and would not hesitate to talk with us if he sensed any danger there.

He often recalled that he had suggested a dismembering of Germany at the end of the war. At that time, he said, he had wanted to sign an agreement with Stalin, which would help to make France strong and bring it closer to the Soviet Union geographically and politically. If France, he explained, would have been allowed to occupy the Rhine area—and he had told Stalin just this—then "there would have been no Franco-German rapprochement, since Adenauer would not be on my side".

"If I were in Cologne today, as you are in Königsberg," he reasoned, "Adenauer would probably be not only against you but also against me. Stalin, however, did not wish to conclude such an agreement with me; moreover, even the treaty signed in Moscow in 1944 to provide against German aggression was later regarded unnecessary."

The general also made this reasoning: since France was a peaceful country and never intended to attack the USSR, then its rapprochement with West Germany presented no threat. It would be quite another matter if Adenauer joined hands with the USA—that would be dangerous indeed. De Gaulle made it clear that by building up Franco-West German ties he was drawing the FRG away from the USA, preventing their coming together. He stressed that he knew Germans well enough, had suffered a good deal from them, and did not want to allow Americans to command them.

His hobbyhorse was the idea that by relying on the FRG's help he would be able to strengthen France's positions in Western Europe, achieve a balance between the Western and Eastern parts of Europe, and then start close cooperation with the Soviet Union.

De Gaulle not merely said he did not loose vigilance with regard to German militarism, but made some political steps, in particular, he curbed any speculation about future German borders. He was the only Western leader to recognise the Oder-Neisse border as final and declare that all German borders in general were unchangeable. "We are not interested in changing Germany's borders now or in the future," he said in a talk with us in March 1959. "Germany", he said "should reconcile itself to the punishment it deserves for its aggression." Later De Gaulle declared all this publicly at the press conferences on March 25 and November 10, 1959.

He assigned an important role to the FRG in his plans for building a "smaller Europe" comprising six EEC countries, which would express specific European interests and pursue an independent policy, relying on the community economically and on the nuclear forces of France militarily. He set forth his ideas of a political alliance of West European countries for the first time during the talks with Adenauer in June 1960, and soon made them known to the other members of the community. He expected to achieve European political unity through all-round cooperation among these countries, using relevant specialised agencies, and later to build a multinational confederation of independent states.

To design a structure of a union of six West European states, a committee was set up, named after its French chairman Fouchet. The project drawn up by the Fouchet Committee envisaged their joint policy in international relations, defence, economy, and culture. The project, submitted for discussion to the foreign ministers of the "six", was not approved because of objections by Belgium and Holland. In the 1960s the Common Market was hit by a series of heavy crises as a result of the sharp objections by the French President to a supra-national character of the proposals advanced by the EEC Commission and to adopting decisions by a majority vote.

But the Europe of the "six", or "smaller Europe", was merely a stage on the path to De Gaulle's chief goal of creating a "greater Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals". He said in Paris back in April 1954: "I have really always wanted to see a united Europe as it is, rising from the ashes of war. I see it stretching from Gibraltar to the Urals, from Spitsbergen to Sicily." Sometimes he defined united Europe as a "joining together of Slavs, Teutons, Gauls, and Latins". In his memoirs he wrote about a project of "building Europe in the form of an organised association of its peoples—from Ireland to Istanbul and from Gibraltar to the Urals". In the long run he arrived at a briefer formula: Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Today this notion has become firmly established in international parlance.

Possessed with the idea of "greater Europe", De Gaulle already at the end of the war denounced the splitting of Europe into West and East, calling it "nonsense and poor politics". He was opposed to setting up NATO partly for these reasons. And later he asserted more than once that the European organisations established in the West were crippling Europe, leaving it without its genuine meaning. Europe should be created, he stressed, together with Russia and in a situation of detente. De Gaulle had somewhat of a mystic belief in "greater Europe", sometimes virtually calling Europeans a special white race.

On becoming President, De Gaulle arranged a large reception for the diplomatic corps on January 22, 1959. S. A. Vinogradov was in Moscow at the time, and I performed the duties of charge d'affaires. My two colleagues from the embassy and I stood in the grand hall of the Elysée side by side with our foreign counterparts. De Gaulle passed round the hall, greeting the heads of the embassies. After that he made

a brief speech, stressing the importance of concord, detente and cooperation among states.

After the speech those present mixed in the hall and De Gaulle strolled through the crowd of diplomats along a corridor of people, first with the US ambassador and then with the British one. Soon the chief of protocol approached me to say that the President had invited me for a talk with him. Walking ceremoniously about the hall, De Gaulle asked me whether I liked his speech. I said I did, and he told me he was thinking about us as he was delivering it.

Then abruptly he added confidentially: "Beware of the Chinese, don't trust them." I was dumbfounded. That was a time of Soviet-Chinese friendship, the song "Moscow-Peking" was sung so often, and nothing seemed to betoken any change there. "Oh, no, my General," I said, addressing him the way Vinogradov used to. "Why? You know we have friendly relations with the People's Republic of China." "They only appear to be friendly," remarked De Gaulle, "but sentiments hostile to you are growing within the Chinese leadership, and this will soon make itself felt, believe me." To all my objections he would say he had information from reliable sources and wished to warn us. Concluding the conversation he said: "Some day we shall find ourselves in the same boat, a European one. Europeans should stick together."

De Gaulle said as early as December 1958 that he was "very much interested in the problem of building a united Greater Europe. Europe needs unity. It has its special problems and interests that are different from those of America and Asia." He realised, he said, that "Europe cannot be built without the Soviet Union, and if European countries want to preserve peace, they should be together with the USSR, the country which can be a guarantor of peace, since it is stronger than all the others now". Later, in May 1968, he said in a public address: "The significance and might of the Soviet Union make it a pillar of the continent."

PIONEERS OF DETENTE

The problem of promoting ties with the USSR was always in the focus of De Gaulle's attention, though it was sometimes dimmed by temporary considerations a situation required. But, as he once told a diplomat from a socialist country, "France will always remain France, and Russia will always be Russia, and no epithets can change the essence of relations between them". Having the memory of an elephant, as the French say, which is a very good memory, De Gaulle did not forget that as early as in September 1941 the Soviet government regarded him as "the leader of all free Frenchmen" and promised to "ensure the restoration of the independence and grandeur of France after victory".

He also remembered that in 1942 the Soviet Union was the first to recognise the French National Committee (transformed into the French Committee of National Liberation in 1943 and in 1944—into the Provisional Government of the French Republic). The Franco-Soviet Treaty on Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1944 on De Gaulle's initiative, ensured the return of the great-power status to France. This was evidenced by its equal participation in the Potsdam Conference and the sittings of the council of the foreign ministers of the four member countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, its inclusion in the Allied Control Council, the allotment to it of an occupation zone in Germany, its becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and so on.

De Gaulle in general liked Russians and Russia, as he usually called our country. "In France," he would tell us, "there exist strong

anti-German sentiments. 'Les boches' are not liked, which serves them right. This is our old problem, I suffered from them myself. Anti-American sentiments, too, are widespread among us. There are grounds for that. Americans are too brazen. As for the British, it is all obvious. Albion is out of favour among the French. That's how it is historically. But I have never known about anti-Russian sentiments in France. Of course, there are people, quite a few of them, who don't like communism. But even they like Russians, they are not prejudiced against them."

This is what one of his ministers once told us about the General: "De Gaulle is sentimental and enjoys the kindest feelings towards Russia. He has not forgotten that Soviet Russia alone displayed a good attitude to him during the war and supported him at that time. De Gaulle sincerely dislikes, and even hates, Americans, though, having become the President, he says little about it, of course. But he cannot forget that during the war the USA and Britain slighted him." In the first days of Hitler's aggression against the USSR, De Gaulle resolutely took the side of our country. "Since the Russians wage a war against the Germans, we are unconditionally with the Russians," he declared. The "Normandie-Niemen" air regiment was formed at his initiative as a symbol of joint struggle and fought together with our pilots at the Soviet-German front.

At the Consultative Assembly sitting on December 21, 1944, De Gaulle uttered his famous words: "To France and Russia to be united means to be strong; and to be disunited means to be in danger. This is an immutable condition in terms of the geographic position, experience and common sense." The role of the Soviet Union and its attitude to France, he went on, "have enhanced to the highest level the age-old feeling of sympathy which we, the French, have always felt towards the Russian people".

In the post-war period De Gaulle wrote in his memoirs that "Franco-Soviet solidarity continued to be in keeping with the natural order of things, both from the point of view of the German threat and considering the Anglo-Saxon striving for hegemony". Incidentally, he told all this at the time of the cold war. He expressed these thoughts during the talks with us as well.

For instance, in mid-June of 1958, he said he had "not changed his views and convictions with regard to the USSR and continued to believe that historical considerations, the current needs and the interests of the future dictate to France an insistent need to maintain and promote normal relations with the Soviet Union". And in March of 1959, when international tensions ran high, De Gaulle said: "France feels no hostility towards the USSR. For all the differences between us, our countries will some day be together. I don't know when, but I am sure that this day will come."

Later that year, in October, De Gaulle invited the head of the Soviet government to come to France on an official visit. I took part in the preparations for the visit and then arrived in France as a member of the Soviet delegation. De Gaulle offered a vast programme of the visit. Apart from talks and meetings in Paris, it envisaged a tour of the country and visits to many cities and various industrial, agricultural and cultural centres, and a large number of official and public receptions.

The programme was discussed in detail, some new suggestions made by us, and some of the French proposals declined. De Gaulle, for instance, insisted that during the visit Nikita Khrushchev fly with him to Algeria, to the oil fields in Hassi Messaoud, which, he said, were of great economic significance to France. A trip to Algeria when France was waging a colonial war there was, naturally, unacceptable to us.

During the first ever visit by the head of the Soviet government to France, which lasted from March 23 to April 3, 1960, the reception by the President and the authorities and the reception by the people all merged together. Maurice Thorez said later that the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the visit was an unusually great success exceeding all expectations. "I must admit", he added, "that we had not expected it to be that good, though we had been sure that a warm welcome would be accorded to the head of the Soviet government."

Even Paul-Henri Spaak, the then Secretary General of NATO, was surprised to see us establishing such good contacts with De Gaulle. After all, the President is known to be a very difficult man, he said, and France's allies often cannot come to terms with him even on minor issues. According to Spaak, it had not been expected in NATO that the reception of the Soviet delegation by the French population would be so well-wishing and warm, since the influential quarters in the country had been opposed to that.

During the talks the two sides discussed a broad range of international problems, above all the German issue, and through it the future of Europe, disarmament questions, aid to developing countries, and practical ways of promoting bilateral relations further. Among the main items on the agenda were possibilities for creating an atmosphere of detente on the continent of Europe. The positions of the USSR and France on the greater part of the questions discussed coincided or were close. De Gaulle even agreed with the idea that, parallel with destroying the delivery means of nuclear weapons, the military bases in Europe close to the Soviet borders be dismantled. He confided to Khrushchev his intentions to recognise the right of the Algerian people to self-determination.

During the talks De Gaulle spoke at large about the idea of a united Europe including both its Eastern and Western parts. The President would always harp on the European theme with regard to France and the Soviet Union in his public speeches. "Russia and France," he said at the dinner in the Elysée on March 23, "the two countries that are at once most ancient and very young, are the daughters of one mother Europe, the two nations whose souls had taken shape under the influence of one and the same civilisation and which have always been especially attracted to each other."

The French President was invited to visit the Soviet Union, but it was only six years later that he paid the return visit. It was delayed because Soviet-French relations worsened for some time, and the disruption of a meeting of the heads of the four great powers, which was due in Paris in May 1960, was followed by an increase of international tensions. De Gaulle hoped it would help to consolidate the role played by France in discussing world problems. Though he criticised Americans for sending the U-2 spy plane to the Soviet Union, which worsened the situation on the eve of the summit, De Gaulle painfully reacted to Khrushchev's refusal to take part in it on the grounds that Eisenhower had not apologised formally for the incident.

There was yet another event in 1962 that worsened Franco-Soviet relations still more. Because the USSR recognised the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria, De Gaulle recalled the French ambassador from Moscow for several months, and Vinogradov had to leave Paris for the same period of time. But despite these "péripéties", as De Gaulle used to say, his general line towards establishing close ties with the Soviet Union remained potentially valid. Besides, by the mid-1960s there emerged grave contradictions between France and the USA and other Western partners on problems concerning European

integration, NATO, the US plans of "multilateral nuclear forces", and so on.

De Gaulle was disappointed with his West German ally as well. The alliance of the two countries had notably gone to seed, especially when the Bundestag, ratifying the Elysée Treaty, attached to it a preamble stressing the FRG's adherence to the USA and NATO, and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, who succeeded Adenauer, declined De Gaulle's idea of a "joint leadership of Europe" in 1964. The President expressed all his bitterness in the speech he made on June 23, 1964. "The FRG," he said, "does not yet believe that the policy of Europe should be European and independent." Some time later he added: "The preferential relations with Washington, which Bonn has been constantly promoting, have taken the inspiration and essence out of the Franco-German accords."

Deputy Jean Lipkowski, a man close to De Gaulle, declared at the National Assembly on November 31, 1964, that "the FRG gives Europe no opportunity to resist American pressure". Rapprochement with the Soviet Union was evidently also viewed by De Gaulle in the context of exerting pressure on the FRG—he wanted to push it off the positions that were unacceptable to him.

De Gaulle's new turn towards the USSR was crowned with the first ever official visit by a French President to the Soviet Union, which lasted from June 20 to July 1, 1966. On the eve of that event Prime Minister Georges Pompidou said that the visit "fits into the general policy facilitating... rapprochement between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, on which the future of peace, at least on our continent, depends; it will help eliminate the cold war climate and promote detente to the benefit of not only France, but also of its neighbours".

The Soviet visit by the President fully lived up the hopes that it would help to consolidate and promote the relations between the two countries. The common positions on major international issues—the priority need to expand detente and improve interstate relations and cooperation in Europe, inviolability of the post-war frontiers, resolute opposition to the nuclear armament of the FRG, prevention of the growing threat of German militarism, the situation in Southeast Asia in connection with the Vietnam war, and other issues—were confirmed.

During the talks and in his speeches in Moscow De Gaulle spoke much about the idea of a united Europe in the context of Soviet-French cooperation. In the speech he made at the dinner in the Kremlin on June 20, 1966, he said: "In France's opinion, the restoration of Europe into one fruitful whole, but not its fruitless division which has paralysed it, is the primary condition for pacifying and transforming the world, though France does not ignore the important role the USA should play in this process... As we are waiting for the whole of Europe to agree on the ways and means which will lead it to these necessary goals, it seems to us that everything impels France and the Soviet Union to do this between themselves already now."

In December 1966, France began to consider in a constructive way the problems to be discussed at a conference on security and cooperation in Europe, whose convocation had been proposed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Conference, held in 1975 in Helsinki, marked the beginning of the European process, a factor of primary importance in the life of all European nations.

De Gaulle's visit to the USSR is usually considered the starting point in the growth of the broad process of European detente. The Soviet Union and France had pioneered it. "It was precisely in Moscow," said Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking in the Paris Town Hall on October

3, 1985, that the formula that later became known was heard for the first time: 'Detente, concord and cooperation'. In the capitals of our countries bilateral Soviet-French documents were elaborated and signed, setting the example for many other multilateral acts which to this day regulate the peaceful and goodneighbourly relations and cooperation among European states."

Many of De Gaulle's plans remained unfulfilled because of lack of time and poor health, and due to objective circumstances. He could carry out any of his ideas to the utmost possible extent, until the conditions, which were not yet ripe for that, prevented him from going further. Clearly seeing these conditions, he never wasted time to combat them, despite the frequent accusations of quixotry. A sober-minded statesman, he was at the same time a rebel who smashed many canons in France's domestic and foreign activities and shook the system of military-political alliances in the capitalist world. But doing all this, De Gaulle never departed from the main goal of his life—that of restoring the greatness of France by ensuring its independence, protecting its national interests, raising it to the level of a power charged with world responsibility.

De Gaulle concluded his *Memoirs of Hope* with these words: "On the mountain side on which France is moving, my mission has always been to lead it upwards, while all the voices down there incessantly urge it to go down again. Having preferred to listen to me once again, it has re-emerged out of the state of decay and has just entered the stage of renewal. But, beginning from this point, as before, I still cannot indicate for it another goal except the summit, and another way except exerting efforts."

A good deal of De Gaulle's political credo has been lost today in his homeland, but time has not obliterated the memories of him. At a meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and representatives of the French public, held in the Kremlin on September 30, 1987, all the French speakers, people of most different views, recalled that it was General De Gaulle, who imparted stability to Franco-Soviet relations and to East-West relations as a whole and discerned three main elements in Franco-Soviet ties—detente, concord and cooperation which are the highlights of Franco-Soviet friendship today as well. And when Roland Leroy referred to De Gaulle's idea which he had expressed in 1944, that it is a misfortune for Europe when France and Russia are divided, Mikhail Gorbachev remarked: "We remember this utterance by De Gaulle."

The main lessons of the life and activities of the great Frenchman Charles De Gaulle have retained their message and continue to exert an influence in the world today. The most important of them is that De Gaulle was the first among Western leaders to see the changes in the alignment of forces in the world and to make appropriate conclusions. He was the first to discard the myth about the Soviet Union's aggressiveness and before anyone else he began to come closer to our country and to interact with it in international affairs and in the area of trade, economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation.

World developments since De Gaulle's death in 1970 have confirmed the foresight with which he sensed the trends that were only beginning to emerge then. At the same time, they have shown that some of his other views were illusory. Those of his political acts which expressed the will and genuine interests of France and Europe, doubtlessly, paved the way for the ideas of a common European home and new political thinking, which are gaining ground in the international arena.

USSR—INDIA: Together Into the Third Millennium

Andrei FIALKOVSKY

Soviet-Indian relations were highlighted by another summit in Delhi last November. It marked important progress in building up the unique friendly cooperation between the two influential countries, which are so different, in the interests of their peoples and of world security.

The evidence of modern history is that Soviet-Indian cooperation, developing at a dynamic pace in every field of state-to-state relations, has long since gone beyond the bounds of purely bilateral ties and plays an increasingly stabilising role in the world community.

The year 1955 was a turning point in Soviet-Indian relations. The mid-fifties saw the anti-imperialist, anti-war and anti-colonial potential of Indian diplomacy gain in strength and scope. In the same period, positive changes occurred in Soviet foreign policy; it became more flexible and dynamic, and its trend towards promoting relations with Third World countries assumed a more open and pronounced character. In summer 1955, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India came to Moscow on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet government. This event, preceded by the establishment of diplomatic relations in April 1947, added one of the most vivid chapters to the history of Soviet-Indian relations by paving the way for steadily growing cooperation in every sphere.

In November 1955 the Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin paid a return visit to India. That visit, for its part, was unique in many respects. The Soviet leaders stayed in India for three weeks during which they toured the country and addressed mass rallies in a dozen big cities. For the first time ever, hundreds of thousands of ordinary Indians heard about our country from its own spokesmen.

A further major milestone was the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (Delhi, August 9, 1971), which placed the manifold ties between our countries on a solid legal basis. We consider it a fact of fundamental importance that the treaty included an article under which the Soviet Union and India would, in the event of either of them being attacked or threatened with attack, proceed immediately to mutual consultations with a view to eliminating the threat and taking effective steps to safeguard peace and their security.

The scope of Soviet-Indian cooperation is widening in every sphere: politics, trade, economy, science, military technology, culture. Moreover, this applies to all of the governments. When, in 1977-1979, power in India was exercised by the Janata Party some of whose leaders were more conservative than the leaders of the Indian National Congress, India's foreign policy, including policy towards the Soviet Union, underwent no significant change.

The political, trade and economic situation that had shaped up in the world by the mid-eighties, a trend towards a marked escalation of the arms race in a number of countries, the visible danger of nuclear annihilation of

humanity and the need to solve without delay major social and economic problems facing the Soviet Union and India called for new approaches to co-operation in every area of Soviet-Indian relations and for measures to lend them a new quality.

It was in that context that Mikhail Gorbachev visited India in November 1986; as a result the development of Soviet-Indian relations entered its third stage.

The signing by Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi of the Delhi Declaration on Principles for Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World was the keynote of the visit. The ten fundamental principles of the Declaration, worked out on the basis of new political thinking, outline the road to the consolidation of democratic principles in the world community, of peaceful coexistence, of freedom to choose development paths and ideological values.

The Delhi Declaration and reciprocal top- and high-level visits led to a considerable intensification of Soviet-Indian cooperation on the international scene. The Indian leaders vigorously supported the INF Treaty signed in Washington in 1987 by the General Secretary of the CPSU CC and the US President and the subsequent ratification of the treaty in Moscow. They take an active stand in favour of the conclusion of a Soviet-US agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear armaments. India backs the efforts which the Soviet Union is making to bring about a mutually acceptable solution to existing contradictions over the whole range of disarmament problems. Operating within the framework of the non-aligned movement and the Group of Six, in the UN and in other international organisations, India contributes its share to the realisation of the goals and principles of the Delhi Declaration. In June 1988 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi submitted to the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament his country's "Action Plan for the Ushering in Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World Order", a document of great international significance.

The plan, which is largely consonant with the Soviet proposals of January 15, 1986, provides for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the world in three stages by the year 2010. It is one of the concrete results of the process initiated by the Delhi Declaration, from which it is inseparable. It calls for a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests and for prevention of the deployment of any space weapons systems and envisages the subsequent conclusion of an international convention banning the testing, development, deployment and storage of all such weapons. The plan includes provision for expanding international cooperation in space, signing an international convention that would outlaw the threat or use of nuclear weapons, ending the production by any nuclear state of fissionable materials suitable for the development of such weapons, withdrawing all armed forces from the territories of other countries and abolishing foreign military bases.

Delhi hailed the proposals for consolidating stability in the Asia and Pacific region which Mikhail Gorbachev put forward in September 1988 in Krasnoyarsk. It stressed that the proposals are aimed at strengthening Asian security and create additional prerequisites for Soviet-Indian cooperation in building a common Asian home.

Both countries realise that a new system of relations in Asia is by no means an abstract idea but a perfectly feasible goal. To attain this goal, it is necessary that new political thinking take firm root on the vast Asia continent and that every state contribute on a par with the Soviet Union and India to the general process of stabilising the situation in the Asia and Pacific region. After all, the Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk platforms and, for that matter, the Indian approach to the problem of strengthening Asian security amount to an invitation

for all the parties concerned without exception to join in dialogue and a search for mutually acceptable compromises.

The constructive efforts being made by India in the interest of an Afghan settlement are common knowledge. During Afghan President Najibullah's visit to India in May 1988, the two sides were at one on the need for the Republic of Afghanistan to become a stable, non-aligned state and stressed that any possibility of interference in its affairs must be completely ruled out. During his visit to the FRG in June 1988, the Indian Prime Minister stated that "a fanatical and fundamentalist government coming to power in Afghanistan would be the worst possible situation in the region. It would complicate the situation in our region and also have far-reaching repercussions in other areas of the world."¹

The Soviet Union and India are seriously concerned about the fact that implementation of the Geneva accords of April 14, 1988, encounters considerable difficulties. They are resolved to contribute as much as possible to the establishment of lasting peace on Afghan soil and to a renaissance of Afghanistan in line with the policy of national reconciliation.

Indian diplomacy also plays a constructive role in settling the situation in Kampuchea and the Iran-Iraq conflict, searching for a mutually acceptable solution to the complicated situation in Central America and seeking an end on a fair and comprehensive basis to the years-long tension in the Middle East.

The signing of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan, the appreciable headway made towards a settlement in Kampuchea and towards ending the eight-year-old war between Iraq and Iran—a war senseless in every respect—and the positive signs in evidence in the Middle East all indicate that the principles of new political thinking written into the Delhi Declaration are gaining ground in international relations and becoming guidelines in world affairs, including the settlement of regional conflicts.

The identity or closeness of the Soviet and Indian approaches to the majority of today's global and regional problems do not imply, however, that the positions of the two countries fully coincide on all international issues. A case in point is the difference in opinion between Moscow and Delhi over the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This treaty, which has an immense positive potential, justly holds a prominent place among treaties limiting nuclear armaments. On July 1, 1988, it was twenty years since the treaty was submitted for signing, and as many as 136 countries have already affixed their signatures to it. India, however, still refuses to sign it, seeing it as discriminatory towards non-nuclear states. Delhi is also against creating a nuclear-free zone in South Asia on the grounds that the military political situation around India is abnormal and that there are nuclear arms in neighbouring China and at the US Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean.

Under these circumstances Indian political analysts consider that declaring South Asia a nuclear-free zone would merely create an "illusion of security" for India. The Soviet Union appreciates India's position on these issues and hopes that progress towards nuclear disarmament and a healthier climate in the Asia and Pacific region and the world over will also make possible a mutually acceptable solution to this complex problem. The important thing is, in our opinion, to keep the South Asian region free of nuclear weapons in deeds and not in words. The Soviet Union thinks highly of India's allegiance to the policy of developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes only. Rajiv Gandhi pointed out that India has demonstrated its will not to make nuclear weapons although it has for some time past had the capability to do so. India had made it clear that it did not want to go down that road.² This important statement confirms the principled character of India's peace-loving foreign policy.

The Soviet Union has always seen growing economic cooperation with India as a key task. This cooperation, coupled with the joint political documents signed by our countries, puts Soviet-Indian relations on a solid material basis, lends them still greater stability and gears them to the solution of future problems. Our country has done much to help develop India's heavy and power industries, build up its infrastructure and increase its production of oil and other raw materials. Since 1955 we have within the framework of economic cooperation granted India state credits totalling over five billion rubles. About 1,500 Soviet specialists work in India alongside their Indian colleagues in industry and other spheres of bilateral cooperation.

In 1985 Soviet-Indian trade registered a record turnover of 3.1 billion rubles. The same period, however, witnessed certain negative trends in Soviet-Indian trade and economic cooperation as the disadvantages of extensive methods of developing it began to come out. The persistence in Soviet exports to India of a large quantity of raw materials for the power industry (over 70 per cent) led, with the drop in world prices for oil, to imbalances in trade between the two countries and to a decrease in its value. This called for a thorough restructuring of Soviet-Indian trade, economic, scientific and technological ties. And it explains why, during Mikhail Gorbachev's 1986 visit to India, the two countries decided on a serious restructuring of these ties and on a search for new forms and methods of mutual contacts aimed at actively helping accelerate the socio-economic development of the Soviet Union and advance the modernisation and consolidation of India's economy.

Joint ventures are to be a major line of Soviet-Indian cooperation in trade, the economic sphere, science and technology. Both the Soviet Union and India are in a position to set up joint ventures also in third countries. The future of Soviet-Indian economic cooperation undoubtedly belongs to growing cooperation and specialisation in production, joint efforts in science-intensive industries, direct ties between Soviet state enterprises and co-operatives, on the one hand, and Indian state and private firms, on the other. Increasing cooperation in the creation of major fuel and energy complexes and in the modernisation and reconstruction of the plants which were built with Soviet assistance will understandably continue playing an important part.

Furthermore, work on a large scale will be needed to perfect Soviet-Indian trade relations, primarily by modifying the pattern of Soviet exports to India to increase the share of machinery and equipment in them.

Recent years have seen a marked expansion of Soviet-Indian cultural ties. These take the form of ample exchanges in the sphere of education, the social sciences and the health services, reciprocal visits by art groups and cultural workers, exchanges of exhibitions, cooperation in broadcasting, television, the cinema, publishing, and so on.

In 1986 agreement was reached in Delhi to hold Soviet and Indian festivals of unique proportions. Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi became honorary chairmen of the Festivals' organising committees. The two Festivals, each of which lasted for one year, were unprecedented in the cultural history of the Soviet Union and India.

The Festival of India in the USSR, which was opened in July 1987 in Moscow by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and came to an end in summer 1988, during Indian President Ramaswami Venkataraman's visit to the Soviet Union, acquainted millions of Soviet people with both India's ancient traditions and its present economic, scientific, technological and cultural achievements. Over 3,000 Indians visited the Soviet Union within the framework of the festival,

which marked the beginning of "people-to-people diplomacy" as a new important aspect of Soviet-Indian relations.

The Festival of the USSR in India, opened in November 1987 by Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, drew to a close during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to New Delh. It contributed its share to the further reciprocal enrichment of our peoples in the cultural sphere, made it possible to continue exchanges of cultural values and familiarised numerous ordinary Indians with the Soviet peoples's life and economic, cultural and social achievements.

The new top-level visit to India enabled the two countries to sum up their achievements over the past period in order to perfect their mutual relations and step up their joint efforts in the interest of reason and goodwill in the world. It helped set new tasks in building up Soviet-Indian cooperation throughout at the end of this and the beginning of the next millennia which will promote the two nations' interests and further the principles of new political thinking among the world community.

¹ *Hindu*, June 9, 1988.

² *Ibid.*

FREEDOM, PROGRESS, AND PEACE

Ronald REAGAN

Let me begin by thanking the editors of *International Affairs* for affording me this opportunity to address its readers in the Soviet Union. This invitation truly reflects a new spirit that encourages a freer exchange of opinions in your country, a development which all Americans welcome.

On my visit to Moscow in May-June 1988, particularly in my address to the students and faculty of Moscow State University, I had the chance to say something of my political philosophy. This is what I would like to elaborate upon here.

FREEDOM AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS

I am a proud champion of America's heritage of liberty. It is no accident (as some of your leaders have been known to say) that, over two centuries, my country grew—from a sparsely populated agricultural society into an industrial and technological giant—with a political system that restricted the power of government and left free the initiative and creative genius of individuals. In 1987 we celebrated the 200th anniversary of our Constitution—a blueprint of limited government, which built structural safeguards against a concentration of power. It divides these limited governmental powers between the national government and the states; it further divides the limited powers of the national government among three co-equal branches (the executive, the legislative, and the judicial). This system of “checks and balances” among institutions is what ensures the independence of the judiciary, the rule of law, and the protection of the political and human rights articulated in the Bill of Rights in our Constitution. It is what ensures the primacy of free, private institutions in a pluralist society, and denies to any party or group a monopoly of power. It is what effectively guarantees, by the very structure of our system, citizens' rights against the power of the state, including freedom of the press, assembly, and worship, and the right of organized political opposition.

As a great Justice of our Supreme Court, Louis Brandeis, once put it: “The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted ... not to pro-

Ronald Wilson Reagan, born in 1911, President of the United States of America since 1980 (in 1984 he was re-elected for the second term). He graduated from a college, where he studied economics and sociology, in Eureka, Illinois, in 1932. Following his graduation he worked as a radio announcer and a film and TV actor. He was a captain in the US Army Air Force during World War II. He took part in the trade union movement and was elected president of the Screen Actors Guild from 1947 to 1952 and in 1959. He joined political activities in the 1960s. In 1967-1975 he was elected governor of California. President Reagan had meetings and talks with Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Geneva (1985), in Reykjavik (1986), in Washington (1987) and in Moscow (1988). As a result of the joint efforts and due to a businesslike approach and realism, the INF Treaty was signed and came into force during the Moscow summit. That treaty is the first real step in nuclear disarmament that has ever been made.

mote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but ... to save the people from autocracy."

Other nations in the democratic world organize their institutions somewhat differently, but the basic principle is the same: restraints on state power. This basic principle is not simply an historical curiosity of the 18th century. On the contrary, our experience suggests that this principle of government is even more attuned to the modern world. Let me explain.

When I spoke at Moscow University, I began by describing not the past, but the future. I spoke of the miracles of today's technology that promise a new technological revolution during our lifetime. This new revolution is a peaceful one, but its effects will fundamentally alter our world, shatter old assumptions, and reshape our lives. It is easy to underestimate because it is not accompanied by banners or fanfare. It has been called the Information Revolution, and as its emblem, one might take the tiny silicon chip—no bigger than a fingerprint. One of these chips has more computing power than a roomful of old-style computers.

Information technology is transforming our lives—making computers an everyday fact of life, putting robots on assembly lines, forecasting weather for farmers, and mapping the genetic code of DNA for medical researchers. Microcomputers today aid the design of everything from houses to cars to spacecraft—they even design better and faster computers. They can translate English into Russian or enable the blind to read—or help a musician produce on one synthesizer the sounds of a whole orchestra. Linked by a network of satellites and fiber-optics cables, one individual with a desktop computer and a telephone commands resources unavailable just a few years ago to even the largest governments, and can reach out to the entire world. A person in New York can communicate with someone in London as easily and directly as if he were in the next room.

Like a chrysalis, we are emerging from the economy of the first Industrial Revolution—an economy confined to and limited by the Earth's physical resources—into, as one economist titled his book, *The Economy in Mind*, in which there are no bounds on human imagination and the freedom to create is the most precious natural resource.

Think of that little computer chip. Its value is not in the sand from which it is made, but in the microscopic architecture designed into it by ingenious human minds. Or consider the example of a satellite, able to relay a news broadcast around the world, replacing thousands of tons of copper mined from the Earth and molded into wire. In the new economy, human invention increasingly makes physical resources obsolete. We are breaking through the material conditions of existence into a world where man creates his own destiny. And, even as we explore the most advanced reaches of science, we are returning to the age-old wisdom of our culture, a wisdom contained in the Bible: In the beginning was the spirit, and it was from this spirit that the material abundance of creation issued forth.

But progress is not foreordained. The key is freedom—freedom of thought, freedom of information, freedom of communication. The renowned scientist, scholar, and founding father of Moscow State University, Mikhail Lomonosov, knew that. "It is common knowledge," he said, "that the achievements of science are considerable and rapid, particularly once the yoke of slavery is cast off and replaced by the freedom of philosophy."

One of the first contacts between your country and mine took place between Russian and American explorers. The Americans were members of Cook's last voyage on an expedition searching for an Arctic passage;

on the island of Unalaska, they came upon the Russians, who took them in. Together, with the native inhabitants, they held a prayer service on the ice. Today, our explorers are the entrepreneurs—individuals with vision, with the courage to take risks and faith enough to brave the unknown. These entrepreneurs and their small enterprises are responsible for almost all the economic growth in the United States. They are the prime movers of technological innovation. In fact, one of the largest firms manufacturing personal computers in the United States was started by two university students in the garage behind their home.

Some people, even in my own country, look at the riot of experiment that is the free market and see only waste. What of all the entrepreneurs that fail? they ask. Many do, particularly the successful ones. Often several times. And if you ask them the secret of their success, they will tell you that it is what they learned in their struggles along the way—it is what they learned from failing. Just as for an athlete in competition, or a scholar in pursuit of the truth, experience is the greatest teacher.

And that is why it is impossible for government planners, no matter how sophisticated, ever to substitute for millions of individuals making their own individual decisions, motivated to work night and day to make their own dreams come true.

Can it be a coincidence that this latest burst of technological innovation originated in the nations where knowledge and information flow freely, where creativity is given free rein, where ideas flourish in a system of true openness? And does this new generation of technological advance not pose a special challenge to systems that keep photocopiers under lock and key as a threat to the state's monopoly on information—the challenge that if they do not change, they will fall further and further behind?

Even among the non-Communist countries, it has been rediscovered in the 1980s that excessive government regulation is a powerful obstacle to economic progress. Indeed, there is a kind of revolution in economic thinking taking place today.

Fifty years ago, amid the economic crisis of the 1930s, the non-Communist world learned the lesson that the global system needed some safeguards against economic instability. Humane societies had an obligation to sustain the most disadvantaged among their citizens; a free market system needed some structures and processes to protect against the excessive swings of the business cycle. Then in the 1970s, the energy shocks forced another reassessment of the modern world economy. It became clear that governments had gone too far during the preceding generation in depriving their countries' economies of the flexibility so vital to their dynamism. The postwar boom in the non-Communist world had concealed the problem for a time, but the stresses of the 1970s revealed the truth: Excessive rigidity had come to be built into national economies; excessive faith had been placed in centralized policies and planning; it had come to be taken for granted that government controls and regulations were both socially desirable and cost-free.

The lesson of the past 10 years in the non-Communist world is that the societies which recovered most readily from the crisis of the 1970s were those with the resilience and flexibility to respond to market forces. At the Bonn Economic Summit in 1985, the leaders of the major industrial democracies declared their unanimous conclusion that structural rigidities and excessive state intervention were the main obstacles to a revival of growth.

This insight has spread around the planet. The Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and other developing economies have vaulted into the technological era, barely pausing in the industrial age along the

way. Low-tax agricultural policies in the South Asian sub-continent mean that in some years India is now a net exporter of food. Countries in Africa, facing severe problems on the path of development, acknowledged at a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1986 that structural reforms were the key to sustained growth and development. We also see the winds of change blowing over the People's Republic of China and over many countries in Eastern Europe. And we see perestroika in your country.

Worldwide, therefore, we see a trend toward structural reform, decentralization of decision-making, an easing of institutional rigidities—to give greater scope to market forces, to liberate the natural, innovative, productive forces in every society. Some of us knew this all along: that the true source of prosperity and productivity is the God-given genius and creativity of the individual, not government. But I find it heartening to see this truth acknowledged so universally in the last quarter of the 20th century. Systems based on materialism and determinism, that prided themselves on a special mastery of economic forces, have shown themselves failures.

This truth does not discriminate between developed and developing countries, or among races and cultures, or among social systems. It applies to all, and it offers to all the same opportunity for progress.

In parallel with this revolution in economic thinking, the growth of democracy has become one of the most powerful political movements of our age. In Latin America in the 1970s, only a third of the population lived under democratic government. Today, over 90 per cent does. In the Philippines, in the Republic of Korea, in Botswana, free, contested, democratic elections are the order of the day. In South Africa, the black majority has asserted its rights and its voice as never before, and the prospect that the hated apartheid system will give way to a democratic future is more real than ever before. If, throughout the world, free markets are the model for economic growth, then democracy is the standard by which governments are measured. There was a time, in earlier decades, when pluralist democracy was thought to be a peculiar phenomenon confined to the industrialized West, inappropriate (or a "luxury") for societies in earlier stages of development or in other cultures. The experience of the 1980s disproves that. The aspiration of freedom is universal, and can not be suppressed forever.

The link between freedom and human progress is now widely understood. Democracies, too, face economic and social problems. But experience demonstrates that free societies are the best able to stimulate and benefit from the creativity and energy of their citizens to attack these problems. That is why political freedom is the most fundamental of human rights.

FREEDOM AND PEACE

There is another truth to be learned from recent experience—another ancient truth being rediscovered for its contemporary relevance. That is the interconnection between economic progress, freedom, and world peace. No one has expressed it better than the courageous Andrei Sakharov, who declared in his Nobel Lecture:

"I am convinced that international trust, mutual understanding, disarmament, and international security are inconceivable without an open society with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to publish, and the right to travel and choose the country in which one wishes to live. I am also convinced that freedom of conscience, together with other civic rights, provides both the basis for scientific progress and a guarantee against its misuse to harm mankind."

I have often said that a government that is not at peace with its own people is not likely to live in peace with its neighbors. Solemn international agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act, reflect that these issues of freedom and democracy are important issues of international concern. Naturally, they have also been prominent on the agenda of Soviet-American relations. This dimension of reform in your country—which you call glasnost or democratization—will therefore have its inescapable positive effect on the Soviet Union's relations with the United States and with many other nations.

In August 1987, in an address broadcast to the Soviet-American conference in Chautauqua, New York, I expressed the hope that we would see greater glasnost in your military affairs—publishing a valid military budget, revealing the size and composition of your armed forces, and opening up the big issues of military policy to wider debate. These are all things we do in the West. Such steps in the U.S.S.R., I said, would contribute to greater understanding between us, as well as to the good sense of your own decisions in this vital area of national—and international—concern.

The world now looks to your country with profound hope. Who knows what wonders your great people are capable of when their talents are fully liberated? The great cultures of your diverse land speak with a glowing passion to all humanity. One of the most eloquent contemporary passages on human freedom appears in *Doctor Zhivago*, by one of the greatest writers of the 20th century. Pasternak writes, "I think that if the beast who sleeps in man could be held down by threats—any kind of threat, whether of jail or of retribution after death—then the highest emblem of humanity would be the lion tamer in the circus with his whip, not the prophet who sacrificed himself. But this is just the point—what has for centuries raised man above the beast is not the cudgel, but an inward music—the irresistible power of unarmed truth."

Today the world looks expectantly to signs of change, steps toward greater freedom in the Soviet Union. We watch and we hope as we see positive changes. It is one of the most exciting times in your history, and indeed, because of your country's importance, in the history of the world.

TOWARDS A NEW QUALITY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Genrikh TROFIMENKO

The problem of demilitarising relations between the USSR and the USA cannot be reduced solely to arms limitations or the development of political contacts. By virtue of the very fact that the United States and the Soviet Union represent opposite socio-economic systems they are objectively rivals and will continue to be so in future. However, the prime task of the day is to prevent this rivalry from leading to a military conflict and especially from assuming the form of military confrontation. For the purpose it is imperative to have a clear picture of how the militarisation of these relations began and how it grew to a level where both sides viewed the other not as a civil society but as a huge military machine that geared itself to destroying the opponent.

I

It has already been accepted as a truism that the military aspect in Soviet-American relations emerged to the forefront immediately after the Second World War. This took place not so much consciously as spontaneously. As we know, the huge armed forces which the USSR and the USA possessed at the end of the war were unnecessary for peacetime. Mass demobilisation began. Both powers energetically cooperated in creating a new world organisation to ensure peace on the planet—the United Nations. All the same, the rivalry between them began to exacerbate, manifesting itself above all in the form of political, psychological and military competition.

Hundreds of volumes have been written about the sources and causes of the Cold War, and it is not the purpose of this article to repeat or analyse all the arguments presented. Importantly, no article or book on this issue so far published in the USSR has drawn on Soviet classified documents of the 1940s or 1950s. And the thousands of declassified American documents (including the diaries of statesmen, documents of the National Security Council, the military plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.) provide a suitable opportunity for blaming everything on the USA and not seeing mistakes in Soviet foreign policy of the 1940s and 1950s and at the same time being influenced by US documents.

Soviet scholars interpreted the reasons for the start of the Cold War in the US strategy in one vein, namely that American imperialism's

ambition for US world domination was manifest in this strategy (and the Cold War was precisely an American political strategy, and this is unequivocally acknowledged in declassified American documents today). We have "overworked" the very term "US world domination" to such a degree that we apply it to every conceivable and inconceivable situation. If we thoroughly read our scholarly literature, let alone pure propaganda, the following picture takes shape: in the first postwar years, when the USSR was weakened greatly by the devastating war and by the enormous human casualties suffered for the sake of victory, the USA sought world hegemony but did not attain it. But at the start of the 1980s, when the efforts of the Soviet people enabled the country to create armed forces equipped with the most advanced hardware that were much more powerful than those in the 1940s, to build a huge industrial base, and to attain strategic parity with the USA, we supposedly encountered a situation where American plans to "establish world domination" were all but closer to materialisation than 40 years ago!

If we divorce ourselves from incongruities of this type which were hardly spawned by a search for truth, today in the period of a reassessment of values, we can state, too, that there predominated in the US ruling elite in the latter half of the 1940s the view that the unique situation in which the USA found itself as a result of the war (combination of financial and economic might with a qualitatively new military force—atomic weapons) has enabled it to a certain degree to "run" the world order and dictate to other countries, using promises of economic aid and threats of the atomic "big stick", decisions which would promote the expansion and consolidation of America's global positions.

Precisely this was the attempt to build the "Pax Americana". The maximalist task of strengthening and broadening US global influence replaced the task of preserving the American system which the USA had been guided by during the Second World War.

As far as the USSR is concerned, its overriding aim during the first postwar years was to restore the war-ravaged economy, into which enormous resources were channeled. In foreign policy, its chief goal was to promote the consolidation of the system of states that had embarked upon the path of building socialism, a system which took shape as a result of the war. Of course, the Soviet leadership of that time, like the present leadership, never even considered a "breakthrough to the English Channel". However, it was obvious that the enormous broadening of the socialist system as a result of the war, which took place not without USSR military assistance, especially after the victory of the popular revolution in China in 1949, frightened the American ruling class, which unequivocally perceived this broadening as a result of "communist expansion" by Moscow.

The United States, which entered the war against Germany largely to maintain the balance of power on the Eurasian continent, regarded the formation of the "Sino-Soviet monolith" as the elimination of the balance of power in Eurasia, only with Moscow replacing Berlin as the hegemon! The ruling circles of the USA and its allies in Western Europe were also troubled by some statements from Moscow regarding neighbouring countries (Iran, Turkey) and by the creation of the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties and its resolutions, as well as the political "trials" which, to put it mildly, were held not without Stalin's knowledge in the countries of people's democracies. The fear experienced by the US ruling quarters which was caused by developments that buttressed their stereotyped notions of the "aims of communism" combined with a desire to formalise for themselves a leading role in the world was precisely a catalyst to the Cold War with its

fundamental concept of the mandatory containment of communism, or simply, the Soviet Union, chiefly by military means.

This in turn required the creation of the appropriate military machine, the formation of a system of military alliances and the elaboration of the corresponding military doctrines and concepts. The main tool of containment was nuclear deterrence, on which the US ruling circles staked during America's initial monopoly on nuclear weapons. They have not disavowed it to this day, despite the Soviet Union's actual attainment of strategic parity with the US in the latter half of the 1970s.

As a result, Washington began to regard the socio-economic rivalry between the two systems exclusively as rivalry between two military complexes in which the upper hand would be gained by the one that would create the more effective, more formidable and more intimidating military machine. In theory this machine would most likely not even have to be set in motion. The very realisation by one side (the USSR) of the definite superiority of the other (the USA) would give the stronger side an advantage in a test of will in the international arena and ensure a political victory without a big war, namely, the possibility of imposing on the "main enemy" and at the same time on allies and most other, neutral, countries American ways and models! This was the foremost consideration behind the "theory of escalation" of Herbert Kahn which was aimed at exerting psychological pressure on the rival before a war and, so to speak, in place of war, and behind the many other military-strategic and politico-psychological concepts which were elaborated by American political scientists and public figures.

Moscow officially rejected such an approach to the rivalry between the two systems. However, the situation was developing in such a way that the Soviet leadership in reality was increasingly drawn into the arms race. We were forced in practice to channel more and more manpower and material resources into the nation's security in the face of the threat from the USA, which was also setting the pace and determining the areas of the arms race. This circumstance, as well as the fact that the development of non-military industries was dominated by the principle of "production for the sake of production" led to a situation where predominating in the sphere of consumer goods production became the "residual" principle, which could not but have a negative effect on efforts to raise the living standards, resolve agricultural problems and ultimately boost labour productivity. We were moving away from the Leninist tenet that socialism will ultimately emerge victorious only if it attains higher labour productivity than capitalism. Questionable was becoming attainment of the top economic priority of catching up to and overtaking the most developed capitalist countries in per capita production of the main types of output.

The USSR's attainment of strategic parity with the USA was properly assessed by the latter. No matter what criticism American theorists subjected the Marxist term "correlation of forces" to, it was only the levelling out of the balance of military might between the USSR and the USA that pushed the American leadership into equitable talks with the USSR on a broad range of problems, including a treaty-regulated balancing of the levels of the nuclear arms of the two countries. If not for this historic achievement, no one in Washington would be dealing with us as equals. This fact is self-evident.¹ However, when they began talks with us on these problems American leaders turned out to be insincere in their declarations to the effect that they would agree to parity. While negotiating parity they strived to put the USSR in an unfavourable position as regards military construction and specific proposals at the talks. That is why the American ruling class, if we take into account the trend which gained the upper hand in it in the late 1970s did not agree

to ratify the SALT-2 Treaty which was the first such agreement consolidating a real parity between the USSR and the USA in strategic offensive weapons, that is not only, in their quantity but in their combat potential, too.

However, before we came to realise that parity in combat possibilities is not the same thing as parity in numbers, we got ourselves caught up to a certain extent in the "parity knot" and actually began tightening it around ourselves. We started viewing military rivalry with the USA through the same prism of gross indices. At times it began to seem that our lack of some ballistic or cruise missile violated this parity and made us vulnerable, although it was obvious that for a strategic balance: a) quantitative indices are not the most important; b) the specific geostrategic or, to use the American term, geopolitical, position of the USSR dictates that we avoid military development according to the principle of "mirroring" everything the USA does; c) a combination of military policy and diplomacy and a flexible foreign policy makes it possible to find solutions to security problems through means other than the simple buildup of military hardware according to the maxim "if you can do it, do it".

II

President Ronald Reagan is known to like to quote one place from the memoirs of Salvador de Madariaga, who in his time held the post of Chairman of the Commission on Disarmament of the League of Nations: "Nations don't distrust each other because they're armed; they arm because they distrust each other" Reagan ends it at this point. Madariaga, however, continued "And, therefore, to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in winter. Let the weather be warm and people will discard their clothes readily, and without committees to tell them to undress"² It is difficult not to agree with this view, although it is also obvious that in our day the arms race is so closely linked with mistrust, and mistrust with the arms race that the primacy of either factor is just as difficult to establish as in the classic case of the chicken and the egg. During the Cold War period the political and ideological relations between the two countries served not so much to establish trust as to fan mistrust and to substantiate the need not to slacken the pace in the arms buildup. In the USA everything—blunders, failures of American policy *per se*, successes of the national-liberation movements, and even some more or less realistic actions by America's allies with regard to the USSR—was attributed to the intrigues of "international (read: Soviet) communism".

On our part very many phenomena in the foreign-policy sphere were explained away by the intrigues of "world (read: American) imperialism", although many world phenomena and developments did not, by and large, have anything directly to do with either Moscow or Washington. It got to the point that even on the eve of positive shifts in Soviet-American relations, statements were normally made regarding an "intensification of the aggressiveness of American imperialism"; in other words, a repetition of established slogans was substituted for a careful analysis of changes in a specific situation that would make it possible to effect changes in policy.

Bluffing in the international arena played a no small role in whipping up the atmosphere of mistrust and thus in creating additional reasons for accelerating military development. When John Foster Dulles came out in 1954 with the doctrine of "massive retaliation", which allowed and implied the possibility of a US nuclear strike "at the centre of world communism—Moscow", even in the event of developments un-

favourable for the USA in any distant region of the Third World, he was patently bluffing. He was bluffing from positions of strength, but he was bluffing, for even the most vehement hawks in the American cabinet would not have made the decisions to deliver a nuclear strike at Moscow what with the USSR possessing nuclear weapons and having scored successes in developing ballistic missiles, which, judging from declassified documents, American intelligence had an idea of. However, the Soviet side perceived this bluff very seriously and it evidently led to excesses in the implementation of additional measures to buttress the nation's defence capability.

The same could be said of some statements on our part, such as Nikita Khrushchev's threat in 1956 to deliver a nuclear strike at Britain and France if Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt was not halted. Admittedly, Khrushchev in this case was acting from, so to say, a position of "local strength"; utilising the fact that medium-range ballistic missiles had appeared in the USSR, he tried to compensate for the USSR's nuclear lag behind the USA by a threat. Such mutual threats only fanned passions and led to overreaction on both sides, to what American theorists call "preparations to rebuff a threat that is greater than the one expected".

The American interpretation of "nuclear containment" as intimidation of the other side did not promote an improvement in Soviet-American relations and greater trust either. During the period when the USSR's strategic potential began to approach that of the USA and when the first steps were made to establish more or less constant political dialogue between the two countries, many Soviet theorists, including the author of this article, began to interpret the American term "deterrence" precisely as "containment". The realistic American theorists' concept of "mutual containment" of the USA and the USSR through each side's preserving a capacity to inflict unacceptable harm to the other side even after it has gone through an attack gave even more cause to interpret the term "deterrence" as "containment" or "mutual containment".

Only the Soviet military continued to interpret "deterrence" as "intimidation from positions of strength". If we reflect on this objectively we have to admit that though outdated, this definition was not devoid of sense. By all indications, so far American political and military officials cannot part with their ambition to ensure positions of strength. No maintenance of the parity potential of dissuading the rival regarding the futility of an attack, but the creation of a superior potential for pressure, intimidation and coercion—this for the time being is what the American military are being guided by, the shifts towards realism notwithstanding. Naturally, this orientation cannot promote the creation of an atmosphere of trust between the USA and the USSR.

However, we cannot but level criticism regarding our own stand in the past. Although the Soviet leadership expressed satisfaction with the attainment of strategic parity with the USA and categorically stressed that we were not out for superiority, the tenet of the need to *impose* detente on imperialism was nonetheless advanced. However, how can you "impose" on another sovereign country any "rules of the game" if you don't act from positions of strength? Obviously, the "imposition of detente" tenet was perceived by the other side in approximately the same way as we perceived the "intimidation from positions of strength" thesis, the implication being that the USSR has reached such positions of strength that it considers it possible not to reach agreement on a "code of conduct" in the world arena by way of the negotiating table, but to foist upon the USA and the other NATO countries such a code, a supposedly pro-Soviet one at that.

This tenet played a highly negative role in Soviet-American relations, and the commitment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was conducive to an upsurge of anti-Soviet feelings in the USA in the early 1980s. The arguments used to justify the new round of the arms race inaugurated by the Reagan Administration at the time also included references to this Soviet concept, as well as to the then tenet of ours that peaceful coexistence is a form of the class struggle.

Evidently here lies the reason why at the Soviet-American summit in Moscow President Reagan's advisers insisted that the assertion that peaceful coexistence is regarded by the sides as a universal principle of international relations not be included in the joint statement on the results of the summit, although Reagan himself was not against this wording initially. The stereotype that established itself with American experts in the 1970s to the effect that such wordings in their interpretation at the time meant "Soviet code words from the Nixon-Kissinger era of detente"⁴ which seemingly permitted the USSR to comport itself without restraint in the developing world had its effect.

The tenet of one side's foisting upon the other some rules of behaviour in the world arena has still another unexpected aspect: if in some instance one side has failed to foist these rules for any reason, this gives the other side reason to portray the situation as its own victory or a defeat for the other side. For example, the fact that we were unable through stern demarches to prevent the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe initiated in 1983 and that the USSR ultimately went to the negotiating table with the USA, basing itself on the "zero option" the Americans had advanced in their time, gives grounds to some American Sovietologists to speak of Soviet foreign policy as a "policy of weakness".

In other words, they are seeking, in pursuit of their selfish aims, to pass off the policy of realism grounded in the new political thinking as weakness, although I am certain that they understand full well that the USSR would hardly have agreed to so radical a solution of the problem had the former leadership remained at the head of the Party and the state. More likely both the USSR and the USA would have had about 2,000 new mighty nuclear warheads in Europe, but would have continued to assure their citizens of the attainment of new, "greater" stability.

This striving to assess everything according to the old benchmarks, to reduce the entire matter to a game of odd and even is still very strong in the minds of politicians and theorists in the USA and not only the USA. Soviet-American relations cannot be demilitarised if such stereotypes are not broken down.

Evidently it is also superfluous to say that the theory widespread in the USSR in the 1970s that detente does not presuppose an end to the ideological struggle (this theory was akin to Stalin's concept of the exacerbation of the class struggle in step with the progress of the building of socialism) hardly promoted confidence between states with different social systems and a sober analysis of contacting and parallel spheres of foreign policy interests, as well as spheres of on-going antagonisms.

In the context of fierce military confrontation and exacerbated ideological struggle, which at times resembled muscle-flexing (for jamming of radio broadcasts and cuts in speeches by Western leaders and articles in the Western press, if they were published at all in this country, often went in place of arguments in "discussions"), there naturally could not be any particular illusions to the effect that economic ties could play the role of a "stabiliser" or "pacifier" of relations. What long-term programmes of economic cooperation and projects running

into the thousands of millions could there have been if it was uncertain whether peace would be preserved tomorrow or the day after? An atmosphere of mistrust and malevolence dominated economic considerations, and the intensified arms race gave both sides cause to include any industrial article or raw material under the heading of "strategic commodity".

The following episode should be recalled in this connection. In the late 1960s-early 1970s realistic American theorists of the liberal persuasion who were convinced opponents of confrontation and adherents of peaceful coexistence advanced the concept of convergence. It boils down to the belief that as the two systems—capitalist and socialist—compete peacefully and evolve they will merge in the distant future into a hybrid system that will borrow each other's best features. One could agree or not agree with this generally objectively peaceable theory, and even criticise it heavily. But we censured it in a frenzied storm of abuse, alleging that the bourgeois jesuits had gone so far as to want capitalism to swallow up socialism. When familiarising oneself with such argumentation—and it was almost unanimous—one was thrown into confusion: why, strictly speaking, should capitalism swallow up socialism? Why not the other way round? It is the main principles of socialism—planned economy, the absence of large-scale private property, etc.—that could emerge to the forefront in such a converged system! The answer suggested itself: because the frenzied critics of the convergence theory, the very ones who drew rosy pictures of developed socialism and communism, did not believe themselves in the advantages of socialism, figuring that in the rivalry with capitalism it would definitely lose out! But just try and write about this in those years! Moreover, this uncontrolled criticism of the convergence theory, which may have been bourgeois and even incorrect but nonetheless aimed at a search for prospects for peaceful coexistence, implied the fact that socialism would be able to overcome capitalism only by building up its military might extensively, by reaching the unattainable military superiority and loudly declaring to the whole world. "Stop fooling around with capitalism—follow me!"

III

That is how many layers of antagonisms, real and imagined conflicts, contradictions, misunderstandings, mistrust and prejudices accumulated over the past 45 years in Soviet-American relations. That is why the task of genuine, not superfluous, demilitarisation and humanisation of relations between the USSR and the USA is extremely difficult and delicate. And it is to the credit of the new CPSU leadership that it was the first to set this task by making the search for a path to a demilitarised, democratised world the keynote of the foreign-policy aspect of the new thinking.

What is specifically being proposed for the realisation of this most noble and humane of tasks?

To recognise the abnormality of military confrontation between states and social systems and the inadmissibility of nuclear war and war altogether.

To agree with the belief that all international issues, including territorial, social and other disputes, can and should be tackled solely by political means.

To begin gradually progressing to a much less armed and as a result nuclear-free world by reducing and scrapping all nuclear weapons and by way of substantial reductions, initially by the leading countries, of conventional arms and armed forces under strict mutual and international control.

To renovate the mechanism of international life and peaceful settle-

ment of disputes and disagreements, namely, to set up a system of global security, consolidate the UN and its institutions by turning the UN into a truly central organisation for maintaining peace worldwide.

To carry out globally and regionally a series of measures to educate the population in the spirit of peace and friendship, cease portraying socio-political rivals as enemies, broaden international dialogue and people-to-people contacts, and pay more attention to human rights and encroachments thereupon in some countries.

To strengthen international economic ties in every possible way, universalise international financial and economic organisations, i.e., end discrimination against individual countries by preventing them from joining regional or global economic associations, etc., and to consistently implement the principle of international division of labour (the principle of interdependence, as it is known in the West). To establish reasonable economic assistance to be rendered by the rich, industrialised countries to the underdeveloped countries to enable them to attain self-sufficiency, and to settle the problem of the developing countries' debts on a democratic and just basis.

Most of the points on this "agenda" likewise apply to Soviet-American relations and map out guidelines for their demilitarisation. Many recent Soviet proposals aimed at restructuring the world on democratic, humanistic and antiwar principles are well known. I will only dwell on those aspects of the ways and means of demilitarisation which still need to be studied and which are interpreted in a special way by Western politicians and theorists.

Today the leaders of the USSR and the USA have recognised the fact that for all the importance of promoting trust and understanding between the two countries, we will hardly advance very far if we do not make substantial progress in arms limitation and reduction. However, whereas, say, the SALT Treaty is beset by specific unresolved problems, the very process of nuclear disarmament is being hampered by common concepts on which the sides have not reached a general understanding.

It is they that are the main impediment to demilitarisation of relations, including in the long term. The key problems of this type are the military doctrines of the sides and the principles for maintaining a military equilibrium between the USSR and the USA, since, as the sides have repeatedly stressed in the statements on the results of their summit meetings, neither of them seeks military superiority, and they have of late been criticising in the USSR and in the USA "deterrence" as a dangerous and outmoded concept.

However, American theorists and politicians have replaced the concept of "deterrence" through the threat of an inevitable retaliatory strike with the idea of defending the country against an attack by creating an ABM system with space-based elements. Instead of deterring the other side from an attack with the threat of a massive retaliatory strike at its population and industrial centres (and as a result of the slaughter of tens of millions of innocent people), it will be deterred by a realisation of the fact that its missiles will be offset by an impermeable space-based shield and so its plans will be frustrated. These arguments were accepted by President Reagan. That was how the SDI programme was hatched. This idea of replacing "deterrence" with the threat of an "unacceptable strike" by the strategic defence has made deep inroads in the USA.

It is obvious, however, that the transition from emphasis on offensive strategic weapons (with the preservation of the latter, even if in reduced form) to emphasis on defensive ones will not solve the problem of stabilising and demilitarising Soviet-American relations or even making them less confrontational. For the rivalry between sword and shield (in today's version: the nuclear sword and the laser shield) is the mainspring of the

arms race, a mainspring which has been in operation for many millennia. The shield concept has not and will not lead to any stabilisation, nor can it. If the USA cannot reconcile itself to parity without the shield, it will hardly agree to parity with the shield for both sides either. So the American concept of defence in terms of an end to the strategic weapons race and of turning it back just does not work.

What is the Soviet stand on this issue? While politically rejecting "deterrence" and underscoring the unequivocally defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, we, frankly, are still in the search, an energetic search, of a truly equivalent replacement for the concept of "detering" the opponent from attacking with the threat of a retaliatory strike that would be unacceptable for him. The fact is that the concept of a comprehensive system of international security provides no full answers to questions of how equilibrium shall be maintained during the progress towards this system, a process which can prove rather lengthy. Of substance in this sense are considerations and specific proposals regarding guarantees of a secure advancement towards a nuclear-free world that were described by Mikhail Gorbachev in his well-known article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World".

As to "trust", this is a category of a completely different order. Our fathers and grandfathers made the revolution and built a fraternity of working people, limitlessly trusting their own—proletarian—leaders. But there was a leader who turned into a despot and destroyed more Communists than Hitler and Mussolini put together. Because, as it seems there was too much trust but no effective mechanism for restraining and terminating such willfulness. And this within a socially homogeneous country. But here the point at issue is confrontation between two powerful states with enormous stockpiles and a global network of interests and commitments. Here the deterrent mechanism has to work long before everything can be based on trust. For this reason the question remains of how to keep either of the sides from feeling encroached upon and less secure than the other in the process of limiting and reducing strategic weapons.

Obviously, this can be done only if the sides are guided by the principle of equality and equal security in limiting and reducing nuclear weapons, only if they realise that the nuclear arsenal that each side retains after a stage in the reductions is necessary and sufficient, as Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Yazov has said, to "*deter* (my emphasis) an aggressor from unleashing a war and deprive him of illusory hopes of victory in it". It seems that, it is still too early to scuttle the concept of deterrence by way of dissuading the other side from an attack by the possibility of an *unacceptable response* precisely in such a purely military-operational sense. It is working, and will continue to work, for the prevention of war until not only the USSR and the USA but all the chief members of the international community work out a collective principle of stabilising the multifaceted equilibrium, including with due account for conventional arms and armed forces. The expedience of this approach is also evidenced by the fact that a number of Soviet proposals on arms limitations are geared precisely to preserving and solidifying the mechanism of this type of dissuasion. (For example, the Soviet proposal to reach agreement on zones free of anti-submarine defence are aimed at providing nuclear-powered submarines carrying ballistic missiles, which are still the most effective instrument of retribution, with the most favourable conditions for carrying out their function of dissuading an opponent against an attack.)

There are also arising conceptual matters of a different, philosophical, rather than military, nature. Today both the USA and the USSR are increasingly talking about national, i. e., state, interests. In the USA

there has been a flurry of interest of late in the national-interest concept, its catalyst being pragmatists—representatives of the school of real politics. They have again arrived at the conclusion that the USA has overstrained itself and spread itself too thin. And all this foreign-policy overstrain—grabbing at this, that and the other thing—is veiled behind arguments about national interests or vital interests. But what are real national interest or the national interests of the USA? What are the priorities in them? To what extent do these national interests clash with those of the other superpower, the USSR, and (this is a new question for America) to what extent do these interests coincide and can coincide?

We, too, are raising such questions—about our own national interests and foreign-policy priorities. We have assessed not only differences in the interests of individual states, but we have seen the main thing—a growing trend towards interdependence of the states of the world community. In this connection the Soviet leadership has advanced the concept of universal interests which stand above national, class, racial and other interests. These interests consist in joint efforts to prevent nuclear war and a global ecological catastrophe and to combat pandemics like AIDS. They also lie in humanising the international atmosphere and democratising international relations and turning them from chiefly interstate relations to truly international ones.

It is clear, however, that the existence of universal interests does not replace national interests. In Soviet-American relations there are not all that many spheres where their real interests clash. After all, when you think about it, the tenet of a "Soviet menace" for the USA and of an "American threat" for the USSR is the direct result not of a clash of national interests but of notions of each other that were engendered by the Cold War and the arms race. By virtue of the special status occupied by both the USSR and the USA in each of the corresponding socio-economic systems, the national interests of the two countries clash not so much directly as indirectly—through the interests of third countries.

Why, say, do US interests supposedly clash with Soviet interests in Europe? Obviously, by virtue of the American presumption that the USSR intends to seize or subjugate Western Europe and, for its part, by dint of our supposition that NATO, headed by the USA, is ready to launch an aggression against the USSR or East European countries. But today, and not only today, both these premises do not accord with the actual state of affairs. By scuttling them one can find a realistic balance of interests as was found in the INF Treaty. It is this path of searching for a balance of interests through compromise and not through forcibly imposing detente, i. e., what the Americans perceive as "Soviet-style peace", on the West, or an analogous foisting of the "Pax Americana" upon the East, that is the only possible way to demilitarise international relations.

However, the following question can arise as well: Is a balance of interests solely a reflection of the existing balance of power or is it something else? This question still has to be studied. In advance, we can assert that as a rule the balance of interests reflects the existing balance of power. However, in principle a balance of interests is a higher notion. The Soviet Union even considered SALT-2 a realistic balance of interests, although at the moment it was signed the USA had almost twice as many strategic nuclear charges than did the USSR. But the balance of interests was that both sides were able to effectively "dissuade" each other and, what was most important, the very signing of the treaty ensured strategic stability in the relations between them, which was in the interests of the USSR and in the interests of the circles in the USA which concluded and signed the SALT-2 Treaty.

IV

The optimists are joyful that the breakdown of established stereotypes of thinking is taking place not only in this country but in the West as well. If even Ronald Reagan, a leader who symbolised for the American right-wingers the unshakeability of conservative orthodoxy, stated in Moscow that he was scrapping his former assessment of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire", this means that the ice has begun to crack in America, too. Even Reagan's meeting with dissidents in the American ambassador's residence in Moscow, which was assailed by the Soviet mass media, was perceived differently in the West: yes, there is democracy and *glasnost* in the USSR; this is not window-dressing for the West but the real thing, proof of the new state of freedom in the USSR and Soviet society's new-found confidence in itself.

For the first time in many years prominent members of the US Democratic and Republican parties after the Moscow summit agreed on a common platform not of anti-Sovietism but of a positive, constructive approach to cooperation with the USSR. In their theoretical article entitled "Bipartisan Objectives for American Foreign Policy", which was published in the journal *Foreign Affairs*, former US secretaries of state—Republican Henry Kissinger and Democrat Cyrus Vance—write about the need to "give much greater emphasis to the *political* dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union". "The West should explore, with an open mind," they continued, "what steps can prudently be taken to reconcile vital U.S. and Soviet interests."

This is a highly important statement, one which opens the way to deepening Soviet-American political dialogue under the new American leadership. And the authors themselves underscore this when they say that "the new American president and the Soviet general secretary should initiate a wide-ranging discussion of where they want U.S.-Soviet relations to be at the beginning of the next century and how they propose to contribute to a climate of international restraint... Beyond this initial phase, we would favor regular U.S.-Soviet summits, so that meetings between the two leaders are not seen as rewards for good behavior or reasons for concessions or pretexts for signing agreements."⁴

The events that have been taking place in the world after the definite thaw in Soviet-American relations make people take a fresh look at customary, established postulates. It is almost axiomatic that the USSR and the USA become enmeshed in Third World conflicts by virtue of having been involved in them by the local belligerents. But whereas conflicts may not arise in and of themselves, isn't the reason they drag out is that they sort of "absorb" American-Soviet global confrontation?

Or can we consider it incidental that better USSR-US relations are accompanied with substantial shifts in settlement of local conflicts and problems, including Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq war, Kampuchea, Southern Africa, Cyprus, and Western Sahara?

The "atmosphere" in Soviet-American relations is an important and palpable qualitative parameter not only of bilateral relations but also of the entire global situation. That is why it is so important to cultivate a propitious psychological climate between the USSR and the USA, promote trust and do everything possible to gradually eliminate the "image of the enemy" in the person of the other side. The reason I am talking about a gradual approach is that the stereotypes that have taken shape and that were cultivated over the years return all too easily in comment on actions and events which concern the other side.

It is naive to think (but it seems to me that such hopes do exist), that through the mass media and drawing above all on the enormous popularity and prestige which the General Secretary of the CPSU Central

Committee enjoys abroad we will be able to eliminate the image of the USSR as the enemy in the USA and other Western countries while leaving intact "for internal needs" the image of the USA as our enemy, albeit not to the extent that it was during the Korean War. It will not work out that way. And the fact that a number of Soviet newspapers and magazines are now being translated into English concerns this problem directly. In covering the actions of the other side, just as in military development, we must get away from analysis "according to the worst variant" and even give our potential opponent "the benefit of the doubt".

However, our propaganda treatment of the USA at times does not lend itself to any reasonable analysis. In the Soviet media the USA in fact still figures as the "number one enemy", as the instigator of all anti-Soviet provocations and all actions aimed at undermining world peace and prosperity.

The Soviet press is so obsessed with a negative approach to the USA that from its news items one can easily compile a registry of all the hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes and air crashes, if not all the bicycling accidents, that occur in America. What lasting peace, mutual understanding and cooperation with the USA can be hoped for with such an approach? And how does this relate to the tenet of deideologisation of relations and declarations on repudiation of the "image of the enemy"?

Restraint can even be displayed when it would seem that vicious epithets and other strong expressions against the USA are an absolute must. Regrettably, we still do not have all that many examples of this kind. For this reason it is important to realise that the essence of the psychological aspect of the task of demilitarising Soviet-American relations and world politics in general lies in improving human reason and human morality. We must do all in our power to lower the threshold of mutual mistrust, fear and hatred and get away from the diabolical practice of reacting, as if programmed, to the very first spark with a barrage of the cannon of psychological warfare.

And this requires, aside from all else, the support and development of the tender shoots of a global humanistic consciousness. The great Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov, who was obsessed with the idea of unity of the human race, wrote in an open letter to I. S. Aksakov 100 years ago: "In the temples, in services we pray for peace unto all the world ... and for us all to unite. But would that prayer be sincere if our deeds keep it from fulfilment? The unity to which we pray cannot come about from outside those who are to unite; for the fulfilment of our prayer to be possible, something is needed from us as well. Justice and impartial and multifaceted discussion are required first of all. And then something greater is needed: a peaceful mood, amicable disposition of the will and thought, the replacement of an accusatory, exclusively polemical attitude to the opposing side with an *irenica* (peaceful) attitude."⁵

In the specific instance of Soviet-American relations, being guided by such an approach does not mean, of course, reconciling oneself with what the USA does, not criticising its illegal actions in the international arena, or not expressing one's negative attitude to antidemocratic actions by the authorities within the country. Alongside all of this it is necessary to explore persistently and purposefully points of contact in the two countries' stands on international issues and in their national interests and to discuss on a businesslike basis mutual concerns, doctrinal problems, perspective steps to reduce and limit arms, and possible measures, including token ones, to lessen the reasons for confrontation.

An extremely good example of this is provided by the exchanges of visits that have begun between members of the top military leadership

of the USSR and the USA, exchanges which seemed inconceivable several years ago. If we continue to proceed in this direction, it will be much easier to handle questions pertaining to trade and economic relations.

The essence of the matter was succinctly expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev in response to questions put by Soviet citizens during a walk with President Reagan in Red Square during the summit: "We have proved not only to ourselves but to the whole world that we can live without each other. Now we have to prove that we know how to cooperate as well."

One would wish that the presidential elections in November and establishment of the new US administration do not provoke a pause in the Soviet-American relations that of late have been shaping up so favourably. Of course, new men bring new views. The sides shall have an opportunity to reassess what has already been achieved in Soviet-American relations, to exchange views, including at the top level, on unresolved problems and on prospects, and to formulate an agenda for cooperation for the late 1980s-early 1990s. And the point at issue is precisely equitable cooperation, which would exclude the possibility of pressure and unilateral concessions obtained through power politics. This has to be underscored above all because there are still influential advisers around who are suggesting to the new administration to test Gorbachev, "to push actively for specific and major steps by Moscow that advance Western interests".¹

However, the people who claim to know the atmosphere and situation in the relations between the two countries should have at long last clarified for themselves the fact that this approach is past history in the annals of Soviet-American relations. Negotiating as equals, not dictating one's writ, is the only possible way to improve relations between our two countries.

¹ At a discussion in the USA of Soviet American relations, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a prominent aide of Henry Kissinger during the Nixon Administration, stated unequivocally that Washington's recognition of the USSR as a great power equal to the USA occurred only after it showed its capacity to take its place by force (*The Twenty Fifth Congress of the CPSU. Assessment and Context*, ed. by A. Dallin, Stanford, California, 1977, p. 100)

² As quoted in "Implications of Soviet New Thinking". Institute for East-West Security Studies New York, 1987, p. 22

³ *Time*, June 13, 1988, p. 18

⁴ *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1988, pp. 905, 906.

⁵ В. Соловьев, О христианском единстве Brussels, 1967, p. 194

⁶ *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1988, p. 19

OUR COMMON EUROPEAN HOME

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The notion of a common European home, which appeared only recently, is winning ever broader popularity in the 1980s. However, there are still many people in the world, Europe included, who take a patently guarded attitude to this novelty. Unquestionably manifest here is the impact of the hackneyed stereotypes of confrontational thinking and doubts as to whether or not some propaganda ruse is concealed behind the veil of the new idea being advanced by the Soviet Union. Hence the urgent need to infuse this term with specific content and to elaborate a long-term concept aimed at imparting the new quality to intra-European relations.

The Vienna meeting of the 35 countries participatory to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is on the verge of adopting important political decisions on which development on the European continent in the years to come will greatly hinge. The final document which they are to adopt in the immediate future will open up broad horizons for cooperation among the European countries and it is to define precisely the outlines of accords possible at the present stage of East-West relations on the key problems of security and cooperation within the CSCE framework.

The question today boils down to the following: Will CSCE continue along the way paved at Helsinki? Will the participating states be able to set the world an example of new political thinking in their approach to problems of security, trust and cooperation? The prerequisites for this are present. A programme of concrete endeavours unprecedented in the history of interstate cooperation, endeavours which could become the first major step forward towards implementing the idea of a common European home, is taking shape today.

Many Soviet research institutions and state and public organisations are concentrating their efforts in this area. Such work in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where scientific and practical meetings dealing with European-home problems have been held under the auspices of the European Security and Cooperation Department, has been put on a regular basis. They were attended by staff members of different subdivisions of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as European-studies scholars from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, the Institute of the USA and Canada, the Institute of Europe and the Institute of World History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Foreign Trade, Moscow State University, the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, and the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Similar work is apace in the foreign ministries and also research centres of a number of other countries, including at Harvard University, the New York Institute for East-West Security Studies, the Royal Institute of

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International Affairs (Great Britain), the Institute of International Politics and Economics of the GDR and the Institute for World Economy of the Hungarian People's Republic, to name a few. One of the authors of this article took part in the work of a research group of the West Berlin branch of the Aspen Institute (USA), which is also engaged in a study of the problems of the common European home.

The conferees have expressed different, at times conflicting judgments both regarding conceptual and methodological approaches to the "common European home" concept and concerning individual matters pertaining to specific substance of the edifice being designed. In dealing with this topic, we would like not only to generalise the thoughts that have been expressed but also to formulate our own viewpoint and designate what we feel should be of key importance in an understanding of the prospects for the development of the very idea of a common European home and its implementation.

Meanwhile, the new mode of thinking is making increasingly palpable inroads into the consciousness and lives of Europeans. Enthusiastically perceiving their involvement in the destinies of our continent, they are understanding more and more clearly that the future of Europe is today being determined by its capacity for renewal, by its readiness for open dialogue and cooperation, and by a realisation of common interests. The notions "European family", "commonality of Europe", "Europeism" and "European consciousness" are already entering the political vocabulary. A great deal is also being said about the common European home; admittedly, for now, there are more questions than answers.

It is important, of course, to avoid unnecessary ballyhoo and inordinate haste, and to preserve a capacity for realistic, balanced analysis. If an idea is to mature it needs time. Today *two typical tendencies* are manifesting themselves. In many journal and newspaper publications and in a number of rather serious studies by Western scholars the idea of building a common home is interpreted chiefly from the vantage point of the aims being pursued by Soviet foreign policy in Europe. They regard it as the next stage in the accomplishment of the political tasks of Soviet society. We believe that such an approach can be considered acceptable only in part. In this instance there is the danger of sliding towards the pseudo-scientific elaboration of political slogans.

We consider to be more substantiated the approach to this idea from the vantage point of the concept of a multifaceted and contradictory but now largely integral world, a concept advanced at the 27th CPSU Congress. As we know, any solid and stable political form is created not by the abstract-logical way but by the specific historical way, which is formed with due account for all the objective realities of the surrounding world. For Europe they consist in the existence of the European civilisation, in the presence of similar features in historical fortunes, in the single cultural and spiritual heritage of the peoples and countries of our continent.

The formation of the new European consciousness is being increasingly linked today with the specifics of the current stage of the scientific and technological revolution and with the realities and specific conditions of the nuclear-space age. It is *new European thinking*, which operates not with categories of national or inter-bloc contradictions but with categories of unity and universal and European values that should become the cornerstone of the projected home. Naturally, this proposes the conscious and motivated involvement of all the European nations in it.

As the British historian Thomas Macaulay put it, the genesis of wisdom consists in the recognition of facts. Pertaining to the construc-

tion of the common European home it implies a necessity to strictly abide by a realistic analysis of the present situation and draw a dichotomy between the constant and transient factors of its development. In exploring approaches to the new concept it should be kept in mind that any idea evokes interest and a positive response if it promises specific results attainable within the lifetime of one generation. This presupposes a concentration of our attention on the foreseeable future. The exclusion from the project of the would-be house of any elements of present-day European reality, even if we find them somehow uncomfortable, should also be considered unrealistic.

While not calling for the tyranny of the existing over the imagined, i. e., to a view of European realities that has become frozen once and for all, and while recognising the possibility of the evolution of both military-political alliances and integrational associations, we shall say that the system of security in Europe will evidently still be long based on the *existence of two military blocs*. Greater security will be achieved by adjusting their relations rather than by disbanding them. The very concept of blocs will be preserved as well. Military disarmament measures should not precede, but proceed in step with, the establishment of qualitatively new structures of cooperation in Europe. However, the perception of the world, once set in will not be forgotten right away; negative stereotypes will still long influence the way people think and the policies states shape and pursue.

This country's elaboration and advance of a plan meant for implementation in the near future and which is based on the idea of complete disarmament and the disbandment of military blocs, etc., will inevitably lead to heated disputes and sharp opposition, fraught only with another replenishment of the list of fine initiatives which have no chance of being effected in the foreseeable future. A very attractive idea can be shelved for a long time, if not buried forever.

Evidently we will all have to reckon with the fact that no country today will scrap the present structure of its integrational ties and relations with other states for the sake of building from scratch the edifice of fundamentally new relations. This directly applies to so substantial a question as the *place of the United States in the common European home*. In most articles on this topic it is overlooked or designated by the general phrase "recognition of existing realities".

We think that it would be beneficial to inject greater clarity into this problem. By all indications, the Americans are not looking for space in the new home and are showing little interest in contributing to its emerging concept. What is more, "advice" is coming from Washington on removing altogether this metaphor from the active political lexicon, the allegation being that it is "delusive with its outward attractiveness".

Some Americans who take a benevolent attitude to the idea of the historic commonality of Europe propose setting about building the common European home without the Americans, contending that with the passage of time "we will decide ourselves whether to settle in there or go away to our ranchos forever". Others who are still a majority, however, definitively assess the idea of the common European home as the result of efforts aimed at the Europeanisation, i. e., de-Americanisation, of Europe and consequently as being dangerous for the US and for Western unity. However, official Washington, on the one hand, is cautioning the West European countries, especially West Germany, which is exhibiting the greatest interest, against excessive enthusiasm, and, on the other, is proposing "verifying the Soviet Union's readiness for seriousness in this matter", i. e., for steps in reciprocity to the West's proposals.

Of course, such statements could be ignored were it not for the opinion prevalent among the West Europeans themselves. The European NATO

countries, however, do not conceive their security being ensured apart from America and view any reasoning overlooking the issue of the USA's place in European affairs above all as an attempt by Moscow to drive a wedge into Atlantic unity.

However, US involvement in European affairs should not be identified only with American military presence on the continent. If we take a look at the present-day panorama of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, we cannot but admit that the United States is very strongly integrated into it, be it in politics, the economy or culture. Western Europe's vested interest in consolidating ties with the USA is very great, for that matter, and if the United States is excluded from the list of participants in the construction of the house being designed a valuable idea runs the risk of being stillborn.

We are setting about the search for the most effective way of imparting a fresh quality to intra-European relations proceeding from the "building materials" at hand and above all from the fact of the existence of different states. We will not delve into the question of at what stage of the creation of the common European home universal human interests fully prevail over state interests. Let us instead take a look at how we can combine national priorities so as not to do harm to any of the participants in the construction effort but to provide all with an opportunity to prosper on a mutually beneficial basis.

Incidentally, considerable experience has been amassed in European history of consideration of different interests. Examples are the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, the Moscow Treaty of 1970 between the USSR and the FRG, and the agreement on the establishment of relations between CMEA and the EEC, to name a few. It would not be an exaggeration, however, to consider the *Helsinki Final Act*, which laid the groundwork of the European process, unique in this respect. This process, which encompasses an extremely broad spectrum of issues pertaining to interstate relations, is today at the threshold of a qualitatively new stage—the transition from recommendations to decisions, to real disarmament and the strengthening of military-political stability and the creation of a mechanism of humanitarian cooperation.

Of course, the agenda of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe does not cover the entire range of international relations today. Bilateral and multilateral contacts among political and public forces of different orientations and diversification of economic ties are becoming increasingly weighty factors behind the development of cooperation on the continent. The key element, of course, is security, without which a turn from confrontation to cooperation could hardly be effected and without which Europe would be a politically unhealthy region.

The European process is essentially based on the concept that cooperation makes for a better guarantee of security. The CSCE is a highly effective instrument capable of exerting an impact on the situation on the continent in the broadest sense of the word. It is legitimate to assume that the Helsinki process is also the optimal basis for erecting the European home. And it would hardly be expedient to come up with a drastically new scheme, some "code of relations" for European countries or to extrapolate the principles of the UN activities to European realities. Aside from the difficulties involved in inventing such projects, it would take years for the political and public consciousness to adapt to them, all the more so since it would most likely reject an artificially spawned idea.

Unquestionably, the Final Act will become an important component of the *new European law and order*. Other founding elements of the CSCE, UN documents and conventions whose participants European countries or groups of countries are, will become part of the would-be "European constitution", too. The bloc and ideological confrontation between the two

systems makes for the sides' desire to ensure themselves guarantees of socio-political security and to preserve their own system through the maintenance of domestic stability in each state. The Europeans will have to consider measures to consolidate such safeguards and propose fresh options designed to complement the present juridical systems of maintaining a balance.

The problem of the legal foundation of the "common home", of future European peaceful law and order is only being put on the agenda. It is obvious, however, that it should be based on the principles of common responsibility, adequate defence, and repudiation of the use or threat of force, and reaffirm the principles of political pluralism and socio-political tolerance in Europe. The universal principle of peaceful coexistence will remain the fundamental one, of course. The idea of depolitisation and deideologisation of the new European law, the creation of which should proceed along the path of recognition of the general tasks extending beyond the bounds of antagonism and take into account universal interests as the cornerstone of the common European home, should be further developed.

Of course, the methodological experience of CSCE, which has divided all issues of international relations into three large "baskets", should not be ignored either. Frequently their content is reduced in an oversimplified fashion to questions corresponding to the names of sections, the point being overlooked that military security issues have been supplemented by a long list of political instruments, confidence-building measures first and foremost, and that cooperation in the humanitarian sphere encompasses people-to-people contacts, educational, cultural and informational ties, and that the economic section embraces questions pertaining to trade, industrial cooperation, science and technology, environment protection, tourism, travel, etc.

By virtue of objective factors *security matters* have always been in the forefront in our appraisals. We would draw attention to the fact that realistic possibilities for a transition from dialogue between foes to dialogue between partners have been opened. International security is being viewed in a different light, and the role of military-political factors affecting the formation of military doctrines is being reassessed and analysed. This is a complicated search for drastically new approaches to national and universal problems.

When the point at issue is the common European home today, what we imagine the clearest of all is precisely military-political measures. This comes as no surprise, what with the Warsaw Treaty countries having advanced so dynamic and detailed a programme of measures to lessen the military confrontation. The issue of a transition from military to political means of ensuring security is being raised for the first time. In short, if we are asked how to build the military-political wall of the home in question, we can offer a wide selection of well-considered and carefully elaborated initiatives. This is only understandable, as the desire to survive can be characterised as an imperative intrinsic to the national interests of all countries.

All the same, merely a "desire to stay alive" is insufficient for building a common European home; its foundation must rest on much broader interests. In this connection the conclusion suggests itself of the need for a definite *reshifting of accents in the relations* between the residents of the home, specifically the transition from a negative orientation (the threat of mutual destruction) to a positive one, to a lessening of the role of the military component and to greater weight for humanitarian, ecological and other elements.

When the point at issue is other, non-military-political components of the design of a common European home, we at best share common considerations regarding an exchange of commodities and values, know-how, people and ideas. And nothing more. Scientific and technological, economic, environment-protection, human, cultural and other aspects of the idea have yet to be worked out in effect. Meanwhile, this could greatly stimulate the concept's advance and popularisation and designate with greater clarity the prospects for an early end to the split of Europe and thereby promote solutions to military problems as well.

Revealingly, in other countries as well interest in purely "civilian" elements of the common European home is not less, and at times even more, than in its military components. This is telling in a rather unique way on the actions of many of the opponents of the idea most criticisms are geared to discrediting the "home" in the sphere of humanitarian and economic relations. Whereas in the military sphere East and West simply cannot but cooperate, in other spheres even small areas of coinciding interest cannot be singled out. The allegation is made that only a common West European home is possible, as the East is not yet "ripe" for cohabitation from the standpoint both of the perspectives for overcoming the technological gap and of its readiness to remove the barriers and pitfalls on the path towards "humanising" international relations.

Let us see whether this is actually the case. Take the *human dimension of European politics*. The revolutionary processes of *perestroika* and development of democratisation and *glasnost* apace in the USSR have in effect torn down the fence behind which we used to hide from attacks by the West in the human rights sphere. The situation has changed—in a move that was unexpected for our partners we have stated our readiness to hold all-round discussions aimed at practical results in order to arrive at a mutual understanding that would improve the state of affairs in the humanitarian sphere in all the CSCE countries. It is in this light that the Soviet initiative on holding a conference in Moscow on a wide range of humanitarian issues should be viewed.

We need not be ashamed of our understanding of human rights as a set of civil, political, economic, social and other rights. However, since we are proposing the elaboration of the design and the construction of the very "edifice" in conjunction with other countries, it should be acknowledged that matters pertaining to the development of multifaceted people-to-people contacts will naturally emerge to the forefront. This will make it possible to organically supplement the principles proclaimed at the top level of better familiarisation with the realities of the lifestyle and mentality in neighbouring countries and will introduce the population at large into this sphere.

It is difficult even to imagine the scope of the possibilities that are opening up: people's diplomacy, communal (local) ties, ties between parties and between trade unions, meetings between young people, athletes, etc. This will be the shortest road to putting an end to the cultivating of the notorious image of the enemy and to the removal of the blinkers that artificially narrow people's view of the complicated and contradiction-filled world around them. But the shortest path does not mean the simplest. This choice will be difficult not only for those who are used to regarding each critical remark as slander and ideological sabotage but also for those who like to shout in a proprietary manner if something does not accord with the old traditions and notions.

The following three factors can be an earnest of the maintenance of normal, benevolent relations in the humanitarian sphere: a) the obligation of states to ensure conditions as favourable as possible enabling citizens to exercise their human rights; b) cooperation among states in implementing human rights, cooperation that is based on the appropriate

international agreements; c) exchange of experience accumulated in this sphere.

The creation of a mechanism of humanitarian cooperation in the framework of which the above three components could be implemented and the activity of the requisite consultative apparatus set in motion would definitely play a useful role. The draft of such a mechanism is already being elaborated by the members of the CSCE Vienna meeting.

This is, of course, only the first step in a qualitatively new stage of interstate humanitarian cooperation. However, in combination with the right of citizens to contribute, independently or as members of unofficial associations, to the development and protection of human rights and the main freedoms in their country, such a step would definitely speed up creation of the home. There are also many issues which have not been worked out with regard to cooperation among European nations that have a common history, a common cultural heritage and common age-old traditions and that have made an enormous contribution to world civilisation.

A detailed analysis of humanitarian issues is all the more necessary in that in a number of Western countries it is today advancing to the forefront of their state policies. However, whereas in the USA these matters are a traditional priority for its foreign-policy propaganda, in the FRG they are quite often presented as a component of the "*German question*". Specifically, West German Defence Minister Rupert Scholz has stated that "the unity of the people of Germany is one of the most important elements and treasures of Europe and an element of its unity" and that he pictures very well a united Germany in the European home.

This motif is being heard rather frequently in the context of the creation of the common European home. It appears as though some in Bonn believe that in this context it would be much easier to tackle such a task step by step. With this in mind some West Germans are oriented to the goal of fitting this home with the "amenities" that should lead to greater openness between the two German states, to a further broadening of their multifaceted ties and to the establishment of more "permeable" borders and their gradual removal. And in the light of the increased flexibility of Soviet foreign policy certain West German politicians are apparently nurturing dreams of some "turn" in the Soviet stand.

This line of the West German "dreamers by the hearth" is uniquely reflected in the criticism of it by Americans who allege that the FRG is too obsessed with the idea of the unification of the two Germanies and is forgetting about the interests of the allies, and is also showing an inordinate readiness for cooperation with the socialist countries to establish as close ties as possible with the GDR under this veil.

It hardly needs reiteration that the USSR proceeds from the belief that the preservation of the territorial status quo in Europe, the existence of the two sovereign German states, the strengthening of socialism in the GDR and quadripartite responsibility in the issue of West Berlin are an inalienable part of the foundation of the common European home. Advance of the slogan of "reunification of Germany" as a prerequisite for a convergence of all Europeans will hardly garner support in other Western countries, for that matter. However, it is our view that it would be incorrect to make the long-term forecast that this problem will not be raised altogether or will dissolve in the broader context of general European cooperation.

However, one should not adjudge the perception of the new ideas of humanitarian cooperation by many, if not most, Europeans solely on the example of the FRG, where adherents of pragmatism and national ambitions can often be found among the energetic champions of humanisation. The human dimension of the development of cooperation in Europe is one

of the priority areas of the policies of our northern neighbours as well. "The individual and his rights and living conditions—this is the main benchmark of the European process," Finnish Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa pointed out at the CSCE Vienna meeting last May. Finns are vigorously implementing the Helsinki ideas; they are reacting sensitively to our new European course. They constantly show a readiness to be mediators between the West and us and they are exploring common ground in the interests of a multi-faceted Europe.

An understanding of the ecological catastrophe threatening man is only now beginning to penetrate deeply the consciousness of our countrymen. In the West, however, the significance of the *ecological factor* came to the fore much earlier. It is not fortuitous that Finland, like all the Nordic countries, is setting the pace in the discussion of environment protection issues at different European forums and meetings. It is largely thanks to the activity of the Nordic and socialist countries that ecological questions were broadly covered in the draft of the Vienna meeting document. In the section devoted to these matters the arsenal of measures to protect the environment is considerably renovated and broadened. Extensive work in this area is also being done in the UN Economic Commission for Europe.

Addressing foreign affairs commission of the Hungarian National Assembly on July 8, Finnish President Mauno Koivisto called the exacerbated ecological situation a "common challenge to all". According to the President, the urgent need for joint defence of the environment of our habitat "can have an influence on a breakthrough in European thinking, as was the case in the age of the Enlightenment". Not only are ecological problems common in their nature, they are perceived in the public consciousness as truly "common European" problems. We believe that it is ecological cooperation, the idea of an "ecologically clean Europe" that is to become one of the most attractive "signs" of the common European home for any European. Universal, deideologised matters of environmental protection will also become a reliable connecting link for the generations of Europeans to come.

The common European home is also the multifaceted *economic interaction* of all its inhabitants. The objective tendency of intellectualisation of economic life dictates the need for a further development of cooperation, the creation of new forms of this cooperation and the elaboration of fundamentally different approaches. Despite the heterogeneity of economic processes and forms of intra-regional integration and differences in the economic potentials in Europe at the present juncture, conditions have been created for laying the economic structure of the common European home.

Many of its "architectural" forms and construction standards have been proposed during conferences and discussions and in the press. Then there are the drafts of the UN ECE, especially as regards industrial cooperation, and the proposals of GATT and other international governmental and non-governmental organisations engaged in East-West cooperation and also "models" like the CMEA-Finland agreement.

The Helsinki Final Act and the final documents of the subsequent meetings held within the framework of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe are called upon to play a large role here. They contain detailed principles governing economic cooperation and recommendations to the member-states on the development of various areas of cooperation. There is apace a constant mutual complementing and developing of the provisions of the final documents of the CSCE and the

UN ECE which are of considerable importance for our continent's economic future. Declaration on relations between CMEA and the EEC and bilateral agreement between the European communities and the CMEA member-countries obviously should become elements of construction of the common European home. The establishment of relations between CMEA and European Free Trade Association could inject new factors into the realisation of the ideas of a common European home.

The right of each to live in the "common home" will largely be determined by the *intensification of integrational processes* in both parts of the continent. Even though the existence of regional economic systems cannot itself be a prerequisite for the creation of the economic foundation of the common European home, the development of integrational cooperation in both East and West will unquestionably create additional conditions for their participation in inter-regional economic cooperation. The overriding problem here is the EEC's degree of integration, which is much more advanced than that in CMEA, and the Communities' course for unifying domestic and foreign economic policies and creating an integral common market.

By all indications, the consequences of these changes will be ambivalent for the CMEA countries. This, of course, will largely depend on the nature of the accords reached on bilateral relations between the EEC and East European partners. However, the determinant will be capacity of the socialist countries to overhaul their economic relations.

There is no time to waste in getting the ball rolling. If our countries fail to revamp our integrational mechanisms by creating a common socialist market in the immediate future, we will be unable to place on the basis of equality and parity of possibilities the institutional foundations being laid today for relations between the European Communities, on the one hand, and CMEA and individual socialist countries, on the other. At the present juncture the level of coordination of the foreign economic policies of the socialist community countries vis-a-vis the European Communities is not adequate to the tasks of building the European home.

By virtue of a number of objective factors the East European region has always been integrated into the general European system of relations to a much greater extent than the Soviet Union has. With progress towards the formation of an integral domestic market by 1992 the attractiveness of the European Communities for the East European countries will continue to grow. Also deserving attention are the proposals that appeared this spring in the press of the EEC countries regarding a higher level of EEC-CMEA ties, which is manifest in the plans for major capital investments in East European countries which are to be financed by the Communities, i. e., the so-called new Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe. Even though many Westerners are somewhat sceptical of this project, calling it the brain-child of West Germany which is out to tether the German Democratic Republic more tightly to itself, a thorough analysis of the possible consequences of the initiatives of this kind is imperative.

Will this, as well as the overall economic influence of the EEC, lead to the emergence of centrifugal tendencies among the socialist countries? Obviously, this can be avoided above all by an overhaul of economic cooperation among the CMEA countries. It is the Soviet Union that has the most difficult changes to make. We have to begin *perestroika* at home. Also obvious is the close connection between the USSR's possibilities for influencing developments on the European continent and the progress of *perestroika* processes in all aspects of social development within the USSR.

Scientific and technological cooperation will of course hold a prominent place in the structure of the common European home. Regrettably, talk about inter-regional scientific and technological cooperation at the

level of economic groupings is not very promising as yet. West European scientific and technological integration, which is constantly renewing its forms and methods, has shot far ahead and this gap is not narrowing. The point that can more likely be at issue is bilateral or multilateral, but always concrete, ties at the level of research and production enterprises, research institutes, etc., on the basis of target-oriented programmes and agreements. All the more so since the structure of the Eureka project as well as a number of other comprehensive scientific and technological programmes in Western countries permit this.

Nor should the unifying importance of *bilateral relations* of European countries be underestimated. The right of each state to "special" relations with any other partner within the new European structure being created has been called into question during the discussion of this issue. All the same, it is incorrect to assume that with the passage of time some of the residents of the European home will reject centuries-old traditions and rules of communication, forget history or prefer a new language of intercourse. Privileged, "special" relations will organically enter the future Europe and become a connecting link. Why not, for that matter, use the "favourites" of the home for mediatory, peacemaking functions? The development of bilateral ties in the political, economic, scientific and humanitarian spheres will become a prerequisite for building the common European home.

The role of *subregional structures*, among them, the countries of Northern Europe and the Balkan Peninsula, is enhancing as well. Despite the growth of their political authority of late we have a rather foggy notion of the significance of such associations for the future of the European continent. The development of subregional relations will also proceed along the lines of extra-bloc and inter-bloc structures which are to be based on the historical and cultural commonality of nations and the orientation of state policy on universal values. The idea of Central Europe as an unofficial historical public association incorporating Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the FRG and Austria is widespread in a number of socialist countries today. Evidently the point at issue is the shaping of the first islands of the future Eurostructure.

A special role is being played by the Mediterranean region, which does not exhibit a high level of economic integration. Its political horizons are very diverse, too. However, in our constructions we will not be able to single out a "northern" Mediterranean and "tether" it to the rest of Europe without due consideration for the interests of African and Mideast neighbours. We must approach the Mediterranean from the standpoint of the concept of a contradictory but largely integral world. This region should become the natural bridge connecting Europe with the African and Asian continents.

The creation of a common European home as a phenomenon of international relations can be assessed differently. It is the process of the formation of an integral regional system of states which are closest to one another in their development level and which have reached a point where awakening to the realities of the present stage of the nuclear-space age gives rise to an understanding of the interdependence and commonality of all the countries of Europe. However, this system cannot exist isolated from other regions of the world. The processes taking place within its framework will not only engender a response in Asia, Africa, America and Australia; it will inevitably encounter problems on a global scale, including such problems as the arms race, regional conflicts and ecology.

It is quite natural that as the idea of a common European home is implemented the question arises of a correlation between the common European home and the global efforts of the USSR to create a comprehensive system of international security and a nuclear-free and non-violent world. Evidently a dual approach will be needed here, too. If the concept of the foreign-policy activity of the Soviet state can be described in the words "common European home", it is permissible to call this activity a "part of a comprehensive system of international security in the European direction". However, this posing of the issue will not reflect the idea which we have injected into this notion from the outset.

If we are counting on Soviet authors not being alone in creating the design of the common home (which is what we are in essence calling for), we can hardly expect any creative contribution to embody the socialist foreign-policy programme. One can thus speak of a *parallel coexistence of a European home with a comprehensive system of international security*.

We have designated a range of issues which we feel will determine to the greatest extent the initial process of the construction of the common European home and comprise its foundation. However, this is but a part of the problems that are arising in this connection. Nor are we proposing a specific design of the common European home. Reality will unquestionably be much more complex than notions of it, as each of its participants will have its own approach to this common home.

The idea of common European home embodies the process of the creation of a new Europe, a continent which has realised the objective need for developing cooperation on a qualitatively new level and which seeks to establish a stable and just international order based on mutual recognition of the political and social choice of each resident and on non interference in one another's internal affairs.

The idea of a common European home is new political thinking developing on European soil. Even though cooperation in Europe will still long be cooperation between its two parts, existence in it is no longer possible without recognition of all its elements, without a transition of this interdependence into a practical positive dimension, without a search for and determination of interests common to all Europeans.

"STRONG IS THE ARMOUR..."

Tank Asymmetry and Real Security

Vitaly SHLYKOV

The tank asymmetry which has emerged and grown in Europe after World War II is, perhaps, one of the most obvious examples of the deeply embedded reliance on quantitative parameters of the military power in the defence development and of the desire of many top military leaders to have at hand more armaments and troops than all the potential opposition taken together.

I cite this example as the most obvious because, first, tanks are easy to count and to compare, and, secondly, with military information being classified in the USSR, they are one of the few types of weapons which can be a subject of at least some quantitative comparison between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

Tanks are easy to compare also because, unlike certain types of most modern weapons, none of the NATO countries has ever classified data on their production, their numbers in troops or their tank production capacities.

Though similar information on Soviet tanks is, indeed, not available, we find an important point of reference for comparison in the statement of the Soviet Defence Minister to the effect that the Warsaw Treaty countries have 20,000 tanks more in Europe than does NATO.¹

In the post-war years of 1946-1987 the NATO countries have produced about 60,000 main battle tanks. (The term "main battle tank" is used by NATO since 1960 instead of the earlier division into medium and heavy tanks. This author does not count light tanks which are less than five per cent in the total NATO fleet.) About two thirds of this number (41,000 tanks) were manufactured by the USA and the rest by the West European members: 8,000 by the FRG; 7,300 by Great Britain; 2,800 by France; 1,100 by Italy; 400 by Spain.

Only four of the NATO countries have mass production of tanks of domestic design: the USA, the FRG, Great Britain and France. In the post-war period they have produced 10 basic models: four US (M-47; M-48; M-60 and M-1 Abrams), three British (Centurion, Chieftain and Challenger), two West German (Leopard-I and Leopard-II) and one French (AMX-30). Italy and Spain have been producing tanks under foreign licences (Italy, M-60 and Leopard-I; Spain, AMX-30).

In addition to the above-mentioned ten main models the military industry of NATO had produced smaller series (from 40 to 300 each) of heavy tanks (M-103 in the USA and Conqueror in Great Britain—both in the 1950s), as well as the so-called "export" tanks i. e. tanks intended exclusively for export and not for the national armed forces (Vickers in Great Britain and OF-40 in Italy).

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From 1946 till 1987 8,679 M-47s, 11,703 M-48s, 15,421 M-60s (including 15,221 in the USA and 200 in Italy), about 5,000 M-1 Abramses, 4,423 Centurions, about 2,100 Chieftains, about 300 Challengers, about 250 Vickers, about 200 Conquerors, 6,491 Leopard-I's (including 5,611 in the FRG and 880 in Italy), about 2300 Leopard-II's, 2,822 AMX-30s (2,446 in France and 376 in Spain) were produced.

At present NATO countries have four types of tanks in mass production: M-1 Abrams, Leopard-II and Challenger and AMX-30. Production of M-60s was discontinued in 1987.

The total number of tanks produced in NATO countries in 1987 was about 1,050 (840 M-1s; 48 M-60s; 88 Leopard-II's, 70 Challengers and 7 AMX-30s).

Depending on their performance and novelty of design NATO experts classify NATO tanks into three generations: the first generation tanks produced prior to the 1960s (Centurion, M-47 and M-48); tanks of the second generation which went into production in the first half of the 1960s (M-60; Leopard-I; AMX-30); tanks of the third generation launched in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Leopard-II; M-1 Abrams and Challenger).

Of the total 60,000 tanks produced since 1946 approximately 30,500 tanks are still in service in the NATO armies (as of 1987),² including 22,200 in Europe. The remaining 30,000 tanks were either exported beyond the NATO boundaries, lost in combat (in Korea, Middle East and other regions) and in accidents, or scrapped.

As the data on the tank production and deployment in the USSR and Warsaw Treaty countries are not available all relevant figures here are taken from Western sources, mainly publications of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and British tank yearbook "Jane's Armour and Artillery". (Obviously, these sources cannot be considered exhaustive. However, in my opinion, they reflect the main trends in world tank production in the post-war period. Release of the Soviet data on the issue which is long overdue could help make the necessary corrections. In the absence of these figures, many important aspects cannot, naturally, be taken into account. For example, I was not able to find figures on the Soviet production of T-34, IS-3 and T-10 tanks which were known to have been turned out in considerable numbers in the early post-war period. Full data on tank production in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania which are listed by Western experts as large producers of tanks, are also unavailable.) According to Western estimates, the USSR industry turned out nearly 100,000 tanks of only the five types currently deployed in the Soviet Armed Forces (T-54/55, T-62, T-64, T-72 and T-80), including 50,000 T-54/55s, 20,000 T-62s, no less than 9,300 T-64s, 8,500 T-72s (Western estimates provide only the total numbers of T-64s and T-72s deployed in the Soviet Army, which do not include tanks delivered to other Warsaw Treaty countries or exported) and 7,000 T-80 tanks.³ So, even if we add the tanks made by People's Republic of China (in the 1970s it manufactured 500 to 700 tanks a year) and other countries of the globe, assuming that Western estimates are correct, in 40-odd years the USSR turned out more tanks of the five models only than the rest of the world taken together.⁴

As for the strength of its tank fleet the Soviet Union, to cite the same Western sources, had in 1987 53,300 tanks including 19,500 T-54/55s, 13,700 T-62s, 9,300 T-64s, 8,500 T-72s and 2,300 T-80s. The other Warsaw Treaty countries had in the same year 15,000 tanks. Thus, the total number of tanks in the Warsaw Treaty countries reached 68,300 in 1987 of which 52,200 were stationed in Europe, i. e. more than twice the number of the NATO tanks (22,200).⁵

In spite of the fact that for more than four decades the Soviet Union remains the world's largest tank power the post-World War II development of the tank asymmetry has never gone along a straight line.

The USSR made its first step to the superiority in tanks as early as 1945-1950. During the Great Patriotic War the Soviet armour had borne the brunt of the war because it had been used not so much as a specialised force but as a universal weapon. The result was that, on the one hand, tanks were in constant demand because of their wasteful use and heavy losses, and, on the other, due to their top-grade combat capabilities they became a kind of a *universal equivalent of military power* in the eyes of the Soviet commanders, one that, when in sufficient supply, can accomplish any combat objective and sometimes merely make up for the lack of combat skill.

Generally speaking, search for universal equivalents of both economic and military power which would be as simple as possible and susceptible to arithmetic counting was one of the most characteristic features of the Stalinist way of thought which for years affected the development of the Soviet armed forces.

In his pre-election speech on February 9, 1946, which gave a powerful impetus to the post-war extensive development of the Soviet economy, Stalin stated how much cast-iron, steel, coal, oil we must annually produce to insure the nation against any emergency.⁶

There can hardly be any doubt that a similar simplistic scheme was applied to armaments as well, especially to the tank in view of the atmosphere of the cult of tank.

Anyway, this assumption is substantiated by ensuing practice. While the USA and Britain started curtailing tank production as early as 1944 (Britain cut it to one third and the USA by half as compared to the level of 1943), the Soviet Union went on increasing its manufacture of tanks in the post-war period.

Soon after the war the USA discontinued mass production of tanks altogether and dismantled all their tank facilities, retaining only federal tank arsenals whose job was not manufacture but modernisation and maintenance, as well as designing of new tank models. In 1946-1950 only a small test series of M-46 Patton tanks was produced in the USA. By the beginning of the Korean war in June of 1950 the USA had absolutely none industrial production of medium and heavy tanks.

As a matter of fact, the capitalist world's only tank producer in the first five years after the World War II was Great Britain which produced about 700 Centurions during 1946-1950.

Meanwhile the USSR continued manufacture of T-34 tanks up till 1948 when it turned over to producing the new T-54 tank armed with a 100-mm gun.⁸

In the 1950s the USSR's relative tank superiority over the West diminished sharply. That was due to two reasons.

First, as the USA partly mobilised its economy during the Korean war of 1950-1953 it practically created anew an extensive specialised tank industry capable of peace-time annual production of 30,000 to 35,000 tanks (including light ones) without the conversion of the rest of economy. Thus, in 1951-1954 three new large tank facilities were constructed. The production of tanks reached impressive proportions. In the 1950s about 20,000 medium M-47 and M-48 tanks and 5,500 light M-41 tanks rolled off the assembly lines of US plants. Great Britain also stepped up its production of Centurion tanks which in the 1950s totalled about 3,600 tanks.

The other reason to lower the tank asymmetry level during that period was the major reduction of the Soviet armed forces initiated by

Nikita Khrushchev in the second half of the 1950s which included tank forces.

During that period missiles and nuclear weapons were rapidly acquiring the role of the universal equivalent of military power in the Soviet military policy. There emerged a real threat to the proponents of "tank philosophy" which was based on the pre-eminence of tanks in a war. Those were difficult times for tanks that did not go unnoticed by the Soviet military literature. According to Major-General M. I. Cherdnichenko, "...in the post-war period the role of tanks remained unclear for some time which led to a certain stagnation in their development".⁹

However, this situation did not last long. Like "the cavalry way of thinking" of the 1930s the "tank philosophy" regained its seemingly lost positions. To judge by combat experience of most military leaders of that time the proponents of "tank philosophy" commanded obvious majority within the highest military leadership of the USSR. Besides, their actions were imaginative. Unlike the "cavalry way of thinking" which appealed to military conservatism of Stalin who absolutised the experience of the Civil War, "tank philosophy" renovated its stand with the help of a supermodern ally, the nuclear weapons: *tank was declared an ideal weapon in a nuclear-missile war.*

The book on military science entitled "Voennaya strategiya" ("Military Strategy") edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovsky (on the eve of the Great Patriotic War he served as a Deputy Chief of Staff and in 1952-1960 as Chief of Staff of the USSR Armed Forces) which was published in 1962 and later reprinted twice (in 1963 and 1968), stated the following: "It seems that the proportion of armour within ground forces would be increased even further. Combat capabilities of tanks make them less vulnerable to nuclear weapons, they possess high passability and mobility regardless of road conditions and are capable of rapid manoeuvring and delivering deep strikes. They can rapidly cross the opposition's radiation danger zones and make use of the results of our nuclear strikes with utmost efficiency.

"Tank detachments, formations and armies possess tremendous fire power and, like artillery, are capable of destroying and suppressing both open and concealed targets. Given adequate organisation they can not only make effective use of the results of nuclear strikes but also by their fire power and armour wipe out the surviving and resisting enemy troops, deliver rapid strikes on their flanks and rear and easily penetrate to considerable distances. *Of all the branches the tank forces are best suited for the nature of nuclear-missile war*".¹⁰ (*Emphasis added*).

In essence, while explicitly recognising nuclear weapon's revolutionary effect on military strategy, the proponents of "tank philosophy" saw nuclear weapons mostly as a supermeans designed to clear the way for tanks to raid the opposition's deep rear, exactly the view the German tank generals of "blitzkrieg" period held of the "flying artillery", the diving bomber.

This kind of approach continued through the 1960s and 1970s. The book "The Scientific and Technological Progress and the Revolution in Military Strategy" published by a group of military scientists in 1973 stressed: "Modern Soviet tank is a sophisticated machine whose main tactical and technical parameters surpass those of the latest tanks of capitalist armies. Of all the branches of ground forces tank troops are most suitable for rapid manoeuvring and combat in nuclear warfare. High mobility and fire power enable them to use the effects of nuclear strikes rapidly and effectively. Tank forces are a modern and very promising military branch".¹¹

An interview of the Commander of Tank Forces of the Soviet Army Tank Marshal Babadjanyan testified to the fact that such a view on the role of tanks in a nuclear-missile war was not an exclusive opinion of the authors of scientific and research works: "Against the background of the development of military technology and weaponry the role of tank forces at present is far from being diminished; on the contrary, it grows. As before the Soviet military strategy regards tanks as the main striking and manoeuvring component of the ground forces".¹²

Naturally, today when it is universally recognised that there could be no winners in a nuclear-missile war, such pronouncements seem completely obsolete and undoubtedly cannot reflect the views of the present Soviet military leadership. But in 1960-70s such an approach had played a certain role in building up the tank asymmetry in Europe.

The concept of the growing role of tanks in a nuclear-missile war presupposed that as many tanks as possible should be produced in advance. Such a requirement can be accounted for by expected astronomical losses of tanks during a massive exchange of nuclear strikes. To wit compared to the Great Patriotic War when monthly irreparable losses could amount to 19 per cent of the total number of tanks at the front, during just the first two weeks of a future war the losses in ground forces were expected to reach 30-40 per cent.¹³ Such estimates of losses would lead to a conclusion that as many tanks (and other materiel) as possible should be produced before the beginning of the war. Thus was laid the "theoretical foundation" for the next leap in the tank production.

Judging by Western estimates, such a leap did take place, the number of Soviet tanks reaching 42,000 in 1975 as compared to 30,500 in 1965. The increase was particularly noticeable at the Central European Theater of Operations which is of key importance to NATO where in just five years from 1970 to 1975 the USSR built up its tank strength from 13,650 to 19,000 tanks, while NATO could counter them with only 6,100 tanks in 1975.¹⁴

As estimated by Western military experts, the tank superiority of the WTO over NATO peaked in the late 1970s. According to London Institute for Strategic Studies, the Warsaw Treaty countries had in 1978 65,000 tanks as compared to 25,000 NATO tanks. The WTO allies of the USSR alone had more tanks than all the NATO's West European members taken together (15,000 against 13,700). In 1978 the USSR had 50,000 tanks while the USA—10,500. By the same sources, China had 10,000 tanks in 1978.¹⁵

It follows from the above figures that from the mid-60s to late 1970s the Soviet Union had almost doubled its tank fleet. It is not difficult to imagine how many tanks there would have been in Europe had the West met the Soviet "tank challenge" by proportionate increase of its own tank force. One can hardly doubt that the West possessed the necessary capability. As is known, in World War II the USA without overstraining its economy was able to make as many tanks as it needed. Some West European members of NATO, too, showed that they are capable of producing quite modern tanks, a proof being the vast number of West German Leopards.

So, given the will the West could have matched the number of tanks in the Warsaw Treaty countries. Why did this not happen?

Though there are considerable differences among the NATO countries in their approach to the problem of the tank asymmetry the decisive role in that respect is played by the position of the USA as economically and militarily the most powerful state of the West. The USA has never

made any secret of its stake on the nuclear weapons as the cheapest and most effective counterbalance to increases in the conventional arms potential of the Warsaw Treaty countries. Former US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in his report to the Congress on the military budget for 1988 fiscal year put the following reasons for that: "Since the end of World War II, our defense policy has continued to rely on U.S. nuclear weapons to help deter conventional attack as well, primarily because larger conventional forces are far more expensive than nuclear forces and neither we, nor our allies are able to spend larger sums on defense".¹⁶

Obviously, the fundamental reason behind such a contraposition of nuclear to conventional weapons was not so much the "low" price of nuclear weapons as the US confidence in its nuclear superiority over the USSR. However, one cannot fail to see that till the turn of this decade when the USA started to doubt its nuclear superiority, it kept a tight lid on its military budget most of which went on conventional forces.

Table 2¹

Tank Production in USSR and USA in 1966—1975

Years	USSR	USA
1966	3,500	360
1967	3,500	342
1968	4,000	68
1969	4,000	332
1970	4,500	147
1971	4,000	363
1972	3,000	357
1973	3,000	399
1974	2,500	615
1975	2,000	547

For 25 years right till the Reagan Administration came to power the US military expenditures, including the costs of the Vietnam war, averaged \$213 billion annually (in 1986 dollars), that is, were below the average level of military spending in the second half of the 1950s.¹⁷ A particularly low level was in the period of the Soviet "tank leap" from the mid-60s to mid-1970s. From 1968 till 1975 the US spending on arms and materiel was cut 2.5 times to the lowest level since the end of World War II.¹⁸ In the 1970s Pentagon spendings on arms purchases were less than the annual average in the preceding 35 years.¹⁹ The strength of US Armed Forces dropped by one million men during 1968-1975 period.²⁰

Thus, for a long time there was nothing to indicate any particular US concern with the growing Soviet tank force. Moreover, one cannot but feel that the USA deliberately contributed to the deepening of the US-Soviet tank asymmetry seeking to draw the USSR into an economically ruinous and politically disadvantageous kind of "tank off-side". Anyhow, as the Soviet Union undertook to accelerate its tank production the USA took the opposite course: it began to fold up its tank industry.

For instance, in the 1960 to 1969 decade the USA produced only 5,072 main battle tanks, i. e. four times less than in the preceding decade. Very drastic drop in tank production occurred in the late 1960s-early 1970s.

As can be seen from the table, in 1966-1975 the USSR produced almost ten times more tanks than the USA. Though this article deals with tanks only, it should be noted that the craving for quantitative parameters was typical in the case of other types of weapons as well. As was noticed at the Scientific and Practical Conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1988, until recently we were engaged in the production of enormous amounts of chemical weapons at tremendous costs which diverted considerable industrial capacities, manpower and resources. At present we have to bear additional considerable expenses to destroy the chemical arsenals. Another example is artillery. A Pentagon publication ("Soviet Military Power" 1987) asserts that the procurements of field pieces during the 1977-1986 period totalled 28,200 in the USSR and only 2,750 in the USA; in three years (1984-1986)—8,200 guns in the USSR (1,750 in other Warsaw Treaty coun-

tries) and 2,000 guns in the NATO countries. Perhaps, these figures are exaggerated and mislead the public. In that case we should clarify them.

Besides, had there been no craving on our part for quantities, perhaps, we might not have had to destroy under the treaty on medium and shorter range missiles almost two times more missiles and three times more warheads than the USA.

By mid-1970s the tank asymmetry between the USSR and the USA was 5:1. At that time the Soviet Union had 42,000 tanks as compared to 8,226 tanks in the US armed forces of which 5,049 were of modern design (M-60 series) and the rest were obsolete M-48s designed in the 1950s and equipped with a 90-mm gun and gasoline engine.²²

The reduction of the US tank fleet was absolute. That was due to the fact that the export of US tanks at that time exceeded their production in the USA. Up till mid-1960s the USA and Great Britain were the only producers of main battle tanks in the capitalist world. From 1949 till 1969 the USA delivered 20,000 tanks to its allies.²³ These exports depleted the US stock of tanks accumulated mostly during the Korean War. As a result, when the urgent need arose for the USA to make up Israel's tank losses in 1973 war with Arabs the necessary armour had to be taken from US combat units in the FRG.

However, the most vivid demonstration of Pentagon's lower interest in tanks was its position on retaining the capacities of US tank industry. During 20 years from 1960 till 1979 main battle tanks (the only M-60 model) were produced by the only US tank facility—the Federal Detroit Tank Plant. Though the nominal capacity of the Detroit facility was 4,800 tanks annually, the protracted period of operation at a level adequate only to maintain continuous production cycle brought about an erosion of the production base of subcontractors (5,000 in all were involved in M-60 tank production) who supplied units and parts necessary for the assembly. As all subcontractors, unlike the Detroit facility, were private owned their proprietors had no incentives to maintain at their expense reserve capacities should Pentagon all of a sudden require to step up tank output. Obviously, they would have readily done so if the government continued as it had done in the 1950s to subsidise such reserve capacities to mobilise in the case of war.

However, the Defense Department was gradually reducing such subsidies and practically discontinued them altogether by the end of the 1960s.²⁴

As a result, when after the Israeli-Arab War of 1973 there was an emergency need to increase tank output, it soon became clear that the US tank industry was incapable of producing annually more than 500 to 600 hulls and turrets without which tank production is impossible. The Federal Government had to invest sizeably in the development of subcontracting base of the Detroit Plant, so that tank output could reach 1,200 pieces a year.

In the mid-1970s the USA clearly changed its attitude towards tanks. With full support of the Congress the administration worked out and implemented a major programme aimed at increasing tank output and expanding tank industry. It was decided to put a new tank, M-1 Abrams, into production. For that purpose new assembly plant in Lima (Ohio) was built and Detroit Plant was modernised. The Congress appropriated one billion dollars for the construction of production facilities which would enable to produce annually 1,800 Abrams tanks should the need arise.

The purchases of tanks for the US Army also increased considerably so that its tank fleet grew from 8,266 in 1974 to 12,821 pieces in 1981 and 14,296 in 1987.²⁵

A consequence of the US efforts was that the USSR-US tank asymmetry reduced from 5:1 in 1975 to present 3:1 but only in relative and not absolute terms. For, though the Soviet Union during the last decades has decreased its tank production by 50 per cent as compared to the preceding decade, it continued to produce three times more tanks than the USA. During 1977-1986 the USSR produced 24,400 tanks (against 30,500 in the preceding decade), while the USA during that period produced 7,100 tanks (against 4,000 in the preceding decade).²⁶ So, in mid-1970s the USSR had 34,000 tanks more than the USA; at present the difference rose to about 39,000 tanks. Thus, "reduction" of asymmetry has led to a marked increase of tanks on both sides.

The growth of interest in tanks on the part of the US military and political leadership in the 1970s was due to several factors.

The first group of factors was a purely military one and linked to the outcome of the October 1973 Israeli-Arab War. The hostilities showed a much higher rate of tank losses than had been estimated in the USA for a modern war, despite the fact that it was non-nuclear and had a limited nature. The irreparable losses of the Israeli Army, which had entered the war with 2,000 tanks, in just 18 days of combat totalled 840 tanks (42 per cent of its tank fleet) and the number of incapacitated tanks later repaired reached 2,500 (125 per cent of tank fleet as on the first day of war). Basing on that experience the US Command deemed it necessary to augment the expected rate of planned losses in a conventional warfare from 8.6 to 20.1 per cent a month which naturally called for an increase in tank fleet.

In addition, the US military experts expressed the view that 1973 war had demonstrated a larger role of tanks in modern warfare as an anti-tank means in spite of the fact that this war saw the first extensive use of anti-tank rockets including helicopter-launched ones. According to some estimates, more than 6,000 AT guided missiles were fired which put out of service less than 300 tanks while more than 80 per cent of all destroyed tanks were hit by tank gun fire.

The chief of the office of tank forces of the US Army General L. Lawrence reported to the US Congress in April 1978 hearings: "In the case of a very dynamic battlefield we will be faced with defending against hordes of tanks quite similar to the kind of environment that prevailed in the Arab-Israeli War 1973. It is our belief that the major defender against that tank threat would be a direct fire antitank weapon which would be on a tank".²⁷

Summing up Pentagon's opinion to the effect that the best anti-tank weapon was the tank itself *Newsweek* magazine wrote: "While some predict that so-called 'smart weapons'—guided by radio waves or wires—will soon make the tank little more than a high-priced museum piece, such a scenario remains for the far-off future. At present, anti-tank technology is nowhere near the point where it could reliably compete with the modern armored monsters".²⁸

It is characteristic that the Soviet Tank Forces Command also arrived at the conclusion that the use in the Israeli-Arab War of 1973 of such new and highly publicised anti-tank weapon as helicopter-based anti-tank guided missiles would not noticeably affect tank's combat efficiency. In the above-mentioned interview to *Pravda* Marshal Babadjanyan stated: "Personally I believe that fire support helicopters are unable to exert substantial influence on the effectiveness of tanks used in operations, especially large ones".

TANK ASYMMETRY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The second group of factors to start the process of expansion and renewal of the US tank fleet since mid-1970s was directly linked to the development of the situation in Europe. As in the second half of the last decade the Soviet Union, according to Western estimates, achieved nuclear parity with the USA in strategic weapons as well as in tactical and battlefield weapons, the continued and, especially, growing tank disbalance in Europe in favour of the Warsaw Treaty provoked a most serious concern of the Europeans.

It should be pointed out that European members of NATO and especially the FRG always reacted more nervously than the USA to the growth of the Soviet tank potential.

This can be seen not only from the stepped up production of anti-tank means (the FRG alone supplied its troops with over 100,000 anti-tank missiles) but also from the fact that it is they within NATO who lead in tank weaponry development. For example the FRG produced (in October 1979) the first tank of the third generation; all post-war US tanks including the Abramses were armed with European-designed guns; the famous Chobham multilayer tank armour used in the latest NATO tanks was developed in Great Britain, etc.

Since mid-1960s Western Europe has sharply increased its tank output. Production was started by the FRG, France, Italy and Spain. Between 1965 and 1972 the FRG alone produced almost twice as many tanks as the USA (2,960 against 1,570). It not only made its Bundeswehr self-sufficient in tanks but also supplied its Leopard-1s to the ground forces of Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Turkey and Greece. However, neither the FRG, nor other West European nations could have matched the number of tanks deployed in the Warsaw Treaty countries without the risk of undermining their economy. The cost of a modern Leopard II is about 3 million dollars. 50,000 tanks would cost 150 billion dollars, this not counting maintenance, training grounds, personnel upkeep, etc. And how much fuel would that armada consume? One Abrams tank, for example, consumes almost 10 litres of fuel per 1 kilometre.

The increased concern in Western Europe over reliability of the US nuclear guarantees in the face of the Warsaw Treaty tank superiority induced the USA to try to back up its obligations before the allies not by costly programmes of the NATO tank fleet buildup but by deployment of neutron weapons in Europe which were declared to be a reliable means against the Soviet tanks. However, these plans met such a strong reaction on the part of the European public that in April 1978 President Carter had to renounce US plans to produce such weapons.

In this situation the USA thought that it should demonstrate to the Europeans its willingness to assume additional burden of non-nuclear defence of Europe.

The announced programme of increased production of Abrams tanks was given utmost publicity. The tank itself was declared the best in the world and capable to deal easily with three Soviet T-72 tanks, not to mention earlier models. Praise was piled on its secret armour and fantastic manoeuvrability as it was the first tank ever to be equipped with a turbogas engine (with rated power of 1,500 h. p.).

Contrary to Pentagon's strict rules the tank was launched into mass production before its trials were completed (the only other reported case of similar exception the USA permitted was with "Pershing-2" missile). However, the USA had no real intention of getting involved into a costly programme aimed at eliminating the asymmetry through drastic increase of tank production.

Therefore, as soon as the two first Abrams tanks rolled off the assembly line of the new Lima tank plant (in February 1980) and the

appropriate festivities were over, and even before tanks went to troops (this happened only in 1982 after the testing of the tank was completed in January 1982), the USA decided to demonstrate to its European allies that the US nuclear guarantees of their security were as unshakeable as its firm belief that nuclear weapons were the best means to counter Soviet tank superiority and that the territory of Europe was the most suitable place for using them.

The USA gradually drifted away from the tank programme which had been promised to the Europeans. The planned production rate of 120 tanks per month was never reached, monthly output never exceeding 70 tanks.

Pentagon also stated that it was not planning to order additional Abrams tanks after the completion in 1991 of the tank production programme approved by the Congress (by that time, according to plans, 7,467 M-1 tanks would be procured for the Army and 560 tanks for the Marine Corps).

Nor is the USA in a hurry with development of a forth generation tank to replace the Abramses. Early in 1988 US Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci said that there would be no 1989 fiscal year appropriations for the development of a new main battle tank.

It should also be noted here that, according to Western press, Great Britain would stop its production of Challenger tanks as from 1989 and the FRG its Leopard-II tanks as from 1990. (Assembly of this model under West German licence of parts and units supplied from the FRG shall continue till 1993 in Switzerland; the programme is for 345 tanks only.) The defence ministries of both countries do not plan development of tanks of a new generation before the year 2000.

One more thing deserves attention in this connection. Campaigning against the threat of "the offensive tank potential" of the Warsaw Treaty countries the West prefers to invest not in tank production but in improvement of its anti-tank capabilities thus compelling us to keep on spending more and more economic resources. With a 20,000 tank superiority of the Warsaw Treaty over NATO tank fleet the question arises what would be the cost of modernising so many tanks?

One cannot ignore the fact that as a primary counterbalance to Soviet tanks the USA is more and more persistently attempting to involve its West European allies into a sort of a "ground-based SDI" using the latest technological innovations. As the Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee Senator Sam Nunn put it: "We need to have a declared goal in our technological research to render tanks obsolete. This is an achievable goal in my view, but it will take an all-out dedicated effort".²⁹

Thus, the outline of a new spiral of the arms race in the West is becoming more and more clear where the pretext of countering the Soviet tank threat is used to plan development of not only defensive anti-tank weapons.

This is a brief account of the emergence and development of the post-war tank asymmetry and some of its implications which I was able to reconstruct on the basis of quite limited and surely not quite accurate information on Soviet tanks. I believe that it allows to make some conclusions of preliminary nature.

I have already found in our press some attempts to justify the emergence of the tank asymmetry by the Soviet desire to compensate for the nuclear superiority of the West.³⁰ These explanations seem to me no more convincing than the attempts of the Soviet military leaders of the

1960s and 1970s to justify an increase in tank production by the requirements of nuclear war. I am confident that the emergence and protracted maintenance of the post-war Soviet tank superiority is accounted for not by nuclear weapons but by exclusively pre-nuclear way of thinking. Stalin and his closest military advisers always sought a thick wall of quantitative superiority over the opposition to hide from complex diversities of qualitative parameters of military power which were incomprehensible for them.

Seeds of "the science of winning" by numbers and not by skill sown in those years found rich soil in the conservatism of Soviet military theory during the period of stagnation whose heritage is yet to be overcome. "Strong is the armour", and strong are stereotypes which for some are hard to shed. As was pointed out by the USSR Defence Minister Army General Dmitri Yazov, "our military thought is still often fettered with inertia, routine, and lack of competitiveness of ideas and opinions. It can hardly be expected to produce without resolute renunciation of obsolete approaches, methods and stereotypes, without democratisation of the whole situation within the military science".³¹

I am convinced that the tank problem in Europe requires exactly such kind of resolute departure from the obsolete methods and stereotypes.

At present when the East and the West have recognised that there could be no winners in a nuclear war and both Warsaw Treaty and NATO have officially stated that they would adhere to defensive doctrines, the numerous tank forces in Europe with guns aimed at each other constitute a dangerous anachronism and an unbearable burden of stagnant military way of thinking.

As Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out in his report to the 19th Party Conference, the effectiveness of our defences must henceforward be assured primarily not by quantitative but by "qualitative parameters—both in terms of technology and military science, and in terms of the composition of the armed forces. This must guarantee the Soviet State and its allies reliable security, and must be achieved in strict conformity with our defensive doctrine".³²

This approach has been further developed at the Scientific and Practical Conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his report at that Conference Eduard Shevardnadze stated, *inter alia*, that the reliable defences of the country, its security are guaranteed by skill, not numbers, by reliance on quality and not only on quantity, by the general development and high level of scientific and technological infrastructure and not by numerous weapons and contingents... Today, the report goes on, the security of a nation is determined not so much by its weapons arsenals as by its ability to create and produce innovations. In other words, by its reserves of scientific thought, by its reserves of technological capabilities, and by its reserves of qualified personnel.³³

We cannot ignore the fact that the tank asymmetry in Europe is used by the opponents of disarmament as a catalyst of the arms race and as a convenient pretext for keeping on nuclear weapons in the region.

But in the long run it is not the asymmetry as such that is the problem, but the high level of the tank confrontation in Europe. It would be over-optimistic to believe that the Europeans both in the East and the West would feel secure with tens of thousands of tanks remaining on the continent even if a tank parity be established between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, say, on the level of 20,000 or 15,000 tanks on each side.

Prospects of a non-nuclear world by the year 2000 could be made a reality in the nearest years if a breakthrough is achieved in conventional armaments reduction as bold and unorthodox as the one accomplished by the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles. The way for such a breakthrough is, in fact, open. For the INF Treaty provides a reliable and proven recipe for the elimination of complex asymmetries and imbalances in the field of dangerous offensive weapons.

This recipe in full measure meets the principle of equal security; on its basis it would be possible, to my mind, to initiate in the nearest future talks on deep cuts in the tank strengths of both Warsaw Treaty and NATO, or, better still, a complete elimination of all tanks in Europe. There should be room neither for tanks nor for nuclear weapons in our common European home. In other words, as I see it, there is a possibility for a "zero option" on tanks.

¹ *Правда*, Feb. 8, 1988.

² *The Military Balance 1987-1988*, London, 1987, p. 231.

³ *Jane's Armour and Artillery 1987-1988*, London, 1987, pp. 70, 78, 82, 84; *The Military Balance 1987-1988*, p. 35.

⁴ Thus, according to Western sources the tank fleet of PRC as of 1 July, 1987 was estimated at 11,500. The production in all non-socialist countries outside NATO did not exceed 5,000 tanks, including about 1,500 in India, 1,200 in Japan, 500 in Switzerland, 500 in Israel, 300 in Sweden, 350 in Argentina (see the *Soviet Military Review*, No. 1, 1988, pp. 36-37, *The Military Balance*, 1987-1988, pp. 101, 146; 157, 160).

⁵ *The Military Balance 1987-1988*, pp. 35, 231.

⁶ See И. В. Сталин Речи на предвыборных собраниях Сталинского избирательного округа в Москве 11 декабря 1937 г. и 9 февраля 1946 г. Gospolitizdat, 1953, pp. 22, 23.

⁷ *Jane's Armour and Artillery*, 1986-87, London, 1986, p. 146.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1987-88, p. 87.

⁹ *Научно-технический прогресс и революция в военном деле*, М., 1973, p. 83.

¹⁰ *Военная стратегия*, М., 1968, p. 300.

¹¹ *Научно-технический прогресс и революция в военном деле*, pp. 106-107.

¹² *Правда*, 1974, September 8.

¹³ *Военная стратегия*, М., 1963, pp. 427, 428.

¹⁴ General Robert Close. *Europe Without Defense?* New York, 1979, p. 38, 36.

¹⁵ *The Military Balance*, 1978-79, London, pp. 6, 9, 19, 21-28, 56.

¹⁶ C. W. Weinberger. *Annual Report to the Congress. Fiscal year 1988*, p. 51.

¹⁷ William W. Kaufmann. *A Reasonable Defense* Washington, 1986, p. 21.

¹⁸ Jacques S. Gansler. *The Defense Industry*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, p. 26.

¹⁹ Caspar W. Weinberger. *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987*, p. 16.

²⁰ J. Schlesinger, *Fortune*, January, 1976.

²¹ *Armor*, March-April 1981, pp. 44-45.

²² Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, December 12, 1974-March 15, 1975, p. 195.

²³ F. O. Miksche. *Rüstungswettlauf. Ursachen und Auswirkungen* Stuttgart, 1972, S. 63.

²⁴ Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975. December 12, 1974-March 15, 1975, p. 279.

²⁵ *Newsweek*, November 16, 1987, p. 32.

²⁶ *Soviet Military Power*, 1987, p. 121, *Armor*, March-April 1981, pp. 44, 45.

²⁷ Department of Defense Appropriations for 1979. Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, April 6, 1978, p. 374.

²⁸ *Newsweek*, September 27, 1982, p. 44.

²⁹ *Air Force Magazine*, August 1987, p. 46.

³⁰ *Известия*, April 2, 1988.

³¹ *Красная звезда*, August 9, 1988.

³² *Правда*, June 29, 1988.

³³ *International Affairs*, No. 10, 1988, pp. 17-18.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RESERVES OF PERESTROIKA

Valery KARAVAYEV

For three years now, the trenchant word *perestroika*, meaning the line for a radical renewal of every aspect of our life, primarily the economy, has been a household word in this country. We naturally realise that all our problems cannot be solved at one go, that decrees alone cannot accelerate the country's socio-economic development or scientific and technical progress. In short, a long and hard road still lies ahead, and we are still at the very outset. The thing to do now is to take a look around to see that we have not forgotten anything and make sure that we do not lose our bearings.

In doing so, we are guided by Lenin's ideas, by his clear-cut plan for building socialism in this country. Now that we have embarked on our revolutionary *perestroika*, with the Party working hard to restore Leninist norms and principles in every sphere of social life, we should treasure every single bit of Lenin's theoretical legacy and the practical experience of socialist construction.

As we restructure our external economic ties in general and economic relations with the capitalist world in particular, it is highly important to turn to Lenin's theory as a whole, without quoting "convenient" passages out of context, as some were prone to do in the past. That is the only way to get rid of the bureaucratic, dogmatic and voluntarist dead-weight of the past half-century, including the recent past, and to find a constructive approach to the solution of the far from simple problems facing us today.

The principle of state monopoly of foreign trade has been and remains the basic principle of our economic exchanges with the capitalist countries. For a correct understanding and consistent implementation of that principle, it is important to start from the initial, Leninist formula, and not from its subsequent, often arbitrary readings. In April 1918, Lenin signed a decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the Full Nationalisation of Foreign Trade", which said: "All foreign trade shall be nationalised. Trade deals in the purchase and sale of diverse products (mining, manufacturing, agricultural, etc.) with foreign states and individual commercial enterprises abroad shall be carried out on behalf of the Russian Republic by specially authorised organs. Apart from these organs, any trade deals with foreign countries for export or import purposes shall be prohibited."¹ This broad and inclusive formula leaves no place for a narrowly departmental, bureaucratic reading of the state monopoly of foreign trade as a monopoly of one ministry or department. It is no accident that the decree mentioned "organs" rather than a single organ.

It those far-off days, the right to deal on the external market was granted not only to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade (PCFT) and Centrosoyus (Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives) but also such organisations as the Joint-Stock Company for Domestic and Export Trade in Leather Materials, set up in the 1920s by the PCFT, the All-Russia Council for the National Economy and Centrosoyus together with private entrepreneurs. It was already evident at the time that a single department's monopoly in the field of foreign trade was unwarranted, and it is even more so today. Such a monopoly fet-

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ters initiative and enterprise by raising all kinds of bureaucratic barriers, which extremely complicate any business deals with foreign partners and delay their implementation. The cumulative effect of such "delays" is to hold back the development of our national economy.

The recent decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government authorising production associations and enterprises to trade and do business with foreign (including capitalist) partners are in accord with the letter and spirit of Lenin's decree, with its inner logic, and meet the interests of the whole people.

Lenin took a remarkably creative and flexible approach to the choice of forms for external economic cooperation with the capitalist states. In the 1920s, vigorous use was made of concessions, a form of such cooperation initiated by Lenin. He said: "The granting of concessions under reasonable terms is desirable also for us, as one of the means of attracting into Russia... the technical help of the countries which are more advanced in this respect."² At that time, concessions granted to foreign firms did not mean an actual concession to capitalism or a step back to its restoration, as critics from the "left" maintained. On the contrary, they were an economically valid measure aimed at ensuring active use of external economic cooperation to strengthen socialism.

An interesting point to note is that the first industrial concession in the USSR for the exploitation of asbestos deposits in the Urals was granted to the now well-known US businessman Armand Hammer. In terms of numbers and volume of capital investments, concessions prevailed in the mining and manufacturing industries. Thus, Lena Goldfields, a major British concession with a capital of over 18 million rubles, set up under an agreement with the Soviet government on November 14, 1925, mined gold in the Lena-Vitim region in Siberia (in 1926, it accounted for 30 per cent of the Soviet Union's total gold output), and also equipped mines and arranged the production of non-ferrous metals in the Urals and the Altai region.

Many minor concessions turned out consumer goods, which were in short supply in the country at the time, so helping Soviet industry to concentrate on the development of more important branches of the national economy.

Another fact worth noting is that our country was the first to use such a progressive form of international division of labour as mixed enterprises. Lenin said at the 11th Congress of the CPSU(B): "We now have a number of mixed companies. True, we have only very few... Thus we now have seventeen companies with an aggregate capital amounting to many millions, sanctioned by several government departments."³

Today, nearly 70 years later, there are fewer mixed enterprises on Soviet territory than at that time. At the beginning of 1925, the country had 64 mixed companies, which accounted for 10 per cent of the country's exports and 5 per cent of its imports, with the Soviet side owning over 50 per cent of the shares. These figures can still serve as a pointer in assessing the development of new forms of external economic cooperation. It is highly important that joint ventures were set up in different branches of the economy. Take, for instance, the Russo-US compressed gas company, the Russo-Austrian enamel-ware company, the Russo-British and Russo-Dutch timber companies, the Russo-German building company, the Russo-US agricultural association, and many others. There is no doubt that mixed companies, just as concessions, helped to rehabilitate and develop Soviet Russia's economy and to strengthen the positions of socialism in the country without undermining these in any way. These forms of cooperation were used in the period of Lenin's New Economic Policy, which could in effect be descri-

bed as the revolutionary *perestroika* of the 1920s.

Unfortunately, the progressive forms of cooperation with foreign partners that emerged in that period were gradually wound down and by the mid-1930s were virtually extinct. That was because the country's leadership came to regard the New Economic Policy as a brief and forced return to capitalism rather than a long-term line whose main principles had been elaborated by Lenin back in 1918 and whose implementation was obstructed by the Civil War and the foreign intervention against the young socialist Republic. As steps were being taken to scrap the New Economic Policy, the concessions and mixed companies born of it were stigmatised as well. Another factor here was that these flexible forms based on economic methods were clearly incompatible with the bureaucratic, administrative-command system for running the economy and foreign trade that was taking shape at the time.

Meanwhile, the forms of international cooperation that emerged in the early days of the Soviet power could have undoubtedly done a great deal to promote socialist industrialisation and the technical reconstruction of the Soviet economy. But all the external economic ties with the capitalist countries were soon reduced to foreign trade, to export-import operations, and towards the end of the 1930s and the early 1940s, in the face of the looming military threat, were largely discontinued.

One cannot, of course, deny the important role played by foreign trade in implementing the programmes of the early five-year plan periods, when many industrial giants were built with foreign equipment and with the help of foreign specialists. These include the Dneproges hydro-power station, the metallurgical works in Magnitogorsk and Novokuznetsk, the Gorky motor works, the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor works, and many other enterprises.

In the postwar period, it was no longer one socialist country but over a dozen European, Asian and Latin American countries following the socialist road that were involved in East-West economic relations. The common line of their postwar external economic policy was to develop mutually beneficial and equitable trade and economic relations with states belonging to the other social system, including industrialised Western countries. But these relations began to make real headway only under the detente of the 1970s, which marked the beginning of their modern history. Still, foreign trade remained the main channel of economic exchanges between the two systems, with the price factor exerting an extremely powerful effect on its development tendencies.

East-West trade in the 1970s expanded largely at the expense of the price-outlook factor, and also through an extensive transfer of our natural resources to the West. Such "growth" amounted to marking time and could not last forever. It made our country heavily dependent on the current level of commodity prices on the world market. But few gave it any thought at the time, and up to a point things moved along by momentum. For three years now, Soviet trade with the West has been declining owing to a decline in the world prices of oil and oil products and a resultant drop in Soviet exports. In 1986 alone, trade went down by almost 30 per cent. That is due, in particular, to the irrational structure of Soviet exports to the West, roughly 80 per cent of which consists of oil and energy resources.

The worsening of the world political climate in the early 1980s held back the development of trade links. In that period, the West began to take various discriminatory actions against the socialist countries, including sanctions, embargoes, restrictions on the export of technology, import quotas, etc., and sometimes even downright breach of contract. Such discriminatory measures were bound to deform the structure of trade, to distort commodity flows and slow down their dynamics. In

spite of all that, East-West trade in the 1980s continued to grow, even if at a moderate pace, which shows that it has acquired a certain self-propelling quality, a certain autonomy from changes in political relations, which is due to its mutually beneficial character, to a force which is more powerful, as Lenin put it, than the will, desire or decisions of any government. In the 1980s, this force is even more powerful than in the 1920s, for the new stage of the technological revolution has deepened the internationalisation process and increased the economic interdependence within the world economy.

The world economic situation in the 1980s, too, does not favour an expansion of East-West trade. The 1980-1982 decline in production in the West was followed by a recovery, but that proved to be fairly sluggish and short-lived. The demand for CMEA goods remains limited, and there is a growing asymmetry between the interests of the partners in the East and the West, for both sides are primarily interested in expanding their own exports: the socialist countries want to expand these in order to balance out their trade, while the Western countries seek to maintain employment levels, increase production loads and invigorate the economy in general.

The price and monetary instability in the world capitalist economy, such as the seesawing exchange rates of the US dollar and bank rates, inject elements of uncertainty into our economic relations with the West. The CMEA countries' exports of such mass commodities as oil and other energy resources are usually paid for in dollars, whereas their imports largely involve other Western, primarily West European, currencies. As a result, changes in the dollar's exchange rate against these currencies often affect our exports and imports in opposite ways. The "lighter" dollar we get from exports is exchanged for a smaller amount of other currency units as these "gain weight" against the dollar, so reducing our imports, while a rising dollar has an opposite effect and serves to reduce our total external indebtedness in convertible currencies and, consequently, the overall debt service payments. But dollars, however "light" or "heavy", first have to be earned on the world market by boosting our exports of competitive goods, and that is a hard thing to do.

The sharp changes in bank interest rates in the leading capitalist countries have also had a significant effect on the dynamics of East-West trade. In the first half of the 1980s, these rose to an unprecedented level, markedly altering the state of affairs on the international capital market and generating a massive flow of liquid funds to the USA. That has served to narrow down the credit possibilities in other areas of world trade, including East-West trade, for the abundant and low-interest credit market of the 1970s did a great deal to expand that trade. In the 1980s, the situation is much less favourable, for the general lending terms are now much tougher, interest rates on credits have increased, and this is bound to restrain would-be borrowers, especially those like the socialist countries, which are highly sensitive to fluctuations in the lending rates. Their external indebtedness in convertible currency, which stood at \$110 billion in mid-1986, in itself has a restraining effect on new borrowings. With such a level of indebtedness, even the decline in lending rates towards the mid-1980s has done little to reduce interest payments, which swallow up a considerable share of the exports of the main debtor-countries. And that, for its part, puts significant constraints on their imports.

It would be a mistake, however, to attribute all the difficulties facing the CMEA countries in their economic relations with the West solely to the effect of the world economic situation and changing prices. The roots of the predicament lie much deeper: in the domestic economy of the socialist countries themselves.

In the first half of the 1980s, economic growth rates in the CMEA countries as a whole were lower than in any preceding postwar five-year period, and that could hardly serve to invigorate their trade with the West. There were signs of stagnation and, in some countries, an absolute reduction in the scale of capital investments. In view of the limited investment potentialities and for other reasons, there are now fewer multilateral investment projects being built with active use of Western credits and equipment.

As production growth in the CMEA countries slowed down while development remained extensive, their demand for fuel, raw materials, foodstuffs and consumer goods constituting the basis of their export to the West continued to increase, so limiting the possibilities for the export of these goods.

Yet another and, perhaps, the main problem is that the CMEA countries' transition from extensive to intensive economic development is much too slow. Today, most of them are at the stage of partial intensification, having only improved the use of some types of resources and production factors, such as energy, materials, labour, etc. No progress has so far been made in raising the output-asset ratio or the efficiency of capital investments.

Naturally, an extensive economy could only have extensive external economic ties. Such development of relations with the West was due, among other things, to the input-swelling economic mechanisms, the administrative-command system of running the economy and foreign trade, and also the bureaucratic and dogmatic departures from Leninist principles in some countries.

Under the extensive model of external economic ties, foreign trade is given priority over other, more advanced and progressive forms of international economic cooperation, whereas in foreign trade itself imports are given indisputable priority over exports. The pro-input economic mechanism created an insatiable appetite for imports in order to meet the numerous and constantly reproduced shortages: ministries, departments and enterprises kept lobbying the central planning organs for imports at any price. At the same time, the pro-input mechanism did not provide any incentives to efficient use of imported goods, especially technological equipment, so that billions of roubles and other currency units in the socialist countries were spent on equipment which was immobilised in "construction-in-progress" or failed to be installed, with all the adverse consequences.

While imports were in such demand, exports were enforced from above as a source of funds that went to pay for imports. Incentives to exports, including foreign-currency incentives, were too weak to compensate enterprises for the additional efforts required to bring their products up to international standards and to meet stringent contractual delivery deadlines. It is much easier to sell goods on the much less exacting domestic market, which in a shortage economy is a seller's market, where the seller dictates his own terms to the virtually defenceless buyer, who is obliged to take whatever he is offered.

In the pro-input economy, foreign trade was almost totally separated from production, and domestic prices from foreign-trade prices. Economic efficiency indicators in foreign-trade operations played a secondary role and were only used for research and analysis, and not for decision-making. Foreign trade was conducted on the principle: "We buy what we are short of, and we sell whatever will be bought".

Of course, it is not all the socialist community countries that had such a mechanism in its pure form in the 1970s and early 1980s. Each of them had its own specifics, and some carried out reforms to modify, sometimes significantly, the system they had inherited from the past. But all these

changes and modifications were not enough to overcome the extensive type of economic relations with the West, so that the unfavourable commodity-exchange structure has been virtually frozen for decades.

Many economists in the CMEA countries and their governing bodies have often urged the need to change the structure of their commodity exchanges with the West, to increase the share of machinery and equipment in their exports, and to reduce the share of raw materials, foodstuffs and semi-manufactures in their imports. That has not been done, however, and can hardly be done unless the pro-input mechanism is dismantled and extensive economic development gives way to intensive development.

It is now abundantly clear that the decades-old "structural barrier" in East-West trade has turned into a formidable obstacle in the way of its development. The present structure of trade offers no real prospect for its further expansion. Changes in that structure are long overdue, and the future of trade between the two systems depends on these changes.

Another long-term problem arising in this context is to balance out the CMEA countries' trade with the developed capitalist states. The large-scale trade deficits of the 1970s reached a peak for the USSR in the first half of the decade, and for the East European countries, in the second half. In the first half of the 1980s, intensive efforts on the part of the CMEA countries (mainly aimed at cutting imports rather than boosting exports) led to a surplus in their trade with the West, so helping to trim their external debt in convertible currency. In 1986, however, there was another relapse: the East European countries' surplus in their trade with the West was markedly reduced, whereas the USSR once again ran up a considerable deficit: the growth of its indebtedness was resumed.

To complete the present picture of the development of East-West trade, one should also note that it is being held back by outdated, conservative theoretical tenets reflecting bureaucratic and dogmatic views and interests. Signs of stagnation were evident in economic theory as well, manifested, in particular, in a narrow reading of Lenin's principle of a foreign-trade monopoly as the monopoly of a single ministry, and in an obvious underestimation of such progressive forms of external economic ties as industrial cooperation and mixed enterprises, whose development was restrained without justification. The problem of the socialist world's technical and economic independence was overemphasised, which was out of accord with the objectively growing economic interdependence in the world and which was in effect meant to cover up autarkic aspirations. Various projects and programmes were drawn up on the tacit assumption that progress in all branches of production on the highest world level could be achieved within the framework of one sector of the world economy (the economic complex of the CMEA countries). With such an assumption, contacts with third countries were naturally assigned a secondary, supplementary role.

Foreign-trade analysts in the stagnation period kept emphasising the supplementary character of ties with the West as a factor of the socialist countries' economic development. That assumption proceeds from quantitative parameters alone (the share of ties with the West in the foreign-trade turnover, in the national income and industrial output of individual countries), but takes no account of the qualitative side of the matter (the high standards of the producer and consumer goods being imported from the Western countries and their positive influence on the economy). Our economic relations with the capitalist world should today be seen not merely as a supplementary, but as an organic and most important element of the reproduction process.

The traditional and fairly wide-spread view of the economic content of East-West relations as relations of struggle between the two systems⁴ has an equally conservative ring. Its advocates tend to overlook yet

another and much more important aspect of the economic content of these relations, namely, mutually beneficial cooperation. With the old, confrontational approach to contacts with the capitalist states, an approach engendered by the stagnation period, by old thinking, we can hardly achieve anything. What we need today is not mutual recriminations, which have long become a banality, but a real quest for points of contact and mutually acceptable solutions, with due regard both for the legitimate interests of our Western partners and our own interests.

Perestroika in the USSR and transformations in the economy of other socialist community countries are meant to do away with the negative phenomena, to end the stagnation in our economic relations with the West and to give them fresh impulses in order to accelerate our socio-economic development and strengthen socialism in every way. The work being done to dismantle the braking mechanism through a radical economic reform paves the way for more active involvement in international economic cooperation on the broadest possible international basis in accordance with the conditions and vital needs of our times.

In the overall complex of external economic factors serving to accelerate socio-economic development in the CMEA countries, an important role belongs to relations with the West as a major source of additional material and financial resources. It is particularly important to attract such resources at the present, initial stage of *perestroika*, for it will take time to achieve economic results. In particular, Western equipment could be imported to accelerate the modernisation of the agro-industrial complex, group B industries, the services, the social infrastructure and the public utilities, for COCOM bans and other restrictive measures of the developed capitalist countries do not apply to such equipment. It is necessary, however, to look for more flexible, modern and comprehensive forms to finance and organise such imports and, which is particularly important, to ensure their efficient use. If that is done, import of equipment for the consumer industries will prove to be more efficient than simple imports of foodstuffs and consumer goods.

The Soviet Union and a number of other socialist countries are now working to create an essentially new internal economic climate, which will promote more efficient exchanges with the West. As associations and enterprises go over to the principles of full cost accounting and self-financing, they will no longer be tempted to order imports they do not actually need, for they will have to pay for these out of their own pocket instead of that of the state. The category of "gift" imports is to become a thing of the past, and enterprises making inefficient use of imported equipment will have to cover the expenses from their own income, their incentives fund or even their remuneration fund, so that wastefulness and mismanagement will no longer be tolerated for economic reasons.

The new conditions of economic activity should change the attitude of production enterprises to export, which will no longer be an additional chore performed on orders from above, but a source of income and foreign-exchange earnings used for the needs of the exporters themselves. Another important point is that the results of work for export are to be included in the overall economic balance of production enterprises, in the overall economic results. That indicator has proved to be most effective in the GDR, whose enterprises have been using it for many years, and has fully justified itself in the economy of other socialist countries. It is a major step forward in breaking down the barrier that separated production from foreign trade in the command economy with its traditional input-swelling mechanism.

Serious changes in the system of running external economic ties also help to improve the atmosphere for more efficient economic exchanges with the West. In the USSR, for instance, that system had taken shape

several decades ago and no longer corresponded to the new conditions and modern demands. Indeed, our economic relations with the West should no longer be fitted into the framework of mere trade, but these relations were in the charge of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which was ill-adapted to running production cooperation or other progressive forms of cooperation. The export of engineering and building services along the lines of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations was divorced from their import, which lay within the orbit of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In these conditions, it was virtually impossible to follow a coherent state policy on external economic affairs, to overcome the barriers between the departments, or to harmonise their interests, which did not always coincide with state interests.

Now that many associations and enterprises in the USSR, Hungary and other CMEA countries have been authorised to operate directly on the external market, a major step has been taken in the right direction. It helps to expand direct ties with our Western partners and to strengthen the network of contacts on a microlevel, which makes up the living fabric of East-West economic relations, including trade. The green light has been given to the development of industrial cooperation and other progressive forms of joint economic activity. Scholastic disputes over the possibility of excessive dependence on the Western partners, technological bondage, etc., are dying down, for life itself shows that a skillful choice of partners results in mutual dependence, in mutual and lasting business links between the partners, which create a material basis for stable political relations and an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

Another important thing is that the current transformations do not imply a one-way process of decentralising the management of external economic ties, and that state control over their implementation in the interests of the whole people is to be maintained and is to become ever more flexible and efficient. Such control is being exercised with economic (and not bureaucratic-command) methods, which are much more efficient than direct orders. The stagnation period showed that proliferation of orders from above makes it possible to choose which of these are to be fulfilled, and that the planned economy could turn into an elemental force that is hard to manage.

It would be wrong to paint an idyllic picture of the ongoing transformations. Life has brought to the fore a host of problems and difficulties caused, among other things, by the unfavourable world economic situation, and it is today, at the outset of *perestroika*, that we have to face the bitter fruits of stagnation in the external economic sphere. The production associations and enterprises have also proved to be largely unprepared for independent economic activity because of a lack of experience, personnel and elementary information. That is the result of their long-standing isolation from the outside world under the "departmental" monopoly of foreign trade. Much has yet to be done to remove the remaining bureaucratic barriers and put an end to the interference and excessive regulation of external economic activity from above.

All of that has naturally had an effect on the use of such a progressive form of economic cooperation as joint ventures. Although the essential decision on setting up mixed enterprises with the involvement of foreign, including Western, firms has already been taken and the groundwork legislation adopted, with over 250 tenders from foreign firms, progress here is still very slow, and no more than a few agreements have been signed. The reasons here include excessive bureaucratic regulation, high taxes, tough terms of shareholdings and, what is perhaps the most important thing, the difficulties of dealing with Soviet cooperation partners. On some points, however, the conservative critics of that form of international cooperation have already been proved wrong. In spite of

forecasts by "stagnation champions", foreign capital has not inundated our economy and has not started exploiting Soviet workers, whose rights are well protected by the law. Joint ventures are no longer called into question by anyone as a promising line of cooperation. The important thing now is to give them preferential treatment, especially at the initial stages of their formation, for the advantages of attracting Western capital in its productive form are obvious in comparison with, say, its credit form. Joint ventures could markedly invigorate East-West trade.

Another non-traditional form of external economic cooperation worth noting in this context is the establishment of free customs or economic zones. Different versions of such zones have already been set up in China, Hungary and Romania, and are being set up in Bulgaria. The fact that customs duties play a secondary role in regulating external economic ties in the socialist countries cannot serve as an argument against the formation of free economic zones. These should envisage simplified entry and exit procedures for those involved in international cooperation, a simplified system for regulating economic activity, which could be done by local organs, tax and foreign-currency concessions, and so on. Small wonder that Western business circles which take a sincere interest in strengthening economic ties with the USSR keep raising the question about the formation of such zones on Soviet territory as well. One should think that the necessary conditions for that do exist in the Baltic Republics, the Far East and some other regions of the USSR.

The formation of free economic zones is well in accord with the efforts being made to democratise economic administration within the framework of the radical economic reform. These efforts could be further invigorated by extending the rights of the Union Republics and of large economic regions with suitable conditions in the field of external economic activity. Such a measure, which would entitle them, in particular, to set up free economic zones on centrally stipulated terms, will help to tap the large local reserves of deepening international cooperation. That which has been done for the industries, industrial associations and enterprises, and, under the recently adopted Law on Cooperation, for the cooperatives, should also be extended to the local organs on a regional level.

The whole range of external economic factors should be brought into play as soon as possible in the interests of *perestroika*, in order to accelerate socio-economic development. Thus, it is time to reorient the deepening integration within the CMEA framework towards the external world. This means that the conception of socialist economic integration should be formulated with due regard for the global division-of-labour model that is now taking shape, so as to enable the socialist countries to take a fitting place within that model and to strengthen, instead of losing, their positions in world economic relations. This demand was first included in the Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Economic Integration, adopted back in 1971, but progress in this area, just as in other areas covered by the Programme, has been insufficient.

The CMEA countries have now focused their integrative cooperation on the development of direct ties and joint enterprises, in short, on micro-level cooperation, which is perfectly justified. The important point here is not to overlook the external aspect of socialist integration, to provide for joint export operations on the world market, and to work out a mechanism for sharing profits, foreign-exchange earnings, and also risks and expenses. Implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Scientific and Technological Progress in the CMEA countries up to the year 2000 could also have a positive effect on exchanges with the West. The thing to do here is to provide for developing export and reducing import.

A future common market of the CMEA countries will also have a far-

reaching positive effect on their economic cooperation with the West, for the emergence of a free socialist economic area within the framework of the socialist community will give the Western partners powerful incentives to deepen their economic cooperation with the socialist community countries. It will also mark a major step forward in realising the ideas of a common European home in the economic field.

The results of the development of foreign trade in recent times indicate certain positive changes, which confirm the right direction of the current transformations. The adverse tendency for a decline in Soviet exports to the West has been stemmed: the three-year drop gave way to a marginal increase, with the export of machinery and equipment going up the most. After a break of several years, we have again reached a surplus in our trade with the West. These, of course, are the very first, initial steps, and what we have to do now is to continue our consistent efforts to invigorate external economic activity and expand our business partnership with the West in order to accelerate socio-economic development and fulfil the tasks formulated by the party.

It would, of course, be wrong to discount the past experience and view whatever is happening in rosy shades. Transformations in the foreign economic sphere, like the economic reform as a whole is a complex process of dialectical contradictions which poses quite a few problems as it goes. There exists miscoordinated action of our associations and industries in the world market, their unprofitable goods exchange operations, exports at cut-rate prices, etc. It would be as hard to see as optimal the present-day practice of managing the foreign economic activities: it still remains cumbersome and bureaucratised, with continued duplication of organisational structures and functions. What is important, however, is that these problems are being dealt with by the authoritative bodies who are introducing proper and timely adjustments of the foreign economic mechanism as it forms in the course of the reform. Important steps in this direction are documents elaborated by the USSR Council of Ministers and approved by the CPSU CC Political Bureau on October 6, 1988: the draft "Strategy of the USSR Foreign Economic Ties", "The Concept of Development of the USSR Foreign Economic Relations with the CMEA Countries" and the draft "Development Programme of the USSR Export Basis for the Period up to the Year 2000". These are strategic documents that combine a comprehensive approach to foreign economic problems with further progress of the reform in such directions as ensuring convertibility of ruble, setting up a common market of the CMEA countries, etc. These documents should not be let to turn, as happened before, into another set of correct decisions comfortably stacked on bureaucrats' shelves and in their desks and never brought to materialise. Foreign economic restructuring bears no braking.

A new and higher type of socialism should imply a qualitatively new type of economic cooperation with partners from the other social system, a type of cooperation whose foundations are being laid today. In drawing up his cooperative plan, Lenin noted that "we have to admit that there has been a radical modification in our whole outlook on socialism."⁵ At that time, the party had to make an immense effort to assert the new viewpoint, and today we face a task of equal magnitude.

¹ *СУ РСФСР*, 1918 г., № 33, p. 432.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1965, p. 39.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, 1966, p. 283.

⁴ See, for instance, Л. А. Славинская. *Механизм экономических отношений Восток-Запад*, М., 1987, p. 62.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, 1966, p. 474.

SOVIET ARTISTS ABROAD

Igor OBROSOV

A lot can be said about economic, social and political development and scientific progress. However, these are but empty words unless they rest on a profoundly moral foundation, that is culture, the aesthetic and moral environment, for scientific and technological revolution and scientific and social progress are unthinkable without the all-round development of culture and arts. All forms of arts, whether painting, architecture, prose, poetry, theatre, cinema or music shape and perfect human culture, and the culture of mankind as a whole. It is based on the centuries-old culture and traditions of every nation. It is impossible to grasp the cultural values of a nation if one disregards the mutual enrichment and influence of the cultures of all nations.

A substantial role in the evolution of these cultures has always been played by man's striving to create images and grasp their essence. This is both joy and sorrow, bitterness and pain, beauty and ugliness, creation and destruction. There is no language barrier in art. Hence the relative easiness of communication and comprehension, the ability to understand the language of painting, graphic works, sculpture or applied arts. Indeed, it is better to see something once than to hear about it a hundred times. And here the exchange of art exhibitions between nations is extremely important as a means for asserting moral and cultural values in the life of society and as an element of human environment.

It so happened that for many decades Soviet art has been practically unknown abroad. At best, the public in the West was acquainted with artists of the 1920s such as Vasily Kandinsky, Alexander Rodchenko, Kazimir Malevich, Lazar Lisitsky. The art of the 1940s-1950s described as socialist realism was represented exclusively by paintings of its "grand masters" such as Alexander Gerasimov, Vladimir Serov, Dmitri Nabandyan, Vasily Yefanov, etc. Regrettably, we still appraise socialist realism only by their paintings depicting factory chimneys, tractors and banners. Strict control on the part of the then functionaries supervising culture and arts in the USSR Ministry of Culture and the Fine Arts Academy, the suppression of "dissent" in art resulted in a primitive reflection of the reality and served as fertile soil for such artists as Vladimir Serov and Alexander Gerasimov which made a negative impact on the entire Soviet culture.

Soviet art exhibitions abroad were extremely rare. They were notable for the showiness, political portraiture that was at the service of Stalinism and embellishment of reality which perverted the very essence of Soviet art. Unfortunately, people judged our artists mainly by such works as "The Morning of Our Motherland" by Fyodor Shurpin, "Voroshilov Strolling" by Isaak Brodsky, "Stalin and Voroshilov" by Alexander Gerasimov and numerous paintings unrestrainedly glorifying our endless

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"feats of labour". We feel shame and pain when recalling all that. It is a painful experience because this glorification was accompanied by the official persecution of artists of the 1920s and their followers when even the knowledge of their art was criminal and their paintings were kept away from the public in storerooms.

The debunking of Stalin's cult and the years of the "thaw" awakened both our country and our art. There appeared a new generation of young artists with their own new style, the style of real life which excludes any pomposity, falsity or hypocrisy. These changes were reflected most vividly and consistently in paintings by Pavel Nikonov, Nikolai Andronov, Victor Popkov, Tair Salakhov, Edgar Illner, Mikhail Savitsky and many other artists of the 1960s. Unfortunately, this trend was short-lived. The voluntarism of Nikita Khrushchev and the failure of officials to grasp the essence of art, and first of all on the part of Vladimir Serov, President of the Fine Arts Academy, who upheld outdated primitive traditions which were disastrous for art, resulted in the harsh suppression of new styles and trends in art.

The period of restraints on artists was superseded by a period of stagnation in art and culture, as well as in the economy, agriculture and the entire complex organism of the country. However, the creative life of genuine Soviet artists upholding their principles inescapably continued in the struggle, resistance and harsh discussions about culture, morality, true ideals. However, as before, infrequent exhibitions of Soviet art were arranged by the Ministry of Culture of the RSFSR and the Union of Artists of this republic. These were monotonous, drab and prettified exhibitions. The principle of vulgarisation of socialist realism was again riding the crest of the wave.

We have to give credit to the progressive art critics who came out against pseudo-art, pseudo-realism which made fools of people and was imbued with wishful thinking. They attempted to send abroad broadly represented expositions predominantly based on the revolutionary art of the 1920s. One of the first such innovative art shows was an exhibition in West Berlin in the late 1970s. It was composed by an art expert Vitali Manin who was deputy director of the Tretyakov Gallery at the time. The Soviet art works shown in West Berlin virtually stunned foreign experts, artists, art critics and art lovers by the diversity of trends in the past and the present.

However, the West became better acquainted with the works of Soviet artists thanks to the efforts of individual enthusiasts. Paintings from the private collection of Vladimir Semyonov, former Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, a collector known in this country and now also abroad, were exhibited in West Germany in 1984 and actually once again revealed the Russian Soviet art to the West and the entire world. His collection included paintings by the best Soviet artists of various trends of the 1920s and modern artists: Aristarkh Lentulov, Robert Falk, Alexander Drevin, Pavel Kuznetsov, Nikolai Andronov, Pavel Nikonov, Togrul Narmimbekov and younger artists: Natalya Nesterova, Alexander Sitnikov, Olga Bulgakova, Tatyana Nazarenko. His collection removed the blinds of vulgarisation from the eyes of foreign viewers and connoisseurs.

Soviet art became better known abroad to a considerable extent thanks to the efforts of a prominent collector Professor Peter Ludvig from West Germany who was virtually the first in the West to give his due to the merits of the Soviet art and its national schools. We have every reason to consider him a discoverer of our art abroad. During his frequent visits to the Soviet Union Ludvig most thoroughly selected paintings for his museum. Actually all further advancement of our art abroad is associated with his name. Quite recently Ludvig sent a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev with the proposal to build a gallery of modern art in the Soviet

Union and informed that he was ready to allocate a certain sum for the purpose and grant a part of his collection. The USSR Union of Artists supported the proposal but so far there has been no official response to Ludvig. Incidentally, there was once a State Museum of Modern Western Art in Moscow and it was in the building where the Fine Arts Academy now is. However, it was closed down in 1948, in the period of the struggle against cosmopolitanism in the belief that there was no need to propagate that kind of art. The collection of the museum was handed over to the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow and the Hermitage in Leningrad. Some part of the collection is kept in storerooms. I believe the time has come to open the new trends of world modern art to the Soviet people. Indeed, our younger generation has been entirely deprived of the chance to see these art trends which inevitably affected the cultural development of the country. Among the best known collectors of Soviet art is Edward Nakhamkin, the owner of three art galleries in the United States, who has opened an art centre in the USA. He is doing much to publicise our art abroad and helps organise exhibitions evoking great interest among the US public.

In this respect one of the most remarkable events was an exhibition cosponsored with the Deutsche Bank (FRG) which was held in both countries in 1984-1985. For this we have to pay tribute to Soviet art experts who had to overcome the opposition of some bureaucrats from the USSR Ministry of Culture in composing that exhibition which made it possible to show the main trends in the development of Soviet art. Before that there had been arranged an exhibition "Moscow-Paris" by the USSR Ministry of Culture. It showed that Russian art, and Moscow art in particular, is not at all inferior to Paris art. For the first time we were on par representing independent phenomena in world culture.

A breakthrough was made and there followed a wave of Soviet exhibitions—exchange exhibitions, commercial exhibitions and others. We had no need any longer to prove that our art is an inalienable part of the world art without which the latter would be incomplete.

One method of advancing Soviet art abroad are international competitions, biennials and triennials arranged in capitalist and socialist countries.

In this connection mention should be made of a Baltic countries' biennial in Rostock (GDR). Under the permanent president of its organising committee this biennial exhibition has made it possible for twenty years now to obtain a thorough knowledge of the art trends in the Baltic countries. Soviet artists also successfully participated in these biennial exhibitions.

It seems that a triennial exhibition of realistic art in Sofia (Bulgaria) has become one of the most authoritative of this kind. Thus, more than 30 countries took part in the sixth Sofia triennial exhibition. It is noteworthy that the Sofia exhibition, where so many trends and the diversity of the realistic art are represented, is almost unique in the world. It gained its prestige largely due to the efforts of the "patriarch" of the Bulgarian art Dechko Uzunov, his talented pupil, an outstanding Bulgarian artist Svetlin Rusev and other Bulgarian artists, who made a contribution to the development of the Bulgarian art and raised the prestige of the Sofia triennial exhibitions. At the sixth Sofia triennial exhibition the Soviet Union's section was among the four best ones. Togrul Narimanbekov, People's Artist of Azerbaijan, became a laureate.

The constant participation in international biennial and triennial exhibitions held in Bulgaria, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Yugoslavia, Poland, France and numerous prizes awarded to Soviet artists prove the rising international prestige of the Soviet art; it is confirmed by the exhibitions arranged by the USSR in Greece, Sweden, Nor-

way, Mexico, Cuba, the USA, Japan, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Finland and many other countries.

However, can we say that Soviet artists are well known elsewhere? Unfortunately this is not the case. All these exhibitions and competitions are just a small fraction of what can be done and the participation in them requires tremendous effort by enthusiasts overcoming the resistance of administrators attempting to channel Soviet art onto the beaten path. Quite often we hear from "recognised leaders" (merited artists): "No, do not send this. Why do you send only avant-gardists and modernists? Where are the recognised patrons?" By the latter they mean themselves, but theirs is the art of yesterday. And today we go forward in the search for new themes and methods which are of interest to the modern public and art experts.

In the period of stagnation the situation in art in the Russian Federation was particularly frustrating. The Union of Artists of the Russian Federation was headed by a group of people imposing their principles on the others and believing that only they were true creators of the Russian realistic art. Everything else was treated as depraved and harmful art, as avant-gardism, modernism, cosmopolitanism. That was their policy. This group of artists allegedly defended realism.

However, in actuality they replaced the truth of life and struggle with an idealistic reflection of reality, particularly the Russian village with its sugar-sweet *izbas*, little rivers, haystacks and prosperous life. At the same time they did not avert to paint labour: on their paintings one could see powerful transformers of nature, victorious scientific progress, huge construction sites, the Baikal-Amur Mainline, front-rank workers and farmers. In a word, it was wishful thinking on the canvas, and that was called socialist realism. Unfortunately that was the stuff that was shown abroad. One of such exhibitions was arranged several years ago to stun the foreign public. It seemed that all paintings had been made by one and the same artist, in one style. The exposition showed the plentifulness of what we do not have: new villages, land reclamation, a high level of scientific and technological progress. There has been shown practically everything, and only the main thing was lacking: real art. In effect, that show discredited the Soviet realistic art and its sponsors and organisers, in their turn, ardently criticised modernism and avant-gardism of the hospitable hosts totally oblivious of the fact that they were not at home but guests.

Still present were the commandments of the Stalinist period which were deeply ingrained in the minds: to teach others, guide them, show them, inform, report to the Central Committee, prohibit and interfere in other people's work without any restraint.

Under *perestroika* Soviet art acquired a new quality, the reflection of all trends. It became possible to portray everything which is not anti-human.

Our present reality should rule out any falsehood, ambiguity and pomposity, demanding that artists and writers be utmostly honest. Therefore, speaking about *perestroika* in the sphere of arts, we mean in the first place a rejection of command methods which had held back their development and blocked the way to all that was truly valuable, truthful and necessary for the public good.

However, true artists remained faithful to their principles in the stagnation period as well. True artists preached what they believed in at all times. For Pavel Nikonov, for instance, there is no need to change. Pain for the villages without a future, for their miserable existence and

abandoned houses was and remains his main theme. Togrul Narimanbekov created on his canvases a bright hymn to Azerbaijan, his homeland. But there are no false notes in his hymn. And no falsity can be traced on the canvases painted by Indulis Zarins, Mikhail Savitsky, Nikolai Ignatov and many other Soviet artists whose work has always shown the truth of life.

Artists form associations according to their shared positions and world outlook. In this way the "Hermitage", the "Avant-gardists Club" and many others, which already number more than 20, were formed. It is a pity that some of them disintegrated because of bureaucratic obstacles. However, artists continue to create, experiment, and each trend proves its worth in creation, not in words.

Nowadays problems of socialist realism are widely discussed by the intellectuals. Discussions mainly deal with the method of socialist realism which was given birth to by the first congress of Soviet writers with Stalin's bidding. It was proclaimed as a unique, supreme accomplishment in the evolution of art. The gross vulgarisation of this method and the fact that it was pushed down the throats of everybody engaged in art and culture, tethered the creativity of artists, too. And it is good that following numerous discussions the notion of "socialist realism" was deleted from the new rendering of the charter of the USSR Union of Artists. Thus, the method of diktat was replaced by a search for various trends and styles.

Unfortunately, we are still lacking objective criticism and sometimes we feel a prohibitive and antipathetic atmosphere around culture. Hence the hullabaloo around the works of some artists.

It seems that the most difficult process is the formation of criteria for what is truly artistic, the more so because the colossuses on clay feet, idols and their ideas have been debunked. However, it is still difficult for us to do away with the editor and censor within us, with the killer of one's own creative potential and abandon everything we have inherited from the unprecedented terrible phenomenon: Stalinism.

Now a few words about the commercial aspect of the matter. Today, a department of sales on the foreign market under the Vuchetich All-Union Art Production Association operates actively alongside the export salon of the USSR Union of Artists. It is good that its management has sharply "leaned to the left" and now allows the foreign sales of avant-gardists, modernists, etc.

There are active sales and even auctions of the works of Soviet artists are held initiated by Sotheby's which attracted the attention of a number of foreign firms and art galleries to the Soviet art. Last July a successful Sotheby's auction was arranged in Moscow. Everything went smoothly, as everywhere else: passions, the sound of the hammer, cries of "going, going, gone!" and prices. However, with prices not everything was quite clear. It is understandable that the works of the representatives of the Russian avant-garde such as Alexander Rodchenko, Nadezda Udaltsova, Alexander Drevin and Varvara Stepanova fetched high prices because they were also pioneers of the Soviet avant-garde. But why such huge prices for modern, little-known artists as Grigory Bruskin, Ilya Kabakov, Yevgeni Dybsky? Many guests, owners of art galleries were stunned. However, the auction has been held, paintings have been sold to private collections and art galleries in a number of West European countries and the USA. Our art will become known throughout the world.

The problem has two sides to it.

The first aspect: is it not a pity that the masterpieces of the Russian avant-garde of the early 1920s have left the country forever (who knows, maybe one day we shall also buy them at international auctions or they

will be given to us as a gift)? To my mind there is just one answer to that question: "No." The Russian avant-garde should be known throughout the world and represented in the best galleries of the world. We should take pride in this fact. However, beside this pride there is a taste of bitterness: why did we fail to appreciate that art in due time? Why did we hide paintings in storerooms for so long and did not show them to the people? That is why I feel no pity.

The second aspect: is it not a pity that the modern avant-garde, which is not officially recognised here, also partially leaves the country? Time will show what will remain an eternal value in the development of the world art and what will sink into oblivion.

Even now the criteria for genuine art are rather blurry. It will take a lot of time to form and discuss them. And here it would be very dangerous to glorify a new "naked king", for the "money bags" of both private patrons and the state treasury making the name for the artist play an important role in evaluating this or that phenomenon. Characteristically, now we speak about not only national cultures but about a shared human culture. Therefore, it is not important where a cultural acquisition was made: the main thing is that it happened. Is it that important where Marc Chagall was born? It is important that he is a phenomenon in the world cultural heritage.

Today sales in salons and at auctions are a form of art life in a broad sense. And some cultural functionaries make futile attempts when they say as in the old days: "It is ours. We cherish it. These are our prophets, and who said that there is no prophet in one's own land?" If they held art so dear they would not have piled paintings in storerooms but would have spared no effort to open art to all people.

Yes, times are changing. We wanted change and we are changing. Now we ourselves tend and cherish our prophets. Nowadays we are recognised in the entire world which is confirmed by the prizes won at international competitions and triennials. And does art need anything else? More talents! More creativity! Do we have everything we need to translate these slogans into reality? Not yet, unfortunately. But we shall strive to ensure that we shall have. Obviously, it is within our power.

THE IDEALS OF THE REVOLUTION

By all indications our society is gradually recovering from a chronic disease which may be described as the "jubilee syndrome". In our country, every memorable date used to bring with it waves of unrestrained self-praise. It had become customary to ignore the Leninist approach to jubilees as occasions for summing up the work done and concentrating on unsolved problems. With reference to celebrations dedicated to his 50th birthday, Lenin spoke of the fatal danger coming from political conceit, especially in the case of a ruling party. This danger is still there. "It is a very stupid, shameful and ridiculous position. We know that the failure and decline of political parties have very often been preceded by a state of affairs in which a swelled head is possible."¹

Self-satisfaction is an unmistakable sign of a fallacious policy. Those pursuing such a policy need self-glorification and extolment of their achievements to compensate for a lack of real progress. While *perestroika* in our country has not yet fully overcome the "jubilee syndrome", it has considerably eased its harmful impact on society.

In any case, to be true to the ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution it is worth reviewing some fundamental questions put by the very course of events in the focus of public attention, primarily at the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

This applies both to our internal problems and to foreign policy, to international relations, to appraisal of the world situation and the prospects of its evolution. We are reassessing our place and role in the world as we seek to cognise it without bias, to get to know it as it is in reality and not as we would like it to be.

An in-depth elaboration of the complex problem of relations between the two world systems must become a major component of socialism's present-day concept of foreign policy. First of all, we must creatively revise some fundamental theoretical and political propositions in the spirit of new thinking. We need this because the world is changing and so are our notions of it.

This fast-moving age, which occasionally seems mad, has shaped many things in its own way, shifted the emphasis in many cases, reclassified habitual values and shown, perhaps more strikingly than ever, that the main value is man himself, who may become—that is, if he has not yet become—a victim of his own insatiable aspiration for progress, for a knowledge of the unknown.

New political thinking calls a halt to the unscientific, utterly incorrect tendency to oppose the working people's class interests to the common interests of the whole of humanity. Until recently, ideas about the community of universal and class interests were ostracised, so to speak, although as far back as the last century Engels, analysing the process of the rise of the bourgeoisie, wrote that this "made it possible for the representatives of the bourgeoisie to put themselves forward as representing not one special class, but the whole of suffering humanity."² And he stressed, directing his words to representatives of the British

working class movement: "I found you to be *Men*, members of the great and universal family of Mankind, who know their interest and that of all human race to be the same."³ This approach is now far more relevant and justified than before.

The revival of the Marxist-Leninist conception of social development as a single process encompassing all social formations helped detect and remove misinterpretations of the class struggle as a factor for social movement. Transplanting the laws of the class struggle, whose main field is the capitalist formation, into international and, above all, state-to-state relations, that is, into relations between diverse formations, caused confusion in questions of both theory and practice. To judge the evolution of international relations solely in terms of the class struggle meant discounting their peculiarities. And we must also remember that both the form and the content of this struggle today are going through a deep metamorphosis. In the area of international relations, all this necessarily had the most adverse effect on the establishment of a common front against the war danger, for the elimination of the threat to the existence of humanity.

Hence the exceptional importance of clarifying the set of problems relating to the interpretation of the role of the class struggle and the class factor in international relations. A realistic approach to these problems, one based on the realities of life and not on a particular dogma or postulate, helps eliminate simplistic notions and appreciably widen the scope of international cooperation.

An aspect of the problem that should be singled out primarily is the open character of socialism. It was from the principle of the openness of the new social system that many conclusions of fundamental significance to both home and foreign policy were drawn. "We... will act openly in full view of the whole people," Lenin said in his report on peace on October 26, 1917.⁴ The very nature of socialism ruled out the possibility of interpreting it as a society separated by a sort of Chinese Wall from the rest of the world. Lenin repeatedly underlined the need to tackle major domestic and foreign policy problems "not from the standpoint of one party or of one country, but from the standpoint of all countries together."⁵

In the context of today's international realities, this approach poses the biggest problems of world development on an entirely different plane. This implies primarily a resolute discarding of the concept defining confrontation between the two systems as the main trend of the present epoch, a concept which served for a long time as the starting point of various theoretical constructs.

Seen from the historical point of view, this concept was genetically a replica of the theory of "two camps", a theory that was one-dimensional and oversimplified from the outset, for it tried to squeeze a vastly diversified world into a kind of Procrustean bed. The division of the world into two systems as interpreted by Stalin came down to confrontation between two camps, meaning rather military camps ready to engage in mortal combat. This guideline also served as something of an "ideological" rationale for the policy of terror adopted by the Stalin dictatorship in the mid-thirties.

The twofold purpose of the concept of mortal confrontation between the two worlds—a concept intended for internal and external use—undoubtedly caused serious damage to socialist construction. This concept justified an unchecked wave of repression at home while abroad it alienated many friends of our country from socialism, hindered the growth of socialism's international prestige and undermined unity of action against the war danger.

The rigid definition of the theory of "two camps" generated something

comparable to a "camp mentality", an extremely simplistic, uniform interpretation of the world and its contradictions. This mentality did not merely limit the area of cooperation and interaction between countries with different social systems, but rather turned it into a battlefield. The confrontational nature of the concept negated in fact the very idea of the unity of human civilisation. This resulted in drastically reducing our country's foreign policy potential and in circumscribing beforehand cooperation between countries belonging to different social systems, with the entire complicated problem of relations between the two systems moving in a vicious circle of self-sustaining hostility from which there was no escape. Indeed, this postulate tended to undermine Lenin's doctrine of peaceful coexistence by reducing it to the level of a foreign policy tactic of socialist countries. Peaceful coexistence was set temporal limits, so that the universal character of this principle was called into question.

To be sure, the contradictions dividing the two systems cannot disappear just because we want them to. They are objective, and as for universal harmony, it is still a long way off. The contradictions between the two systems remain a social reality. However, they are undergoing a serious transformation. Confrontation between the two systems is giving way to another fundamental contradiction, that between war and peace, which is the dominant trend of world development shaping both the present and the future of the world community.

This does not mean renouncing the ideals and goals of socialism. On the contrary, bringing the problem of war and peace to the fore in world politics and in social progress amounts in today's conditions to steadfast promotion of socialism's ideals.

As a rule, history offers more than one choice. But the only choice today is the eternal dilemma: to be or not to be. The answer is contained in the idea of the precedence of universal interests over all others, including class interests. The revival of this idea, which is also expressive of socialism's humanism, and its scientific breadth and depth played a role of paramount importance in the theoretical and practical substantiation of the new foreign policy line of the Soviet state. It was a crippling blow to dogmatism as a way of thinking and to conservatism as a mode of action. And it lent Soviet foreign policy a new quality and new dimensions which extended its scope and range and gave it new dynamism. Rising to a new level of global thinking was indispensable to our foreign policy. Without such a breakthrough there could have been no real question of renewing it nor could we have expected to lay a groundwork for a broader-based dialogue with our partners.

The process of asserting the principles of new thinking in international relations is certainly difficult and will take time. But there is reason to believe that it has begun. And the fact that it generally meets with a favourable response even in Western ruling quarters is most gratifying. Here is, for instance, a conclusion drawn by the authors of a reputable American study of new political thinking advocated by the Soviet Union. "A purely reactive Western approach in the face of the new Soviet policy is not an acceptable option," they write. "In order to seize the opportunities offered by new Soviet policies, the U.S. and its allies need to respond creatively to Gorbachev's initiatives. In order to do that, the West must be clear about its own policy objectives and priorities. New political thinking in the East requires new policy thinking in the West."⁶

It is by fostering on this political process in East and West alike that wide-ranging international cooperation can be promoted. Renouncing dogmas and stereotypes of the past still used by many of our opponents will provide greater opportunities for mutual understanding.

Wide and fruitful cooperation will hardly be possible unless the place and role of the ideological struggle in international relations are made clear enough.

Historical experience sheds a particularly vivid light on the negative impact of extending ideological differences to relations between states. While admitting the possibility and necessity of economic cooperation between countries with different social systems and calling for cooperation in the political sphere, we proclaimed without sufficient reason that ideology was exclusively a sphere of struggle. Of course, there can be no question of reconciling ideologies expressive of the antagonistic interests of classes which are poles apart. But it would be primitive to consider that ideology expresses none but class interests and is devoid of universal elements. The tendency to absolutise ideological factors, to treat them as self-contained and elevate them to the rank of demiurges almost independent of economics and politics, made it difficult to search for mutually acceptable solutions to many international problems. Forced into an ideological strait-jacket, the world community was suffocating. The ideologisation of state-to-state relations hampered mutual understanding between nations.

The call for a thorough deideologisation of state-to-state relations to enable nations to meet the challenges of the times will therefore help clear the atmosphere and eliminate many entanglements in world politics. Humanity knows too well the cost of religious wars to delude itself with such notions any longer, all the more so since nowadays they are likely to have infinitely more dangerous consequences than ever. Explicit recognition of the principle that state-to-state relations shall not be an arena of ideological struggle could remove many hurdles to cooperation between all nations.

We think the recurrent thesis alleging that the ideological struggle in the international arena was steadily growing was born in a sense of the notorious postulate about the class struggle gaining in intensity as socialism strengthened its positions. This guideline, imposed by Stalin, was discarded but its double continued functioning, disrupting the integrity and unity of the peaceful strategy of Soviet foreign policy. True, the ideologisation of international relations was a result of something more than our misinterpretations of the problem. The Western powers contributed their share and a very considerable share it was. This makes the task of deideologising international relations, of freeing them of the shackles of ideocracy, a common task for both the East and the West.

The corrections being introduced into the theoretical principles of Soviet foreign policy show that Soviet society assesses itself self-critically and revises obsolete concepts. This is unquestionable evidence of its strength. At the same time it confirms our readiness to conduct a serious dialogue with all partners on an equal footing and to help formulate a planetary platform that serves humanity's vital interests.

In short, we are engaged in a concrete and fruitful activity aimed at translating the ideas of the October revolution into reality.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1965, p. 528.

² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. Three, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973, p. 116.

³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, M., New York, International Publishers, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 298.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 26, p. 252.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 30, p. 381.

⁶ *Implications of Soviet New Thinking*. Institute for East-West Security Studies. New York, 1987, pp. 86, 90.

PACIFICATION OF SPACE TECHNOLOGIES

Stanislav RODIONOV

Nowadays it seems to be somewhat out of tune to write about the probability of outer space militarisation and measures that could be taken in order to preclude such a turn of events. However, even leaving aside the talk about the popularity of the subject it is enough to compare broad publicity given it in recent years with present-day brief reports on SDI evolution to realise that this topic is going through a crisis. This is rather strange statement. Why? What has changed of late?

A lot has happened. On the one hand, in its evolution the essence of the problem is changing: it is becoming more diversified and its varied military technological and political links and dimensions are multiplying, while, on the other, we are witnessing an improvement in Soviet-American relations and the realisation of such a major initiative as the signing of the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. A keen understanding of the "political moment" poses the question: can we now criticise our partner, a co-signer of one agreement and of possibly others? Will it not dissipate the political wisdom the partner once showed?

However, this is not a matter of criticism, of comparing yet again, since 1983, SDI with the "sword of Damocles which Washington wants to hang over the world". Besides, criticism that offers no constructive solutions is only tedious. The problem is much more intricate. Yes, indeed, the advocates of space weapons are capable of demolishing the 1972 ABM Treaty by its unacceptably broad interpretation, although it is only fair to say that the present-day trends in American politics and, in particular, the attitude of the Congress are against such encroachments. However, a detailed examination of these trends can narrow down the scope of the problem and, paradoxical as it seems, lead away from the analysis of its present state.

Here it is advisable to return to the origins of the problem and define the terms. Indeed, what we should be more concerned with, Star Wars or the deployment of weapons in outer space or, to be precise, with the prohibition of the use of present-day and future advanced technologies in outer space which are intended for military purposes? If we opt for the latter, broader task there must be more reasons for our concern. The problem is that even if the present or the future administration repudiates SDI the militarisation of outer space will not become less tangible. And this is not just an idle paradox.

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Today there exists yet another, increasingly likely option for weapons, including nuclear weapons, to get into outer space. This opportunity

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is due to the fact that human activities in outer space have undergone quantitative, and what is more important, qualitative changes. (We may recall that there was once a lot of talk about the dangers involved in a qualitatively new spiral in the arms race, that is, the technological race in outer space.) The real situation is that many technologies which are based on new physical principles and can be applied in the development and creation of strategic defence systems even now, albeit on a more modest scale than the one promised by Star Wars, are used in space research for peaceful purposes, as well as in military systems, which are not included in the range of strategic defensive weapons or, so far, just do not have a sufficient anti-missile potential. Thus, along with the purposeful elaboration of various aspects of anti-missile defence there surfaces an actually new chance for eroding the ABM Treaty.

For instance, the entire "space world" has long since been using lasers for long-range space communication. In July this year the Soviet Union launched two space apparatuses under the Phobos project. Their programme includes the study of the Martian satellite which gave its name to the undertaking. Incidentally, it is an international, entirely peaceful project but "armed" with a laser which will be used in the investigation of the Phobos matter. The laser beam will be concentrated by a focusing optical system on the Phobos surface of several microns thereby heating and evaporating the dust of the satellite. Then these vapours will be analysed by the instruments of the space apparatus which will fly about 100 metres above the surface of Phobos. These are just two examples of how lasers can be used today in outer space.

Several years ago practically the entire world was involved in a lively discussion of creating large solar electric power stations on a geostationary orbit which would transmit energy to the Earth by a beam of microwaves. At that time scientists considered solar-cell panels with a surface of about one hundred square kilometres, the microwave capacity of 10-20 megawatts and the diameter of the transmitting antenna of up to one kilometre. If energy is transmitted by radiowaves whose length is about 10 centimetres this system would have a brightness of about 10^{18} joule/steradians for a one-second "shot" which corresponds to a destruction range of hundreds of kilometres.

This can pose a threat only to objects which are in the proximity of the geostationary orbit. However, if millimetre waves are used the effective range grows dozens of times which makes large solar-cell batteries in outer space (with a surface of over ten square kilometres) devices with an impressive anti-missile defence or, at least ASAT, potential. This is one example of how seemingly purely peaceful activities in outer space threaten to lead to deployed space weapons unless proper measures are taken.

Of course, the latter example belongs to the future rather than today's world. However, missiles launching satellites with nuclear reactors and fissionable materials on board already exist. What can be done to stop the "creeping" expansion of weapons in outer space once and for all?

This is a most pressing problem, but it already has its history. Several years ago, when the US administration launched its onslaught on the ABM Treaty in an attempt to undermine its regime, many US non-governmental scientific and public organisations began a thorough examination of all measures that could be taken in order to avert the spillage of any weapons into outer space. This research was also joined by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Threat of Nuclear War. A detailed analysis of the joint work was made at a special seminar dedicated to the technical aspects of the ABM Treaty which was held in February 1987 in Moscow within the framework of the International Forum on Drastic Reduction and Final Elimination of

Nuclear Weapons. More than 60 scientists from various countries took part in this seminar. They paid particular attention to the need to draw a clear-cut line between the permitted, according to the ABM Treaty, activities in outer space and prohibited activities, by establishing quantitative limitations on technologies with an anti-missile capability. Among these technologies there were discussed weapons systems with directed energy emission, some types of kinetic weapons, space-based energy sources, new types of high-sensitivity infra-red sensors, etc.

As distinct from the US administration, the Soviet leadership reacted positively to the idea of drawing a clear-cut line between the two types of activities in outer space. In April 1987 at a meeting with a group of US Congressmen Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that experts of both countries carefully investigate this issue and submit an agreed-upon list of devices whose launching would be prohibited in the course of the SDI-related research. The joint work of Soviet and American scientists dealing with the problem of establishing criteria for the prohibited activities in outer space began last year and still continues. The main result of this cooperation is the mutual conviction that a qualitatively new spiral in the arms race can be averted precisely with the help of *quantitative* criteria which, while guarding the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty, would be applicable to all so-called exotic technologies.

Incidentally, these methodological dialectics are fully in accord with the clear logic of the 1972 Treaty, while extending and developing its approaches at a qualitatively new level. Indeed, let us recall, that the subject-matter of this agreement is regulated precisely by quantitative thresholds, and all limitations are obligatory rather than illustrative. Hence, an exceptionally concrete essence of the instrument: it provides for only one ABM system; its deployment range cannot exceed 150 kilometres with more than 100 anti-missile launchers and 100 one-warhead anti-missiles; there must be no more than 15 launchers on the testing grounds; a strictly limited number of radar stations is stipulated for the defence of the capital (6), as well as for the protection of the IBM positions (2 large phased-array radars and 18 radars with a lesser capacity), and so forth.

Thus, quantitative criteria stipulated in the 1972 Treaty quite clearly and unambiguously define the parameters of all three components of the ABM system: anti-missile launchers, anti-missiles themselves and radar stations. One can extend the parallels with this document and define another triad which is also subject to strict limitations.

Indeed, in outer space the role of anti-missile launchers will be apparently played by combat space stations, the role of anti-missiles—by laser, beam and kinetic weapons, and the tasks of radars will be performed by infra-red sensors or, in a broader sense, by the SATKA system, developed within the SDI framework.* This approach is convenient because it immediately defines the kind of space activities to be limited. True, we should be cautious in this matter so as not to overlook ABM components which were not included in the text of the 1972 Treaty but can emerge with the transition from land-based to space-based weapons. In particular, it seems that these components may include combat control system christened C³I by the American press.**

Generally speaking, the ability of any device or system to have an anti-missile potential depends on many parameters. The search for them is limited, naturally, by a number of necessary conditions, for instance by the degree these parameters reflect the actual operating potential of a particular device, how simple it is to monitor them, etc. Our joint work

* Search, Acquisition, Tracking, Kill Assessment.

** Control, Command, Communication, Intelligence.

with the American partners revealed two different approaches to the identification of parameters which should be subject to limitation.

The point is that many American researchers among whom the leading role is played by John Pike, chief of the space programmes of the Federation of American Scientists, regard as their main goal the compilation of a more exhaustive list of criteria satisfying the requirements of demonstrability, functional correspondence and verifiability. One of the last variants of Pike includes 29 of these criteria. Apart from their large number, which is a problem in itself, the situation is further complicated by the fact that it is impossible to establish quantitative thresholds for all parameters since in many cases verification is difficult if not entirely impossible.

Among the parameters which are more or less fit for quantitative limitations it is worth noting the following.

- the brightness of the laser should not exceed 10^{19} watt-steradians although even prior to 10^{16} watt/steradians the laser has a certain anti-satellite potential;

- it is prohibited to test all interceptors at altitudes of more than 40 kilometres, while testing at lower altitudes with a relative approach speed of more than four kilometres per hour should be regarded as tests conducted within the framework of the ABM Treaty which limits the number of such tests;

- the size of the land- and space-based mirrors for the lasers of aircraft and satellite sensors should not exceed 2.5 metres;

- it is prohibited to launch into outer space more than five kilogrammes of fissionable material;

- no more than 300 tons of payload annually is permitted to be launched into outer space.¹

However, it is important that the position of our American colleagues is flexible. The number of points subject to accord is being reduced, and in many of them "shifts" are in the making. Thus, at the meeting of the delegations of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the US National Academy of Sciences on international security and arms control issues which was held in November 1987 American scientists suggested the following quantitative thresholds:

- the mass of a space-based interceptor should not exceed one kilogramme, the final velocity 1 km/sec and acceleration 10 g (where g stands for the acceleration of the gravity force equalling 10 m/sec²);

- the maximum brightness of space-based lasers should be 10^{15} watt/steradian; for ground based lasers with upward orientation the limit can be higher (10^{18} watt/steradian with the total power not exceeding 10 kW). In that case the laser must operate on the wavelength which is absorbed by the atmosphere;

- the size of a space-based infra-red laser mirror should not exceed 1.5 metres in diameter; the size of land-based mirrors is allowed to be bigger—up to 25 metres in diameter;

- the energy of the particles of a space-based proton accelerator should be less than 5 mW and the power of the beam should not exceed 10 kW;

- the potential of phased-array radars should not exceed 30 mWm² for stationary land-based installations and 0.3 mWm² for mobile radars;

- the speed of air defence surface-to-air missiles should not exceed 2 km/sec;

- no more than 1 kilogramme of fissionable material is permitted to put into outer space at one launching;

- a satellite can have no more than one interceptor with parameters established by the first item of this list.

Still, it seems to us that even such approach to the establishment of quantitative criteria suffers methodologically from a certain degree of uncertainty and the criteria themselves need further substantiation. In a word, it will take some time before it becomes an efficient instrument. What is to be done? Is it at all possible to find such an instrument and a magnitude which could serve as a common denominator for all possible technologies and systems? The prospects look plausible.

As we have already seen there are quite a few parameters determining the anti-missile potential. However, as it is often the case in practice among many variables it is possible to select one or two basic values which can be used to describe the behaviour of the function as a whole with a sufficient degree of precision. In our case the *destruction range* can serve as such constant and most natural, as the essence of the weapons goes, parameter.

Of course, from the standpoint of observation and control the criterion suggested for discussion still needs to be explained. In other words, the problem is how one can express the destruction range through such characteristics of devices and systems which on the one hand the physicists have grown accustomed to, and, on the other, can be easily verified?

Although it is a difficult task, we shall try to explain a number of new technologies which are a subject of lively discussion as candidate elements of a hypothetic space-based ABM system.

Let us begin with the *laser weapons*. For them the destruction range can be found from a simple equation which includes the indicator of the laser brightness B (let us recall that it expresses the quantity of energy emitted in a unit of a body angle and is expressed in joule/steradian) and the magnitude of the destruction threshold q (the minimal density of energy reaching the surface of a target and producing the desired effect, the melting of the casing, for instance; the magnitude of q is expressed in joules per square centimetre). As we see the notion of the destruction range combines the properties of a weapon and the characteristics of a target, which our American partners have failed to do so far. Thus, the formula of the destruction range R is: $R = \left(\frac{B}{q} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}$

The destruction threshold of the laser can have a wide range of meanings:

20 kJ/cm²—fuel tank walls of missiles are burnt through. This threshold value is applied to assess assured destruction range for laser weapons.

1 kJ/cm²—unprotected walls of fuel tanks with a thickness of several millimetres are burnt through;

100 J/cm²—thinner walls typical of satellite design are burnt through;

0.1 J/cm²—this threshold is equivalent to the direct sunlight exposure in a period of several seconds.

When speaking about *beam weapons* we mean a beam of fast neutral hydrogen atoms which is created by an accelerator of negative hydrogen ions. In this case a more intricate procedure is involved in calculating the destruction range taking into account the energy of an accelerator, the "quality" of the ion beam and a number of other factors. In that case the destruction threshold in the problem is substituted by the so-called critical current density. Instead of the maximum energy of particles in an accelerator and the current of these particles which usually characterise the operation of an accelerator it is more convenient to use another pair of parameters: the energy and power in the beam which can be easier

controlled from outside. A detailed examination shows that in each particular case of using beam weapons the power in the beam has a certain minimum below which these weapons just do not work.

It is convenient to use this circumstance in order to establish a quantitative threshold for the power supply systems of beam weapons. Taking into account the fact that the destruction range of beam weapons depends both on the energy of particles in the accelerator and the power in the beam we may conclude that this type of the beam weapon as a means of destroying missiles and warheads can be of little use.

The concept of the destruction range is also applicable to the *kinetic weapons* although their typical characteristic is projectile velocity. The point is that many situations, for instance the destruction of missiles at the booster stage, are characterised by the time at the disposal of the defence system to undertake appropriate actions. That is why it is possible to demand that over a specified period of time a projectile of an electromagnetic gun or a warhead of an anti-missile should not cover the distance exceeding the established threshold. Here, by using the formulas of uniform and uniformly accelerated movement we can obtain thresholds for the final velocity or, correspondingly, the acceleration of a projectile.

As applied to infra-red sensors, the term "destruction range" should be replaced by the term "detection range". This range is determined by the required linear resolution for the targets (usually several metres) and the properties of an optic system. In their turn, the latter depend only on the diameter of a telescope since the length of the wave to which the sensor is tuned, the task is 2-3 mkm where there is the maximum of the brightness of missile tails on the active part of the flight. Hence, the following correlation between the detection range (R) and the diameter of the infra-red telescope mirror (D): $R=10^6 D$ that is with $D=1$ m the detection range equals 1,000 kilometres.

Thus, the concept of the destruction range has a wide field of use and can be used to obtain substantiated quantitative limitations on the characteristics of various types of space-based weapons and detection systems. So far we have not examined the problems associated with launching fissionable materials and nuclear reactors into outer space. If there is an obvious threshold for fissionable materials which is below the critical mass for an A-bomb, the limitations on the power of a space nuclear reactor cannot be established on the basis of similar standards. It may turn out that the best solution which can be recommended in this case is the total ban on launchings of any amount of fissionable materials in outer space. An exception can be made only for flights into deep space.

Any discussions regarding the quantitative levels inevitably involve problems of their verification. Without putting into question the importance of verification we should not go to extremes and demand control over everything which can somehow be tied in with the discussed technical problem. Any different approach will be counter-productive.

History shows that, given political goodwill, verification problems can always be solved on a mutually acceptable basis. For instance, the 1967 treaty banning the launching of nuclear weapons into outer space was signed at a time when none of its signatories had a real possibility to verify the compliance with 100 per cent certitude. Much more important is its political essence with all the attending consequences. It is not for nothing that none of the signatory powers could risk violating it.

It is interesting that at the time the ABM Treaty was elaborated the USA also did not pay so much attention to the verification aspects. For instance, in his letter of December 1, 1986 to Secretary of State George

Shultz Senator Carl Levin (Michigan) cites the typical reaction of General Palmer in the Senate commission discussing the Treaty before its ratification.

The General said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted on the matter of qualitative limitations on the deployment regions of the ABM system and that they agreed with the thresholds incorporated in the Treaty. The General answered in the affirmative to the query of Senator Jackson who asked whether the reaction would have been the same if it were impossible to verify that process.

While stating the absolute primacy of political goodwill in this matter, we shall note still that by now the technical possibilities for the verification of a particular agreement have grown considerably which is confirmed by the INF Treaty. However, what are they as applied to outer space?

Facts indicate that even now when the parties can rely only on their own national space- and ground-based technical facilities it is very difficult to conceal space activities which can overstep the limits of the ABM Treaty. In this case it is the ground methods which are the most reliable.

Thus, the measurements of the orbit and the tracking of space apparatuses by radars or lasers have a precision within a range stretching from one metre (for outdated technologies) to several centimetres (for new technologies). It means that none of the manoeuvres of a space apparatus can escape detection.

It is not technologically difficult to obtain the photographs of space apparatuses if atmospheric convection and turbulence are neutralised, of course. If telescopes with a diameter of 2 metres and high-quality optics are used to photograph space objects the photographs of apparatuses which are, incidentally, at the orbits of about 500 kilometres can allow to distinguish details no less than 10 centimetres in size. In other words, these photographs will have a linear resolution of 10 centimetres.

In principle, the information about satellites flying on higher orbits, including the geostationary orbit, can be obtained by examining radio-displays formed on the basis of the latest methods which are called interferometrics with a large base. The essence of this method is that the object is observed by two or more telescopes placed at long distances, with the maximum distance equalling two radiuses of the Earth. Since, for example, the height of the geostationary orbit equals six earth radiuses the calculations lead to the conclusion that with these methods the best resolution equals three operating lengths of the wave, that is, it can reach several centimetres!

What do we get by studying satellite photographs? First of all information about solar batteries, the usual energy supply sources for satellite instruments. Then data about the number and particular features of unfolded antennae and the ability to surmise their purpose. It is possible to ascertain the size of mirrors and other elements causing interest or doubts, etc.

Here is just one simple example. The examination of a space apparatus launched by the other side showed that it had no solar battery. At the same time there was an antenna visible on the satellite surface. Land-based stations recorded radiowaves emitted by the apparatus, established the wave length and the power density level (watt/cm^2) of its impulses at the surface of the Earth. Thereby elementary calculations allow to appraise the power level of the emission by the satellite antenna. Besides, if a satellite operates for a long period of time and its size is not particularly large the only plausible explanation of this large amount of energy is a small nuclear reactor on its board. Such are unexpected, at

first sight, conclusions which can be drawn from seemingly routine observations from the Earth.

However, the possibilities of the verification methods are limited. It is not always possible to build such logical sequences of conclusions shown above and establish what is inside a space apparatus. For instance, these methods and similar observations from the surface of the Earth do not allow to establish whether there are nuclear weapons on board. There is yet another impediment due to the different geographic location of the Soviet Union and the United States. Practically all Soviet satellites, with the exception of stationary ones, fly over US territory, but far from all US satellites fly over Soviet territory. That is why even with the best conditions an American satellite launched from Cape Canaveral to a 300-kilometre orbit is visible for us low over the horizon, at the 10-15° angle and the distance to it is at least 1,000 kilometres. Only rather powerful impulse lasers can ensure the obtainment of a picture of the satellite in these conditions of observation.

Thus, whether we want it or not, even the technocratic logic itself makes us turn once again to political measures to build confidence. One of them could be prior notification of the other side about such space experiments which in their characteristics come close to the line separating permissible and prohibited activities. Then the notified party could most expediently prepare its national facilities for tracking space objects of the partner and check the declared programme of operations in outer space.

The next step towards expanding the verification range seems to be obvious: space inspection of one type or another. For instance, there is an option when a spaceship of one side comes sufficiently close (the distance has to be specified, of course) to the space apparatus of the other side and inspects it by using non-destructive control methods in order to establish the presence of fissionable materials, for instance. Of course, this kind of space inspection cannot ensure an all-embracing verification of space activities unless as much or even more money is spent on the deployment of this verification system as on the deployment of a full-scale ABM space system. In other words, to verify the absence of the results of the SDI programme in outer space it is necessary to create another SDI programme. For this reason this approach, all its "exotic" features notwithstanding, is not fit for serious analysis even in the most favourable political climate.

It seems that today nobody says that there are already weapons in outer space. That is why it seems to be most urgent to reach such accords which would impede the spillage of nuclear weapons into outer space rather than only set the rules for checking the absence of weapons in the terrestrial space.

The inspection of the payload on board space apparatuses at the launching pads or, in other words, inspection at the launching is in full accord with this approach. This inspection has a number of indisputable advantages if viewed in comparison with the approaches which have been discussed above:

- the number of space-launch complexes on the Earth is limited and nowadays it seems unfeasible to conceal a new space-launch centre. Thus, all space apparatuses can be subjected to control;

- inspection at the launching will not require any serious technical innovations and, consequently, does not entail high costs;

- as distinct from all previous approaches which only allowed to hope for the detection of a violation, the pre-start control ensures the possibility to delay the launching if an additional clarification of doubts is needed or, if it is necessary, demand the removal of a particular load.

It seems that the pre-launching inspection can be carried out by several methods, for example:

- a) checking every element of the payload before the process of integration with the subsequent control over the entire process of integration until the launching of the booster rocket;
- b) inspection of the payload complex upon the completion of the integration process by using non-destructive verification means;
- c) inspection of the spaceship directly on the launching site with the help of passive and active means of non-destructive verification.

The choice for a guaranteed and sufficiently reliable verification depends on a number of factors which include both a specific type of checked weapons and the limits of the powers of inspection which are defined by prior agreement.

In the recent period in their joint efforts the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Threat of Nuclear War and the Federation of American Scientists paid particular attention to checking the presence on spaceships to be launched of fissionable materials such as uranium 235, plutonium 239 and plutonium 238. (Although the latter is not included in the category of fissionable materials it is used as an on-board energy source because due to its great speed of fission it has a considerable heat release level) It can involve nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors and isotope energy sources, thermoelectric converters, for instance.

Control over the launching of nuclear reactors into outer space seems to be particularly important. The very concept of long-life military space stations implies the use of nuclear energy. Out of the three possible regimes of a station, operational, alarm and combat, at least one, the alarm regime, is unfeasible without a nuclear power station. It is believed that the fuel for a nuclear reactor must be uranium 235 of very high purity, up to 97 to 98 per cent. In that case the amount of uranium fuel must be at least several dozens of kilogrammes. It is clear that in this case a qualitative inspection should cause no problems whatsoever.

However, for a number of reasons it is difficult to quantitatively establish the presence of fissionable materials on board. One of the reasons is the introduction of a payload composition of materials which can unpredictably absorb gamma-ray photons and neutrons, in particular. As a rule, inspectors also do not know the actual composition of uranium and plutonium which are on board of a particular apparatus but, as a rule, the truly fissionable materials "emit light" rather feebly compared to their partner, isotopes. It seems that there it is difficult to avoid even a 100 per cent miscalculation in establishing the quantity of fissionable materials. This circumstance can become a serious impediment to the conclusion of corresponding agreements unless a radical step is made, i. e. unless it is prohibited to launch any quantity of any fissionable material into outer space. This radical step is required by time itself.

Impressive Developments Are Underway

Martin SATHIAH

It is a fascinating experience to be a diplomat or indeed a foreign journalist or businessman in the Soviet Union today. Since my arrival here more than two years ago I have felt privileged to be a direct observer of the first phase of what is clearly a period of fundamental and historical change in the country. I had a modest knowledge of Soviet affairs from an assignment in Moscow in the early 1970s and I had tried to keep track of developments in the intervening years. It was nevertheless a process of re-education for me to develop some appreciation and understanding of what was taking place in the USSR under Mr. Gorbachev's dynamic leadership.

What are the changes that stand out for me? The greatest change has certainly been in the Soviet mass media which has blossomed on *glasnost*. It is practically impossible for a foreigner to keep abreast of all that is being written in the press or broadcast on radio and television but it is clear that the press has become a vital and exciting part of the process of reform and renewal.

In comparison to my earlier stay a considerable effort is now being made to keep diplomats and journalists briefed on important developments. Soviet colleagues are now far more forthcoming and I greatly value my discussions with them as they are stimulating, informative and most helpful.

There have been impressive developments in the cultural field. One can only applaud the new more open atmosphere which has allowed greater expression of the tremendous creativity of the Soviet people. The books like *Children of the Arbat* by Anatoli Rybakov, *Doctor Zhivago* by Boris Pasternak or films like Tengis Abuladze's *Repentance* produce deep impression.

The changes in domestic political and economic policies are of prime interest. The course charted by the 19th Party Conference promises significant political renewal that will reinforce the objectives of *perestroika*. Economic reform, however, appears in a state of flux as its implementation has run into the obstacles engendered by the system it seeks to replace. While it has to be recognised that a great deal has been

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achieved in a remarkably short space of time it is also evident that if *perestroika* is to prosper, rising public expectations must be met soon.

Mr. Gorbachev has emphasised on many occasions that Soviet foreign policy must reflect domestic priorities. The impact of new political thinking on Soviet foreign policy today has been to make it accurately represent Soviet national interests. In the past policies sometimes appeared to have no correlation with the flexible promotion of the Soviet Union's own interests.

Before the introduction of Mr. Gorbachev's new political thinking, some aspects of Soviet foreign policy were perceived by many countries, including my own, as threatening the status quo and therefore the stability of key regions in the world. This was Malaysia's perception of the impact of Soviet policy towards the Asian-Pacific region and, in particular Southeast Asia. As a non-aligned nation, Malaysia did not hold a brief for any major power and has vigorously pursued an independent foreign policy. We were therefore extremely concerned at the escalation of superpower rivalry in our region.

The changes in Soviet foreign policy appear to be based on a realistic assessment of the global situation and the Soviet Union's role in world affairs. Implicitly recognised in new political thinking are the exigencies of coming to terms with the objective realities of the international political and economic situation. There is the understanding that the role of military power is constrained in the nuclear age and that economic power has assumed the dominant role in the assurance of national security. There is the recognition that the Soviet Union must integrate itself into the mainstream of the global economy. Also central to new thinking is the perception that the world is multi-polar and that various nations, especially from the third world, often promote their own interests, independent of the super-powers. There is acceptance that to accommodate these realities a new, non-ideological approach is required. Mr. Gorbachev has himself stated "nobody has any ready recipes ... we are by no means laying claim to a monopoly of the truth...".

It is not my intention to review the many initiatives, proposals and other actions that have been undertaken by the Soviet Union since Mr. Gorbachev was elected General Secretary. I would like instead to focus on their implications for the third world and more specifically on the Asian-Pacific region, Southeast Asia and Malaysia itself.

In the past the superpowers have not shown themselves to be at ease with multi-lateralism and, while paying lip-service to international institutions, surreptitiously worked for their emasculation. The current Soviet view that there should be international solutions to international issues is therefore well received.

From a third world perspective, the major powers have a special responsibility for much of the instability in the world. The view is that, at the very least, many regional conflicts would not have assumed the proportions they have if not for superpower involvement. The buildup of nuclear and conventional arms is also perceived as a direct result of superpower rivalry.

For the third world the management of global problems would be best served if the UN could play a greater role in settling conflicts and regulating tensions, reducing the need for superpower intervention. The *sine qua non* for this to happen is the willingness of the major powers themselves to unfetter the UN mechanisms set up for this purpose. The renewed Soviet commitment to the UN and other global organisations is therefore welcome.

Many countries, including my own, however, would like further clarification on the Soviet objective in calling for a comprehensive global security system. We feel that there is a need to enhance the role of exist-

ing global institutions but that they should not be circumscribed, duplicated or supplanted by parallel systems.

The moves on disarmament between the USA and the USSR are, of course, most encouraging for those of us from the third world. I was in the United States at the time of the Washington Summit and half a year later—in Moscow at the next talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. In late May—early June, I sat glued to the television screen, watching that unique historical event. The signing of the INF treaty was applauded and the current negotiations on START and on the whole related range of issues connected with nuclear weapons are followed with attention and the hope that there will be early results. Reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons will, hopefully, be accompanied by major reductions in conventional weapons, as the latter, especially, will free enormous resources, some of which could be used to alleviate the severe social and economic crisis that many third world countries are undergoing.

An interesting development in respect of the difficulties faced by third world countries has been the growing prominence of the Soviet Union as an aid donor. I do not have the figures for 1987 and 1988, but, according to OECD figures Soviet aid rose to 0.33 per cent of its GNP in 1986 (to 1.4 per cent according to Soviet sources), exceeding the figures for a number of the leading western industrial nations in their own contributions to official development assistance.

Disarmament is the major feature of the Soviet-American relations but for the third world it is most important that the Soviet-American agenda is broad-based, covering a wide range of issues. This was firmly established in the Moscow Summit and it promises a more stable and predictable relationship for the superpowers which can only benefit the international climate. We have already seen its results in Afghanistan, and its potential in the Middle East, Southern Africa and elsewhere. What also stands out is that it has enhanced the role of the UN.

Vladivostok was a timely reminder that the Soviet Union was also an Asian-Pacific nation and had a legitimate role to play in regional affairs. It gave due recognition to the region's importance to the USSR and for this to be reflected in Soviet policies.

In the past the USSR has not been an active participant in the mainstream of regional affairs in the region. An inherent suspicion of regional institutions and ideological factors constrained the Soviet role. This approach is still reflected in the thinking of some Soviet experts as evidenced in the article on the "Newly Industrialised Countries of Asia in the World Capitalist Economy" by V. Andrianov in the *Far Eastern Affairs* journal, which talks of "industrial" neocolonialism and claims that the newly-industrialised countries "are stamped with all the vice of an exploiter system".

Economic imperatives have no place for ideological considerations. Economic dynamism in the Asian-Pacific region is the direct result of the efficacy of free enterprise coupled with hard work. Market forces determine the decisions made by Asia's entrepreneurs and to do business the Soviet Union will have to develop an understanding of free-market mechanisms. There has been almost total reliance on government to government arrangements in the USSR's economic relations with regional states and only marginal contact with the vibrant private sector of the rapidly-growing Asian-Pacific economies. In the absence of marketing and promotion, Soviet products are unknown to regional businessmen.

The Soviet Union's participation as an observer at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference Meeting in Vancouver in November 1986 was an important development in the USSR's effort to formulate new approaches to promote trade and economic cooperation with Asian-Pacific

countries. I recall a Malaysian representative to the PECC extending an invitation to his Soviet counterparts to participate in PECC meetings during discussions on Asian-Pacific affairs in Moscow in May 1986 at a time when the USSR still harboured reservations about the Conference. It is therefore especially satisfying to see the Soviet Union take this step forward. This has been followed recently by the establishment of the Soviet National Committee for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation which will host a meeting with representatives from Asian-Pacific countries in Vladivostok in September.

Much also depends on an improvement in the political atmosphere in the vast Asian-Pacific region which has been threatened by regional conflicts. A collective approach to security and other issues as in the Helsinki Conference may not be practical in the region because of its special characteristics. The priority is the resolution of tensions in the sub-regions in Asia and the Pacific. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the improved prospects for a Kampuchean settlement are very important developments in this context and offer real hope for stability in the entire region.

The Soviet Union has made an intensive effort to develop relations with countries in the region. The exchanges of high-level visits and the wide-ranging consultations with the ASEAN countries have been a notable feature. The enhanced relationship with the ASEAN countries has a special significance which goes beyond Southeast Asia. ASEAN enjoys a network of important links through its system of dialogues with the USA, the EEC, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Amongst the ASEAN countries Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia are members of the non-aligned movement. Indonesia and Malaysia are also members of the Islamic Conference and Singapore and Malaysia are members of the Commonwealth. Of relevance is the forum for discussion on Asian-Pacific affairs provided by ASEAN's dialogue relationship with its Asian-Pacific partners.

ASEAN's stature is recognised internationally because it is respected for its pragmatic and moderate outlook. Its success as a grouping is founded on the spirit of goodwill and accommodation that prevails amongst its leaders and peoples. The strength of ASEAN cooperation has sometimes been under-estimated. In the field of economic cooperation progress has been sure rather than dynamic because of the ASEAN system of consensus. ASEAN has, however, been supremely successful in its political cooperation; differences of perception amongst its members on various issues have never prevented them from arriving at a strong common stand.

The ASEAN countries wish to have consistent and friendly relation with all nations, irrespective of their systems. Improved mutual understanding and good working relations with the Soviet Union will contribute positively to the achievement of ASEAN's objective of the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia.

Malaysia's own relations with the Soviet Union have steadily developed since diplomatic relations were established in 1967. The USSR has been a major importer of Malaysian commodities, especially natural rubber and tin but, traditionally, there has been a major trade imbalance in Malaysia's favour. Malaysia's imports from the Soviet Union have been restricted to fertilisers, some medical products and, since 1985, newsprint and tractors. Total trade between the two countries peaked in 1983 when it stood at 265 million rubles but it has since declined significantly to 115 million rubles in 1987.

The situation is clearly unsatisfactory for both countries and much time and attention has been devoted to finding ways and means of boosting trade and economic cooperation. A framework towards this end was

established during the visit of the Malaysian Prime Minister to Moscow in July 1987. I can state this on the basis of my personal impressions, as I accompanied the Prime Minister during his meetings in Moscow, as also in his trips to Leningrad and to Uzbekistan. There is no question that there is considerable potential in economic relations. The Soviet market for Malaysia's manufactured products has not been tapped and Soviet products are little known in Malaysia.

To improve trade a great deal depends on Soviet foreign trade organisations and Malaysian businessmen developing commercial links with the two governments helping to promote their efforts. A start has been made in this direction. There are prospects for joint ventures. Negotiations have begun on setting up an eye microsurgery clinic in Malaysia and a proposal has been made by the USSR Ministry of Oil Refining and Petrochemical Industries to set up a joint venture in Malaysia to produce a range of rubber surgical products for export to the USSR and other countries.

An agreement on joint political consultations signed during the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow has substantiated the process of consultations. The range of issues on which consultations have been held has also significantly broadened. There is close accord in the views of both countries on many political issues including disarmament questions, the Middle East, and Southern Africa. Policy is also coordinated on international economic issues. Of greatest importance was the wide-ranging discussion of a wide range of issues between Mr. Gorbachev and Dr Mahathir Mohamed during the Prime Minister's visit to the USSR.

The first important steps have been taken to implement the concepts outlined in Mr. Gorbachev's Vladivostok statement. It is important that the momentum is maintained. The Soviet Union will find in Malaysia a willing partner in its efforts to improve the international climate, especially in the Asian-Pacific region and Southeast Asia in particular

AN ARAB AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW

Abdo Othman MUHAMMED

As the Ambassador of the Yemen Arab Republic to the USSR since February 23, 1983, I have had the opportunity not only to get acquainted with the achievements and cultural heritage of the Soviet Union, but also to make my own contribution to the growth of relations between our countries and peoples and help expand our cooperation.

However, my "discovery" of the Soviet Union began long before my first visit and the subsequent work in the homeland of the October Revolution. As I review the early 1950s, the time when the ideas of civic duty, nationality and humanism were just beginning to form in me, I should say that the start of my "discovery" was fairly modest. It became possible due to the Great October Socialist Revolution, and also due to the impression produced on me by the works of your wonderful poets and philosophers, such as Plekhanov, Chernyshevsky, Belinsky, Pushkin, Lermontov, Blok, Turgenev, and Gorky to mention a few. But the greatest influence on me was that of the personality of Lenin and his works.

My knowledge of the Soviet Union increased due to the positive influence of the October Revolution in the East, including the countries of the Arab East, at the time when the national liberation struggle against imperialism, the colonialists, Zionism and their alliances was mounting.

After the revolution was accomplished in Egypt on July 23, 1952, under the guidance of Gamal Abdel Nasser, its leader, Cairo became the bulwark of that struggle, which strengthened the stance and support rendered by the Soviet Union morally and politically.

I recall those years now and my early attempts to write poems in which I mentioned Moscow and the Volga River even before I saw them. That was in the first half of the 1950s. Addressing the late Nazim Hikmet, a great Turkish poet, I wrote.

Oh, the bird feeding on words,
Glorifying the vast land,
Drinking the waters of the Volga River,
The Volga, the source of love.

However, I sometimes departed from the views current at that time as I spoke in defence of socialist principles and called for a return to their real sources in order to prove the advantages of socialism which has provided conditions for enhancing man's dignity in the sphere of his thinking and freedom.

Today, I again recall Boris Pasternak. After his death I wrote:

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His modest funerals passed in darkness,
And the Moscow children did not bring flowers.
Never mind. The recognition of the Universe is enough for him...

Though some persons in the West were trying to use the name of Boris Pasternak and his writings for their own purposes, as had been the case with other writers who had sold out their work and themselves, Pasternak was different from them all, preferring suffering to treason and is therefore remembered by his homeland forever.

I recall all this as I watch today the process of *perestroika* in the Soviet Union, the exercise of democracy and the return of everything back to its place, which once again stresses the real essence of socialism and its greatness.

Yet another idea is worth mentioning here, that is, the connection between revolutions. Thus, the July 1952 Revolution in Egypt, which enhanced the struggle of the Arab people and of the whole Third World to a new level, was an echo of the October Revolution. And soon a revolution was accomplished in our country on September 26, 1962, which liberated the Yemeni people from heavy bondage and paved a way toward a new life. The July Revolution in Egypt and the support rendered by the Soviet Union played the main role in the defence and consolidation of our revolution, in the attainment of its main goals.

During my first visit to the USSR in March 1964 I had the honour to be a member of the Yemeni delegation headed by the first president of our republic. I was present during the signing of the Treaty of Friendship between the Yemen Arab Republic and the Soviet Union, which was a continuation of the 1955 Treaty. During that and other visits I met some well-known Soviet public figures and writers. For instance, I met with the first cosmonauts Yuri Gagarin and Valentina Tereshkova who had scored a space victory not only for the Soviet Union but also for the whole world.

I had the honour to be present at the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the YAR and the USSR during the Moscow visit by our president Ali Abdullah Saleh in October 1984.

Our relations have been developing in every sphere, rising to an ever higher level. But this is not all. It is gratifying to note also the similarity of the main positions of the Soviet Union and the Arab countries.

The Soviet Union's invariable principled stand with regard to the rights of the Palestinian people, its protests against the Israeli occupation of a part of the territories of some Arab countries and its position concerning the Lebanese people and its problems and the military conflict in the Persian Gulf provided a stable foundation for the relations between the USSR and Arab countries. It is our common responsibility to promote these relations and preserve our friendship and cooperation, especially because this friendship and cooperation are still opposed by many.

During my work in the Soviet Union as the Ambassador of the Yemen Arab Republic I have been impressed by the most important period of *perestroika* and by the facts showing how your great people is changing its life, opening the creative potential of socialism. I have been here since the very start of this innovatory process, beginning with the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, which outlined the main principles and directions of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, and the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU aimed at deepening and consolidating the process of *perestroika* and making it irreversible.

It is a great experience to witness this historical process. And it is still more important to be a witness to the events in the capacity of an

ambassador: a new history is being made right before your eyes. One feels this every minute, seeing how the new edifice is being built.

Though this is not an easy process and it has many difficulties, we see that it proceeds rapidly as a revival.

My diplomatic work in Moscow coincides with a great event in the history of the Yemeni-Soviet relations.

Early in November 1988 two friendly countries, the Yemen Arab Republic and the USSR, will mark the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Yemeni-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Trade. In the same month, the Soviet Union will celebrate the 71st anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which brought victory to Asian and African peoples oppressed by colonialists or fighting to preserve their independence. In speaking of the significance of the treaty (signed on November 1, 1928, in Sanaa), account should be taken of the assessments made by the political leadership of our country and repeatedly borne out by developments. Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of the YAR and General Secretary of the General People's Congress, has pointed out the Yemeni people's initiative in favour of establishing relations with the Soviet Union as follows: "Recalling this Yemeni initiative, we recall at the same time the principled position which the Soviet Union adopted in support of our glorious revolution. The Yemeni people will for ever remember that position, which helped strengthen the roots of friendship between the Yemeni and Soviet peoples." The President also stresses that the peoples of our countries, who are striving for prosperity, peace and universal love, are equal to carrying forward their relations, for this meets both their interests and the interests of the whole of humanity.

The Treaty of Friendship and Trade was not only the first treaty on cooperation between Yemen and the Soviet Union but the first Arab-Soviet agreement of its kind. It is therefore regarded as the basis for Arab-Soviet friendship and cooperation opening up for the first time vistas for cooperation between an Arab country, Yemen, and the young Soviet state, which had emerged on the international scene a short time before. The treaty had special historic and political significance that was enhanced by the new international situation resulting from World War I. With the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, colonialist designs, especially on the part of the British Empire, became only too obvious. Britain, which occupied the southern areas of Yemen, considered that the time had come for it to extend its influence to the whole of Yemen. By contrast, the Yemeni-Soviet Treaty represented a new model of cooperation between our people and a great power to which the exploitative practices and ambitions typical of the policy of colonial powers were alien.

Let us recall the situation in 1928. Yemen had not yet won full political independence; although it had cast off Turkish domination, it had still to confront British colonialists oppressing the southern areas of our country. At that time the Soviet Union, too, was blockaded by imperialist states trying in various ways to undermine the socialist revolution in the Soviet Union and its influence at international level. The treaty, being expressive of a common necessity and mutual benefit, helped ease pressure on our country and the isolation in which it found itself. Among other things, it helped supply us with some commodities even though poor communications made this difficult.

The treaty began to bear fruit with the development of a selfless national struggle. In the late 1950s the port of Hodeida was built; British pressure notwithstanding, it became a gateway to the outside world. The glorious September 1962 revolution and the proclamation of the Yemen Arab Republic put an end to the people's suffering due to backwardness and diverse forms of oppression. It was only the revolution that paved the way for liberation and full sovereignty and ushered

in the epoch of building a just life and realising the Yemeni people's aspirations, which merged into one stream with the dreams of the Arab nation and the efforts of friendly, peace-loving countries with the Soviet Union at their head in their struggle against international imperialism and reaction. The Yemeni-Soviet treaty was an important component of this process. And so it was by no means accidental that Marshal Abdullah al-Sallal, first President of the YAR, led a large government and people's delegation. During the visit, on March 21, 1964, the two countries signed a new Treaty of Friendship which laid solid foundations for extensive and fruitful cooperation between them in the political, economic, cultural and other spheres. These foundations are inseparable from earlier ties and relations and from the Treaty of Friendship and Trade whose 60th anniversary both countries are about to observe.

The purpose of celebrating this date in our two friendly countries is not to merely commemorate it as a historic event but to underline outstanding achievement in diverse areas of cooperation, relations based on mutual respect, as well as the consolidation of the foundations and the deepening of the concepts on which the treaty rested and which were expressed in its text. These concepts were based on firm principles and the two countries' clear-cut policy line. We also note joint efforts to perfect and extend the framework of cooperation defined by the treaty, it being understood that whatever has been achieved in various fields in the context of this cooperation is an embodiment of the vitalising spirit and very essence of the treaty.

The treaty was an expression of common confidence, respect for international treaties, laws and traditions governing normal state-to-state relations, and joint efforts aimed at realising the peoples' dreams and their aspiration for cooperation and closer mutual relations. It thus reflects the interests of both peoples and common ideas about many contemporary problems of humanity, such as peace, banishment of the spectre of war and the provision of assistance and support to national liberation forces fighting against backwardness, imperialism and colonialism as well as against Zionism and racial segregation, that instrument and mainstay of imperialism.

The pursuit by both countries of such a policy towards these problems is not an accident but constitutes implementation, conscious and precise realisation of the principles of two great revolutions. One of these revolutions was accomplished on September 26, 1962, with the proclamation of the Yemen Arab Republic as one of its major achievements. The other was the Great October Revolution, which took place in 1917 and among whose main achievements was the founding of the Soviet Union on the ruins of tsarism and its emergence as a victorious force serving the interests of peoples. Both revolutions, taking place in different periods, influenced other countries and thwarted colonialist schemes prompted by the ambitions of counter-revolutionary and imperialist forces. The October Revolution had its effect on the East and the rest of the world in proportion to its potential as to area, population and resources. As for the victorious revolution of September 26, it played its role and had its effect on the region and third world countries. This was shown by subsequent events as well as statements by thinkers, authors and politicians.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that our two countries' common position on problems of national liberation, peace, the struggle against colonialism, against hegemony and diktat in the world, created favourable conditions for interaction and made for closer relations and cooperation between them to the same extent as our special relations with the Soviet Union and our active stand in the non-aligned

movement, the Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Conference. This also applies to the fact that the Soviet Union supports our national cause, particularly in regard to backing the Palestinian people in their struggle against Zionism and imperialism, for their right to self-determination and the founding of an independent national state on their soil.

Developing Yemeni-Soviet relations were given a renewed spur and advanced to a new stage as regards cooperation growing in breadth and depth thanks to the visit which Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of the YAR, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Secretary of the General People's Congress, paid to the Soviet Union in October 1984. As I said early a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed that had a visible beneficial effect by strengthening relations between the two countries and expanding fruitful cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, technological and other spheres. A joint economic commission was set up; it held its early meetings in Moscow and Sanaa. The leaderships of our two countries maintain permanent contacts involving bilateral relations and international and regional problems. Ties have been established between political organisations (the General People's Congress and the CPSU).

Undoubtedly, the positive changes currently taking place in the Soviet Union, the economic and social *perestroika* under way and the openness gaining ground in the socio-political life of the Soviet Union will have a positive impact on cooperation between our countries, especially when laying the foundations for democracy in the Yemen people's life has been completed, something which has found expression in democratic elections for the Consultative Council. The new thinking which Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC, is promoting in foreign and home policy has found a broad response in our country and all other Arab states. We are convinced that it is the optimum way of extending and strengthening relations between all nations, peoples and states of the world, relations in which cooperation should prevail instead of discord as should security and just peace instead of war and distress, for this is what the interests of the whole of humanity call for.

THE CARIBBEAN LESSONS

Theodore C. SORENSEN

America's basic long term foreign policy objectives do not change from election to election. The maintenance of our national security and friendly alliances, the advancement of world and regional peace, a commitment to the liberty of nations and individuals, a recognition of our responsibilities as a leader, a preference for free market competition—these and other fundamental principles will characterize American foreign policy during the next four years whether Democrat Michael Dukakis or Republican George Bush is elected this November to succeed Ronald Reagan as President of the United States.

I

Both major political parties in the United States have generally stood by these principles for over four decades. This consensus was broken in some quarters during the latter half of America's war in Vietnam. From time to time other temporary disputes or deviations have occurred. Occasionally positions are erroneously taken that in hindsight prove to have been inconsistent with these objectives, for Americans like all humans are not free from error or endowed with the gift of prophecy. But, in general, over the course of any one Administration or decade, these areas of agreement between America's two major political parties—and between its Executive and Legislative branches—have overshadowed the areas of disagreement that are so often the focus of attention.

In a country as large as the United States containing so many heterogeneous interests and different backgrounds, the existence of only two national political parties of importance necessarily causes each one of those two parties to be a coalition of diverse groups and views—liberal, moderate and conservative views, populist and elitist, interventionist and isolationist, unilateralist and internationalist—and requires each of those parties to hover near the middle of the ideological spectrum where its diverse members can find common ground and where the crucial independent voters not firmly aligned with either party can be wooed.

Thus, disagreements on foreign policy within the American body politic, when they occur, do not occur strictly along party line. Conservative Democrats and conservative Republicans may join together on an issue, for example, against a coalition of liberal Democrats and the

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moderates in both parties. Even these disagreements are usually over means, not ends; over the choice of paths or the pace of the journey, not the ultimate destination; over priorities and tactics, timing and tone, not basic values.

This is not to say that such internal debates in my country are unimportant, or that the political parties offer no major differences between them on international affairs, or that American foreign policy is incapable of serious reexamination and change in this changing world. But given this overarching framework, long-term basic changes in American foreign policy are usually slow and evolutionary, not sudden and revolutionary, proceeding incrementally with the consent of the people as well as Congress, and not swinging wildly from one extreme to the other whenever one party in power is succeeded by the other. Most Americans loyally support their President's actions abroad, even when they are dissatisfied with that course, displeased with that President and looking forward to changing both.

It is within this context that the impact of this year's Presidential election on U.S.-Soviet relations must be viewed. It is within this national consensus on basic goals and values that the next American President, whether Dukakis or Bush, will choose a foreign policy team and course of action that build on Ronald Reagan's last year in the White House. Whichever wins, these basic goals and values will remain. And it is within this limited area for disagreement that the two candidates have offered the American people slightly differing views of how Washington's relations with Moscow should be conducted.

While I emphasize here the objectives and interests shared by both parties and candidates, I am neither indifferent, to their differences nor objective about my preferences. As a member of the Democratic Party, I am known to support Governor Dukakis's candidacy and to share his views, his focus and his emphases in foreign affairs, including those points of policy that differ from Vice-President Bush's. While it would not be appropriate for me to describe those differences in a foreign publication at this time, it is not a secret that I like Dukakis's judgment, intelligence and prudence in national security matters, and I am confident that he would surround himself with a first-rate team of foreign policy advisers and negotiators. As an ironic illustration of the point noted above that foreign policy divisions do not always occur along party lines, many have noted that Michael Dukakis's speeches and statements on U.S.-Soviet relations, more often than George Bush's, resemble the kind of constructive, flexible and hopeful tone and approach to Moscow that have most often characterized those exhibited during this past year by Ronald Reagan, the Republican President whom Mr. Bush has loyally served and supported as Vice President.

The resemblance on which I wish to focus in this article, however, is the strong resemblance in the Dukakis foreign policy approach to the posture of positive reciprocity between the two superpowers that characterized the Administration in which I served twenty-five years ago, the Administration of John F. Kennedy.

Dukakis, like Kennedy, is from the State of Massachusetts. Like Kennedy, he has an energetic and intelligent wife, a Vice Presidential running mate from the State of Texas, and a deep and abiding interest in politics and public service. He has made clear more than once his admiration for President Kennedy's leadership and philosophy, and he frequently invokes JFK's name and words. He has told of how he was inspired as a young college graduate by the campaign of President Kennedy.

More importantly, in his speeches and in the Party Platform approved at the Democratic Party National Convention, Governor Dukakis

has adopted, cautiously but clearly, a tone much like Kennedy's of combining vigilance and deterrence with constructive hope and opportunity regarding future U.S.-U.S.S.R. collaboration on the reduction of superpower tensions and armaments. Thus a brief reminder of the Kennedy years would not be amiss.

Kennedy, it is sometimes forgotten, did not speak solely in terms of friendly collaboration with Moscow. He took office in January, 1961 at a time when "Cold War" concerns in the U.S. were dominant. His strong hopes for peaceful competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union were tempered by an equally strong determination to promote and protect the United State's basic security interests.

The memory of Stalin, the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, a variety of belligerent statements by Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, and strong disapproval of the Soviet legal and political system, philosophy and human rights practices, had all caused the leaders of both American political parties at that time to look at Moscow as an unrelenting and dangerous adversary and to maintain for the United States a large military establishment and an assertive foreign policy position.

Thus, in his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1961, the new young President referred unambiguously "to those nations who would make themselves our adversary." He spoke of an "iron tyranny", "a hard and bitter peace", the need for "arms sufficient beyond doubt," "defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger," and America's determination to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty".

But in that same speech, he issued an unprecedented appeal directly to the Soviet Union: "that both sides, overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom ... begin anew the quest for peace ... explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us ... formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms ... seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors ... join in creating ... a new world of law ... a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself ... Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

That speech signified John Kennedy's determination to be prepared for war and simultaneously, earnestly search for peace with the leaders and people of the Soviet Union. One of his early efforts in that search, Kennedy's summit meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in May of 1961, was not a success. It is true that the meeting enabled the two men to become better acquainted with each other's manner of thinking and personal traits, and to establish a direct tie that would later prove invaluable. It is also true that they recognized certain basic interests in common and made progress on those specific issues on which they could agree. But they disagreed sharply on other issues, most particularly on the status of West Berlin. A crisis followed, with escalating threats, troop movements and refugees that subsided without a direct clash only after the infamous Berlin Wall had been constructed and months of tension had been endured.

Relations deteriorated still further later that summer when the Soviet Union, without notice and in the midst of negotiations, unilaterally ended a mutual moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. But even as public tensions heightened, even as he increased American military preparedness and warned Khrushchev against any precipitous

action, Kennedy in his private letters to the Soviet Chairman and in his public speeches to the American people was emphasizing the destructive folly of war for both sides and the constructive benefits of peace.

In a November 1961 interview with *Izvestia*, conducted by Khrushchev's son-in-law, Kennedy again emphasized that "the Soviet Union suffered more by World War II than any country." He expressed hope that trade between our two countries could be expanded, once such issues as the status of West Berlin and an agreement on nuclear testing could be settled. The key requirement, he said, was for both superpowers to refrain from intervening in third countries, permitting each nation and its people to choose the economic and political system it wished and not have it "imposed by a small, militant group by subversion, infiltration or Soviet pressure ..

"We believe that if the Soviet Union—without attempting to impose the Communist system—will permit the people of the world to live as they wish to live, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States will then be very satisfactory, and our two peoples, which now live in danger, will be able to live in peace and with a greatly increased standard of living "

Asked whether his attitude would be different if he were a veteran of the Soviet Navy instead of the American Navy, and found his country still threatened by the Germans [West Germany--*Ed*] and by others in the West, the President, relaxing during the interview in his country home in Massachusetts, thought for a moment and replied: "As a Soviet veteran, I would want the Soviet Union to reach an agreement with the United States which recognizes the interest and commitments of the United States as well as our own ... The important thing is for the Soviet Union and the United States not to get into a war which would destroy both of our systems Our two peoples have the most to gain from peace."

II.

The turning-point—for Kennedy, for both nations, and for a world that had previously believed that a nuclear war between the two superpowers was ultimately inevitable—came nearly a year later with the crisis in the Caribbean known in the United States as the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is imperative that both countries reflect today, on the eve of a potential new era in Soviet-American relations, on the grim lessons of that crisis

It was twenty-six years ago this October 28 that the United States and the Soviet Union stepped back from the abyss. Through an exchange of constructive messages, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev mutually resolved the fearful crisis created by the Soviet emplacement of offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba.

By doing so, Khrushchev risked the wrath of those in the worldwide Communist camp who wanted Soviet missiles as close to the American mainland as possible, and Kennedy risked the wrath of those in Washington who wanted him to use this excuse to destroy the Castro regime in Cuba. Those unhappy with that statesman-like conclusion were few. Most of the world hailed with relief the peaceful resolution of this potentially nuclear confrontation. Even today, nearly 26 years later, their joint statesmanship is still widely regarded as a classic model of successful crisis management and a watershed in world history. Under the most tense conditions, with political temperatures and public fears rising, with nuclear weapons on alert and military men in the ascendancy, the civilian leaders of the two superpowers

had kept cool and kept the peace. Perhaps a third world war was avoidable after all.

A meeting last year at Harvard University between Soviet and American participants in the crisis, however, reminded those of us present from both countries that any excessive self-congratulation on our part was unwarranted. There was nothing glorious about taking the world to the brink of destruction. The crisis was well-managed, to be sure. But it was also unwise, unwarranted and unnecessary in the first place; and, all management efforts notwithstanding, it came close to spinning out of control before it was ended.

At the heart of the crisis were certain basic assumptions in the minds of the policy-makers on both sides in 1962.

- The Soviets, in justifying the original missile emplacement, assumed that the Americans were preparing to invade Cuba.

- The Americans, advised by their experts on Soviet military behavior, assumed that the Soviets would never station nuclear weapons outside the safety of their own borders.

- The Soviets assumed that they could place an entire complex of nuclear missile bases in Cuba without the United States learning about them until they were operational.

- The Americans assumed that the missiles were stationed in Cuba "under a cloak of secrecy and deception," in Kennedy's words, in order to pressure the United States into making concession on West Berlin.

- The Soviets assumed that Kennedy was "too intellectual," in Khrushchev's words, to respond to this threat with anything stronger than protests to the Soviet Union's exercise of its "equal and sovereign" right to place offensive missiles wherever it wished and in whatever manner it wished.

- The Americans assumed that the U.S. U2 photoreconnaissance plane that was shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) on the penultimate and darkest day of the crisis had been downed at the explicit order of the Soviet high command.

- The Soviets assumed that sabotage raids against Cuba immediately before and after the crisis had been specifically ordered by Kennedy for those dates in order to intimidate Soviet as well as Cuban decision-makers.

- At least some of the Americans who favored a conventional military air strike on the Soviet missile sites, to be followed by an invasion of Cuba, assumed that the Soviets would not dare respond to such an attack by taking military action in the Caribbean or anywhere else in the world.

- At least some of the Soviets advising Chairman Khrushchev in this crisis believed that John F. Kennedy was morally capable, if the U.S.S.R. did not remove its missiles from Cuba, of launching a first-strike nuclear attack against the Soviet Union.

Both sides now know that every one of those key assumptions on the part of both governments was wrong.

These nine assumptions went to the heart of each nation's strategy and response. They were among the foundation stones of each side's thinking and planning during those crucial hours when the fate—the very survival—of the world may have been at stake. Yet every one of those nine assumptions was based on a miscalculation, a misjudgment or a misunderstanding. As a result, what U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk has termed the "most dangerous crisis in history" brought the world close to a war, potentially a nuclear war, that neither the Americans nor the Soviets nor Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted or

believed necessary. Among the decision-makers in both capitals, we now know, fear of a nuclear war at that moment was widespread.

We also realized at that Harvard Conference that, despite the vast differences in our two systems and societies, the two superpowers faced several common problems and common pressures in the management of the crisis.

(1) Neither side had a clear understanding of how the other side was making its decisions. In both the White House and the Kremlin, speculation was voiced to the effect that military hardliners in the other capital could take the reins from the civilian commander-in-chief in determining the outcome of the crisis. Both sides learned at Harvard that such speculation was groundless.

(2) Neither side felt it could meaningfully survive the nuclear destruction that the other side was capable of inflicting upon it, whatever the disparity in numbers of warheads at that time. That was a prudent conclusion.

(3) Both sides, despite elaborate systems of military command and control, found that they could not prevent technological and human failings at the scene of operations from posing unintended risks of escalation. (Recent unnecessarily tragic airliner incidents involving each country have reminded us once again that the best military technology is no better than the information and judgment of the people who operate that technology, and that adequate time to correct misinformation and misjudgments may be crucial to the prevention of an unnecessary nuclear war.)

(4) Both Kennedy and Khrushchev formulated their initial courses of action under the restraints of tight secrecy, and both believed their final choices were subject to the most severe pressures of time.

(5) Even superpower chiefs felt obligated in 1962 to take into account the views of their allies and neighbors, to listen to the United Nations Secretary General, and to weigh each other's proposals in the light of what the world's opinionmakers and future historians would deem justifiable and reasonable.

(6) Finally, both Kennedy and Khrushchev were sobered by the unprecedented experience of peering at each other down their respective nuclear gun barrels; and both decided there had to be a better way of resolving their countries' conflicting interests.

This planet has changed in 26 years, and not all for the better. Nuclear weapons are now far more powerful and numerous. The United Nations is weaker. The forces of irrationality in the world are stronger. The ideological, geographical, historical, political and economic interests of the two superpowers still clash. The mistrust and ignorance of each by the other has diminished comparatively little, despite recent summits and pacts.

Yet there are valuable lessons for both Moscow and Washington to remember from the successful resolution of this crisis. At the Harvard Conference, it was inevitable that the representatives of two such different systems would disagree on some aspects of the past. Yet our agreement was virtually unanimous on at least three of the lessons to be learned from both our mistakes and our successes 26 years ago:

LESSON ONE: Given the limitations on either side's ability to control events, *crisis prevention* in the nuclear age is a lot more important and less risky than *crisis management*. Both delegations at Harvard agreed that Khrushchev's establishment of missile sites in Cuba had failed to consider adequately the probable consequences and U.S. reaction, and that Kennedy had failed to make his country's vital interests and intentions sufficiently clear in advance to Khrushchev. Neither side can afford to repeat that kind of error today. Both sides

must reduce nuclear weapons and bring their conventional forces into balance.

LESSON TWO: Given each side's inability to know with certainty the other's response, each superpower must move with caution and flexibility in a crisis, never driving the other into a corner where it would face a disastrously narrow choice between humiliation and escalation. Instead, each side must always keep an open mind about mutual concessions, and constantly strive to see the situation as the other side sees it.

LESSON THREE: Given the grave dangers and great likelihood of miscalculation and misunderstanding, continued confidential communication even during the height of a crisis is indispensable. Dialogue and diplomacy are as important during a crisis—as well as before and after—as defense and deterrence. Our two countries may never see eye to eye on many subjects. We may never love each other or wholly trust each other. But, if we are not to destroy each other, each needs to know and understand the other better. Increased scientific, educational and cultural exchanges will help, as will an increase of trade and tourism in both directions.

These three lessons will be no less relevant to Messrs. Gorbachev and Dukakis (if he is elected) in 1989 than they were to Messrs. Khrushchev and Kennedy in 1963.

III.

The conclusion, drawn by both leaders at the end of the crisis, that "there had to be a better way of resolving their country's conflicting interests"—gained strength in both countries during 1963, Kennedy's last year in office.

I have elsewhere termed those productive months of 1963 "one brief period of symmetry." I referred not to a superpower symmetry of forces, weapons or military assistance, which can be a useful concept in diplomacy, not to a superpower symmetry of moral values and political systems, which is not realistically achievable in our lifetime. I referred instead to a superpower symmetry of effective, constructive leadership in lessening the prospects for war and building the bonds of peace. For 1963 produced the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—the first step toward nuclear arms limitation in history, the "hot line" for swift emergency communications between Moscow and Washington, the first large-scale sale of American grain to the Soviet Union, an agreement to ban weapons of mass destruction from outer space, and a new attitude of positive reciprocity in both capital cities.

Both John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev, whatever their other qualities, were in 1963 able to see their respective nations' needs beyond the Cold War. Both were strong enough and smart enough to break through the cycle of suspicion that had theretofore fuelled the arms race and prevented any serious nuclear arms agreement. Both could bring around or override the naysayers in their own governments. Both were bold, decisive, determined leaders; and both had lived through—and would never forget—the Cuban missile crisis.

That is the posture of positive reciprocity to which I referred early in this article as characterizing the approach of both John Kennedy and Michael Dukakis. By reciprocity, I do not mean assured affection or trust between the two superpowers. Instead it is a concept that expects each of them to undertake a genuine and sustained effort to live and work together, to resolve their conflicts of interests by means other than the use or threat of military forces, to enter into verifiable agreements on arms control and reduction that serve their common needs, and to

recognize each other's legitimate security concerns. The basis of reciprocity is the grim knowledge on both sides that neither can truly "win" either an arms race or a nuclear war, and that both superpowers have more to gain by preventing such a war, and more to lose if it breaks out, than anyone else on earth.

If reciprocity is to succeed, neither side should adopt the old practice of offering for public relations or propaganda purposes proposals that it knows full well the other side cannot accept. Both superpower leaders and their military chiefs should eschew the kind of war-like oratory that in past years has increased the world's fears while diminishing the prospects for successful negotiations.

I am certain that Dukakis, like Kennedy, would not be willing (and neither would Bush) to undertake unilateral disarmament, or make one sided diplomatic concessions to Moscow, or tolerate Soviet military aggression. If a future arms race or confrontation is made unavoidable by Soviet conduct, he would be prepared to lead it. But no such arms race or confrontation should be necessary. It is my belief that both countries and their future leaders increasingly recognize that this is no longer a bi-polar world in which the East-West struggle is all that matters; that neither superpower can endlessly expand its military commitments abroad without endangering its economic stability at home; that neither can go it alone in this increasingly interdependent world or stand still in this rapidly changing world; and that, in this context, repeatedly testing each other's will or nerve in explosive regional conflicts makes no sense.

Both superpower leaders, in 1989 and the years that follow, if they are to be more effective than their predecessors, must be able to take the long view, to acknowledge error, to prevent the perfect from driving out the good, to narrow the gap between the desirable and the possible, to bargain, to compromise, to defer, and occasionally to take "yes" for an answer.

If our two countries and their respective leaders can negotiate in that spirit, there is much to negotiate—including deep cuts in the production and deployment of nuclear and antisatellite weapons, conventional and chemical weapons reductions, nuclear and missile testing bans, accidental war and environmental safeguards, renewed efforts to halt the spread to other countries of nuclear weapons and the plutonium from which they are made, and new agreements on trade and cultural exchange.

In short, a posture of positive reciprocity between our two very different societies resembles a bicycle built for two. If either person fails to mount or to pedal, or stubbornly insists upon heading in his own direction, then the bicycle will not function. If either person attempts to counteract or mislead the other, then the joint effort will collapse. But if both bike riders wish the vehicle to move, then it will go forward—slowly, at the start, and no doubt with some difficulty, trepidation and disagreement by both parties—but it will go forward.

An era of reciprocity would not signify an end to competition between the superpowers for friends and influence among developing nations, a political, cultural and economic competition from which Americans should not shrink. Nor would it bring an end to each nation rejecting and publicly deploring the other's system and practices. Whatever the outcome of our presidential election in this country, neither the leader of the U.S. nor the leader of the Soviet Union will abandon his nation's principles or allies. Our differences will remain, for those differences are real. But, as John F. Kennedy said at American Univer-

WE KNOW EACH OTHER FOR CENTURIES

Janet M. HARTLEY

There have been formal contacts between Russia and Britain since 1553. In this year a group of officials and merchants in London financed a voyage to discover a north-east passage to the Indies in order to give British traders access to the rich markets of China and the East. Three ships left England on 18 May 1553 carrying a letter from King Edward VI addressed to 'all kings, princes, rulers, judges and governors of the earth...' and stressing the mutual benefit to be had from foreign trade.

The expedition was unsuccessful in its search for a route to the East. Two of the ships were forced to winter off Lapland where their crews perished, but the third ship, the *Edward Bonaventure*, reached the White Sea and arrived at the mouth of the Dvina river. The captain of the ship, Richard Chancellor, was invited to Moscow where he delivered Edward's letter to Tsar Ivan IV and received in return a letter from Ivan to the English king expressing his willingness to receive English ships and to negotiate on trade matters. From this chance beginning, commercial and diplomatic relations were established between the two countries and over the following centuries contacts developed and broadened to include many other areas of activity.

The extent and variety of contacts between Britain and Russia are reflected in the rich holdings of British archives. The survey of the holdings of British archives was carried out at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, over a period of three years, from 1982 to 1985. The project was funded by Liverhulme Trust and supplementary grant was received from the Nuffield Foundation. A *Guide* has recently been compiled to the documentary sources in Britain relating to Russia and the Soviet Union.¹ The *Guide* lists 331 repositories holding such material and since its completion further holdings have come to light.

The main repository holding material concerning to diplomatic relations between Britain and Russia is the Public Record Office in London. Documents relating to Russia can be found in many classes of records but particularly fruitful are the following: State Papers, Foreign (up to 1782); Foreign Office (after 1782); Admiralty, War Office; Cabinet Office; private collections of ministers and diplomats. The India Office Library and Records, also in London, hold public records relating to India and *inter alia* much material on Russian expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Scottish Record Office in Edinburgh and the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland in Belfast also hold public records and private papers and have large collections relating to Russia.

Large holdings on Russia can also be found in the major British national and university libraries—the British Library* (London), National Library of Scotland (Edinburgh), National Library of Wales

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(Aberystwyth), Bodleian Library (Oxford), Cambridge University Library, British Library of Political and Economic Science (London), John Rylands University Library of Manchester etc.—and in the national military and naval museums—the National Army Museum, the Imperial War Museum and the National Maritime Museum (all in London).

An attempt was made to track down material on Russia which has been deposited in less obvious places. Therefore, enquiries were made of public libraries, city museums, regimental museums, banks, chambers of commerce, firms with Russian connections, political parties, trade unions, newspapers, learned societies and a variety of scientific, medical, artistic, cultural, religious, missionary and charitable associations and organisations which had contacts with Russia.

Holdings of these small repositories bring to light some of more unusual and interesting material relating to Russia. For example, the Museum and Library of the Order of St. John (London) holds a copy of the document of Paul I which established the Order in Russia and accounts and protests by the Priory of St John in Russia about the capture of Malta by the French in 1789; the Society of Merchant Venturers of Bristol record complaints by merchants about the seizure of cargoes of Russian iron in 1791; the United Grand Lodge of England Library (London) holds material on freemason lodges in St Petersburg and Riga in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; the Shakespeare Birthplace Trust (Stratford-upon-Avon) holds a diary of a visit to Russia in 1869 and costume designs by F. P. Komisarzhenskii; the Alpine Club Library (London) has photographs and photographic slides of the Caucasus in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the Scout Association's Archives (London) hold the log-book and photographs of the 1st Archangel Scout Troups, 1918-19.

County and municipal record offices are the main repositories for local records and considerable collections have been recorded of traders, manufacturers, diplomats, soldiers (serving in the Crimean War and the Allied intervention), travellers and tourists which include material on Russia. Northamptonshire Record Office (in Northampton) is an illustration of the variety of holdings that can be found in a county record office. Twenty-six collections have been recorded which include the following diverse material: an account of a dispute at cards signed by the British ambassador in Russia, 1740; a letter about the education of the future Paul I, 1770; a memorandum on the baptism of Princess Bariatskaia, 1807; a letter describing Tiflis, 1814; extracts from the notebook of an English clergyman in Archangel, 1824; material on the Crimean War including letters from soldiers, a journal and diary written during the war, letters on British policy, plans of Sebastopol, notes on British cemeteries in the Crimea and three letters in Russian taken from Sebastopol; notes on a housing tour of Russia, 1935; notes on the USSR and the Second World War, 1941-2; papers relating to the reception given to Bulganin and Khrushchev by the Mayor of Northampton, 1956.

Records relating to Russia in British archives date from the middle of the sixteenth century although some documents of an earlier provenance have found their way into British archives.² The earliest document recorded in the *Guide* is a strange one—a certificate of a sale of a Russian female slave at Venice, dated 7 February 1450, held by the British Library. Early records comprise royal letters between the rulers of England and Russia concerned mainly with the granting of trading privileges to English merchants. By the time Richard Chancellor returned to England Edward VI was dead and the first royal correspondence took place between Ivan IV and Elizabeth I. These

letters are held in the British Library, the Public Record Office, the Bodleian Library and Cambridge University Library and many of them have been published. Trading concerns are paramount at this time, but unfortunately a vital source for early trading contacts has been lost—the records of the Muscovy Company were destroyed during the Great Fire of London (1666). Partly in consequence of this, but also because contacts were of a limited nature in the second half of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is little surviving material in British archives covering the first century and a half of Anglo-Russian relations.³

The situation changes dramatically in the eighteenth century, with the reign of Peter the Great, and in particular with his visit to England in 1698. From this point the importance of Russia in European affairs is reflected in the increasing amount of diplomatic correspondence relating to Russia to be found in British archives. The growing importance of Russian trade is also apparent, and both public and private collections in the archives show the importance as the century progresses of the import of Russian timber, tar and hemp (so important for the British navy) and the export of a variety of British goods (including a Wedgwood dinner service for Catherine II). Although there are travel accounts and commentaries on Russia dating from before the eighteenth century, it is from this time there is evidence of a keen interest in the country and the people of Russia, shown by the travel accounts, diaries, scientific and learned papers on Russian phenomena and customs etc found in British archives. These contacts developed and broadened in the nineteenth century, reflecting the wider cultural contacts that developed between the two countries. Nineteenth-century records, however, are dominated by foreign affairs and document the growth of Russian influence in the Balkans and in Asia, and the British reaction to this.

The bulk of documents are relating to military matters although the internal affairs of Russia continue to provoke great interest, especially, of course, the Revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Coverage of Soviet affairs since the Second World War is less comprehensive. This is due to the fact that all British public records are by convention closed for thirty years and to the fact that many papers are still in private hands.

Military contacts with Russia are recorded from an early date. There is a history from the seventeenth century of Britons, and in particular Scots, seeking their fortune in the Tsar's service as soldier, and the Scottish Record Office holds a licence given to Sir Aleksei Mikhailovich attesting that Captain Villiers from Scotland, who had served, in his army and now wished to return home, was a skilled soldier, and the Scottish Record Office holds a licence given to Sir Alexander Leslie for levying soldiers in Scotland for Russian service in 1633 and an 'instrument of sasine' (a legal document giving possession of feudal property) by General Patrick Gordon, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, dated Moscow 1692. The journals of General James Keith while commanding the Russian troops in Finland against Sweden, 1741-3, and the careers of Admiral Thomas Gordon and Admiral Charles Knowles in Russian service in the eighteenth century are also recorded in the British archives. Of particular interest among early naval records is the Lieutenant's log of the *Royal Transport*, the fast experimental schooner given to Peter I by William III on Peter's visit to England, which is held by the National Maritime Museum and

many other documents, held mainly in the Public Record Office, Admiralty Papers, relating to this ship and the tobacco monopoly, which the gift was intended to secure for London merchants.

As Russia's importance in European affairs became more pronounced in the eighteenth century, so diplomatic papers in the British archives comment more on military campaigns in which Russia was involved, including the Great Northern War, the Seven Years War, the Russo-Turkish wars of 1768-74 and 1787-91, and the French Revolutionary and then Napoleonic Wars. British concern with Russian military strength in the first half of the nineteenth century is reflected by a growing documentation on Balkan and Near Eastern affairs and on Russian expansion into Asia. The result of this conflict of interests was the Crimean War and, as mentioned above, this campaign has generated far more documentation in the British archives than any other campaign or, for that matter, event in the history of Anglo-Russian relations. The many letters from British soldiers serving in the Crimea, held mainly in county record offices and military and regimental museums, comment on the hardships suffered during the campaign and inadequacy of supplies and medical provision. These views are confirmed by the medical army records—casualty returns, registers of cases, incidence of cholera, correspondence and reminiscences by doctors—held in the archive of the Royal Army Medical College (Aldershot) and elsewhere, by the reports made by the famous English hospital reformer Florence Nightingale on the nursing situation (main collection of her papers is in the St Thomas' Hospital papers held in the Greater London Record Office), and in the dispatches and correspondence of Sir William Russel, correspondent of *The Times*, whose reports about conditions and British policy caused a sensation at the time (the main collection of his papers is held by the archive of *The Times* newspaper in London). There are also papers and letters relating to individual battles and incidents, including accounts by the few survivors of the Charge of the Light Brigade. The harsh consequences of war for the dependants of those killed can be seen in the many papers relating to fund-raising activities for the widows and orphans of soldiers who had died in the war.

Among the documents relating to the Crimean War several are of Russian provenance, presumably picked up by British soldiers as souvenirs, and somehow these documents have found their way into British archives. They include: a diary of a Russian officer containing a number of small prints (Regimental Museum of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, Bodmin); the military journal and account book of the garrison at Kinburn, 1853 (Cambridge University Library); two Russian documents relating to the Naval Hospital in Sebastopol, dated 1840 and 1844 (British Library); a case report on a Russian sailor and a request for hospital supplies and request for leave picked up in Sebastopol (Royal College of Surgeons of England, London); a Russian pharmacist's ledger, 1850 (Newstead Abbey, Nottingham). The Crimean War is also interesting for the number of sketches and watercolours of the campaign and the surrounding scenery which have been preserved; as well as for collections of early photographs by Roger Fenton.

There are less British records on the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 and the Russo-Japanese War in which the British were not active participants, although British concern about the outcome of these wars is documented in diplomatic papers. In addition to military and diplomatic papers concerning Russia in the First World War, the archives also hold interesting material on some of the lesser known areas of Anglo-Russian contact during the war, for example, the work of the

Scottish Women's Hospital in Rumania and Russia, 1916-17, is documented in Edinburgh Central Library and the National Library of Scotland, and the University of London Library holds the diaries of Lt-Col Alfred Claude Bromhead during his mission to Russia in 1916-17 to show propaganda films to the Russian forces (he travelled to Petrograd on the same train as Lenin and makes some reference to the arrival at the Finland Station).

Documentary material concerning the Allied intervention in Russia is less extensive than concerning the Crimean War, but letters, diaries and photographs have been preserved and the largest collections can be found in the Imperial War Museum and Peter Liddle's 1914-18 Personal Experience Archive at Sunderland Polytechnic (135 records, written and oral, have been listed in this repository). Tape recordings have also been made of the experiences of participants in the military and naval campaigns of the Allied intervention. Many of the papers relating to the Second World War are still in private possession (important exceptions are the Beaverbrook papers in the House of Lords Record Office (London) and the Liddell Hart Collection in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London), but there are records relating to diplomatic activity, Allied convoys and Royal Air Force operations in the USSR, to give but a few examples.

It has already been shown that trade was the cause of the opening of relations between England and Russia, and trade and economic factors have been of vital importance ever since. Royal letters of the second half of the sixteenth century almost exclusively concern the trading privileges of English merchants of the Muscovy Company, and although few documents concerning this early trade survive, the archives show the continuing concern of the English merchants with the Russian trade. Amongst the early records are notes concerning the benefit to England of the Russian trade by M. Tok, 1575 (Trinity College, Cambridge); a letter to Robert Carr, Lord Rochester, on Russian trade c. 1613 (Cambridge University Library); a contract for trading voyage to Archangel, 1637 (Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich); the text of a new trade statute with Russia, 1667 (British Library). Documentation in the British archives on trade with Russia increases substantially from the eighteenth century onwards, reflecting the growing importance of this trade. Among the goods concerned are agricultural machinery, carpets, flax, furniture, furs, guns, iron, jute, linen, locomotives, mining equipment, oil shale, rails, saws, shipping, textiles, timber and woollen goods as well as more unusual ones such as beer, icebreakers, hides for periwigs (1702-3), pigs from Siberia (1926-35) and sheep-rips (1896-7)! Records of British companies which operated in Russia have also been preserved, and many of their records are extensive.

Few British firms maintain their own archives, which meant that it was easier to find information relating to the pre-revolutionary trade of firms which had deposited their older records, or which had ceased trading, than to find records concerning recent or current trade with the USSR. British banks have preserved their records more systematically and contain material concerning Russian loans and other aspects of Russian economic and political life. The Midland Bank Archives (London), for example, include the following: Union Bank of Moscow papers, including balance sheets and memoranda, 1907-9; lists of shares in Russian banks, 1908-9; loan correspondence with the municipalities of Odessa and Moscow, 1909; papers of the Bank's agent in

St Petersburg/Petrograd including comments on the economic and political situation, 1913-18. The records of Baring Brothers and Co. (Guildhall Library, London) including statistics and papers on the state of the Russian economy from the 1850s, and the extensive records of the Rothschild Bank (London) include family correspondence from many parts of the Russian Empire as well as business papers on loans and Russian finances.

The records of learned and scientific societies are a rich source and demonstrate the extent of contacts between Britain and Russia in a great variety of academic and scientific areas of scholarship from the early eighteenth century. The Royal Society (London) has a draft and fair copy of the diploma given to Prince Menshikov as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1714. The minute-books of the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (London) list as members Count I. G. Chernyshev (1769), Father A. A. Samborskii (1774), Count A. I. Musin-Pushkin (1775), Grand Duke Nicholas (Nicholas I) (1817), and amongst the subscribing and honorary members recorded in the minutes of the Royal Institution (London) are Prince I. Gagarin, N. N. Novosil'tsev, Count G. Orlov and Prince P. M. Volkonskii.

Englishmen were also recognized by Russian learned societies and the archives hold the diploma conferring membership of the Imperial Academy of Sciences on Professor James Bradley, 1754 (Bodleian Library) and the diploma conferring honorary membership of the University of Khar'kov awarded to Robert Barnes, 1867 (Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, London), to give but two examples. The archives also record the considerable correspondence between British scientists and their Russian and Soviet counterparts. Particularly noticeable in this respect is the extent of correspondence with distinguished scientists such as A. O. Kovalevskii, D. I. Mendeleev and P. L. Kapitsa. The Royal Greenwich Observatory Archives (at present in Hailsham but will shortly be transferred to Cambridge) include correspondence and exchange of observations with the Pulkovo Observatory and with Russian astronomers from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present day and the Royal Botanic Gardens Archive includes correspondence with Russian botanists and directors of botanic gardens from the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century.

Several English and Scottish medical doctors entered Russian service and material relating to them can be found in the British archives. Documents relating to Dr Robert Erskine, physician to Peter I, include correspondence with various individuals including Admiral John Norris, the Earl of Mar (a Jacobite), Prince Golitsyn and Prince Menshikov. Dr James Mounsey, physician to Empress Elizabeth, corresponded with, amongst others, Dr John Hope of Edinburgh University concerning Russian rhubarb (Scottish Record Office) and Henry Baker of the Royal Society on many scientific subjects including rhubarb, electricity, monstrous births, everlasting sacred fire and black naphtha (Wellcome Institute and John Rylands University of Manchester Library). The certificate of Empress Elizabeth in favour of Dr. North Vigor upon his leaving her service is retained by the Royal College of Physicians' Library in Edinburgh. Of particular interest are the papers of Dr (later Baron) Thomas Dimsdale, who visited Russia to inoculate Catherine II and her family against smallpox, which include correspondence with members of the Imperial family, Count G. Orlov,

Count N. Panin, Count S. Vorontsov and Princess Dashkova (the papers remain in the possession of the Dimsdale family).

The documents in British archives testify to an interest in many aspects of the natural history of Russia. The British Museum of Natural History (London) includes material on Russian minerals from the late eighteenth century, drawings of fossils, shells and bones from Orenburg in 1877 and notes on egg collecting, birds, mammals and fossils made in the twentieth century. Correspondence, notebooks and drawings concerning Russian flora can be found in the Linnean Society of London, along with a paper on the locusts which devastated the Crimea in 1824 and notes on the ravages of the Black Sea teredo at Sebastopol in 1858. The Geological Society of London and British Geological Survey (Keyworth) contain nineteenth-century geological maps and drawings of Russian territory and records on rocks and meteorites.

There is a paper on the lepidoptera of the Ukraine, c. 1787-8, in the Royal Entomological Society of London and notebooks and papers about the birds of Russia in the Edward Grey Institute of Field Ornithology in Oxford. The Royal Geographical Society's extensive archives in London comprise maps and correspondence and papers concerning expeditions, and is particularly rich on material concerning the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia and the Far East. Particularly rich are the holdings of the Royal Society, which, as well as extensive correspondence with travellers and Russian scientists, include papers read on, amongst other things, 'Observations on the mammoth's bones and teeth found in Siberia' (1735), 'On the cold in St Petersburg in the winter of 1762-3' (1776), and 'Of the plan to recover people in Russia apparently deprived of life by the burning of quicksilver' (1779).⁴

The scientific papers relating to Russia frequently comment on aspects of Russian life and culture. Travellers' accounts are also a useful source in this respect. For example, the papers of Matthew Guthrie, traveller in Russia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, include notes on Russian customs and recreations, as well as a description of the Crimea and the English translation of the text of Catherine II's opera *Oleg* (British Library). Important travel records include those of Jerome Horsey and William Borrough (in the sixteenth century), Sir Dudley Diggs and Engelbert Kaempfer (in the seventeenth century), William Coxe and William Tooke (in the eighteenth century), Sir Robert Ker Porter and Lt-Col W. Monteith (in the nineteenth century) and Lt-Col Frederick Marsham Bailey and Morgan Philips Price (in the twentieth century). The papers of Anglo-Russian and Anglo-Soviet friendship societies have been preserved and include those of the Anglo-Russian Friendship Committee, Aid to Russia Fund, British-Soviet Society, Friends of Soviet Russia, and Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR.

Documents and correspondence relating to distinguished Russian literary and musical figures are preserved in the British archives, although, it must be said, the material is not extensive. There are verses by Alexander Pushkin (Greater London Record Office) and an unautographed manuscript of his poem 'Freedom' (The Wernher Collection, Luton Hoo). Correspondence of L. N. Tolstoi with, amongst others, Aylmer Maude, P. I. Biryukov, Isaac Heysinger, Percy Redfern and to Russian conscientious objectors has been preserved, as well as drafts of a passage of an earlier version of *Resurrection*, discarded in the printed edition (British Library), a draft of the preface to *Tsarstvo bozhie unutri vas* with corrections in Tolstoi's hand (Bodleian Library) and material relating to the Tolstoyan Community at Tuckton House (Brotherton Library). The archives also hold correspondence by

I. S. Turgenev and the poem 'Steno' (British Library) and letters from F. Dostoevskii and commentaries on his work.

Other Russian and Soviet literary manuscripts in the archives include: the poem 'Serenada' by V. A. Sollogub (Brotherton Library); manuscript and typescripts of the works of Daniil, Leonid and Vadim Andreev, Nikolai Bokov, Ivan Bunin, Natalya Kodrianskaia, David Magarshack, Aleksandr Aivazovskii and others (Brotherton Library, Leeds Russian Archive); typescript articles by Gor'kii and poems by V. Brusov and S. Esenin (London Library); correspondence and contracts with many Russian and Soviet writers in the papers of British publishers, including George Bell and Sons, Bodley Head, Jonathan Cape, Chatto and Windus, Longman and Macmillan and Company (Reading University Library). The following manuscript scores are also held in the British Library: 'petite suite' for piano by A. P. Borodin; musical scores by A. K. Glazunov; 'Darling Savishna' and 'Aus meinen Tränen' by M. P. Musorgskii; 'O Salutaris Hostia' by S. Rakhmaninov; 'Les Noces', 'Pulcinella', 'Chant des Bateliers du Volga' and 'Renard' by I. Stravinskii. The Royal College of Music (London) holds letters from Glazunov and Tchaikovsky, and the Royal Northern College of Music (Manchester) has the Adolph Brodsky collection, which includes letters from Tchaikovsky and Turgenev, photographs and family papers. The archives of the Royal Opera House, the London Festival Ballet and the Ballet Rambert (all in London) also contain material on Russian and Soviet performers and productions.

The archives of British religious and missionary societies contain interesting material relating to Russia and the Soviet Union, much of which comments on matters outside the immediate scope of the work of these societies. The archives of the Scottish Foreign Mission and Scottish Missionary Society (National Library of Scotland), Council for World Mission and Methodist Missionary Society (School of African and Oriental Studies Library, University of London), British and Foreign Bible Society (Cambridge University Library) include reports from representatives in Astrakhan', the Crimea, Ekaterinburg, Kiakhta, Khodun', Mongolia, Novgorod, Odessa, Orenburg, St. Petersburg, Sarepta, Siberia, Tiflis, Vladikavkaz and elsewhere from the early nineteenth century.

The archives of the British and Foreign Bible Society are particularly extensive and relate to the activity of missionaries in Russia, their finances, the staffing and administration of agencies and depots, and to Bible distribution and translation into Russian, Estonian, Armenian, Georgian, Ukrainian and several Turkic languages of the peoples of the USSR. The most records relate to the closure of the Leningrad and Siberian depots after the Revolution, and later translations of the Bible into Russian and meetings with Soviet churchmen—contact between the Bible Society and the Soviet Union ended only in 1970 when its functions were taken over by the United Bible Societies.

Some interesting documents relating to Russia can be found in the archives of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (London). They include: a report on the tutoring of Peter I's son; letters on the position and conditions of Catholics and Protestants in Russia and Lithuania in the early eighteenth century; a report on the need for Arabic Psalters for Persian prisoners in Russian garrisons, 1728; report on the presence of Alexander I at the Anniversary Service of Charity School Children in St Paul's Cathedral, 1814. The archives of the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (London in the *Guide* but now transferred to Rhodes House, Oxford) include a letter from Moscow mentioning that Peter I had given the Muscovy Company some ground on which to build a church and papers relating to sending chaplains to

the Crimea during the Crimean War. There are papers relating to Jesuits in Russia in the late eighteenth century (at the time of their suppression elsewhere) in the archives of the English Province of the Society of Jesus (London).

The Society of Friends (Quakers) have had close relations with Russia since the early nineteenth century. Alexander I visited, and addressed, the Westminster meeting of the Society in June 1814, and in the following year discussed the abolition of slavery with the prominent quaker Thomas Clarkson. These events are recorded in the archive of the Society of Friends (London) and elsewhere. The archives also document the visits to Russia by several quakers in the early nineteenth century and the history of the Wheeler family who settled there. More recent records cover the relief work by the quakers in Russia in the 1920s, visits to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and information relating to the quaker burial ground in Leningrad.

The papers of several Russian emigrants and revolutionaries are held in British archives. The Soskice papers (House of Lords Record Office) include papers and correspondence of David Soskice (1869-1943) relating to his experiences in Russia, his speeches and publications, the 'Free Russia' movement and the Russian Political Prisoners and Exiles Relief Committee. The papers of Aleksei Alad'in (John Rylands University Library of Manchester) are only partly sorted but include correspondence and papers relating to his membership of the First Duma. The archives of Prince Peter Kropotkin and S. M. Kravchinskii (pseudonym Stepniak) are now in the Soviet Union but many of their letters can be found in other collections in the British archives (there are Kropotkin letters, for example, in the British Library, Bromley Public Library, Cambridge University Library, Churchill College Archives Centre in Cambridge, the National Library of Scotland, Sydney Jones Library at the University of Liverpool, the British Library of Political and Economic Science, Dr William's Library (London), the Royal Geographical Society (London), University College London, Manchester City Archives Department, the Bodleian Library, and Sheffield Central Library).

The British archives hold disappointingly little on the leaders of the Socialist Revolution in Russia, however. There are collections of photographs of Lenin, but few papers, except for some memoranda and speeches (Brotherton Library at Leeds University in the Ransome papers and George Lomonossoff papers), and interview by C. A. Hill with Lenin (House of Lords Records Office) and letters from Lenin applying for a British Library Reading Room ticket under the name of Joseph Richter (British Library).

There are more records in the archives relating to British left-wing activists, organisations and parties. There are particularly rich collections in the Library of Political and Economic Science and the Brynmor Jones Library at Hull University which include the following (in the British Library of Political and Economic Science): notes by the scientist J. D. Bernal on the organisation of the International Economic Conference in Moscow, 1951; collection of the British Labour Delegation to Russia in 1920; papers of the trade unionist Sir Walter Citrine including his diary of a visit to the USSR, notes and papers on the USSR in general and trade unionism in particular; papers of the Labour Members of Parliament Baron Hugh Dalton and Denis Pritt including diaries of visits to the Soviet Union and papers relating to the USSR from the 1930s to the 1960s; papers of the National Peace Council;

pamphlets of the *Natsional'no trudovoi soyuz*, 1935-61; correspondence of George Bernard Shaw concerning the USSR; papers of Beatrice and Sidney Webb including correspondence, photographs, manuscripts of articles and notebooks relating to the USSR; papers of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom relating to the USSR; (in the Brynmor Jones Library): papers of Stanley Evans, Christian Socialist, including files on Anglo-Soviet friendship societies and diaries and scrapbooks of visits to the USSR; 'Report of a Group of Co-operators on a Visit to Russia' in 1930; papers of Robin Page-Arnott, historian of the labour movement, including reports of visits by the National Union of Miners to the USSR and an account of a Black Sea cruise by members of the British Peace Committee in 1966; papers of the Union for Democratic Control relating to the USSR.

There are also important collections covering contacts between trades unions in Britain and the USSR in the Modern Records Centre at Warwick University (Coventry) and in the Library and Archive of the Trades Union Congress (London). The Modern Records Centre also holds the papers of Rowland Barrett, socialist campaigner, including a letter to Nicholas II urging him to stop persecuting socialists, correspondence of R. Groves, pioneer member of the British Section of the International Left Opposition, a file relating to Russia in the papers of the Socialist Vanguard Group, papers of the Workers' International League and notes from the International Lenin School by Hugo Dewar, Henry Sara and Harry Wicks.

The Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 in Russia naturally provoked great interest in Britain and this is reflected in the holdings of the archives. There are too many documents to list in full but the following gives some indication of the nature of British holdings and of the variety of repositories holding material relating to the Revolution. Records include: letters describing the Revolution; recollections and eye-witness accounts; pamphlets; newspaper cuttings (especially in the *Illustrated London News* Picture Library); photographs (especially in the BBC Hulton Picture Library and the Marx Memorial Library, both in London); tape recordings of recollections (Peter Liddle's 1914-18 Personal Experience Archives); official correspondence from the Petrograd Embassy (Public Record Office and Cumbria Record Office, Carlisle); papers by Sir Samuel Hoare on the Russian situation from the British Intelligence Mission in Petrograd in 1917 (Cambridge University Library); reports on problems of transport and supply, the political situation and the economy in 1917 by Lord Davies, 1st Baron Llandinam, and his comments on the effect of the Revolution (National Library of Wales); Lloyd George's papers on the Russian Revolution (House of Lords Record Office); papers on the Russian Revolution by S. S. Kotlianskii (British Library); diary kept by Jessie Kenney of her visit to Russia with the suffragette Sylvia Pankhurst in 1917 (Fawcett Library, London); diaries by A. M. Scott (Labour MP) commenting on the Russian Revolution (Glasgow University Library); articles by Philips Morgan Price, correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, on the Revolution (Gloucestershire Record Office, Gloucester, Newcastle-upon-Tyne University Library and in private possession); account of events in 1917 by E. J. Harrison, correspondent of *The Times* (Imperial War Museum); notes made by S. C. Harris on the Neva Rope Works in Petrograd on the February Revolution and 'My Memories of the Russian Revolution' by Mrs R. G. Seaborn (Brotherton Library, Leeds Russian Archive); account by Oleg Brodsky of life in Russia immediately following the Revolution (Royal Northern College of Music); Memoirs of a journey to Russia after the Revolution by Sir Bernard Pares and essay by Alexander Block on 'Russia's Contribution to the New Order' relating

to the consequences of the Russian Revolution (School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London); handbill of a notice of a meeting in Hanley to celebrate the Russian Revolution (Staffordshire Record Office, Stafford).

Description of British archives demonstrates that there are rich resources for the study of many aspects of Anglo-Russian relations and Russian history. Further work needs to be done on many areas of Anglo-Russian relations, and it is hoped that the *Guide* will encourage scholars from many disciplines to use the archives and extend their researches. Finally, it is to be hoped that documents relating to Britain and Anglo-Russian relations in Soviet archives will be also made known and that ultimately joint projects for the description and publication of documentary material will be set up. A start has been made in this direction with the joint Anglo-Soviet project to publish documents relating to Anglo-Russian relations in the reign of Peter the Great.

¹ Janet M. Hartley, *Guide to Documents and Manuscripts in the United Kingdom Relating to Russia and the Soviet Union* (Mansell, London, 1987).

² Cyrillic manuscripts held by repositories in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland are described in the forthcoming publication R. Cleminson *A Union Catalogue of Slavonic Cyrillic Manuscripts in Great Britain and Ireland* (The Pennington Catalogue) (London, 1988).

³ Those documents which do exist are described in G. M. Phipps, 'Manuscript Collections in British Archives Relating to Pre-Petrine Russia' *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 6.3 (Fall 1972) pp. 400-415.

⁴ For further details about medical and natural history documents in British archives see John H. Appleby, 'A Survey of Some Anglo-Russian Medical and Natural History Material in British Archives, from the Seventeenth Century to the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century' in Janet M. Hartley, ed., *The Study of Russian History from British Archival Sources* (Mansell, London, 1986) pp. 107-31.

THE CARIBBEAN LESSONS

(Continued from page 95)

sity 25 years ago last June "If we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

DIPLOMATIC DIARY: A RECORD OF 23 YEARS

Alexandra KOLLONTAI

Notebook One. Norway, 1922-1923

November 12

I am beginning to familiarise myself with the work routine here but am not engrossed in it as yet. In Moscow I was used to being everywhere at once, to always being in a hurry, to never eating enough and getting less sleep than I needed, with everybody in the International Women's Secretariat, the Moscow Party Committee and editorial offices seeking my help, wanting to see me. Here, however, I am something of an appendage and an unwanted one at that.

Marcel* says: "That's because ours isn't a real diplomatic mission as yet but only a trade delegation for the time being. We must win *de jure* recognition, and then you'll see how much work we have to do and how badly you're needed here."

I wish I could believe him but my idleness and my being unwanted depress me. [.]

Christiania, November 29

I had an interesting conversation with a parliamentarian Scheffo yesterday. He says the question of recognising us is a current topic in political quarters and may become an acute issue in view of an imminent cabinet crisis. Mowinkel's party (Liberals) may call precisely during its campaign against the Conservatives for recognition of the Soviet Union, using this as a trump card. But if we want this to come about the Soviet mission must take the initiative on two issues of importance to Norway: it must proceed in practice to trade with the Norwegians—the department of trade is concerned with this now—and the cabinet will fully support a proposal of the Soviet Trade Delegation on the outline of a trade plan for 1923.

The other question is purely political; it is about recognition by the RSFSR of Norway's sovereignty over Spitsbergen. Scheffo, noted as a politician and greatly reckoned with in parliament even though he is a Communist, considers that settling the Spitsbergen question is of more decisive importance for establishing diplomatic relations between Norway and our country than even growing trade and economic relations between us.

That is an interesting idea. It tempts me to concern myself with it in earnest. Norwegian sovereignty over Spitsbergen is a pretty

Continued from *International Affairs*, Nos 10 and 11, 1988

* Second Secretary of the Soviet Mission in Norway. — Ed.

complicated diplomatic problem, and this is also Comrade Surits'* opinion. [...]

BUSINESS TRIP TO THE HAGUE FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE

December 8

Everything is ready for me to leave for The Hague tonight; my passport with a German visa, a sleeping-car ticket and German currency—marks worth nothing—are all in my travelling handbag. I am going via Berlin because going by boat would take longer whereas I must hurry; all our delegates have already left for the conference. To be sure, a peace conference called by the leadership of the Second International will hardly help at all in stabilising peace but I am very glad I can attend the Hague Conference. [...]

Berlin, December 13

I am staying in Berlin, in the splendid building of the Soviet Mission on Unter den Linden Street. The expensive but official-looking furniture comes from the former tsarist embassy. Once the building was owned by Talleyrand or his niece Dinot. I recalled as I had a look around Talleyrand's times and Napoleon's wars under the slogan "For freedom"... It was a puzzling period. Without the guide that is Marx's scientific method of analysing events and without Lenin's revelation of the motive forces of the contemporary class struggle, which make it possible to see clear in what goes on and to forecast political conflicts.

Talleyrand walked over this parquet thinking of how to sting Metternich and tame Napoleon with his boundless confidence in his invincibility. As for Berlin, it was a provincial town at the time, the capital of Prussia alone.

And now the Soviet Republic has the Rapallo Treaty with a war-ravaged Germany. [...]

December 20. Back to Holmenkollen

I am back from The Hague to snowbound Holmenkollen. The conference was drawing to a close when I finally reached The Hague.

I was late for the Soviet delegates' speeches but it was clear that we were feared and shunned, nor did our draft resolutions win the necessary vote. [...] I gave two talks on the eve of my departure from The Hague. One was about the main principles of our Soviet state and its active role in the struggle for peace. It drew many male delegates, and the atmosphere was lively. The talk was a success, questions were asked but there was no discussion.

The subject of the other talks was women's achievements in the Soviet Republic, our methods of work among women and the laws establishing complete equality for women. "You are a living illustration of that principle, Mrs. Kollontai," shouted someone from the audience. [...]

The trip to The Hague was useful.

MY FIRST VISIT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

December 22

I was introduced to Foreign Minister Mowinckel yesterday. Then came Esmarch, his deputy bearing the title of Secretary General. [...]

* Soviet Ambassador in Norway. — *Ed.*

After asking some questions about The Hague Conference, Mowinckel spoke of the latest League of Nations session in Geneva, where he is a permanent delegate. As for Esmarch, he asked Surits at once when the Trade Delegation (meaning us) was going to start talks on purchasing herring for 1923. [...]

Following the visit to the Ministry I was accredited definitively as adviser to the Trade Delegation. This will enable me to substitute for Surits as chargé d'affaires. Jackheden, too, is only chargé d'affaires in Moscow.

1923 [...]

January 8, evening

I paid a New Year's visit to Mowinckel at the Ministry. He gave me a friendly welcome and moved on to commercial affairs after we had wished each other a happy New Year. He complained of slow progress in talks on purchasing herring.

"Tell your chiefs in Moscow that so uncommercial an attitude to the contemplated commercial transaction doesn't dispose Norwegian merchants to do business with you. Yet you, Mrs. Kollontai, have come here to promote our trade with your country, haven't you?"

I said yes but pointed out that we were not holding up talks on purchasing herring but the Norwegian Department of Trade was making proposals unacceptable to us. (Our Ambassador and Mission employees in charge of trade had complained of this to me.) [.]

I promised to work on the problem of a basis for herring purchases and voiced satisfaction at being back in Norway, where I had spent two years as a political exile...

I found it appropriate to praise Nansen for his humanitarian activity in favour of refugees and added that Nansen was very popular in the Soviet Republic as a result of his activity in 1920 and 1921 aimed at providing relief to the famine-stricken Volga region. Nansen had made the Norwegians popular with us.

The expression on Mowinckel's face suggested that he was pleased with my words. We gave each other a simple friendly goodbye, and I left feeling that my visit had not been in vain. [...]

January 25

Surits has gone to Berlin, apparently in connection with his likely assignment to Turkey. As for me, I am still his deputy, or as Oshmyansky * said with the stiff accuracy of an official: "You are acting Ambassador, Comrade Kollontai."

Whatever my present title, I am solidly tied to my office, and all staff members come to consult me on all sorts of affairs and problems.

This is as it should be, is instructive. But then I am responsible for whatever happens, big and small things alike. [...]

February 1

What am I to do about those men and officers of what has been Miller's White army, those who keep on fleeing to Norway from our North and besieging the Mission with requests to send them home, that is, to Soviet Russia?

The Norwegian authorities refuse for some reason to intern these deserters from the White army but neither do they give them any jobs. Runaways forcibly recruited by White generals to their counter-revolu-

* Mission Secretary. — *Ed.*

tionary armies call at the Mission, And I look with pity at those ragged, emaciated and homesick Russian peasants who run down their tyrants, General Miller and his gang. Among these visitors there are many seamen who deserted from the Russian merchant marine even before 1917. What they yearn for above all else is to go home, to Russia and their land, and join the ranks of those who stand for the people, for the Soviets.

But we cannot send them home without a careful check-up, nor can we grant them any allowance because the Mission lacks funds for the purpose. The result is an ugly situation where Russian refugees seek help from their country's mission, a Soviet institution, but we refuse them an allowance. Naturally, they turn to the former tsarist consul, Kristi. And those deserters from Miller's army get financial aid from him. This bolsters the standing of the one-time tsarist legation in Norwegian eyes while detracting from our prestige.

I am going to write to Litvinov about this with the next courier to insist on allocating special funds in aid for Russians. As for whom we should let in, we will settle that here together with Norwegian Communists. I hope Litvinov will understand what I want, what I am asking him for. [...]

March 5

The Liberal cabinet has fallen I went to say good-bye to Mowinckel. The waiting room was full of diplomats. Mowinckel assured me that Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Republic would not change with his departure. He was going to work for his part to strengthen Norway's friendship with our country. He said the concession granted by us to the Vinge Company had made a favourable impression in Norway. If we purchased herring and signed a treaty with herring merchants in early spring, he added, the question of *de jure* recognition could be raised even before the Storting was dissolved. The hint was aimed at making us hurry to purchase fish. [.]

March 9

A new, Conservative ministry has been formed. Halvorsen was appointed Prime Minister; Michelet, a brilliant lawyer, is Foreign Minister ..

March 27

Surits has left Norway. He has gone to Berlin and is to be assigned to Turkey. [..] The entire responsibility for the affairs of the Mission and for our work in Norway now rests with me although there is still no formal announcement that I am left here as ambassador of the Soviet state. I am still "acting ambassador" but this makes no real difference. The Norwegian authorities consider me full-fledged head of the Trade Delegation and representative of our Republic. [..]

April 12

Everything is overshadowed by news from friends in Moscow. The news does not merely hurt, it is terrifying. I cannot conceive of Lenin's condition being hopeless. [...]

April 13 [...]

I paid Nansen a friendly visit. Although he has introduced so-called Nansen passports that are used by Whites who have fled Soviet Russia, Nansen has been and remains our friend none the less.

He lives in a country villa of his own, on the shore of a bay, near the small town of Lysaker. There was a lot of light and sunshine in the villa, and blazing in a huge room were pine logs.

On hearing that I was there, Nansen came running down the inner stairs with such youthful nimbleness and speed that you could have forgotten his age. [...]

Nansen is a great man with a magnetic personality. He has wonderful eyes, blue and clever. They reflect his inflexible resolve and will. There is something as hard and cold in them as polar ice. But when he smiles a sunray seems to steal into those blue eyes. He is tall, solidly built and lithe. A titan rather than just a man. This explains why an indomitable will coexists in him with a warm heart and ready response to human suffering. But his thoughts are only about the destinies of whole peoples. Right now he is preoccupied with thoughts about Armenia. He is fighting in the League of Nations for the Armenian people, for their right to freedom, for their protection from the Turks' encroachments. This is what this titan of humanity now lives for.

I admired him as I listened to his fervent plea for national self-determination. Aren't we, too, defending it in our Republic, and isn't it one of Lenin's propositions?

We moved on from general matters to the question uppermost in my mind. What did Nansen think of our standing in Norway? Could we look forward to an early settlement of diplomatic relations between our country and his?

Nansen did not reply at once. His eyes were fixed on the blazing fireplace as he evidently pondered on my question.

"Take your time over raising that issue with the new cabinet," he answered at last. "Give the new ministers a chance to get used to their armchairs. They must first show themselves to be reasonable and competent administrators of the country. Sympathy in Norway isn't in their favour. Public opinion is unhappy about the Liberals' downfall. Besides, there is that complication over Greenland. You must wait for a propitious moment. Learn to be patient, Mrs. Kollontai. Patience is a great force, especially in diplomacy."

I said the fact that relations with us were still unsettled benefited neither us nor the Norwegians themselves.

Nansen agreed but added that our Trade Delegation was too passive and that we should show Norway in practice that the Norwegians stood to gain from friendly relations with new Russia.

"You mean purchasing herring," I said jokingly.

"That too," Nansen replied earnestly. "But in general you should establish more economic and political ties with the Norwegians. You're neglecting an important aspect of diplomatic work, the task of cultivating the Norwegian press. You don't inform it. You contribute no articles about the Soviet Republic and its plans. You are too isolated."

I explained that our activity was very limited because we were still not recognised as a diplomatic mission.

"But you can do business, can't you? Isn't that a function of the Russian Trade Delegation? So get down to work, Mrs. Kollontai, and here's wishing you every success. I'm always ready to help you as best I can."

We parted on a friendly note.

On my way to Christiania I continued thinking about Nansen and recalling episodes of his life. Nansen can be inexorable, almost brutal where it is a question of achieving a major goal.

Captain Sverdrup, who accompanied him on his polar expedition on the *Fram*, told me that when a member of the expedition broke his leg and the expedition was threatened with being prevented by ice motion from its planned trek to the pole, Nansen ordered that the injured man

be given first aid and supplied with provisions but did not allow him to be taken along by sled. "It would hold us up, and we might miss the time for crossing. There's a thaw now, our companion won't freeze to death. He's got enough food, and when his leg is healed he'll catch up with us. We will signal to him with shots, his gun is in order. And now, forward!" And Nansen set out over ice and patches of open water as if he had been walking down Drammensvei. But it was too much for Sverdrup, who fell back without Nansen noticing it and hitched himself to the sled on which the man with the fractured leg lay.

That is what Nansen is like

Where whole peoples are involved, he can suffer and show concern, never feeling tired or taking a rest []

PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIRST COMMERCIAL DEAL

April 11 [...]

There is a directive from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to draw Norway's attention to our agricultural exhibition due to open in Moscow. I am exploring the outlook but my impression is that the Norwegians will send no exhibits because "these are hard times", and so on. They simply refuse to believe in our purchasing capacity. "Purchase herring, and then we'll talk about the exhibition." []

May 11

We have received appalling, outrageous, incredible news. Vorovsky has been shot dead by a White émigré in Lausanne, at the International Conference.

That then is how low the enemies of the Soviet Republic have sunk. They have assassinated our official delegate to a conference of powers. An unheard-of crime fraught with terrible consequences. There can be no doubt that the hand of Vorovsky's White Guard assassin was guided by the Entente with Curzon at its head. Our enemies must have felt that removing an official Soviet representative from the conference would not be enough. Prompted by boundless, blind hatred for us, they have bereaved us of so intelligent and strong statesman and a comrade so dear to us. It is an unprecedented instance of trampling all principles of international law underfoot. The Norwegian press describes it as a return to medieval practices.

Minister Michelet sent an official to me to extend the Norwegian government's condolences to the Soviet Government. The Norwegian public is shocked and outraged. Many people called to offer condolences. Vorovsky was known here.

This bereavement is very painful to me. My memory brings back the living image of Vorovsky, a friend of Krasin's, an energetic underground worker... a man of magnetic presence. I recall the time when, in 1917, he was our first representative in Sweden and I arrived at the conference of the Zimmerwald Left as a Bolshevik delegate. Vorovsky took care of me and advised me to tide myself over the July days by staying on in Stockholm. But when I decided to go just the same, he gave me money for the trip, and I landed direct in Kerensky's jail as Vorovsky predicted. We have lost a staunch and fearless comrade...

When I was leaving the Mission today old Kovalevsky refused to let me go alone and told Nygaard to accompany me all the way to the Ritz boarding house. "They might kill you too some day, so why do you always go out alone?" But I said to myself that they might kill me only

after I had won *de jure* recognition. For as long as I have accomplished nothing worthwhile, White Guards will hardly stick out their necks to win glory for the Entente.

All joy has gone out of my heart, nothing is left of the light that enveloped me yesterday. My thoughts are full of anger and hatred. But also of grief...

What is Lenin's reaction to the news?...

May 14

A telegram from Krasin, an important one. At last! "Get herring for our rye." Putting it in a nutshell. rye for herring

It means that we will purchase herring, and as for them, they need our rye—they imported it from Russia for a long time. There were breaks only in recent years because we exported no grain in the years of civil war and crop failure.

A memorable day. It means that we will get trade with Norway going. A joyful and stirring prospect. [...]

May 14, evening

I have got in touch with Harald Pedersen, head of the grain monopoly. Norway introduced state monopoly on grain during the war. Pedersen is an all-powerful figure in Norway who controls not only grain trade (he is a buyer-up of grain second in the world to none but Dreyfuss) but is master of all grain grinding in the country. A real dictator, as they say. He enjoys immense respect and popularity for his efficiency, administrative talent and, still more, for his incorruptible decency and honesty. A former skipper of the merchant marine, he has sailed all seas and oceans and has connections in every corner of the globe. "He always knows one or two days in advance when grain can be purchased more profitably and from what dealer." This is what people say about him, and so it was not without some excitement that I anticipated my meeting with him. [.]

Krasin's assignment is much more difficult than I believed at first. The task is to coordinate two independent deals, to link them together financially and get permission for all this from Moscow and not only from the Norwegian government but perhaps from parliament as well.

May 15

I called on the Trade Minister. The pretext I used was an Arkhangelsk Vneshtorg (People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade.—*Tr.*) request for inquiries about the prices of boats and nets needed there.

On getting the necessary information, I casually mentioned to the Minister Krasin's new proposal for linking together two commercial deals, meaning that if the Norwegians purchased Russian rye we would reciprocate by purchasing Norwegian herring.

The Minister took a great interest in the idea. I did not fail to tell him about the achievements of our state economy.

"We've forgotten about the crop failures of earlier years and can even offer Russian grain for sale on the world market. Norway has always imported substantial quantities of Russian rye and its grain requirements for 1923 have not yet been met but the head of your state grain monopoly, Mr. Pedersen, shows no desire to discuss Krasin's proposal for a two-fold commercial deal: 'Russian rye in exchange for Norwegian herring'."

Holmboe was upset and even angry, which was what I had wanted to achieve by complaining of Pedersen's attitude.

"Pedersen thinks he's really a dictator who can decide everything. Our government is likely to be interested in your plan for linking a herring purchase to importing your rye to this country, and I'm going to talk to Berge today."

I left feeling that the first step had been taken. Krasin's proposal will become known to the cabinet. The idea is up for consideration. Of course, I have little faith in the Höire (Conservative) cabinet's foresight but the Trade Minister was plainly impressed by our plan. In the case of the Mowinckel cabinet, we would have come to terms in no time, as Baltic sailors used to say in 1917. But Pedersen, too, has a good head on his shoulders, I must talk to him again, he is probably all set to make a concrete proposal for coordinating two agreements that would also be a plus for him.

For the moment we at the Mission are discussing practical ways of putting Krasin's proposal into effect. We have invited fish wholesalers, since a herring deal in exchange for rye may assume large proportions, and then fish merchants are bound to seize on it. I have called Johannesen, head of the Trade Department, for tomorrow. The plan for carrying out Krasin's assignment is unfolding [.]

May 18, evening

Krasin has left Moscow for London by airplane. Curzon's note is a new threat to the Soviet Union. Britain is making two demands upon us: it wants us to recall our representative from Britain and stop our propaganda in the East. Again there is the foreboding of war. The conflict is serious, the rightwing press realises this and has jumped at the subject. The evening papers have taken on a disgusting tone. Could bloody horrors really recur? Is our socialist Republic really threatened with new trouble and suffering for the working people? With war? [...]]

May 30

A notification received today says that Moscow has appointed me Ambassador. A few days ago Vneshtorg informed me of my appointment to the post of Trade Representative. My staff were alarmed, wondering if this did not mean that I would be only Trade Representative and a new Ambassador would be named.

I even found it a welcome prospect, it would have been better that way because I would have had time to write. There is much I want to tell our women. But now I am glad Moscow has decided otherwise. After all, to be recognised as a woman ambassador is an achievement for Soviet women. An ambassador of the Soviet Republic, which we all fought from youth to bring about, and how we fought! ...Against relatives, the tsarist police, the bourgeoisie of many countries and then, in 1917, against Kerensky and his crew [...]

I have notified the Foreign Ministry. In accordance with diplomatic protocol, I must present my credentials to the Prime Minister. But Marcel says it will not yet mean presenting letters of credence, for ours is not yet a diplomatic mission. "That will come too, don't worry."

But work and difficulties are still plentiful. Even so, it is good to be ambassador and not acting ambassador.

June 3

I have talks with Pedersen almost daily. I learn many things from him. He and Rye Holmboe appreciate and sympathise with operation "Grain for Herring". Pedersen drops in often, and every time we meet I

use the occasion to bring up the idea of the usefulness of recognising the Soviet Union at an early date, even before other powers. [...]

June 9

I want no new chapter in my life. I want no change. Let what I have now stay for the time being. I have been a nomad all my life, always longing to hurry on. But now I have settled. This winter was a creative chapter in my life. I am keen on my new job and no longer do it perfunctorily. From "official" I have become "leader" on my Mission ship. I am strongly drawn to "big politics". World events neither surprise nor impress me any more. I am beginning to see clear in the backstage aspect of the mainspring of action.

I avidly read the foreign press. The clearer the international situation becomes to me, the more eager I am to win recognition for our country. It is necessary to bring about normal relations between Soviet Russia and Norway. My aim is *de jure* recognition. For the moment we are taking a series of preparatory steps.

Pedersen is going to Moscow. We are clear about rye—we will sell it to Norway. As for herring, there is still a hitch, now with state trade, now wholesalers to blame. The only thing that is all right is that since the Mission staff was regrouped it has been ticking like a fine clock. Everybody is in the right place. But the effort it required!.. How many hours were wasted on transferring staff members, and how much longer correspondence on the matter with Moscow took; Oshmyansky has left, and we feel greatly relieved. [.]

The world situation has brightened. Denmark has ratified a provisional trade agreement with us, and Cde. Kobelsky is going there as Ambassador.

Each success of the Soviet Republic and each gain of our Mission, no matter how small (Pedersen's trip to Moscow) is one more little nail adding to the solidity of Soviet power. [..]

June 24

We have signed a treaty with fish syndicates, and the problem of herring is no longer preying upon my mind. The path to basic political work has been cleared. We conferred every day without making the least headway. Yet it was a paltry 50 öre per barrel that we had been haggling over these past days. Yesterday we still had a feeling that the whole deal would fail because of that 50 öre. The wholesalers lowered the price to 18 kroner 50 öre per barrel, and we agreed to an increase up to 18 kroner and a single öre more.

We were to have held our last meeting today. The wholesalers said they were leaving for their fishing towns tonight and there would be no deal unless we conceded that 50 öre. I thought it over all night and decided that the deal would fail unless we made a new concession. But how could we do it since the price has been fixed by Moscow? Concessions cause a "big boom". They might accept that. As for Moscow, we would explain the move *post factum*. I must assume the responsibility for it. Vneshtorg (Krasin) would understand. After all, it was not just a business deal but one of the moves leading to diplomatic relations with Norway. It was the basis for *de jure* recognition.

Eleven spokesmen for *varr-* and *storsild* (herring.—*Tr.*) wholesalers called at the Mission first thing in the morning. Hefty, broad-shouldered, well-built and well-fed key representatives of the biggest firms. They sat

in a narrow semicircle around my desk. Also present were senior staff members of the Trade Delegation and the Mission.

I sat behind my huge desk wearing a quiet dark frock and looking very calm.

Both sides spoke out, Semb on behalf of the Norwegians and Dyakonov on our behalf. Both insisted that the offers were definitive and final. Neither side was willing to make any more concessions.

While Semb was adducing his arguments, Dyakonov whispered to me excitedly in Russian: "Don't budge. Moscow's price is final. Bargaining is over, let them moan afterwards."

I nodded. And then, unexpectedly, I said to the syndicate men:

"I have the contract here on my desk. It is ready for signing, all provisions have been agreed and specified. It's only a question of that wretched 50 öre per barrel. Yet the deal is a trial balloon that could lead to a Soviet-Norwegian trade turnover worth millions. This very fall we are going to negotiate with you a long-term treaty for the years ahead to be guaranteed by the state, and so you will again have a guaranteed major Russian market. Surely, gentlemen, you don't want to frustrate on account of an extra 50 öre both today's deal and the prospect of a Russian market for years to come?"

I dropped a casual hint about Scottish herring although the Norwegians certainly know that it does not now go to our market. The hefty herring dealers sitting close together around my desk, were as unyielding as the rocky mountains of their country. They were looking silently at the floor and not at me. Two hours passed without our getting over that 50 öre.

I felt dizzy with vexation and helplessness. Suddenly I put my hand to my head and said in despair.

"All right, now. To rescue the deal, I propose a compromise: take off 25 öre, and we'll add 25 öre per barrel. If my government decides that I've overstepped my powers I'll be ready to pay the difference, 50 öre per barrel, out of my salary throughout the rest of my life."

I wonder whether my tone had its effect (after all, they could not have believed that I could pay the difference—about half a million kroner—out of my salary) or whether they saw it as a lucky pretext but those huge men exchanged glances and a few muttered words. Thereupon the biggest of them, Pedersen, got up to say that, seeing how sincerely I wanted the contract to be signed, they were willing as representatives of the syndicates to incur a loss by cutting the price by another 25 öre per barrel.

That enlivened the atmosphere at once. We signed the contract. There were handshakes and reciprocal congratulations. We decided to celebrate the deal and invited the syndicate men to luncheon at the Grande Hotel. Siverson came over to congratulate me on my skilful ploy.

"You did that in a masterly way, like an experienced merchant. In commerce, too, you have to think of psychology and use effects as on stage. Well done!"

July 4

After the exchange of signatures with Rye Holmboe to the treaty on herring purchases on credit, the wheel of life began all of a sudden to turn at extraordinary speed, event following event as in Moscow.

I handed to the Prime Minister my government's decision appointing me Ambassador and Trade Representative of the Soviet Socialist State in Norway.* I had heard that presenting credentials was a solemn affair,

* Under the 1921 Treaty — *Author's note.*

and so I felt slightly nervous as I thought of what it would be like. But everything came off very simply. I made an appointment with the Foreign Ministry for the day and hours when Prime Minister Berge would receive me. [...]

In an airy room that was half waiting room and half office, a secretary past her prime who was sitting over her papers asked me what I wanted. I told her and she asked me to wait and went out to announce me. Coming back, she said the "State Minister" would receive me in a few minutes. She showed neither interest in me nor curiosity. She was reasonably polite, that was all.

Indeed, Berge received me a few minutes later. A stocky man with greying sideburns, he was more like a banker in a moving picture show. He asked me to be seated.

But I tried to lend solemnity to the "audience" I was granted. I made a little speech standing up, meaning to present my "letters of credence" after that. But before I could finish—true, I delivered my speech in broken Norwegian—Berge took the envelope out of my hand and put it on the desk without even glancing at it. He uttered some non-committal phrases about credits and congratulated me on the signing of the contract. There came a few words about banks, and then I felt that it was time to be going. [...] And so there was nothing solemn after all.

On my way back I realised that my ambassadorial credentials were not yet letters of credence such as are presented by a formally recognised diplomat. Hence the absence of ceremonial and solemnity. In any case, I am a perfectly official person here from now on as head of the Delegation of the Soviet Republic.

Ritz, July 14

It is an enchantingly gentle morning Christiania is also fascinating in summer. But my mind is far away, at home in our Soviet Republic, where I am going on vacation, or rather on commercial business. [...]

But over the past few days in Norway I have had to see to local affairs requiring my intervention and attention.

First of all is the unexpected arrival of a representative of the Vakhtangov Third Studio. *Tourandotte* was a success on the Stockholm stage, both financially and artistically. Not so in Göteborg. [...]

In Göteborg *Tourandotte* flopped, and the studio, having suffered a financial loss in Sweden, decided to move on to Norway, assuming that people in Ibsen's country would understand them better and appreciate the play.

The People's Commissariat of Education had sent the studio abroad to give Europe a taste of new Soviet stage productions. It sent the whole company and all the settings and costumes but failed to take care of the financial aspect, hoping for the theatre's success because it is a Soviet theatre. The trouble is, however, that this is the dead season in Christiania, and the Storting is to be dissolved in a few days. To send a theatrical company here meant merely risking larger losses. [...]

July 15

An event of paramount importance: the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting yesterday discussed the question of recognising the Soviet state. The subject came up following a request from my government for the Norwegian cabinet to allow a Soviet training squadron to enter Norwegian waters and visit the country's main ports.

I gather from Litvinov's telegram that he is raising this question to urge the Storting to proceed even during its current term to discuss

recognition of our state. Litvinov tells me to immediately present a note to the cabinet asking permission for our squadron to call at Norwegian ports. Moscow is looking forward to a favourable reply. [...]

Mowinckel was as good as his word and made a big speech in the Storting Committee in support of a favourable reply to our request for a visit by our ships, saying that this "friendly act" would also bring nearer the solution of the fundamental problem, that of establishing normal diplomatic relations between our countries.

July 17

Mowinckel's speech made a strong impression in the Storting. He spoke all the more convincingly because he is a big shipowner and has a personal stake in the settlement of relations with the Soviet state, which he hopes will expand shipping by freight and increase the prospects of our using Norwegian tonnage. Members of parliament were pleased with the speech.

In answering, Michelet was compelled to discuss how Litvinov's note should be answered -- a step leading to a discussion about recognising us. It was an important statement by the Foreign Minister even though he made it at a closed meeting of the Commission. Litvinov was right in instructing me to ask the cabinet's permission for our ships to call at Norwegian ports. The debate on this matter in parliament inevitably took the issue of *de jure* recognition several more steps forward, bringing it nearer to discussion in specific terms.

The fact that recognition of our country was discussed in the Foreign Commission cannot be reversed in any way. Mowinckel's speech aroused a sympathetic response among Norwegians. It is with such welcome news that I can now go to Moscow to gladden Chicherin and Litvinov.

The question of establishing diplomatic relations between our country and Norway is up for decision, and the cabinet is bound (this is perfectly clear) to authorise a visit by our squadron to Norwegian ports irrespective of the "big question". As far as diplomacy is concerned, it is satisfactory news I will be taking to Moscow. [...]

(To be continued)

MUNICH: WITNESS'S ACCOUNT

On September 29, 1938, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, heads of the British and French governments, signed an agreement in Munich with the German and Italian dictators, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, on the dismemberment of the sovereign and independent Czechoslovak state. The parties to the agreement extolled it as a "dependable shield" against the war menace growing in the world. History, however, proved the opposite for the infamous Munich deal was one of the last steps towards World War II.

The lessons of Munich must not be forgotten. They are still instructive in many respects.

The *International Affairs* publishes for the first time some documents of the period taken from archives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are reports to the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs from Sergei Alexandrowsky, a noted diplomat who then served as Soviet Minister to Czechoslovakia. The evidence he furnished as a participant in the dramatic events of 1938 sheds additional light on them, on the circumstances of the so-called Czechoslovak crisis artificially stoked up by the governments of the four powers. At the basis of Germany's demands on Czechoslovakia was the claim to the Sudetenland, made on the plea of its being partly inhabited by people of German extraction.

The documents in question reflect the alarming situation in Czechoslovakia at that time, and show developments of the period when the shameful Munich agreement was drafted and signed.

A statement by the Soviet government dated March 17, 1938, warned that the seizure of Austria posed a "threat to Czechoslovakia"; it expressed readiness to participate in "collective actions" in order to "check any further expansion of aggression". The Soviet Union proposed calling an international conference to this end. But the Western powers failed to respond to the Soviet proposal. Taking advantage of the situation, in the second half of May 1938 Hitler Germany began moving its troops to the Czechoslovak frontier.

There were real opportunities for resisting the German claim. The Czechoslovak army, 45 divisions strong, was well equipped with modern arms and had more warplanes than France. It is safe to say that this, coupled with the powerful system of fortifications built up over the years, was a serious barrier to the Wehrmacht.

In spring 1938 the Soviet government decided in compliance with a request from Czechoslovakia to supply it with another batch of high-speed bombers to bolster her air force. But while the combined forces of France, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, which expressed a willingness to meet its commitments by rendering Czechoslovakia military aid, exceeded the military power of fascist Germany on all counts, the Western powers refused, none the less, to defend the Czechoslovak people and accepted the Munich diktat.

The Soviet Minister's reports emphasise the Czechoslovak people's anxiety about the threat of attack from fascist Germany. At the same time they reflected the resolution of the Republic's people to stand their ground, to defend their country's independence and sovereignty, as well

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as their hopes for solidarity and support from the Soviet Union, whose position diverse sections of Czechoslovak society had the highest opinion of. Nor did Czechoslovaks despair of getting help from the Western democracies. But their hopes were dashed. In Munich the Western powers betrayed Czechoslovakia's interests.

LEGATION OF THE USSR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Prague, March 29, 1938

Cde. MAXIM LITVINOV
People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs

Dear Maxim Maximovich

I left Bucharest on March 17 and did not arrive in Prague until the morning of the 21st because I had decided to travel and actually travelled across Czechoslovakia by car, from the Romanian frontier to Prague. I did so to ascertain the real mood in the provinces, among the population, in the countryside. My knowledge of the Czech language fully enables me to hear first hand what people think and say. In Slovakia I was mistaken for a Silesian Czech, in Moravia for a Slovak and in Bohemia for a Czechoslovak German.

As far as facts are concerned, the trip did not help much but as regards understanding the mood here, I have reason to be satisfied with the impressions I gathered. I am prepared to affirm that the prevailing sentiment among large sections of the Czechoslovak population is calm except that this calm is by no means an indication of indifference but rather a sign of self-confidence. I heard people in the remotest areas speak about the *Anschluss* and the danger coming from Hitler; the comments were made on a reasonably high political level and marked by sufficient awareness of the absolute concreteness of the questions that arise and of their direct relevance to the interlocutors. There is reason to affirm that Czechoslovakia is a country with a fairly high level of political development and that its population will defend itself actively provided the machinations of the ruling top leave at least some room for this.

In Košice District, Eastern Slovakia, several times I witnessed troop movements in a westward direction, with the troops in two cases fully equipped for field duty. In one place my attention was drawn by engineers' columns. In Moravia and on the Czech frontier, near Iglau, I was delayed three times by large groups of recruits half-drunken and in hats decorated with ribbons and flowers according to tradition.

In Prague from the 21st to the 28th I saw on various occasions (at a tea party at Mrs. Beneš's, a tea party in the Officers' Society, and a reception given by the Director of the Škoda Works) a whole number of Czechoslovak generals and other officers, such as Chief of General Staff Krejčí, Army General Inspector Syrový, Generals Dvořák and Fiala, Air Force Chief Fajfr, Officers' Society Chairman Markovič, General Bláha, Colonel Moravec and many others. All these people as well as officials of the Foreign Ministry, journalists, MPs and various public figures unanimously pointed out the vast significance of your interview with the press. Some of them spoke enthusiastically in this connection about the Soviet Union (now called, however, just "Russia" more often than before), yourself and the "honest consistency of Soviet foreign policy". Many

considered it indisputable that your interview, especially your laconic yet clear answer to the question about Czechoslovakia, had averted an immediate German attack on Czechoslovakia.

Military officials are less enthusiastic and more reserved but, even so, there is no sign of their exaggerating the danger posed by Hitler. I think I can put it on record that the military are very calm and determined to fight for their country's independence. Krejčí, for one, told me in a businesslike and dignified tone that he agreed with the government on the need to avoid irritating Hitler and giving him pretexts for victimising Czechoslovakia or attacking it outright. But this was not at all to say that the army must not prepare to defend the country, nor did it really mean that the army sat twiddling its thumbs. Krejčí spoke sympathetically of his deputy, General Husárek, who was busy erecting fortifications and had "worked wonders" over the past two weeks by shifting his activity to the border with Austria. Krejčí told me at that point that their weakest defence line extended from Bratislava to Hodonín, where the Czechoslovak, Austrian and Hungarian frontiers meet. The government had already allocated over one billion korunas for the further build-up of the network of strong points along the Austrian and Hungarian borders. Krejčí realises that in view of its geographical position and the present configuration of its frontiers, Czechoslovakia cannot seriously expect to defend itself singlehanded against an enemy like Germany, which maintains close relations with Poland and is trying to draw Hungary into its orbit, the latter having not forgotten that until 1918 Slovakia was one of the Hungarian lands for a thousand years. Czechoslovakia is pursuing no such aims. It proceeds from the assumption that its existence has been and will always be an all-European issue. Krejčí recalled Serbian history during World War I. In his opinion, courage and the will to defend their elementary right to independent existence spared Serbia the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Czechoslovakia was still more important and was an infinitely greater force in this respect. No matter how much European politics vacillated, it would have to reckon with the Czech people's will to defend their state. No matter how far modern means of military attack were advanced, they are insufficient just the same for the instant destruction of the Czechoslovak force of resistance. Even if Czechoslovakia were to receive no immediate aid from its allies, it is strong enough to ensure that its resistance compel Europe to step in and join in the struggle. Even routed Czechoslovak troops would retreat arms in hand to foreign territories.

General Fajfr talked to me at length about the combat readiness of the Czechoslovak air force. Over the past week he had personally checked every thing the country had in this sphere, and he assured me that, even operating alone, the Czechoslovak air force would give the Germans a lot of trouble. With reference to the experience of Spain Fajfr said that the Germans could certainly destroy Prague and a couple of other cities but could not quickly force Czechoslovakia to its knees, meaning in particular himself and his air force. From this topic Fajfr switched to Soviet aid and thanked us very much for the new 20 new high-speed bombers we sold them (which was news to me). In an assured tone, he argued that in the early period of war Soviet aid should be not so much real as symbolic to keep up the morale of the army and the people. But in a real sense, too, the Soviet aviation could be very useful.

Incidentally, neither Fajfr nor a whole number of other military men and civilians believed me at all when I said that the purpose of my trip to Bucharest was not to negotiate passage for our troops through Rumania. When I flatly denied this at a reception given by Hromádka,¹ General Dvořák burst out laughing most insolently in my face but then apologised and praised me as a "shrewd diplomat".

Not a single military official tried to conceal the fact that there are troop movements going on in the country, mainly at night and chiefly towards the German frontier. The garrisons of the existing fortifications have been placed on a war footing. General Syrový said that in the very first two days after the *Anschluss*, everything was ready for a complete mobilisation. All that was lacking was the President's signature. There was no mobilisation but everything remained on alert to make it possible to carry out mobilisation in 48 hours if necessary. An officer told me in the Officers' Assembly that there would soon be no need at all to issue special mobilisation orders because the army was quietly being put on a war footing.

Although I have already informed you of the main points of the foregoing by telegraph, I found it useful to put these data together so as to show all the better why I am inclined to affirm that Czechoslovakia is prepared to and will fight in the event of a German military attack upon it.

Comradely greeting,

S. ALEXANDROVSKY

Minister of the USSR to Czechoslovakia

Cde. MAXIM LITVINOV

Prague, October 20, 1938

People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs

Dear Maxim Maximovich,

I will yet have to return many times to the questions put in your letter No. 5475/L of 11/10/1938 because it will be very hard to find out the truth under present conditions. I admit that I myself find it very difficult to see clear in the whirl of events, which are far from being over for Czechoslovakia.

I have been making notes but it will be impossible to reproduce the course of events with chronological accuracy. I will do my best because I realise the importance of a correct assessment of events—past and present—from both the historical and the practical point of view.

I have so far heard nothing about Bonnet putting the blame for the Anglo-French ultimatum on the Czech government. I have no reason to suspect Beneš, Krofta or the Czech government as a whole of anything like that. But I have already had occasion to write that in Prague there is widespread conviction of the existence of an outright conspiracy involving a number of cabinet members. I believe this although I have no direct proof. A whole number of fairly serious people and politicians have told me so. Named as conspirators were the Agrarians Hodža², Machník³, Černí⁴ and Beran⁵, the Czech Socialist Franke⁶, the banker Preiss and Hodáč⁷, a notorious reactionary who is Kramář's⁸ political successor. I do not rule out the possibility of this pack having not only plotted with Hitler through Henlein and attempted a forcible coup in its country against Beneš and his policy but of having worked to carry out its conspiratorial plan also by misinforming France and Britain.

As a matter of fact, Hodža has always betrayed adventurism, or what was mildly described here as expressionism in politics. A former educator of Franz Ferdinand's son, a Magyarophile member of the pre-war Hungarian Parliament, a man whose tastes and ways class him among the gentry, and in reality the son of a poor provincial Slovak

Protestant pastor, Hodža has never known where his motherland is, nor has he ever been a statesman. I cannot say for certain whether there has been anything like that but I would not be surprised if afterwards I came by proof that Hodža had really told de Lacroix that there was a readiness to accept the Anglo-French plan. If that is the case, he cannot have done so with the knowledge of the government, Beneš and the army. However, this is only a supposition of mine, and for the moment it will be more correct to consider that the matter requires a careful, unbiased investigation.

As regards the question of Poland your doubts are perfectly justified. I have tried several times to ascertain why Czechoslovakia failed to put up resistance to Poland in just the same way as it put up resistance to Hungary. The fact is that on the evening of September 30 and the day of October 1 Hungary tried two or three times to cross the frontier with its troops. Subsequently, on October 3, it made a further attempt, and the Hungarians thrust several kilometres deep into Czechoslovak territory. They were met by Czechoslovak troops, and while no bloodshed occurred, it was only under direct military pressure that the Hungarians pulled back. The press here carried several items on this, commenting rather crudely that Hungary had not expected to encounter anybody on its way but had miscalculated and run into an army. The comments were hardly noticed in the whirl of other staggering reports. Lastly, with the talks with Hungary broken off, large Hungarian bands penetrated into the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine at several points. Czechoslovakia mustered sufficient resolve near the small community of Beregovo to have its troops encircle a Hungarian detachment and "capture" all 300 men after a serious exchange of gunfire.

The unanimous answer I got each time I asked about the reason was that both France and Britain had demanded outright and explicitly that Czechoslovakia immediately meet Poland's demands. The documentation which I am sending you contains evidence of the correctness of this affirmation. If it is true, then the only thing to do is to ascertain why France and Britain had a stake in hasty concessions in response to Polish demands. Hitler would certainly not have flung himself upon Prague on account of Poland. Nor does anybody here in Prague say he would.

Whether today's Czechoslovakia is viable and whether it can yet play the role of an independent state is a question which I cannot as yet answer explicitly. I am now taking stock, so to speak, of what Czechoslovakia has lost and what retained. This work is made difficult primarily by the fact that Czechoslovakia has no firm frontiers today, not even with Germany, to say nothing of the fact that the issue of territorial concessions to Hungary or even Poland has not yet been settled at all. Speaking in the most general terms, however, it is already evident that, given definite prerequisites, the economic remnants of Czechoslovakia could definitely form a viable national economic organism. The most valuable asset, the people and their labour power, are first-rate in Czechoslovakia. The technological standard is high. Very little would be required, relatively speaking, to fill the gaps resulting from territorial concessions. In some respects, the loss of the Sudetenland could even have a salutary effect on some industries, such as textiles, glass, porcelain or bijouterie. Even the demand for foreign markets could diminish. Czechoslovak exports could be easily readjusted, so to say, and the country could emerge as a victor before long by marketing a number of high-quality commodities. There is already much talk about this, and it seems that they are beginning to work on it. The transport problem is still exceedingly grave, especially due to the occupation of Northern Moravia and Těšín Region as well as of Hustopeč District in the south,

where rail communication between Prague and Bratislava has been broken off. Huge investments will be needed for this. He who now lends money to Czechoslovakia will be its master. This is hardly a question for us to discuss in practical terms but I will dwell on it at length next time if you wish. It hardly holds out any prospect for France, either. France is already a non-entity throughout Europe both economically and, to a considerable extent, politically. Britain could take a serious interest in the matter, and might well lend a hand in putting Czechoslovakia back on its feet, more or less. However, it would be nearest the truth to suppose that Hitler will complete the subjection of Czechoslovakia by participating directly in the reorganisation of its national economy. But even in that case Czechoslovakia would always strain at its fetters and seek assistance and support everywhere against German bondage. The catastrophe experienced by the country has given rise to a tremendous upsurge in national sentiment. The centuries-long history of hatred and struggle between Czechs and Germans has been revived with fresh impetus. Furthermore, while the idea of democracy would seem to have been badly beaten, democratic sentiments have somehow grown stronger and gained ground among large sections of the people. The really mighty movement at the grass roots for the unification of all democratic popular forces is a most interesting reality. It is not such an easy task to cope with this, not even for Hitler or any other corporal. I am not exaggerating when I say in another letter of mine that the Communist Party could now bring the people onto the streets by just giving the signal. But for the justified fear of physical reprisals by Hitler, a genuine democratic system could be established in Czechoslovakia overnight. Were the masses in Czechoslovakia to feel that there was no direct danger of being crushed by the Nazi war machine or that this machine was rotten and would begin to fall apart as soon as it actually got going, the Czech people, with the exception of a really negligible handful of leeches, would be equal to taking to the streets and making enormous sacrifices in a national liberation struggle against German fascism. The idea of a national liberation struggle, namely, against German oppression, an idea fostered for centuries, has roots too deep in every son and daughter of the people for anyone to simply switch them to subordination, not only to Germany, but to German fascism to boot.

The people are living through one of their deepest tragedies. Every people pays for this sort of thing. The Czech people, for their part, cannot and will not weather it easily. The situation in the case of Slovakia is somewhat different. But even there national consciousness has been growing fast in recent decades. People in Slovakia spoke a lot about the Czechs' colonising policy there. This was actually so, in a sense. But all colonisation leads precisely to growing national consciousness. In the conditions of Central Europe and the democratic Czechoslovak Republic, being surrounded by such neighbours, bar Germany, as Poland and Hungary, Czech "colonisation" benefited Slovakia, and the Slovaks themselves realise this. Once an illiterate Hungarian province, Slovakia has become a country whose people have awakened to national life and are beginning to raise questions about their social being as well. They can still be tyrannised by all sorts of Tisos⁹ and Sidors¹⁰ but they are by no means indifferent any longer to decisions affecting their destiny. It will yet cost the surrounding world much effort to absorb that country and its people. I am not sure whether such attempts will not turn out very badly for all who try to annex Slovakia.

S. ALEXANDROVSKY
Minister of the USSR to Czechoslovakia

*Prague, October 19, 1938***NOTES ON EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN LATE SEPTEMBER
AND EARLY OCTOBER 1938**

Developments and the situation as a whole prevented me from systematically recording day by day the details of events taking place before my very eyes. All I have are brief isolated notes, and as for specific circumstances, I am compelled to reproduce them from memory and with reference to some documents at the disposal of the People's Commissariat. This material is mainly historical already, and my notes only present to modest significance as an account by an eyewitness posted more or less on developments, and partly on their backstage aspect. However, I still find it difficult at this juncture to draw a clear-cut line between facts of objective significance and a multitude of false rumours and notions as well as my own impressions. I consider it correct for the time being to record what seems reasonably important to me and has not yet been taken down by anybody else or elsewhere, so as to have auxiliary material later on for judging the epoch and its events.

Before the downfall of the Hodža government there were several crucial days in terms of the mood prevailing in every section of Czechoslovak society. I met almost daily with Minister Jina, Chief Secretary to Foreign Minister Krofta. Krofta himself had in fact become by then and remained until his resignation something less than a secretary to Beneš; it was but nominally that he received and forwarded notes and demarches from foreign envoys. I could learn or get something important rather from Jina or Smutný, Chief of Protocol and Chief Secretary to Beneš, as well as from Dr. Drtina, Beneš's special private secretary.

At that time a particularly sharp controversy was going on both in government quarters and in other political circles over the issue of Soviet aid. The issue gained particularly in acuteness after September 19, that is, after Czechoslovakia had been handed the so-called Anglo-French plan for the settlement of the Sudeten German question, which contained an outspoken demand for far-reaching territorial concessions. It was plainly in this connection that Beneš called Cde. Gottwald on the evening of the 19th to ask him, among other things, a question about the Soviet Union's likely line of behaviour. This question had already taken clear shape among the public because hardly anybody doubted any longer that not only Britain but France as well were simply betraying Czechoslovakia and that aid from them was simply out of the question. Had somebody in authority in Moscow said just then that the Soviet Union was not going to help, the deep indignation aroused among the people by France and Britain would have turned against the Soviet Union, too, and with still greater force at that. I say "with still greater force" because the masses trusted the Soviet Union and its word far more than they trusted all the other so-called friends of Czechoslovakia. This explains why reactionary forces, particularly the Agrarians, who were no doubt involved in and exponents of an outright conspiracy against Beneš and his leadership, were doing all they could to suggest to the masses that the Soviet Union, too, was "betraying" them. The relevant press reports, with their daily hue and cry about French and Soviet betrayal and treachery, leave no room for doubt on this score. An editorial which *Venkov* carried on September 21 under the headline "We Have Been Betrayed" was downright historic in this respect. The left-wing press campaigned vigorously and cast about for arguments to prove the possibility and value of rely-

ing on the Soviet Union for support even without help from France. The Legation was besieged by dozens of telephone calls and numerous daily visits by noted politicians and journalists, all of whom came to ask: Was the Soviet Union going to help without France? Who was the author of the reservation in the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance linking Soviet aid to aid from France? Couldn't this reservation be deleted? Couldn't a new treaty be signed without delay, this time one of alliance? What was the meaning of Article 11 of the League of Nations Covenant? What was the procedure of appealing to the League of Nations under Article 16 of its Covenant? What practical difference was there between Articles 16 and 17 of the League of Nations Covenant?

Hubert Rypka, a noted journalist, was particularly active in this respect. It was he who looked up in the Protocol to our Treaty of Mutual Assistance Para. 1 saying that the two contracting parties shall seek early decisions in the League of Nations Council and that in the event of the Council failing to adopt any recommendations or a unanimous decision, both parties shall meet none the less their obligation concerning mutual assistance. I must say that two articles contributed by Rypka to *Lidové Noviny* played a tremendous role in this respect. They reached the lowest sections of the population. Subsequent demonstrations and rallies used these articles as a real banner under which the masses demanded defence in alliance with the Soviet Union against attack from Hitler. The reactionary press, attacking, used as a slogan the allegation that the Soviet Union intended to render assistance but solely within the framework of its obligations, which amounted to a virtual refusal, since France would not help and as for the League of Nations, it only existed for the purpose of delaying any practical action whatever. Rypka and others replied that the Soviet Union would render assistance in all circumstances and that this depended on Czechoslovakia itself and on its government. If the government appealed to the League of Nations in time, as it should do already, the treaty on mutual assistance with the Soviet Union would become operative in spite of the dependence of Soviet aid on French aid and regardless of how the League of Nations hummed and hawed as it dragged its feet.

In this situation the speech made by the People's Commissar, Cde. Litvinov, in Geneva on September 21 made a dual impression and was used with equal energy by all trends in Czechoslovakia. The Rypka trend, which it is right to regard as Beneš's, took up Cde. Litvinov's information about the question asked by France of the Soviet Union and about the Soviet answer expressing readiness for representatives of the general staffs to discuss at the negotiating table practical measures for military defence against the aggressor, as well as the information according to which the Czechoslovak government had posed a similar practical question for the first time only two days before. Reactionary quarters seized on the circumstance that Cde. Litvinov stressed very clearly the dependence of Soviet aid on French aid. Cde. Litvinov's speech was a topic of the liveliest debates everywhere, including the streets. Controversies over this issue went on for a very long time.

Patejdl, Chief of the Community of Czechoslovak Legionaires, said that foreseeing France's betrayal, he had submitted to the government for discussion the question of a Czechoslovak initiative aimed at revising the treaty of mutual assistance in favour of ridding it of linkage to aid from France. Besides, he had submitted a proposal for signing simply a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. I no longer remember the dates but my impression is that as to time it preceded somewhat and coincided to a degree with one of my conversations with Beneš during which the

latter said non-committally that some sort of new treaty could be signed with the Soviet Union. I have mentioned this in one of my telegrams.

A few days before September 21, something of a "revolutionary action" group formed around Editor Rypka. The group called itself "Mafia". Inherent in this name are historical recollections of the underground Czech national liberation movement in the epoch of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. At that time there existed a secret society which, prompted by historical reminiscences was called the "Black Mafia". Its membership included Masaryk ¹¹, Beneš, Hájek ¹², Syhrava ¹³ and a number of other outstanding Czech politicians and journalists. The new "Mafia" proceeded from an awareness of the need for radical internal changes in Czechoslovakia, for it had become clear that the Hodža government was blatantly betraying Czechoslovak democracy, that is, if it had not already done so. Rypka himself named some "Mafia" members to me:

Jaroslav Stranský, owner of the daily *Lidové Noviny*, known for his struggle against corruption. His father founded in his day the Workers' Party, which was more leftist than the Czech Socialists but did not recognise Marxism; Richter, MP, a Czech Socialist; Young Rašín, the son of the well-known reactionary, Minister Rašín, a Popular Democrat assassinated in 1925, I think, by an anarcho-communist in protest against growing reaction, and Dr. Vrbenský, ¹⁴ a former anarcho-communist, ex-minister of the cabinet, now Third Deputy Mayor of Prague, and several other less noted people. The purpose of the "Mafia" is to try to concentrate all forces roughly on the model of a popular front, the aims being a radical change in the country's system of government, a swing to the left, reliance on the masses and, in foreign policy, resistance to Germany to the point of waging war with Soviet support. I know that Cde. Gottwald was among those invited to the "Mafia's" meetings on September 19, 20 and 21. The group unquestionably played an organising role in the demonstration on September 22. It took an active part in a 100,000-strong rally outside Parliament. Afterwards Rypka boasted of his group toppling the Hodža government but this is certainly a very strong overstatement, to say the least. However, the group was a rotten business. It continued building on Beneš's prestige and role. His departure cut all ground from under the group's feet, and even Stranský and his *Lidové Noviny* instantly did something worse than waving the white flag. They changed course and are now ready to lick Beran's, Hitler's and anybody else's heels.

Nečas, ¹⁵ a left Social Democratic cabinet minister, was a perfectly sorry sight. An unctuous starry-eyed idealist, he repeatedly shed tears in my presence over the coarse morals and manners dominating the world. He is a personal friend of Léon Blum ¹⁶ but, even so, it was less than he could do to refrain from voicing dissatisfaction at and condemning the attitude and behaviour of the Blum Socialists and Blum himself. Characteristically, Nečas was the first to formulate to me with the greatest simplicity and clarity the reasons for France's treacherous conduct. He said France did not believe that Czechoslovakia was still a democratic republic. France was afraid of a revolution resulting from any military conflict in Europe even if this conflict were "localised". Nečas himself drew no conclusions from this but his party undoubtedly came to the conclusion that it was urgent for it to desert to counter-revolution.

Recalling my conversation with Beneš on September 21, I must point out the following. Beneš rang me up around 5 p. m. and asked me to call on him at 6. Just then Prague was filling with demonstrators. I dro-

ve along streets overfilled with people who had not yet formed columns. It was not easy to make our way through the crowds. Here and there the Legation's smart Packard drew angry remarks from pedestrians compelled to step aside. I heard abuse on several occasions. On Staroměstské Square we had to stop because of the crowd. A worker pushed his cap through the open window and called me a "potbellied bourgeois". But the reaction of most of those who saw the Soviet flag was friendly. When I arrived at the gate of the Hrad (Prague Kremlin) all entrances were shut tight, and the street leading to the gate was thronged with people. Those in the back rows gave the car a hostile reception but as soon as they heard that it was the Soviet Minister coming, they posted guards on their own initiative, and there was a brief rally at which it was announced who the visitor was and where he was going. I heard tumultuous expressions of sympathy twining Beneš and the Soviet Union together to form a single whole which sounded like an impassioned appeal to fight fascist Germany. I was allowed in orderly fashion to drive up to the gate but on reaching it had to stop before a cordon of red-faced, sweating policemen defending the gate against the crowd, which had moved right up to it and was demanding to be let into the Hrad to see Beneš. There was a wild uproar, and excitement ran very high indeed. Nevertheless, a brief explanation by the police officer in charge produced an immediate result. He told the crowd that he would have the gate opened to let in my car provided the demonstrators promised not to follow, for that would complicate fulfilment of the task of the Soviet Minister. This proved enough for the demonstrators to fall back, and not one of them went in after me.

Sitting in Beneš's office, I could distinctly hear the crowd roaring beyond the gate of the Hrad. Beneš was clearly in high spirits. He remarked in a somewhat fatherly tone how good the Czechoslovak people were. What he meant was that with and for a people like that, no historical upheavals were too dangerous. The tenor of the rest of the conversation definitely implied that Beneš did not take seriously the demands and threats coming to Czechoslovakia from Germany, France and Britain. He tried to speak in a purely businesslike vein on the subject of military cooperation, as if he considered a military settlement of the Czechoslovak-German dispute absolutely inevitable. When he asked questions about the Red Army's passage through Romanian territory or about our reaction to the possibility of a Polish attack on Czechoslovakia, there was no sign of doubt in his tone about our resolve to pass through Romania or Poland even if we had to fight. He said clearly enough that he considered Romania a country belonging to the anti-German bloc, as it were, and believed that Poland was in league with Germany. Furthermore, it was perfectly clear that he regarded the French refusal to help as no more than a threat and still believed that at the last minute France, followed by Britain, would have to make common cause with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union against Germany. Beneš coupled all this with his usual arguments and combinations of a highly diplomatic nature and with references to his knowledge of people and the situation in Western Europe. Incidentally, he made it perfectly clear this time as well that the French General Staff was entirely at one with him and could be relied on without qualification.

When Beneš called me to inform me of the mobilisation set for that day (September 23, 1938) he was positively rejoicing. Among other things, he told me that it was he, Beneš, who had succeeded in bringing about a world coalition against the fascist offensive and that all his calculations had proved correct. Czechoslovakia was a victim of attack, and justice would ultimately prevail. In those days the stylish halls of the Hrad looked almost like military offices. Between walls of the epoch of

Maria Theresa there now stood desks and cots, and running about everywhere were anxious-looking army officers. Workmen were busy glueing black paper to the inner panes in preparation for blackouts. The corridors were lit by dim, blue-coloured bulbs. There were numerous military posts everywhere, and they saluted pointedly as I passed by.

When, on September 25, I called on Beneš the premises represented a veritable military camp. His own office looked like general headquarters. All military attributes were there, including a gas-mask displayed ostentatiously on his desk. Beneš spoke plainly and even in a downright arrogant tone. He did not doubt in the least that aid from France and even Britain would be forthcoming. Indeed, he spoke of the French and General Gamelin¹⁷ in such a way as if the General had been his subordinate but a clever one whose advice he listened to. Incidentally, speaking of Gamelin's advice to hold the Czechoslovak border fortifications at all costs, Beneš described it as good advice on an obvious subject. He condescendingly patted Gamelin on the back, as it were, because the General was saying things that had been clear to Beneš for a very very long time. Just let Gamelin do his share, and as for Beneš, he had already done his. I admit that just then I felt very uneasy because I could say nothing to Beneš, especially in reply to his "practical questions". He asked me how many thousand airborne troops the Red Army could rush to Czechoslovakia, what military equipment they would bring with them, what technical means would be required and in what quantities for such troops to go into action. By the way, in asking such questions, Beneš said outright that he would need an air landing the moment hostilities began, not so much in order to achieve real military results as to raise the morale of the masses, who would hail the arrival of the Russians in their splendid machines .

Beneš called me on the evening of September 26, after Hitler had made his speech. I note the fact that Beneš was not merely in a cheerful mood but in really high spirits. The meeting was brief but its entire tenor was militant. Beneš did not mention Hitler's speech until he was seeing me out down the blacked-out corridor. First he said that Roosevelt's speech was a result of his, Beneš's efforts. He had appealed, directly to Roosevelt and had met with proper response and appreciation. It was now clear to everybody that a world coalition had really come into being to defend peace against the aggressor's attempts to start war. The point at issue was not Czechoslovakia but its being a test case now of the solidity of democracy and of defending peace. The test had fully succeeded. From this point on, I can repeat almost word for word what Beneš said. He said Hitler's curses left him unruffled. Hitler had said, using a figure of speech, that here stood Hitler and there stood Beneš over there. Very wrong. There was no such confrontation. But if that was how Hitler saw it, then Beneš must say the "honour" was too great for him. Beneš spoke these last words in German, uttering them with obvious irony and contempt, as a man aware of his superiority.

Earlier, too, Beneš had repeatedly expressed the supposition and occasionally even the conviction that it would not come to war anyway because Germany was not in a position to wage war against a mighty coalition which would include France, Britain and the Soviet Union, with the United States giving moral and possibly even material support. During that visit of mine, on Sept. 26, Beneš voiced such views for the last time, adding that Britain and France, like all other respectable countries, would like to avoid war. The means of achieving this was to make Hitler retreat. This was just what was likely to happen.

On September 27, Beneš spoke quite seriously about the inevitability of war, and his tone regarding the issue of our aid was different. I had a distinct feeling that Beneš, who betrayed great nervous tension and was in an extremely serious mood, wanted us to tell him how and when we were going to help. I would say that for all the outward calm shown by Beneš, he was tormented by dread of the danger of attack from Hitler which had drawn very near. Beneš could not but make out the real meaning of the personal message he received from Chamberlain. Speaking of the message, he described it to me as an expression of Britain's readiness to help Czechoslovakia by force of arms. Yet I learnt afterwards that it was an outright threat used by Chamberlain and, indeed, a complete refusal on his part as well as on the part of France to aid Czechoslovakia unless it submitted to Hitler's diktat. It follows that Beneš simply lied to me. Why? I think because he did not want to scare us off, being anxious to get help from us at the last minute even without its being coupled with help from France and Britain. At that moment Beneš could no longer delude himself into expecting help for his country from France or Britain. But I do not doubt, nor have I doubted before, that up to the time when word came of the conference to be held in Munich, Beneš had no intention of surrendering and was not deceiving himself, his people or us in this sense. Just then, however, he was unquestionably trying to deceive us, not in order to have Czechoslovakia surrender, but in order to involve us in war against Western Europe and have the fate of Czechoslovakia shaped by a European war in grand style and not by decisions of any sort made at Munich. Earlier too, long before the latest complications over the Sudeten German and Czechoslovak-German question, Beneš had enlarged many times on his concept of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy, meaning that the Czechoslovak question was an all-European one. He told me more than once that the important thing in his policy was to place Czechoslovakia in a situation where all great powers would by all means come to blows over its fate should one of them (meaning primarily Germany, of course) try to "localise" some dispute with Czechoslovakia. When, at that time, Beneš saw a fight between the great powers over the fate of Czechoslovakia fail to materialise I had the impression that he clung on to such a prospect and was willing to provoke the Soviet Union into making war on the whole world provided it was a war in grand style that would result in the Czechoslovak question being neither "localised" nor isolated but settled definitively depending on the major results of so major a war. I remember very well how Beneš told me on that occasion (and several times before) in no uncertain terms that the Berchtesgaden programme, to say nothing of the Godesberg programme, was already a setback for Czechoslovakia so damaging to it that the country could expect nothing worse even as the result of a lost war. I am inclined to believe that on September 27 Beneš reasoned roughly as follows: nothing could be worse than what there was already, he had better draw the Soviet Union into war, the Soviet Union had chances of winning while Czechoslovakia had chances of having its existence decided within the framework of radical and all-European solutions to the problems that would result from a new world war; after all, "company in distress makes trouble less".

The likelihood of such a line of reasoning clashes with Beneš's cowardly and half-hearted approach to domestic problems. On several occasions I suspected, as I still do, that the activity of the masses had frightened Beneš. He repeatedly told me that he was clear about the main reason for the policy of concessions to fascism, especially on the part of Britain, but also of France. He often pointed critically to the "reverse side" of the Popular Front in France, which forced the French bourgeoisie into the arms of fascist, including Nazi, reaction. He considered, therefore,

that a popular front policy lacked a basis in Czechoslovakia. Beneš repeatedly stated this principal reason for a readiness to make concessions to fascism as simply a dread of social revolution, a dread of Bolshevism. True, he often told me that he felt no such dread and appreciated the behaviour of his own people, such as the Agrarians, as being prompted by precisely a dread of social revolution. However, Beneš himself offered no concrete proof that he merely understood what caused the dread but did not share it. But he told me on many occasions that when the time came to choose between fascism and Bolshevism, he would prefer Bolshevism, not for social reasons, which he did not accept, but for national reasons because Bolshevism with its nationality policy would leave room for the development of the Czechoslovak people whereas fascism would immediately rob them of this prospect. However, Beneš did nothing to prove that he puts the people's interests above class interests. Nor could he be expected to do so. There are many indications that the class nature of a "democrat" such as Beneš won the upper hand at the last moment. If so, his latest requests for answers concerning aid were a manoeuvre intended to put the blame for the surrender and rout of Czechoslovakia on the Soviet Union as well. However, this is so complicated a matter that I hesitate to affirm anything emphatically just yet. It should be borne in mind that the history of the Czech people (not of the Czechoslovak people, which does not exist) is so complicated and tragic that national interests and, above all, sentiments may and do play an entirely exceptional part. I have lately seen so many serious, courageous and physically strong and robust men cry bitterly, almost like children, that I cannot to this day find an explanation for the phenomenon. On the other hand, I am popular in Prague. The Soviet Union still enjoys exceptional confidence and love, and its Minister finds the door open everywhere. My connections are by no means restricted to government quarters or a bourgeois milieu in general. I must put it on record that at moments of great tension I have invariably witnessed an all but zoological Russophilia everywhere, including a proletarian environment and the Communist Party. In the last days of September 1938, the term "Soviet Union" gave way to "Soviet Russia"—but still "RUSSIA"—in the Czechs' thinking. Whenever I told people experienced enough politically that there was no question of "Russia" and that what existed was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a country defending peace, the answer was that I was right and they knew this but that the problem facing them now was that of the existence and life of their people and it overshadowed the problem of the division of the same people into classes. The fact that the people are talking and thinking about "Russia" is an extreme expression of their being aware of a direct threat to their existence as a people and of the circumstance that the danger comes from the German side. Needless to say, I have heard this kind of talk from intermediate, petty-bourgeois sections of the population.

But where does Beneš belong? He certainly belongs among the same intermediate, petty-bourgeois elements. I therefore think it possible that to the last minute Beneš wanted quite sincerely and intended to get involved even in a war which he himself was certain would lead to a radical social upheaval. I think it possible that he reasoned in the same way as did the obscure Czech petty bourgeois who in the days of a direct threat to the national existence of his people repeated over and over again in letters to and conversations with me that he rather "fall under Stalin" and lose his little green-grocery than to fall under Hitler and become a shareholder of a cartel selling oxhides to Germany (by the way, "ox" is preferred to "ass" in Czechoslovakia as a term of abuse). [...] It is beyond all question and is evident in practice that as soon as the worst is over, these national sentiments slacken, giving way to a very

realistic mood in favour of defending one's class interests. I repeat that the "Mafia" has already made a volteface. All these would-be intellectual, intermediate middle-of-the-road small fry will soon be singing Hitler's praises. The real masses, however, are on the way to sorting out the concepts and notions agitating them. They are close to finding a solution to the national question as a result of solving the social question and not vice versa. The most exacting task facing the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia today is not to lose touch with the masses and to put them in time on the road to a correct solution of acute problems of their social and national being against the background of the continuing collapse and disintegration of a democratic system of the type adopted by Czechoslovak Republic.

I saw Beneš for the last time on September 27.

On September 28 and 29, he only rang me up. Strictly speaking, I have nothing to add to my telegraphic report about my conversation with Beneš on September 28. The information he offered me was no longer marked by certainty. It made the impression of hopelessness and diplomatic fuss whereas it was clear that all questions had already been decided. What struck me as particularly pitiful was Beneš's comments on the subject of Poland. While during one of his earlier conversations he had said almost casually that Poland was no problem and that he had written to Mościcki¹⁸ only in order to "neutralise" Poland for a while so as to prevent it from unexpectedly blocking the formation of a coalition of peace champions, it was now obvious that Beneš saw Poland as a real threat to Czechoslovak interests and did not know how to cope with the evil spirits conjured up by the events of recent days and hours.

Beneš's telephone call at 9·30 a. m. on September 30 sounded like a real cry of despair. I stress that even at that moment Beneš still mentioned the possibility of resistance to the Munich diktat on the part of Parliament and political parties. That historic day, September 30, calls for special coverage. For technical reasons, I will not be able to return to it until the next dispatch of mail.

Finished on October 20, 1938.

S. ALEXANDROVSKY

Minister of the USSR to Czechoslovakia

¹ President of the Society of Skoda Works

² Chairman of the Czechoslovak government till September 1938

³ Czechoslovak Minister of National Defence from 1935 to September 2., 1938

⁴ Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior

⁵ Chairman of the Czechoslovak government from December 1938 to March 1939; convicted in 1947 as a collaboratorist

⁶ Czechoslovak Minister of Education

⁷ One of the leaders of the pro fascist National Association.

⁸ Another leader of the National Association.

⁹ One of the leaders of the Slovak People's Party.

¹⁰ Another leader of the same party.

¹¹ President of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1935.

¹² Head of the Press Department, Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry.

¹³ A journalist.

¹⁴ Chairman of the Union of Friends of the USSR; a noted Resistance leader during World War II.

¹⁵ Czechoslovak Minister of Social Insurance.

¹⁶ Leader of French Socialists, head of the French Government in March-April, 1938.

¹⁷ French Army Chief of Staff.

¹⁸ President of Poland.

THE USSR AND THE THIRD WORLD

Participants in the scientific and practical conference held at the Soviet Foreign Ministry voiced many interesting ideas about the most diverse aspects of the current foreign political process. There was a lively debate on "The Soviet Union and the Third World". At a Guest Club forum of International Affairs, discussion of the problem was continued by **Pogos Akopov**, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Libya,

Victor Kremenjuk, D. Sc (Hist), head of sector, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada,

Georgi Mirsky, D. Sc (Hist), chief research worker, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations,

Oleg Peresypkin, Rector, Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry,

Vladimir Polyakov, Chief, Directorate of Middle East and North African Countries, Soviet Foreign Ministry,

Sergel Sinitsyn, head, Department of the Non-Aligned Movement, Soviet Foreign Ministry,

Nikolai Spassky, Third Secretary, Department of the USA and Canada, Soviet Foreign Ministry,

Professor Kim Tsagolov, D. Sc. (Philos), head of chair, Military Academy,

Robert Turdiyev, deputy head of department, Directorate of Middle East and North African Countries, Soviet Foreign Ministry

Alexei Vasilyev, D. Sc (Hist), deputy director, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa

THIRD WORLD REALITIES

Polyakov. We can build a correct foreign policy only on the basis of a correct and adequate conception of the national interests of our country and those of other countries as well as of the objective laws governing their evolution.

Yet what was often shown in this respect was voluntarism and subjectivism in choosing models of behaviour on the international scene, one-dimensional vision, inflexibility, a lack of precise, scientifically grounded criteria determining our foreign policy priorities. A situation where the system of relations took shape spontaneously, wishful thinking was the rule and policy was framed without in-depth scientific analysis proved detrimental to both ourselves and others.

This is true of, for instance, the concept of "non-capitalist development" as the path of countries freed from colonial rule, a concept used for artificially linking together dissimilar processes which took place in the Third World in the sixties and seventies. We had to pay for this both politically, as when a country placed in this category moved into the orbit of the West (like Egypt under Sadat or Somalia); and in the form of unjustified economic expenditures.

We used to shape our policy towards a country or region often empirically, according to concrete points of reference, by responding to partners' requirements or to new developments or explosion-like changes in the situation.

The task of Soviet diplomacy is to form in close collaboration with other agencies and "big science" comprehensive political models of approach, not

only to global and regional problems, but to specific regions. Without such models we are bound to proceed from attendant circumstances and act on subjective assessments and conclusions.

Tsagolov. Third World problems certainly deserve the closest attention. The term **Third World** is purely conventional. Actually the countries forming the Third World are a periphery of world capital. While these countries have freed themselves from colonial oppression, they remain for former mother countries both a source of raw materials and a boundless market of techniques and technologies, which become obsolete fast, and an investment sphere for actively operating capital. This is the way I see it: imperialism is no longer at all interested in keeping the countries of the former colonial world in a position of a backward periphery. Today, it would be inexpedient to it. Moreover, it is interested in rapidly expanding the club of industrialised countries at the expense of the periphery. But imperialism also wants the unprofitable elements of the infrastructure in these countries to develop at the expense of somebody else or, to be more precise, at the expense of the socialist world. This desire of world imperialism is easy to understand.

If imperialism wants to improve its backward periphery at our expense, what are we to do then? Should we rush to do this "rough" work? Should we rejoice at, and be proud of, the role imperialism has prepared for us? I think we shouldn't. We, too, should proceed from the mutual benefit principle. This is not only reasonable, but is historically justified, because it is imperialism and not socialism that is responsible for the backwardness of those countries. Further, we should clearly determine priorities, while the principle of mutual economic benefit is observed. We cannot, and should not, act on the "a ring to every sister" principle. It would be reasonable for us to display particular attention to definite countries. First of all, these should be countries having progressive social stability in the development of society. Second, these should be countries which can be defined as "regional leaders", countries which are regional centres of attraction.

There is one more point concerning economic relations with the Third World countries that I would like to mention. I believe it would be useful to us if such relations would be established with industrialised capitalist countries on a cooperation principle. They will not agree to that, one may argue. Perhaps they will not, but we should work to that end. Such cooperation will give us double benefit. First, our country, which in some areas has a lower technological level, will deal with a partner with higher technology. Second, together with the supplier country (or countries) we would be equally responsible for the quality of goods. This is very important to us. But this is also beneficial to the Third World countries, for it will help them avoid a one-sided, sometimes fettering, economic relationship with advanced capitalist states. In any case, I suggest that economists in science and in practical diplomacy give thought to these problems, taking into account our own interests.

Sinitsyn. We should now define the place which policy towards Third World countries must hold in Soviet foreign policy generally. What are its peculiarities? Is it to serve solely as a means of easing confrontation between East and West, the Soviet Union and the United States, and achieving progress in the main sphere, international security? Or does it play a role of its own and meet the interests of strengthening our political positions in certain regions or help promote relations with some or other countries? I believe a country's foreign policy consists of a set of different courses of action that, even while differing in degree of priority, are subordinate to one another in a certain measure according to the given situation, problems, stages reached by development, and so forth.

THE USSR AND THE THIRD WORLD

What makes our relations with Third World countries distinct from those with Western countries is evidently the fact that for certain objective reasons (great diversity, social mobility, regional, religious, ethnic conflicts, etc.) they are less predictable. This is why I think we should define our tasks in the Third World more precisely. Just what do we expect from it? What are our national interests there? What are our opposite numbers' legitimate interests which we are ready to reckon with? What we do mean when speaking of a balance of interests in the Third World between, say, the Soviet Union and the United States, is not "spheres of influence" of any kind. We merely stress the need to take account of the interests of all the parties concerned, including countries and regions where our interests come into contact to one degree or another with those of the Americans.

We apparently need a more comprehensive approach to our political positions in the world, including Third World countries. To be sure, foreign policy must pay economically, and it must not be divorced from actual possibilities, especially where it's a question of security and large-scale actions. It would be wrong, however, to reduce the rationale for foreign policy to economic potentialities, for the sphere of foreign policy is far more diverse and ways of exerting influence and realising an initiative do not necessarily depend on economic opportunities alone. There are other factors, such as political prestige of the Soviet Union and the character of relations between the third countries, and the positions we already have in other states, and so on. I wish to stress once again that we need to take a comprehensive approach to the definition of our interests globally, regionally and at the level of individual countries in the political, military, economic and any other sphere.

Speaking of the Third World's anti-imperialist potential, I don't think it has been fully used, because decolonisation is not yet over. And this offers us an opportunity to interact with the Third World, to seek common ground and act together with it wherever possible. This is not to say, however, that developments in the Third World and the attitude of its members to particular issues invariably meet our interests. Hence the possibility of getting in touch with the West when necessary so as, among other things, to safeguard our national interests. This applies to, for instance, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Mirsky. We have quite a stockpile of various dogmas relating to Third World problems. True, they are fewer than those relating to the West, for those concerned with problems of Europe and the United States had for decades to demonstrate the decay of capitalism, the pauperisation of the proletariat and other things. Those of us concerned with the Third World had fewer rigid guidelines to follow. The leading echelons pronounced fewer "indisputable truths" on this point. Nevertheless, quite a few false concepts have accumulated that were possibly prompted by good intentions and occasionally by an impatient desire to see things change or simply by wishful thinking. Be that as it may, the accepted notion was that the Third World was part of the world revolutionary process. This began, in effect, under Khrushchev, as you know. That was also when we achieved a breakthrough to the Third World and jettisoned completely lifeless Stalinist concepts alleging that colonial rule could be succeeded either by the dictatorship of the proletariat or by the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Yet on taking a look at the Third World, then in the making, we saw neither. This was seen as an opportunity for a bold and dynamic breakthrough to the Third World that began with Gamal Abdel Nasser, with whom we signed an agreement. From then on, we looked on the Third World as an area where the world revolutionary movement could score its biggest gains.

All this, coupled with the thesis about imperialism being badly defeated as a result of the disintegration of the colonial system, created a seemingly

natural basis for optimism, for a partially correct or an altogether incorrect view on the Third World.

Let me begin with, say, the fact that contrary to our assertions, the collapse of the colonial system did not lead to any notable weakening of imperialism as a system, meaning its basis, the economy. Imperialism's political domination was over, and this certainly caused it a lot of trouble. But speaking of imperialism, Western capitalism or Japanese capitalism from the point of view of its development and economic prosperity, I would say that in some respects the formation of new independent states, new markets and new economic areas even strengthened capitalism. In any case, the profits it now derives by exploiting the Third World are far bigger than in colonial days.

Another reality is that a powerful alliance of historic dimensions between world socialism and the national liberation movement is unfortunately lacking. Yet this used to be the cornerstone of our propaganda, as you know. And so, looking at things realistically, we must say that this world alliance is lacking and so is an alliance based on fraternal class solidarity between the proletariat of developed socialist countries and the working people of the East. There certainly are various manifestations of solidarity and circumstances that draw us closer together. But to say that these two alliances do exist is to ignore reality. Until recently we were in bondage to the magic formula about the national liberation movement being a powerful force in the anti-imperialist struggle. In point of fact, the very concepts of the developing world, the Third World and the national liberation movement became synonyms. Nobody doubts the existence of a national liberation revolution today. And yet the anti-colonial struggle has long been over. The few areas, such as Southern Africa and Palestine, where it is continuing and will go on for a long time don't really alter the overall picture. As matters now stand, the anti-colonial struggle has long been a thing of the past; independent states replacing one-time colonies have been in existence for dozens of years now, and to affirm that the revolution is continuing is to make a misstatement.

Generally speaking, we interpret the concept of revolution too broadly. We speak by tradition of a continuing national liberation revolution, saying that it merely moves on to new stages or phases. But surely we cannot say that the revolution in India, for one, is still on 40 years after liberation. What kind of revolution is that? What is its nature? Of course, the term can be interpreted broadly to describe as a revolution anything that goes on or is yet to come in newly free countries, such as the struggle in the economic sphere, etc. But in that case it will lose its real meaning and acquire a pseudo-philosophical connotation. We must therefore admit for our own benefit as we take a realistic look at things that at present there is not a single revolutionary process carrying the national liberation struggle further and deeper. It is generally pro-bourgeois though not necessarily pro-imperialist systems, mainly state-capitalist systems of diverse types, that have become crystallised in capitalist-oriented countries.

CONFRONTATIONAL LOGIC OR BALANCE OF INTERESTS

Vasilyev. Assuming that the world is a chessboard with two great powers, two systems or two camps as the adversaries (for this was in large measure our earlier approach), a game won by one side means a game lost by the other. By the same token, when one side caused damage to the other side, no matter how high the price, this was seen as a gain for the former. Can we look on today's world in this way? The obvious answer is no.

But how did we comport ourselves in the past? Can we consider that our behaviour, our policy and diplomacy in various areas of conflict, always met our interests? They apparently did, provided we look on the world as an arena for confrontation. This seemed to be a legitimate response to the con-

duct of the other side, which saw the world through the prism of "neoglobalism", of "rolling back communism", etc. But there is a dangerous logic to confrontation—the rising of stakes. For instance, we supply weapons to Egypt, so that it could defend itself from Israel, after which Israel raises its stakes, getting ever more American weapons, and then we help Egypt again to build up its military potential, and so it goes on. Do we need all this? I don't think we do. We must draw a line somewhere.

True, there has always been a line beyond which neither we nor the United States have ever gone. What our position coincided on in the past with the US position was probably the effort to reach a definite limit and stop at it, that is to stop short of a world conflict which may lead to a worldwide catastrophe. Everybody is familiar with the cases where we were on the brink, such as the atomic alarm in the United States in 1973 and our counter-measures. But if we want to build a world where we will no longer approach developments from a confrontational logic, then we need a different line of behaviour.

I think the mission of our diplomacy is not to seek a settlement of all existing conflicts, which are inevitable in the Third World. The task is to do away, in particular by enlisting the efforts of the Soviet Union and another great power, the United States, if possible, with situations breeding conflict, with their causes, with particular elements of conflict, to try to transfer them from an active to at least a so-called latent stage and ease tensions.

Kremenyuk. I would like to touch on another very important problem. While it goes somewhat beyond political practice, it must be solved if political practice is to make progress. I refer to defining our attitude to forcible, military methods of settling conflicts. Not a single postwar conflict has been settled by military means even where no great powers were involved. Nor could it have. The situation in world politics and the balance of global and regional forces today are such that any move by a militarily strong side comes up against adequate resistance from the other side and sources of aid and support are found. The result is a blind alley and an endless, absurd war, such as the Iran-Iraq war.

I realise that this is a complicated matter. In the past we apparently used criteria valid for a different period. We misled even ourselves a little by adopting the formula of "just and unjust wars", implying that some wars are just and it's right to wage them while others aren't. As a general result, we found a loophole for a positive attitude to the use of military force and actually used it. Experience has shown that no military solution can be brought about even by means of such loopholes or rationales.

This leads me to the conclusion that in framing our subsequent policy towards regional conflicts, we must seriously define our attitude to the principle of using force or the threat of force in such conflicts. If new thinking should also guide us on this, that is, if we accept the proposition that we have no reason to expect a military solution to be politically productive and morally justified today, then we must reorient our policy accordingly. This applies to arms deliveries, the issue of military advisers and some other questions which we've discussed here today.

Polyakov. The past three years have seen noteworthy positive changes in our attitude towards Third World countries. We have, for instance, considerably amended our policy towards the Middle East with due regard to the need to promote new thinking in this sensitive area as well. The Soviet position on the key problem of the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict, is more realistic now. It is open and more flexible tactically and puts the emphasis on the principles of equality and equal security and of searching for mutually acceptable solutions to disputes with due regard to the need for a balance of interests encompassing all the countries concerned. This has extended the appeal of our approach and given further incentive to the search for peace in the region.

However, the evolution of the situation in the Middle East poses new major problems. We cannot discount such new developments there as a fast-paced arms race, the appearance of weapons of mass destruction, namely, chemical weapons to which nuclear ones may be added before long, and the proliferation of missiles. Here are a few figures. The region, including Iran, has moved into third place in the world in military spending after NATO and the WTO. In a period of nine years (1976-1985) it spent about 600 billion dollars for military purposes. The Middle East is unmatched for militarisation indices such as the serviceman-civilian ratio (17:1,000), arms imports (over 40 per cent of the world total) and the share of military expenditures in GNP (15.6 per cent on the average).

There are further indications of the militarisation of the region. The troops involved in the conflicts in the Middle East are 3.7 million strong (as against NATO's three million in Europe).

It goes without saying that we cannot ignore the fact that almost next door to the Soviet Union there is an unstable region chockfull of armaments, with an aggregate military potential comparable to that of the main military blocs.

A priority task today is to lower the level of confrontation in the Middle East, to take the edge off it, to end its destabilising impact on the international climate.

Another major component of our policy in the region is maintenance of normal and even relations with all countries and promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation.

This is important for many reasons. The twenty-two Arab states constitute a fairly important and compact bloc within the world community, the UN. They support our foreign policy initiatives actively enough. Their voice is important to us. We are linked with the Arabs by broad political, economic and other interests. A few hundred large national economic projects have been built in Arab countries with our assistance, and the output of some of these enterprises is even exported. I think it is in our interest to keep these enterprises effective by sending our experts and delivering modern equipment there. Our annual trade turnover with Arabs is worth up to three billion rubles. This is not very much but what is important is that our basic exports to these countries are made up of industrial goods and plants and not raw materials.

Most Arabs regard the Soviet Union as an important and friendly power. Look how many Arab leaders come to Moscow to consult us, to ask our opinion. Regrettably, we are not always ready for this. As concerns new political thinking, the majority of Arabs are rather more receptive to our policy than, say, Israel. This is an asset we mustn't lose.

Akopov. In connection with what has just been said by Vladimir Polyakov and other speakers, I should like to dwell on some aspects of our approach to Libya. The specifics of its policy confirm, in my view, the need to discard stereotypes with regard to developing countries, rule out any signs of disregard, look for new, non-standard ways of cooperation, and conduct hard and painstaking work which, I am sure, will be rewarded some day.

On the face of it, the ideological concept of the Libyan leadership looks like an eclectic mixture of utopian socialism, Muslim religion, pan-Arabism, and some elements of scientific socialism. Its propagation, accompanied by claims that it is perfect, sometimes becomes Messianic. It is for science to decide what comes first here: the sincere belief in building an ideal society or world leadership ambitions? Regrettably, I should state that Soviet science is still a long way from trying to study this problem or at least thoroughly to examine the so-called Third World theory.

As regards the political situation in the country, which may be viewed in different ways, as we see it, one should note both the radical and doubtlessly progressive social and economic reforms in the country (the traditional exploiter classes have been abolished, the population has become relatively

homogeneous in social terms, the economy is nationalised, large industrial projects are under construction, the public sector has been built, the cooperative movement is in action, a high living standard has been achieved, public education and medical care are free, and so on) and the numerous mistakes made when the reforms were being carried out. The mistakes were made because the reforms had not been properly elaborated, command methods were used as they were effected, attempts were made to experiment on a nation-wide scale, there were displays of megalomania, etc.

Nonetheless, the negative aspects of what is going on should not eclipse all the positive that the September 1969 revolution has brought with it. Having no right to dictate our own concept of the internal political make-up of a state to other nations, we must not ignore their experience and never hastily denounce it or wave it aside.

In light of new political thinking in international relations, and in the situation when Soviet diplomacy has been made active and determined, it is especially important to analyse the foreign policy guidelines of other states and see if they are prepared, and to what extent, to back up our line in the international arena and help implement the Soviet concept of a universal system of peace and security of the peoples.

Concerning Libya's foreign policy, one should note above all that it is anti-imperialist. This is displayed in the bilateral political relations of Jamahiriya with the West, which are, "frozen", in fact, and in the diametrically opposite approaches of Jamahiriya and industrialised capitalist states to almost all international and regional issues. This is most obvious in Libya's preparedness to help any movement, any grouping and any regime if it follows an anti-imperialist line.

Another element in Libya's foreign policy which I am going to mention is its consistent and growing support to the Soviet Union's line on the international scene and also the stable and many-sided relations between our two states. It should be noted in this context that Libya is not just part of a majority in the United Nations passively voting for our peace proposals: it assists us actively in many aspects of the disarmament process. No other Mediterranean state has occupied so positive a stance with regard to the Soviet initiative on the withdrawal of foreign naval fleets from the Mediterranean Sea. I am convinced that it is possible to ensure Libya's active support to other disarmament issues as well.

Adhering to Lenin's principles of pursuing foreign policy, we should conduct work with any regime, good or bad, whether it supports us or not. It is only through constant and painstaking work in every sphere with each state that we can ensure guarantees (and stability in the whole world) and rule out the "unpredictability" factor and the threat to international security associated with it.

Vasilyev. I would like to comment for my part on arms sales and deliveries. From the confrontational point of view it would seem that the more arms you pour into a country, the greater the influence, including political influence, you win there. Yet all who are present here know that this is not so. Egypt, being equipped with Soviet arms and finding itself in a state of military confrontation with Israel, contrived to make a U-turn. So did Iran, armed to the teeth by the United States, if in a different form. This suggests that arms deliveries are not equivalent to growing political influence. True, they do win a measure of influence. But again it is unstable.

My conclusion is, therefore, that arms deliveries must be cut back. You may argue that if a country like Iran or Iraq has money it can purchase arms anywhere. That's a fact. Arms are exported by France, Brazil, Israel and another dozen and a half countries. But restraint on the part of both great powers would have its effect on allies. Second, the weapons systems we delivered to Egypt while the United States delivered them to Israel cannot be supplied on

the same level by any other country in the world. Third, granting that Iran and Iraq do have the money, neither Brazil nor any other country would be willing to deliver arms to, say, Africa gratuitously. It follows that arms deliveries can be reduced and, as a result, so can tensions.

Spassky. The West, taking advantage of the absence of official Soviet data on our financial and military aid to developing countries and on the number of Soviet military advisers, unabashedly overstates our outlays. The influential conservative Heritage Foundation has estimated that the Soviet Union spent over 15 million dollars a day on military operations in Afghanistan, that its aid to Cuba is worth five billion dollars a year and to Nicaragua, four billion, and that Soviet aid to Angola in 1975-1987 came to five billion dollars, to Mozambique in 1975-1983, one billion and to Ethiopia in 1975-1986, 3.5 billion. US ultras seize at this misinformation, designed to demonstrate the efficacy of Reagan's policy of backing "freedom fighters", and use it to block constructive modifications in the US approach to regional settlement.

Kremen'yuk. Whatever our attitude to the US role, that is, irrespective of whether we condemn it propagandistically or politically or whether we consider the United States a devil incarnate, experience has shown that no regional problem can be settled either economically or politically without that country. In this case we need resolve, the right approach and a proper rationale if we are to seriously tackle the problem of consultations. The consultations we and the United States hold should apparently become one of the channels or vehicles bringing us nearer to the solution or to attempts at a solution of the problem of a balance of interests. This problem is very serious now but surely no balance of interests can be defined, let alone established, without first discussing the interests in question.

How have interests been generally discussed so far? There were declarations or demonstrations revealing interests or, again, declarations rejecting certain US or Western interests out of hand. The other side proceeded in the same way. The sequence may have been different but the method was the same. One side declared its interests, and the other rejected them. Where vitally important interests were imperilled there came a show of force, with the other side being made to reckon with these interests.

For all the efficacy of this approach in the past. I don't think we can at this stage achieve a balance of interests in this manner. It can only result, or so I believe, from a series of substantive discussions of interests, the lawful interests of both sides, enabling either side to convey to the other the whole range of its interests in the right form, by using the media and diplomatic channels. Of course, this should be preceded by a discussion of them helping to grasp them and preventing a formulation of interests implying that what is bad for the Americans is good for us, and vice versa. We should try to understand and weigh what the other side wants so as to decide whether and how a balance of interests can be attained and, if so, on what principles.

Turdiyev. I wish to begin by offering some remarks on the Soviet-American dialogue concerning regional conflicts. I feel that a very great deal has been accomplished in this respect and that the dialogue is truly businesslike and constructive and doesn't come down to merely getting to know the other side. The breakthrough on the Afghan problem is one result of our dialogue with the Americans. Generally speaking, the promotion of new political thinking in Soviet foreign policy has enabled us to devise a common approach to regional conflicts, an approach making the Soviet position more balanced and flexible than before. Advancing the principle of safeguarding the interests of all the parties concerned and exerting collective efforts as a means of settlement have lifted many regional conflicts out of dangerous stagnation and helped join in active and businesslike dialogue, in particular on a multilateral basis. We have also made notable progress within the framework of peres-

troika towards working out our approach to each particular regional conflict with due regard to its characteristics.

Vasilyev. Hardly anyone can deny that we all need to cultivate civilised behaviour in the Third World. But this calls for civilised behaviour on our own part. If we teach others not to get involved in the arms race while we ourselves will build up the overkill potential and call this civilised behaviour, I must disagree. We have admitted that we allowed ourselves to be drawn into the arms race. Though I have no doubt that this was a response to the line adopted by the USA and other NATO countries, we should now show a constructive example to others, and are already doing so.

Spassky. The process of overall normalisation of Soviet-US relations has had a most tangible effect on the place of regional problems in these relations. The Soviet-American dialogue on regional questions has become more lively, and its tenor has changed substantially. It is shedding its controversial aspects, if not without lapses, gaining in substantiveness and coming step by step to be geared to the end result, which is to help settle regional conflicts and crises.

It's largely Soviet initiative and the openness of the Soviet approach to regional affairs that noticeably neutralised a trend typical of US foreign policy in presidential election years. I mean the trend towards evading solution of problems less urgent for the United States and concentrating on a limited number of priorities.

The Soviet-American exchange of views on a Middle East settlement is continuing in a businesslike atmosphere. I suppose we owe it in important measure to the opportunities offered by the stepped-up Soviet-US dialogue on regional problems that recently progress was made towards ending the Iran-Iraq war and solving the problem of Southern Africa.

These developments are only part of the picture, however. Along with major advances, there are still a number of basic contradictions in the regional sphere of Soviet-US relations. Serious difficulties still block attainment of our objectives.

The regional component is traditionally the most ideologised one in US foreign policy, and conservatives continue paying it the closest attention. The US administration has repeatedly tried to buy off right-wingers disgruntled at the prospect of better US-Soviet relations by pointedly getting tough on regional issues. The most striking case in point of recent date was the bombing of Libya in April 1986; the more remote past witnessed bomb raids on Hanoi and Haiphong and the mining of the ports of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in spring 1972. Nor can we expect the future Washington administration, whatever its party allegiance, to refrain from attempts to use regional conflicts as a means of manipulating the extent of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

There are those in US political quarters who still approach regional conflicts chiefly from the point of view of "wearing out" the Soviet Union (true, this attitude is losing ground). The American Right believes that the Soviet Union and the United States have exchanged roles in comparison with the sixties. It alleges that whereas earlier the United States had to bear a heavy burden by supporting weak, unstable regimes while the Soviets assisted guerrilla movements, which cost much less, the situation has been reversed. Hence the conclusion that US regional policy should be aimed primarily at causing the greatest possible material, political and moral damage to Moscow.

It is probably regional problems that are now the touchstone of the degree of actual US readiness to cooperate with us. A very sizable section of the American ruling class is in principle against all interaction with the Soviet Union on regional affairs.

As regards Soviet aims in the area of contacts with the Americans on regional problems, I think the minimum task is to curb extremist manifestations of US regional policy. This kind of prophylaxis is being effected on a permanent basis and is evoking a measure of response. The bigger long-range task is apparently to gradually win US acceptance of the basic principles from which the two powers would be willing to proceed in grappling with regional conflicts. In other words, this is a sphere where new political thinking must be brought to bear as fully as possible. A big stride in this direction, if one that did not translate into concrete results, was taken at the Moscow summit.

Turdiyev. I would say that settling conflicts requires more than political efforts. It also necessitates a serious basis, including economic and possibly military support. Let us recall what the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty cost the United States. Since 1979, the United States has rendered Israel and Egypt economic and military aid worth some 47 or 48 billion dollars. At present Syria as a party to the Arab-Israeli conflict gets from 1.5 to two billion dollars a year from Arabs. Who is going to pay it such money should the conflict with Israel end? This raises the question: what are our possibilities in the economic field seeing that peace-making, that is, participation in the peace process in one form or another, is bound to entail economic obligations? We must carefully study our real possibilities and decide on our role and our contribution accordingly. Perhaps we oughtn't to seek active involvement in all conflicts, in the settlement of all of them, but should confine ourselves to declaring support of efforts for a political settlement based on a balance of the interests of all sides. The price of establishing peaceful relations is very high. Undertaking to pay if only part of it is no simple matter.

Peresyokin. The problem of ending regional conflicts we are now discussing is very important, and I don't think this has to be proved to so enlightened an audience as this. Soviet involvement in all regional conflicts is greater than the involvement of the United States and our political adversaries. This means that settling these conflicts and normalising the situation created by them are far more important to us than to our opponents.

What we are now advocating as a basis for our foreign policy is not a balance of forces but a search for a balance of interests. We consider that all major international problems, including regional conflicts, should be solved by political means. We must therefore discard double moral standards. It's hardly right to speak of the need to settle conflicts by political means, lower the level of confrontation and search for non-standard approaches and yet go on delivering arms to conflict areas. Still less should we, as I see it, justify such an attitude by saying that we need foreign exchange as a means of improving our economic situation. It seems to me that we get nothing for arms except from Iraq, Libya and one or two other countries. Developing countries regard all arms deliveries as fulfilment of our internationalist duty. Arms deliveries lead to the appearance of our military advisers and experts. The experience of recent years in Afghanistan, Arab countries and elsewhere indicates that reaction to the physical presence of our troops in uniform and our military advisers varies from case to case.

Besides, our military supplies give our political adversaries cause to allege that rather than contributing to the growth of the productive forces in Third World countries, the Soviet Union floods them with arms, and rather than supplying them with bread and butter, it delivers guns and tanks, which generally turn out to be of no use to the peoples concerned and aggravate the situation in the given region.

The issue of arms deliveries and payments for them is, in my opinion, outgrowing the problem of sale and purchase and that of our military presence. It is becoming a mayor political problem which must be solved by all, and we

should think it over seriously. I consider, therefore, that we ought to reduce, at least where possible, our military cooperation and our arms deliveries, especially in the area of regional conflicts.

THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AS AN INFLUENTIAL FACTOR

Sinitsyn. I would like to dwell especially on the non-aligned movement (NM), which is the political spokesman for the Third World and a growing international factor. Eduard Shevardnadze's report to the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Scientific and Practical Conference called it the most influential factor or one of the most influential factors. This is true. How adequate is in this light our attitude towards the NM? We are revising our attitude to the NM, have renounced the thesis about "natural ally" and are deideologising our approach to the movement, which we want to take out of the sphere of East-West confrontation. We have excluded our relations with the NM from the overall complex of ties with non-aligned countries to make it an autonomous line of Soviet foreign policy. This is a positive development earning us favourable reaction in the non-aligned countries, including their moderate wing. Even so, it seems to me that our relations occasionally fail to take into account its actual possibilities and the limits of its influence or to fully use our own potential. What happens now and then is that we sign mutually binding treaties and agreements on important disarmament, security and other issues with Western countries, and as for non-aligned countries (except for in the framework of multilateral disarmament treaties), we mainly sign with them general political declarations or bilateral treaties of friendship and cooperation which are regrettably less effective for the time being than we had expected. I believe this is another sphere of activity for us from the point of view of strengthening and improving our relations with Third World countries.

As far as the role of the NM today is concerned, the main trend in the context of the INF Treaty, the Geneva accords on Afghanistan and other general political advances is, in my opinion, towards winning a "new face", gaining greater independence and taking initiatives on an equal footing with others. This came out at the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament. I think we underestimate the non-aligned movement's ability to approach major global problems, including those of disarmament, on its own. This obviously makes broader practical contacts with non-aligned countries an important line of our future relations with them. It might be well worth to find lines of contact with them on the most important problems beforehand. By treating these countries as partners enjoying equal rights with us, we could cooperate with them on various planes.

First, we could take fuller into account the consonance of our approaches with the NM approach to key issues when negotiating with the West. There are still appreciable opportunities for interaction with the NM regarding the struggle against neocolonial exploitation, racism, and so on, as one of the spheres in which our interests coincide and there are opportunities for joint or at least parallel action with the movement.

Second, we could make greater use of the NM's stake in lessening confrontation in the world and in putting forward proposals that could win support in East and West alike. We could thus help extend consensus among the main world forces of today on disarmament and other global problems. There is, for instance, the movement's proposal to refrain from using scientific and technological achievements for the production of new weapons of mass destruction.

Third, when our positions differ from those of the non-aligned movement, we could make broader use of our contacts with the West in order to help arrive at solutions acceptable for the parties concerned.

What we need generally is, in my view greater mobility and selectivity in regard to our relations with Third World countries and the NM as a whole. We would like to see the movement primarily united and influential, enough, for we need it as a staunch partner in the solution of global problems, above all the problems of combating nuclear arms and bringing about international security.

HOW SCHOLARS SEE IT

Mirsky. For a long time we considered that capitalism in the Third World was only imposed from without or at best from above, that is, by the state. But take, for instance, India or certain other countries. Capitalism there is unquestionably growing also from below. We underestimated the potentialities of capitalism in the Third World. There's no point in concealing this now. The capitalism we see there today may in many cases be a caricature. Nevertheless, it is certainly prospective capitalism.

I think in the economic sphere Third World countries, or individual regions or countries to be exact, will sooner or later scramble out of the precipice. This is not to say that they will end dependence and international exploitation, cease to be a periphery and join the centre. The gap between them and developed capitalist countries will be there for a long time, and they will be dependent. This is understandable because such is the very essence of the world capitalist economy, in which the objective course of events and competition on the market greatly benefit the centre. Even so, it would be very wrong to speak of antagonism between the rulers of developing countries and imperialism.

We occasionally confuse two things. Of course, there is a contradiction between the interests of imperialism as such and the interests of the peoples of developing countries. But then power is wielded by concrete ruling forces. Look at the map of the Third World. Think of the governments existing there—all the way from Latin America to Indonesia—and you will see that the overwhelming majority of them are by no means interested in the defeat of imperialism. They are fighting to win a place in the sun within the world capitalist family. To describe them as anti-imperialist, unwittingly substituting the policy of governments for the really existing, inherent, natural anti-imperialist and anti-colonial sentiments of the people, would be a mistake misleading those who have to deal with these countries in practice.

I believe that politically, too, the Third World lacks—contrary to the opinion which had gained wide currency with us,—the potential needed for exerting decisive influence on world developments. It does exert influence that is possibly quite serious; but this influence isn't strong enough to upset the world balance. In all circumstances, the main confrontation in international relations will continue to depend on the balance of forces of developed countries. Nobody thinks any more in terms of the Maoist theory of a "world village" surrounding a "world city", that is, capitalism, forcing it to surrender. I believe few people now dread the apocalyptic prospect of a war by the hungry South against the rich North. In other words, the Third World isn't the weight that can tip the scales in our favour or in the West's.

However, the Third World—Asia, Africa and Latin America—comprises the regions where the greatest number of conflicts, outbursts of violence and manifestation of terrorism may be expected to occur in the foreseeable future. This is understandable because nation-states have sprung up and there break out both conflicts between states and struggles within many countries involving numerous nations, tribes and peoples and occasioned by awareness that some of them are discriminated against and underprivileged, and so on. All this takes and will take place in growing measure, and therefore we will yet live to see many conflicts there, meaning conflicts some of which cross re-

gional boundaries. Take terrorism, for one, which is becoming an international phenomenon.

Tsagolov. As it happens, one of the three major theoretical constructions we evolved in the past 30-40 years was the model of socialist orientation (non-capitalist development), said to apply to young nation-states. To tell the truth, it was social practice that showed some of these constructions, including the model of socialist orientation, to be no better than social illusions. But this is only part of the trouble, for there is also the fact that our theoretical position proved simplistic and too categorical. We were intolerant of diversity in theoretical quests and, indeed, in the solution of practical problems. The battle of scientific ideas, without which the very existence of science is unthinkable, often degenerates with us into a battle between people. And in the latter case it is the principle of administrative method and command that prevails. Theory, which is expected to illumine the path for practice, was, in fact, used merely for substantiating volitional ideas and deeds. Theory found itself playing the unusual role of a servant to practice. As a result, real life outgrew our theoretical models like children's clothes but we overlooked or refused to notice it.

The idea of the non-capitalist development of countries freeing themselves from colonial rule came from the founders of Marxism. I would say that our big "contribution" to the elaboration of this idea, which in itself is fruitful, consists in utopianism, social illusions and weak logic. It's hard to understand, for example, why we define success in the struggle for the national liberation of a colony from the mother country as a national liberation revolution. The national liberation revolution is a type of contemporary social revolution. The social revolution, however, is the objective, law-governed outcome of the evolution of an antagonistic society. Revolution matures within a given society and not in the relations between colony and mother country. Describing a national liberation struggle as a revolution merely makes for confusion in the classification of phenomena and their division into periods.

And surely there is less than sufficient reason to identify these countries' anti-imperialism with anti-capitalism. The former follows logically from the struggle of colonial peoples against the mother countries. The latter is largely invented with regard to many Third World countries. They may advance slogans rejecting capitalism of the type prevailing in the mother country. But that's something different. There is only one consistent anti-capitalism—it's socialism. And none but a socialist revolution in one form or another can open the door to socialism.

There are also many unanswered questions as regards definition of the stages of society's ascent in following a non-capitalist path. We haven't adequately elaborated problems of the formation of a revolutionary majority, the tactics of regrouping social forces, the defence of progressive achievements, criteria of the dependability of practical steps by a revolutionary democratic movement and its evolution towards scientific communism. I think we need to thoroughly rethink the entire theoretical concept of socialist orientation without delay. And it would be more productive if we proceeded from a usual concrete analysis of the present alignment of class forces and their socially progressive potential.

When analysing the problems and development prospects facing Third World countries, it is highly important to define the character and pace of the world revolutionary process. The founders of Marxism-Leninism did not rule out but foresaw the likelihood of ebb and flow in the world revolutionary wave. I believe they were absolutely right to suppose that the dialectics of the world revolutionary process should allow for periods of quantitative accumulation and phases of qualitative explosion. This kind of development should neither surprise nor frighten us. Indeed, the revolutionary upsurge that

was caused by the October Revolution and swept across all continents was followed by a "lull". Another upsurge came during and in the wake of World War II; it led to the formation of the world socialist system and the disintegration of imperialism's colonial system. But the late seventies saw this gigantic revolutionary wave subside somewhat. The eighties showed that the highest wave was over for both the world revolutionary process in general and the socialist orientation in particular.

Why? Obviously they are not simple. First of all, the scientific and technological revolution, whose distant effects are unforeseeable, enabled capitalism, especially in its citadel, to sharply enhance its survivability and to postpone its historically inevitable end indefinitely. In my view, all talk about a deepening general crisis of capitalism is now irrelevant. That's all there is to it. Capitalism has got its breath back and has rejuvenated itself as a result of technical and technological advances. It now reacts very flexibly also to social problems of bourgeois society.

Second, decades of deformation prevented socialism from fully using its potentialities, to demonstrate the higher level of material production inherent in it, a higher standard of democracy or a more acceptable solution of the nationalities question. All this necessarily affected the aura of pre-perestroika socialism. Hence the vital importance of the perestroika launched by our party, of the party's efforts towards democratising the whole system of social relations, of sustained work in favour of the truth and openness. All this is of both internal and international significance. Success in carrying out perestroika, winning higher positions in material production than are held by capitalism, furthering democracy and ridding our life of whatever is pseudo-socialist are the only way for socialism to restore the appeal of its example.

It should be clear to all of us that the forces involved in the world revolutionary process pursue their class goals. Each people or social group proceeds in deciding on its place in the social process from its own concrete interests and not from abstract considerations. Until we attain superiority over capitalism in the decisive sphere, material production, we cannot expect a new wave in the world revolutionary process in general and the socialist orientation in particular. Evidently, we can forecast in the group of socialist-oriented countries and in the Third World as a whole growing trends towards a capitalist model of development. These trends may be strongly camouflaged by means of various verbal attributes, made out to be national models, and so on.

Now is the time to ask: have we done reasonably fundamental research providing keys to political strategy and tactics for the phase of the ebb of the revolutionary tide? I believe not. We must pay a debt by filling this gap in theory and thus assist diplomatic practice. And I think paying it brooks no delay.

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